High CourtsDivision Bench

Nagendra Singh vs State of Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 12 February 2018 · Citation: (2018) 02 MP CK 0184

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.K.Gangele, Anjuli Palo
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
<a href=1767>Indian Penal Code, 1860</a>, <a href=1767-302>Section 302</a>, <a href=1767-300>Section 300</a> - Punishment for murder - Murder
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
2349 of 2014

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Judgment

183 paragraphs · 3,819 words
1.

The appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment dated 30.07.2014 passed by the First Addl. Sessions Judge, Seoni in Session Trial No.

69/2012 whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and

fine of Rs. 5000/- with default stipulation.

2.

The prosecution story in brief is that the appellant was living in a rented house along with his wife Leela Singh (since deceased). On the date of

incident, one tenant told the landlord Thakur Ram Rai that a quarrel was going on between the appellant and his wife in the room. Then, the

landlord Thakur Ram Rai went to the room of appellant. He witnessed that there was a quarrel between the appellant and his wife. Both were

quarreling and abusing each other. He tried to pacify them. Thereafter, he went to his house. On the next day morning, he noticed that the motor

bike of appellant was not in the house. When he went to the room of the appellant, it was open and the deceased-wife was lying dead. There was

an injury on her stomach. He called the neighbour Mr. Jaiswal and informed the police on telephone. The Station House Officer Incharge reached

at the place of incident and registered Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P/1) and report was registered on the basis of Dehati Nalishi. Police conducted

investigation. The appellant was arrested. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed. The appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded innocence.

3.

Learned trial Court held the appellant guilty for committing offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and awarded sentence of life.

4.

Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that conviction of the appellant is based on the evidence of Thakur Ram Rai (PW-1) and Anil

Sahu (PW-4). Both the witnesses are not reliable. The appellant produced defence evidence that has been overlooked by the learned Trial Court.

The prosecution failed to prove the offence against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In alternate, the counsel for the appellant has submitted

that there were heated exchange of words between the appellant and deceased hence, the offence committed by the appellant would cover under

Exception 1 of Section 300 of IPC.

5.

Learned Government Advocate appearing for the State submitted that this fact has been established from the evidence of Thakur Ram Rai

(PW-1) landlord and Anil Sahu (PW-4) that there was quarrel. The appellant was absent in the next morning from his house. The Trial Court has

appreciated the evidence properly. The deceased was strangulated and injury was also caused to her. Hence, the appellant had committed murder

of the deceased who was his wife. The Trial Court rightly held the appellant guilty of the offence and awarded proper sentence.

6.

Thakur Ram Rai (PW-1) is the landlord. He is the star witness of the case. He deposed that, the appellant was working in a warehouse. He was

living at my house on rent. He was living alone. Before two months of the incident, the wife of the appellant came to live with him along with her

two children. On 11.03.2012, at around 9:00 pm at night, another tenant Babita Chouksey who was living adjacent to the appellant informed me

that a quarrel was going on between the appellant and his wife. I went to the house of the appellant and I witnessed that a quarrel was going on

between the appellant and his wife. Both were abusing each other. I tried to pacify them. Thereafter, I returned back to my house. On the next day

in the morning, I witnessed that the motor bike of the appellant was not at the house. I went to the house of the appellant and noticed that the wife

of appellant was lying on a takhat (wooden bench). Appellant was not in the house. I called the neighbour Shri Jaiswal. Thereafter, I telephoned

police. Shri Vijendra Parihar, Constable came on the spot. He told me that Leela Bai has died. There was an injury on her stomach. On the place

of incident, broken pieces of bangles, three bottles of liquor and one rope was lying. Thereafter, Station House Officer came to the spot. I lodged

the report and Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P/1) and I signed the same. I also lodged Marg Intimation (Ex. P/2) and I signed the same. Police prepared

Panchnama (Ex. P/3) and spot map (Ex. P/4) and I signed the same. There is a lengthy cross-examination of this witness. In his cross-examination,

he deposed the same facts and his evidence is unshakable.

7.

Anil Sahu (PW-4) was also living as tenant in the house of Thakur Ram Rai (PW-1). He deposed that at about 10:30 pm on the date of

incident, I heard sounds of quarrel taking place in front of my house between a male and a female. When I went outside my house, I noticed that a

male and female were quarreling and abusing each other. One other person was also present there. Thereafter, I went to my house and in the

morning, I noticed that the lady who was quarreling was lying dead in the room. Blood was also there. Police came there and recorded my

statement.

8.

Thakur Ram Rai (PW-1) and Anil Sahu (PW-4) are the material witnesses of the incident.

9.

Naresh Pathak (PW-2) is the witness of memorandum and seizure. He turned hostile. Mahendra Kumar Tiwari (PW-3) is also witness of

seizure and memorandum. He also turned hostile.

10.

Dilip Singh (PW-5) Patwari deposed. that I prepared spot map (Ex. P/10) and I signed the same.

11.

Laxman Mishra (PW-6) deposed that I was posted as Asst. Sub Inspector at Police Station Seoni on 12.03.2012 and Mr. Sanjay had given

me Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P/1). Thereafter, I registered crime No. 163/2012 against Nagendra Singh and registered FIR (Ex. P/11) and signed the

same.

12.

Amit Rathor (PW-9) deposed that I identified the dead body of the deceased. He is the relative of the deceased and he signed the

Panchanama of the dead body (Ex. P/15).

13.

Dr. R.M.Vasnik (PW-7) deposed that, on 12.03.2012 I was posted as Sr. Medical Officer at District Hospital, Seoni. I performed the post-

mortem of the deceased. I noticed the following injuries on the person of the deceased :

(i) Ligature mark and abrasion of 22 cm x ? cm on the neck below 7 cm from the chin.

(ii) Abrasion mark below mandibular angle 5 cm.

(iii) Abrasion mark on the neck below mandibular angle of 7 cm and 9.5 cm.

Ligature mark and abrasions were caused by strangulation and the injuries were ante-mortem in nature.

(iv) One stab wound on 12th thoracic rib of size 3.5 cm x 2 cm. It was caused by hard and sharp edged penetrating weapon. It was ante-mortem

in nature. The deceased died due to asphyxia.

The stab wound which was on stomach was also sufficient to cause death.

14.

D.M.Thakur (PW-10) deposed that on 12.03.2012, I was posted as Station House Officer Incharge. After receiving telephonic information

that a dead body was lying in a house at Rajput Colony I went to the spot and noticed a dead body on the second floor of the house. The house

was taken by the appellant on rent from the landlord. Thereafter, on the basis of information supplied by landlord, I recorded Dehati Nalishi (Ex.

P/1) and signed the same. Marg Intimation (Ex. P/2) was also recorded and I signed the name. I also prepared Mauka Panchanama (Ex. P/3) and

spot map (Ex. P/4). I noticed that there was injury on the stomach and neck of the deceased. I sent the dead body for postmortem. I seized three

mobiles phones, broken pieces of bangles, two bottles of liquor from the spot vide seizure memo Ex. P/21. Thereafter, the case was handed over

to Mr. N.L.Dhurve (ASI) for further investigation.

15.

N.L.Dhurve (PW-13), ASI deposed that I was posted as Sub Inspector and conducted investigation of the case. I recorded statement of

Vatsala Bai, Shanno Bi, Babita Bai, Anil Sahu, Kishan Singh, Nitu Kelkar, Thakur Ram Rai, Amit Singh Rathor and Vineeta Jacob. On

16.03.2012, appellant was arrested and on his memorandum which is Ex. P/7, a knife was seized vide seizure memo Ex. P/8. I signed both the

documents. Thereafter, chargesheet was filed.

16.

Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P/1) was registered at around 8:45 on 12.03.2012. It is mentioned in the merg intimation that the landlord noticed that

appellant and his wife were quarreling. He was beating the deceased. Thereafter, he returned back to his house and on the next morning, he

noticed that the dead body of the deceased was lying in the room. Appellant was absent.

17.

The evidence of Thakur Ram Rai (PW-1) is important. He specifically deposed that he witnessed that appellant and his wife were quarreling

with each other in the night. There were heated exchange of words between both of them and thereafter, in the morning, the dead body of the

deceased was found. Appellant was not present in the house. His motor bike was also not there. Anil Sahu (PW-4) corroborated the fact that a

quarrel had taken place between the deceased and the appellant. From the evidence of both the witnesses, this fact has been proved that the

appellant was present at the house in the night and quarrel had taken place between the appellant and deceased. The appellant produced defence

witness to substantiate the fact that he had stayed in a lodge on the date of incident. However, this fact has been discarded by the Trial Court. In

our opinion, this defence evidence is not reliable.

18.

The appellant was arrested on 16.03.2012 i.e. after four days of the incident. The deceased was his wife. If the appellant was not involved in

the offence, why he was absconded for a period of 4 days.

19.

The appellant in his accused statement deposed that he went to work along with one Anurag Shrivastav on 10.03.2012 at Chhapra, District

Seoni and he stayed at Prem lodge upto 12.03.2012. He is innocent. There was a dispute between him and Thakur Ram Rai who is working as

constable in the Police department. The deceased was keep of Thakur Ram Rai and he has been falsely implicated by Thakur Ram Rai. The

aforesaid statement of the accused is unbelievable because the deceased died in the night of 11.03.2012. The report was lodged on 12.03.2012

and appellant was arrested on 16.03.2012. He was absconding. He further denied the fact that he was living as tenant in the house of Thakur Ram

Rai. This fact is contrary to the evidence of other witnesses. Hence, the appellant has not offered sufficient explanation.

20.

In case of Sukhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(2014) 10 SCC 270], the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as under :

In this context, we may profitably refer to a four-Judge Bench decision in Tara Singh v. The State [AIR 1951 SC 441] wherein,

Bose, J. explaining the significance of the faithful and fair compliance of Section 342 of the Code as it stood then, opined thus:

30.

I cannot stress too strongly the importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of Section 342 of the

Criminal Procedure Code. It is not a proper compliance to read out a long string of questions and answers made in the

committal court and ask whether the statement is correct. A question of that kind is misleading. It may mean either that

the questioner wants to know whether the recording is correct, or whether the answers given are true, or whether there

is some mistake or misunderstanding despite the accurate recording. In the next place, it is not sufficient compliance to

string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned

separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him. The whole object of the section is

to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him. The

questioning must therefore be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to

appreciate and understand. Even when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is

facing a charge of murder. He is therefore in no fit position to understand the significance of a complex question.

Fairness therefore requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate

mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand. I do not suggest that every error or

omission in this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial because I am of opinion that errors of this type fail within the

category of curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon

whether prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been occasioned. In my opinion, the disregard of the

provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in this case that I feel there is grave likelihood of

prejudice.

12 In Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat [AIR 1953 SC 468], Bose, J. speaking fora three-Judge Bench

highlighting the importance of recording of the statement of the accused under the code expressed thus:

8.

Now the statements of an accused person recorded under Sections 208, 209 and 342, Criminal PC. are among the

most important matters to be considered at the trial. It has to be remembered that in this country an accused, person is

not allowed to enter the box and speak on oath in his own defence. This may operate for the protection of the accused

is some cases but experience elsewhere has shown that it can also be a powerful and impressive weapon of defence in

the hands of an innocent man. The statements of the accused recorded by the Committing Magistrate and the Sessions

Judge are intended in India to take the place of what in England and in America he would be free to state in his own

way in the witness-box.

13 The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra [JT 2007 (8) SC 644 : 2007 (12) SCC 341] in

following terms:

14.

The word ""generally"" in sub-section (1)(b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a

general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should

also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused

to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed.

The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which

appear against him and that the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate

person will be able to appreciate and understand. A conviction based on the accused''s failure to explain what he was

never asked to explain is bad in law. The whole object of enacting Section 313 of the Code was that the attention of the

accused should be drawn to the specific points in the charge and in the evidence on which the prosecution claims that

the case is made out against the accused so that he may be able to give such explanation as he desires to give.

14 In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, there can be no scintilla of doubt that the when the requisite questions have not been

put to the accused it has caused immense prejudice to him, more so, when there is no evidence to establish his complicity in the

alleged abduction.

21.

In our opinion, the evidence of Thakur Ram Rai (PW-1) and Anil Sahu (PW-4) and conduct of the appellant that he was absconding for four

days from the incident, proves the fact that the appellant had killed his wife and he was present in the house on the date of incident.

22.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court, in case of Deny Bora Vs. State of Assam [(2014) 14 SCC 42] has held that the conviction can be based on the

sole testimony of a witness if the testimony inspires confidence of the Court. The Apex Court has held as under :

As we find, the conviction wholly rests on the sole testimony of PW-14. It is well settled in law that conviction can be based on the testimony of a

singular witness. It has been held in Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)[(2003) 11 SCC 367] that

''9.........as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment

in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But, if there are doubts

about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. The same principle has been reiterated in Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 14

SCC 150] by stating that it is open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction, if the quality of

the witness makes the testimony acceptable.

23.

Now the next question is that whether the act of appellant is covered under Exception 1 of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Exception 1

speaks that Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, deprives of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation. There is a

evidence that there were heated exchange of words between appellant and the deceased and both were abusing each other. The question is that

whether this is sufficient evidence to prove the fact that there was a grave and sudden provocation to the appellant.

24.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in a celebrated case, K.M.Nanavati Vs. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1962 SC 605] has considered Exception 1

of Section 300 in and held as under :

Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of ""grave and sudden"" provocation ? No abstract standard of

reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life,

traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there

are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with

precision : it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the relevant circumstances. It is not necessary in this case to ascertain whether

a reasonable man placed in the position of the accused would have lost his self- control momentarily or even temporarily when his wife confessed

to him of her illicit intimacy with another, for we are satisfied on the evidence that the accused regained his selfcontrol and killed Ahuja deliberately.

The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus : (1) The test of ""grave and sudden"" provocation is whether a reasonable man,

belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his

self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to

bring his act within the first Exception to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the

victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the

offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled

down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.

25.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court again considered Exception 1 of Section 300 in a recent judgment in case of B.D.Khunte Vs. Union of India &

Ors. [(2015) 1 SCC 286] has held as under :

What is critical for a case to fall under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC is that the provocation must not only be grave but sudden as well. It is

only where the following ingredients of Exception 1 are satisfied that an accused can claim mitigation of the offence committed by him from murder

to culpable homicide not amounting to murder:

(1) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused.

(2) The provocation so given must have been grave.

(3) The provocation given by the deceased must have been sudden.

(4) The offender by reason of such grave and sudden provocation must have been deprived of his power of self-control; and (5) The offender

must have killed the deceased or any other person by mistake or accident during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control.

26.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in case of K.M.Nanavati (supra) has held that :

What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc.; in short, the

cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs.

27.

In the present case, the deceased was the wife of the appellant. Generally there used to be quarrel between husband and wife and there may

be heated exchanges of words between both of them. However, this would not mean that husband in such circumstance can kill the wife and it

would be a grave provocation. Apart from this, in the present case, the appellant had inflicted a blow by knife on the stomach of the deceased. He

had strangulated the deceased. The nature of injuries as deposed by the doctor on the person of the deceased indicate that the appellant had acted

in a cruel and barbaric manner. Hence, the act of the appellant would not cover under Exception 1 of Section 300 of IPC.

28.

In view of the evidence on record as discussed above, in our considered opinion, the Trial Court has rightly held the appellant guilty for

committing offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and awarded proper sentence. We do not find any merit in this appeal.

It is hereby dismissed.

29.

Copy of this judgment be sent to the Court below for information and compliance alongwith its record.