Nakuleswar Ghatak vs Promode Kumar Banerjee

Paresh Nath Mookerjee, J.—This appeal is by the tenant Defendant and it arises out of a suit for eviction. The suit is in respect of the back portion of premises No. 13/3, Ramkanta Bose Street, Calcutta. The notice to quit was given in April, 1958, requiring the; tenant to quit and vacate the suit premises on the expiry of May, 1958. The tenant not having complied with the said notice, the instant suit was brought on June 4, 1958, the landlords'' plea under the relevant Rent Control Law (West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956) being reasonable requirement for their own "use and occupation".

There were four landlords, who, as Plaintiffs, instituted the present suit. Of them, the first three were the original owners of inter alia the "suit premises. Later on, the suit premises, barring only the privy and the staircase, were sold by them to Plaintiff No. 4, who undertook to construct her own privy and staircase. The plea of reasonable requirement as taken by Plaintiff No. 4, was of that part of the suit premises, which belonged to her, namely, of the entire suit premises minus the privy and the staircase, which were not covered by her purchase and it was for accommodation of herself and her family. The other Plaintiffs, namely, Nos. 1 to 3, pleaded reasonable requirement of the remaining part of the suit premises, namely, of the privy and the staircase, left out by Plaintiff No. 4 as aforesaid, for their own use and accommodation after building and rebuilding to give effect to the partition between them.

The two requirements, as set out above, constitute the Plaintiffs'' whole case of reasonable requirement under the relevant Rent Control Law.

The defence was a denial of the Plaintiffs'' case of reasonable requirement, both in fact and in law. The Plaintiffs'' story in that behalf was denied and it was further pleaded that the requirement, as alleged, even if true, would not constitute reasonable requirement for purposes of the relevant law as that did not contemplate separate, distinct and different requirements on the part of the several landlords. An objection was also taken to the description of the suit premises; as given in the plaint, and a point was raised that, on the said description, the suit was bad for partial eviction. It was also pleaded that the suit was bad for multifariousness or misjoinder of parties and causes of action and, further, that the notice to quit, on which the suit was founded, was bad and invalid in view of an earlier notice to quit, given to the Defendant.

The learned trial Judge over-ruled all the above defences and decreed the present suit,. granting the Defendant time till December 31, 1959, to vacate the suit premises. Hence this appeal by the Defendant.

All the above points, canvassed before the trial court by the Appellant Defendant in support of his defence, were urged before us. The last two of them, however, namely, multifariousness and invalidity of the notice to quit may be disposed of first.

As to the point of notice, it is quite true that there was an earlier notice to quit but it is equally clear that, at the most, that is, taking it at the worst against the Plaintiffs, the effect of the second notice was that the said first notice was waived. In that view, however, the second notice would be a sufficiently valid notice to quit, there being nothing in law to prevent the landlord or landlords, from waiving a notice to quit and simultaneously asking the tenant to vacate by a fresh notice to quit. The defence plea of defective notice to quit would, therefore, fail.

The plea of multifariousness also is hardly tenable. Admittedly, the Defendant''s tenancy was a single tenancy under all the Plaintiffs as landlords. There was thus a joint and single cause of action on their part, which arose on the termination of the said single tenancy by their notice to quit and, upon that cause of action, the instant suit was brought. That formed the necessary common nexus to sustain the instant suit at the instance of the four Plaintiffs and the suit was, therefore, not bad for multifariousness. The fact that the several Plaintiffs own different parts of the suit premises or that their requirements of the premises or of its several parts, belonging to them separately, were different, would not affect the above position as the tenancy being one and its termination being obviously a part, at least, of the immediate cause of action of the suit, the necessary nexus would be thereto avoid multifariousness. Indeed, it is impossible to contend that, in respect of the same tenancy, separate suits can or ought to be brought by the landlords, even when they own specific portions of the tenanted premises. That would be absurd and unwarranted on the face of it and, if, in the said circumstances, a single suit was not permissible, the landlords, in such a case, would not be able to eject the tenant, who will enjoy perpetual immunity from eviction. Happily, however, that is not the law and the tenanted premises, however separate and divisible it may be for other purposes, would constitute a single unit for purposes of the disputed tenancy and that would be sufficient for the maintainability of a single suit if or ejectment by all the Plaintiffs. This point of defence would also, therefore, fail.

There was some apparent misdescription of the tenancy in the plaint schedule, in that no particular mention was made therein of a courtyard, included in the same. But, as the learned trial Judge has rightly observed, the plaint, read as a whole, particularly in its body with reference to the notice to quit, puts the extent of the tenancy in suit practically beyond doubt and, includes the whole of the Appellant Defendant''s tenancy and, whatever, difficulty might have further remained in the matter, has been removed by the fresh and further amendment of the plaint in this Court, which has been already allowed by us. The defence plea of partial eviction also would, therefore, fail.

Lastly, comes the question of reasonable requirement. As a point of fact, this requirement has undoubtedly, been made out on the Plaintiffs'' evidence in the case. That evidence has been believed by the learned trial Judge and we see no reason to differ from him on the point. It is thus found that Plaintiff No. 4 reasonably requires the portion of the suit premises, belonging to her, for accommodation of herself and her family and the Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 reasonably require the remaining part of the suit premises for building and rebuilding to give effect to the partition between them in terms of the same and for their own use and accommodation. The point, however, has been raised by the Defendant Appellant that these separate requirements of the Plaintiffs, and those again for different purposes, would not constitutes reasonable requirement under the relevant law, that is, u/s 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 Appellant contends that the Plaintiffs'' case of reasonable requirement is really an amalgam of the two parts of the above clause and that is not permissible in law. We do not think that this contention is correct. The requirement, indeed, by all the Plaintiffs is for their own occupation, though in the case of Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3, it would require building and rebuilding before the particular portion is made fit or suitable for their said occupation. That, however, would not be outside the clause in question (vide, in this connection, Krishna Das Nandy v. Bidhan Chandra Roy, C.W.N. ( 1958 ) 63 29. The point, no doubt, may still arise as to whether, for purposes of the relevant law, the several requirements of the several, Plaintiffs, though of the same character would be sufficient or a joint, or common requirement, that is, in respect of the same or the whole premises or a joint or common portion of the premises would be necessary. But, in our opinion, that point should be answered against the Appellant, as we do not think that Taw makes it obligatory on the landlords, the plurality of them, to prove a joint or common requirement, as aforesaid.

Our attention has been drawn to the decision of Renupada Mukherjee, J. in Amarendra Nath Roy Chovdhury v. Kanika Devi ( 1959 ) 64 C.W.N. 29 (notes) in which a different view appears to have been taken and where the learned Judge appears to have been inclined to the view that the two requirements, mentioned in the corresponding provision (Section 12(1)(h)) of the 1950 Act (West Bengal Premises Temporary Provisions Act, 1950) were separate and independent and could not be united or amalgamated so as to entitle the landlords, a plurality of them, to obtain eviction of the tenant on those separate requirements for their respective different portions of the premises'' in question. The learned Judge was even inclined to hold that, if there be more landlords than one, interested in different portions of the disputed premises, their requirement or requirements of their aforesaid respective portions, even if they be of the same type, would not come within the scope of the above clause. With all respect to Renupada Mukkerjee, J., we are unable to agree with his above exposition of the law. That would lead to this absurd and manifestly unjust position that a tenant, holding a premises under more than one landlord, owning the same in specific or defined portions, would not be ejectible on the ground of the landlords'' reasonable requirement. This, to our mind, is not the contemplation of law nor do we think that the statute contemplates only a common or joint requirement by all the landlords, that is, a requirement, in which all the landlords will have a joint or common interest, thus postulating only a joint or common premises, in which and in every part of which all the landlords would be interested, as that view also would be productive of similar absurdity and injustice. We need only point out here that the English case Mc Intyre v. Hardcastle L.R. (1948) K.B. 82 relied on by Renupada Mukherjee J., in support of his above decision, is plainly distinguishable, as, a part from anything else, it was really a case of requirement of one landlady only out of two, the other landlady not having or alleging any requirement of her own, and it does not lay down any proposition, of law as enunciated by the said learned Judge.

In the result, this appeal would fail and it would be dismissed, subject to this that the Defendant Appellant will have time to vacate the suit premises until the end of July next or until the expiry of two months from the date of the amended decree of the trial court (which will have to be made or drawn up now by that Court in view of the amendment of the plaint, allowed and directed by us), whichever is later.

There will be no order as to costs in this Court.

N.K. Sen, J.

I agree.