Nanak Singh and others vs The Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar and others

R.S. Sarkaria, J.—This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for issuance of an appropriate writ, quashing an order, dated 8th September, 1967, (Annexure J), of the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, whereby he accepted in revision the nomination papers of Shri Bihari Lal, Respondent No. 3, as a candidate for the Reserved seat from the Double-member Ward No. 38 to the Municipal Committee, Amritsar. The petitioners, Nanak Singh and Harbans Lal, were also registered as electors for the aforesaid Ward No. 38. Under rule 3 of the Punjab Municipal Election Rules, 1952, the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar (Respondent 1), framed and published a programme for election to the Municipal Committee, Amritsar, specifying October 2,196/ as the date of the poll, August 25, 1967 as the last date for filing nomination papers, and September 2, 1967 as the date for holding scrutiny of the nomination papers. Petitions for revision of the orders of the authority scrutinising the nomination papers were decided by the Deputy Commissioner (Respondent 1) on 8th September, 1967, while the last date for withdrawal of the nominations was 11th September, 1967.

Both the petitioners were nominated as candidates for election from this Ward No. 38 by their respective proposers, and their names were filed before the Returning Officer, Shri P. L. Kapur, S.D.O. (Civil), Respondent No. 2, on 25th August, 1937. The nomination papers of the petitioners were not accompanied by the requisite declaration verified by the competent authority that the candidates were members of the Scheduled Castes. However, the nomination papers of Nanak Singh petitioner were accompanied by the certificate issued by a Magistrate that he was a member of the Megh community and, as such, a member of the Scheduled Caste. The nomination papers of Harbans Lal petitioner were also accompanied by a similar certificate which was, however, not issued by any of the authorities mentioned in sub-rule (1) of rule 11 of the Municipal Election Rules, 1952, but it was from the Social Welfare Officer In the nomination papers of Nanak Singh petitioner, it was also specified that he was a candidate for the Reserved seat, while no such specification had been made in, the papers of Harbans Lal. Bihari Lal, Respondent No. 3 also filed nomination papers before Respondent No. 2 on 24th August, 1967, without specifying as to whether he was a candidate for the Reserved seat or the General seat from Ward No. 38. His nomination papers were also accompanied by a Scheduled Caste certificate issued by a competent authority. Bihari Lal was an official candidate of the Communist Party of India, while the petitioners were sponsored by the Congress Party.

On 2nd September, 1967, the Returning Officer, (Respondent 2), rejected the nomination papers of both the petitioners and Respondent No. 3 for the Reserved seat of Ward No. 38, on the ground that they were not accompanied by their declarations, duly verified by the competent authority, as is required by rule 11(2) of the Municipal Election Rules, 1952. The nomination papers of two other candidates, namely, Surjit Singh and Mohinder Singh were rejected for similar reason:;. The Returning Officer, however, while rejecting the nomination of the petitioners and Respondent No. 3 for the Reserved seat, accepted the papers of Harbans Lal petitioner, and Respondent No. S for the General seat of the aforesaid Double-member Ward.

On 4th September, 1967, the petitioners as well as Respondent No. 3 went in revision against the orders of the Returning Officer to the Deputy Commissioner (Respondent 1). It is alleged in the petition that in spite of the fact that the nomination papers of the petitioners and Respondent No 3 were apparently suffering from the same or similar defects, the Deputy Commissioner (Respondent 1) in a most arbitrary, unauthorised, and capricious manner, applying a discriminatory and double standard, accepted the revision of Bihari Lal, Respondent No. 3, holding "that the non-existence of the verification on the nomination paper itself cannot be deemed to be non-compliance of the law as a separate certificate to the same effect (Scheduled Caste) has been attached; but rejected the revision filed by the petitioners with converse arguments. As a result of the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner, Respondent No. 3 (Bihari Lal) was declared elected unopposed on 8th September, 1967, to the Reserved seat of Ward No. 38 under rule 20 of the Municipal Election Rules. It is alleged that the impugned order was violative of the mandatory provisions of rule 11 (2) of the said Rules, and was consequently without jurisdiction. There was an error apparent on the face of the order inasmuch as it accepted the nomination papers of Respondent No. 3, suffering from a defect of substantial character. This illegal acceptance of the nomination papers of Respondent No. 3 has resulted in manifest injustice to the petitioners and ''the other candidates. It is also alleged that the impugned order offends against Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law.

In para 10(f) of the petition, it is further pleaded that the impugned order is not only contrary to law, but is also malafide and is actuated by motives and considerations totally extraneous to the principles of election law. The revision of Respondent No. 3 has been allowed by Respondent No. 1 positively under pulls and pressures of the ruling United Front of Punjab, of which Communist Party of India is a very powerful constituent. Respondent No. 1 went out of his way to accommodate and facilitate the unopposed return of Respondent No. 3, as desired and directed by Sarvshri Sat Pal Dang and Krishan Lal, Ministers of the Punjab Government, with whom Respondent No. 1 was reported to be in constant touch in this connection.

In para 10(g), it is alleged in a somewhat vague manner that Respondent No. 3 had inserted a declaration of his being a member of the Megh community in his nomination papers, during the pendency of the revision application before Respondent No. 1. This ground, however, is not now pressed before me.

The petitioners have prayed for a writ of quo warranto, removing Respondent No. 3 from his office as elected member of the Municipal Committee, Amritsar. In the petition, which came up before the Motion Bench for preliminary hearing on 19th September, 1967, it was also prayed that the election to the General seat of Ward No. 38 of the Municipal Committee, Amritsar, (which had then been fixed for 2nd October, 1967), be also stayed pending the decision of the writ petition. Respondents 4 to 9 who were candidates for the General seat, were also impleaded as respondents in the original petition. The Motion Bench did not grant the interim relief of staying election to the General seat of Ward No.38, but directed that the main case be heard at an early date within two months. The writ petition, however, could not be heard before the date fixed for the election. Thereafter, the petitioners gave up Respondents 4 to 9 on the ground that they were no longer necessary parties as the petition against them had become infructuous.

The contesting Respondents 1, 2, and 3 have filed separate written statements. Bihari Lal, Respondent No. 3, has denied that he had inserted any declaration, subsequently, in his nomination papers. With regard to the allegation of malafide, the respondent has stated:

Para 10 of the Writ Petition is denied. The order Annexure ''J'' is valid, just, constitutional, intravires, and does not violate the principles of natural justice and the same is not liable to be quashed for any of the reasons given in sub paras (a) to (j) of para 10.

Respondent No. 1 (Deputy Commissioner) in his written statement, while replying to the allegation of mala fide, has stated as follows:

The contention of the petitioners is invalid and not based on any ground whatsoever.

He also denied that Respondent No. 3 was allowed to insert his declaration in his nomination papers during the pendency of the revision application. He has supported the impugned order,

Learned Counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection that under the mandatory provisions of Rules 52 and 53 of the Punjab Municipal Election Rules, 1952, the petitioners were bound to seek their remedy by way of election rather than coming to this Court. It is stressed that thus there was an equally efficacious remedy available to them, and this Court should refuse to interfere, in the exercise of its extraordinary powers, simply on that score. In support of his contention, the Learned Counsel has referred to Rule 52 of the Municipal Election Rules, which says that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with these rules. Emphasis has been laid on the word ''shall'' occurring in this rule. Counsel has next referred to side 53(1), which lays down that an election petition against the return of a candidate to a Municipal election on the ground of material irregularity in the procedure shall be presented to the Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant Commissioner or Extra Assistant Commissioner appointed by the Deputy Commissioner in this behalf within 14 days alter the day on which the result of the election was declared. Reference has also been made to Rule 51(e), which defines material irregularity as including an ''improper acceptance or refusal of any nomination or non-compliance with the provision of the Act or of the rules made thereunder, or mistake in the use of any form annexed thereto as materially affects the result of an election''.

It is urged that the writ petition is, in substance, an election petition seeking to set aside an election on the ground of material irregularity. Stress has also been laid on the fact that if the election is set aside, Bihari Lal Respondent''s right to contest the General seat from this very constituency, would be adversally affected. According to the respondent, there was one consolidated election from this Double-member constituency, and the petitioners were bound to challenge both the elections from the General seat as well as the Reserved seat, impleading all the persons as respondents who had fought for the General seat. Since this has not been done, no relief can be granted in these proceedings in the absence of those necessary parties. Reliance has been placed on Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd., v. Pt. Ram Samp and others, AIR 1957 P&H. 82 N.T. N.T. Veluswami Thevar Vs. G. Raja Nainar and Others, Dr. Raghubir Sharan Vs. The State of Bihar, Telu Ram v. Nothu Ram (1980) 68 P.L.R. 93, and Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. Commissioner of Hills Division AIR 1668 S.C. 398.

None of these contentions appears to be tenable Mr. Rekhi, the Learned Counsel for the petitioners has lightly pointed out that when he made this writ petition, the election to the General seat of the constituency had not taken place. In the original petition, he had impleaded all the candidates for the General seat as Respondents 4 to 9, and had made a prayer before the Motion Bench for stay of the election to the General seat from this constituency pending the petition. The Motion Bench admitted the petition but did not grant the interim relief as against the contestants for the General seat. Since the original petition had become infructuous against Respondents 4 to 9, the petitioners gave up the same as unnecessary parties.

It is thus clear that on the date of the making of this writ petition, no other equally efficacious and speedy remedy was available to the petitioners. That is to say, the election from the General seat of this Ward could be stayed only by the High Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this connection, it may be noted that the candidature of Harbans Lal petitioner for the General seat had been accepted by the Returning Officer, and under the rules, he was not debarred from contesting the General seat. The petitioners are not guilty of any laches. They instituted this petition within 7 days of the date on which Bihari Lal Respondent was declared elected unopposed under Rule 20.

There is abundant authority that in such a situation, the Court would not refuse to exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 226, merely because a less speedy and less efficacious alternative remedy is available. The latest pronouncement of this Court on the subject is Duni Ghana v. Punjab State and others (1968) 70 P.L.R. 48, wherein Narala J. has held that in case of illegal rejection of nomination paper, the existence of alternative remedy by way of an election petition does not bar the High Court from interfering under Article 226 of the Constitution. "In such a case", said Narula J., "it would be meaningless to derive the persons concerned to all the expense and botheration of an election and to unnecessarily postpone the decision on a question which is bound to be raised at a later stage."

In Duni Chand''s case also, the petitioner had come to this Court at a stage when elections had not taken place. In Civil Writ No. 2247 of 1964, Shri Lila Krishan v. The Punjab State 8 C.W. 2247 of 1964 decided on 2nd January, 1965, by Capoor and Dua, JJ., the petitioner was a candidate for election to the office of President of the Municipal Committee. Fatehbad. He challenged the rejection of three ballot papers, which bad been marked in his favour. A preliminary objection was taken that the petitioner could not seek the remedy by of a writ, because an alternative remedy by way of an election petition was available to him. The learned Judges observed that the alternative remedy by way of election petition is not, however, an absolute bar to a writ petition, and it depends upon the circumstances of each case whether the High Court should or should not interfere on the writ side.

To the same effect are the observe ions of Dua J. in Dharam Chand v. The State of Punjab (1962) 64 P.L.R. 686 and the ratio of Devi Ram v. State of Punjab (1964) 6 P.L.R. 1 85, Bhagirath Singh v. The State of Punjab (1965) 67 P.L.R. 413, Tirlok Chander Sharma v. The State of Puujab (1965)67 P.L.R. 452, Charan Dass Dogra v. Punjab State (1965) 67 P.L.R. 1938, Shri Des Raj v. S. Gurnam Singh (1966) 68 P.L.R. 234.

I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that in the circumstances of the present case, the alternative remedy by way of election Petition was not as adequate, efficacious, and speedy as the remedy available to the petitioners in a writ petition under Article 226, Bihari Lal Respondent, in his revision petition before the Deputy Commissioner, had contended that was a candidate for the Reserved seat, and not for the General seat of this Ward, The Deputy Commissioner accepted this contention of Bihari Lal, and allowed his revision petition. Bihari Lal is, therefore, now estopped from turning round and saying that if this petition is allowed, that would have the effect of depriving him of his claim to contest the General seat of this Ward.

Counsel for the respondents have been unable to refer to any authority or rule of procedure, which would make it obligatory in the circumstances of the case, for the petitioners to challenge the election to both the seats from this Double-member Ward. The technical provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, which contain a prohibition against splitting of claims are not applicable to writ petitions. V, V. Giri v. Shri Dora8 cited by the Learned Counsellor the respondents, is certainly not an authority for the proposition that a petitioner seeking to set aside an election from a seat in a Double-member constituency is bound to challenge the election to both the seats, and cannot limit his challenge to election to either of the two seats in that constituency. All that was laid down in Giri''s Case was that the claim of eligibility for the Reserved seat does not exclude the claim for the General seat. It is an additional claim and both the claims have to be decided on the basis that there is one election from the Double-member constituency. This proposition of law is unquestionable, but in the instant case, as already observed, Bihari Lal Respondent had waived his claim to contest from the General seat, and was precluded by his own conduct from contesting the General seat. It was for the petitioners to say, to what extent the irregularity in the elections adversely affected their rights The petitioners do not feel aggrieved by anything in the election to the General seat. They claim relief only against the persons, who were candidates for the Reserved seat.

For the foregoing reasons, I would reject the preliminary objection raised by the respondents.

On merits, Mr. Rekhi has contended that nomination papers filed by the petitioners as well as Bihari Lal, Respondent 3, suffered from defects of a substantial character, and all those papers were violative of the mandatory provisions of the Rules, and the Deputy Commissioner in condoning the defects in the case of Bihari Lal Respondent had honoured the mandatory provisions of law only in breach.

The material provisions of the Punjab Municipal Election Rules, 1952, read as follows:

Rule 11. Nomination of Candidates.-(1) Any person not in-eligible for membership of the Committee may be nominated as a candidate for election, provided that on or before the date specified for the nomination between the hours of eleven O'' clock of the forenoon and three O'' clock of the afternoon or such other hours as the Deputy Commissioner may fix he shall either in person or by his proposer deliver to the authority specified a nomination paper completed in Form 1, appended to these rules and subscribed by the candidate himself as assenting to the nomination.

(2) In a constituency where a seat is reserved for the Scheduled Castes, no candidate shall be deemed to be qualified to be chosen to fill that seat unless his nomination paper is accompanied by a declaration verified by any of the authorities mentioned in sub rule (1) that the candidate is a member of the scheduled castes for which the seat has been so reserved and the declaration specifies the particular caste of which the candidate is a member.

(3) x x x x

(4) x x x x

Provided that the Deputy Commissioner may.-

(a) Permit any clerical error in the nomination paper in regard to the said names or numbers to be corrected in-order to bring them in conformity with the corresponding entries in the electoral rolls, and

(b) where necessary, direct that any clerical or printing errors in the said entries shall be overlooked.

Rule 16. Scrutiny of nomination and decision of objections.''

On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations the authority specified under Rule 10 shall examine the nomination papers.....and shall decide all objections made to any nomination, and shall, on such objections or on his own motion after such summary enquiry, if any, as he may deem necessary, rejuse any nominations if he is satisfied,

(a) that the candidate was on the date fixed for the nomination of candidates ineligible for election under the provisions of Rule 7 or of any other Rales or of the Act or of any other Act and had not before that date been exempted by the Punjab Government from any disqualification imposed upon him;

(b) * *

(c) that there has been any failure to comply with any of the provisions of Rule 11 or 12.

(d) * * *

(e) * * *

(2) * * *

(3) Any person aggrieved by any order passed by an authority under sub-rule (1) or sub rule (2) may within the date specified....present in person or by counsel to the Deputy Commissioner an application for revision of such order.

(4) * * *

The material part of From I, referred to in Rule 11(1) reads as follows:-

Form I

Rule 11(1)

Nomination Paper

Election to the Municipal Committee

(To be filled in by proposer)

I hereby nominate as a candidate for election from Cansituency of Municipal Committee

Full Name of proposer

No. of proposer on the electoral roll of the constituency in which the candidate is a candidate for election

Name of the candidate''s father/husband

Full postal address of candidate

Number of the candidate on the electoral roll of the constituency in which he is registered as an elector

Dated

Signature of proposer.

(To be filled in by the candidate)

I. the above-mentioned candidate, assent to this nomination and hereby declare:-

(a) that I have completed---years of age

(b) that the symbols I have chosen in order of preference are---(i)---(ii)---and (iii)

Date

Signature of candidate.

(Further declaration to be made by a scheduled Caste candidate)

I hereby declare that I am a member of the---------caste which is a Scheduled Caste of the State of Punjab.

Date

Signature of candidate. Verification by Magistrate. The above declaration is solemnly affirmed before me by-- -- who is personally known to me or who has been identified to my satisfaction by.

Place

Signature of verifying

Date-,

authority with full designation.

(To be filled in by the Deputy Commissioner or other authorised person).

XXX

According to Mr. Rekhi, the nomination papers of Bihari Lal, Respondent 3, and Nank Singh and Harbans Lal petitioners had these defects and merits:

Defects.

Merits

BihariLal Respondent 3

(1) Non-specification that he was a candidate for the Reserved seat.

(2i Non-verification of his declaration as required by sub-rule (2) of Rule 11.

Certificate of an authority mentioned in sub-rule t)) of Rule 11. that he was a member of the Megh community.

Nank Singh petitioner.

Absence of verified declaration as required by Jule 1''

(1) Specification in the Fiom I, tot only of the Constituency number but also that he was a candidate for the Reserved seat. [2] Certificate of an authority mentioned in Rule 11(1), that he was a member of the Megh community.

HarbansLal petitioner.

(I) Absence of verified declaration as required by Rule 11(2).

(2) Non-mention of the fact that he was a candidate for the Reserved seat.

(3) Certificate by an authority other than that mentioned in sub-rule (1) of Rule 11, that he was a member of the Megh community.

According to the counsel, the nomination papers of all the three candidates were liable to rejection owing to the common fatal defect, viz, absence of any declaration in the prescribed from, duly verified by any of the authorities mentioned in sub-rule (1) of Rule 11. This defect says Mr. Rekhi, was one of substance, and not a mere clerical error or mistake which could be condoned or overlooked by the Deputy Commissioner or the Returning Officer. Emphasis has also been laid on the fact that the nomination papers of Bihari Lal Respondent suffered from an additional defect inasmuch as it was not specified therein that he was a candidate for the Reserved seat.

So far as the non specification of the fact that he was a candidate for the Reserved seat, is concerned, it could not be fatal for the simple reason that there is nothing in the Rules to debar scheduled Caste candidate from contesting the General seat. All that the Form prescribed under Rule 11(U) requires is, that the number of the Constituency should be specified therein at the appropriate place. This was done by Bihari Lal Respondent as well as the petitioners.

It may be observed that whereas Bihari Lal Respondent had filled in the blanks in the prescribed form with regard to his declaration that he was a member of the Megh community, (one of the Scheduled Castes for which the seat had been reserved), Nank Singh and Harbans Lal, petitioners, did not fill in such blanks in the prescribed form. But even in the case of Bihari Lal Respondent, his declaration was not attested in the manner prescribed in the Form at the appropriate place, by an authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) of Rule H. Only a separate certificate issued by a Magistrate, saying that he was a member of the Megh Community, was produced along with the nomination papers The question is, whether that certificate of the Magistrate produced by Bihari Lal Respondent could be deemed as a "verification" of a declaration of Bihari Lal Respondent incorporated in the nomination form. ''To verify'' in its ordinary dictionary sense in which the word appears to have been used in sub-rule (2) of rule 11 means ''to ascertain'' ''to confirm'', ''to test the truth or accuracy of, and to prove to be true''. From this construction of the word ''verify'', it follows that the Magistrate or the other competent authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) of Rule 11 must append his verification to a declaration made by the candidate on solemn affirmation before him (the competent authority). That is why, Form I, prescribed under Rule 11(1), requires the Magistrate to certify that the declaration was made on solemn affirmation by the candidate before him (the Magistrate), and that the candidate is either personally known to him (Magistrate) or has been identified to his satisfaction by such and such person. The blanks in this Form with regard to the verification of the Magistrate in the nomination pipers of Bihari Lal Respondent are lying unfilled. The production of a separate certificate of the Magistrate certainly could not be called a compliance with the mandatory sub-rule (2) of Role 11, because such a certificate might be produced by a candidate for other purposes also, viz., for availing of the concession admissible to the members of the Scheduled Castes in the matter of depositing security for costs, etc. Election laws have to be strictly enforced, and where under the rules, a certain thing is required to be done in a certain way, it must be done in that manner.

''Where the statute requires", said Gajendragadkar, J. (as he than was) in Sri Baru Ram Vs. Prasanni and Others, "specific facts to be proved in a specific way and it also provides for the consequence of non-compliance with the said requirement it would be difficult to resist the application of the penalty clause on the ground that such an application is based on a technical approach." This being the law on the point, it follows that as soon as the Returning Officer or the Deputy Commissioner found that neither Bihari Lal Respondent, nor the petitioners had made the declaration in the prescribed form, verified by an authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) of Rule 11, he was bound to enforce the penalty prescribed in Rale 16(1) with reference to its clauses (a) and (o). Indeed, the absence of such verified declaration in the nomination papers of these candidates not only attracted clause (c), but also rendered them "ineligible for election" from the Reserved seat within the meaning of clause (a) of Rule 16(1). The exaction of the penalty envisaged in R"le 16(1), therefore, should have been the inexorable result of the non-compliance of the provisions of Rule 11.

In Civil Writ No. 927 of 1964 (Paten Singh v. Shri K.C. Graver C.W. 927 of 1964) decided on the 1st October, 1964, by a Division Bench of this Court, (consisting of Falshaw C.J. and Grover J.), a programme was settled by the Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak, for flection to the Municipal Committee of Babadurgarb. Nomination papers were filed with regard to the Double-member constituency, namely. Ward No. 10, by some Scheduled Castes candidates, and also by persons who were not of such castes.

The nomination papers of two of the petitioners were rejected mainly on the ground that the declaration required by sub rule (2) of Rule 11 on the Form was not verified by any Magistrate. A certificate by a Magistrate saying that the person concerned belonged to a particular tribe, which was a scheduled tribe had been attached to the nomination papers. In the case of another petitioner, he had simply stated in the declaration that he was a Harijan without specifying the particular caste to which he belonged though in addition to that declaration an affidavit to the effect that he belonged to Chamar caste had been filed along with his nomination papers, duly verified by a magistrate. The nomination papers of all these three candidates were rejected on the ground that there was not a sufficient compliance with the provisions of Rule 11(2). All the three moved the High Court by a writ petition under Articles 226/22/ of the Constitution. The cases were first heard by Harbans Singh, J., who referred them to the Division Bench. The learned Single Judge as also the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench were unanimously of the view that the nomination papers for the Reserved seat had been lightly rejected. Harbans Singh, J. observed:-

Prima facie adding of such a certificate to the nomination paper is no compliance with sub rule (2) which requires that the declaration which is filed with the nomination paper must be verified by the authority concerned. If this is not done, than under the rules such a person is not ''deemed to be qualified to be chosen to fill'' the reserved seat. Thus the candidate may, in fact, belong to a Scheduled caste, but he shall not be deemed to be. qualified to contest the reserved seat unless he has filed the necessary declaration duly verified by the authority concerned.

I am in respectful agreement with these observations. They are fully applicable to the facts of the case before me. So far as Bihari Lal Respondent is concerned, his is a converge case, and the acceptance of his nomination papers as valid amounts to an error of law apparent on the face of the impugned order of the revising authority (the Deputy Commissioner), which would warrant an interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The revising authority (Deputy Commissioner) in the case of Bihari Lal''s nomination papers, has said:

It appears that the requirements of the law in this case have been properly fulfilled. There is a declaration on the nomination papers itself that he belongs to scheduled caste community (Megh), Further a Magistrate has verified on 25th August, 1967 the same facts. Non-existence of the verification on the nomination paper, itself, cannot be deemed to be non-compliance of the formalities of law as a separate certificate to the same effect has been attached.

Precisely, this very argument was advanced before a Division Bench in Gurdip Singh v. Gurmej Singh F.A.O. 3(sic) of 1913 F.A.O.3-P of 1983 decided on the 8th of April,.963, reported in the Punjab Government Gazette of June 14,1963. In that case also, a separate certificate had been filed along with the nomination papers, and Mr. Anand Swaroop, counsel for the then appellant, argued that there was a substantial compliance with requirements of law This contention was rejected by the Division Bench (consisting of Dulat and Grover, JJ.) with the observation:

Mr. Anand Swaroop admits, of course, that there was a defect in the nomination papers, but says that defect was not substantial, not being in respect of any really important matter. The submission is, that the important question in such a case is whether the candidate seeking election does or does not belong to a scheduled caste, and that fact according to Learned Counsel was easily ascertainable by looking at the certificate filed by the two candidates with their nomination papers. This was the line of reasoning taken before the Supreme Court in Brijendralal v. Jawalaprasad AIR 1950 S.C. 1049, but is was not accepted.

This view, if I may say so with respect-is found. The reason of the rule is that in a democratic polity, the sovereignty rests with the people The will of the people is supreme; and when this will is expressed in clear, imperative, and exhaustive terms in a statue, it has to be rigidly and strictly enforced. Particularly in the matter of election of people''s representatives, if the law requires that a candidate at an election has to comply with certain formalities and it also provides a penalty for non-compliance with these formalities, no administrative authority entrusted with the execution of that law, can have any discretion to condone a noncompliance with those requirements and stave off the statutory penalty.

Counsel for the respondents referred to a Single Bench judgment of this Court in Civil Writ No. 1401 of 1934 (Kartur Singh v. State of Punjab and others C.W. 140. of 1984) decided on 12th November, 1964. In that case, a contrary view was taken. However, with due deference, it is submitted that the ratio of that case must be confined to its peculiar facts. It seems that the Division Bench judgments of this Court in Fateh Singh v. Shri K.C. Grover17, and Gurdip Singh v. Gurmej Singh, were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge in that case.

Mr. Rekhi has also referred to several judicial pronouncements proceedings on an interpretation of the analogous provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the Rules framed thereunder. Some of them may be noticed. In Baru Ram v. Smt. Prasanni15, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were concerned with the interpretation of sections 33(4), 33(5), and 36(2)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 36 of the aforesaid Act of 1951 dealt with the scrutiny of the nominations and the object of its provisions as shown by subsection (8) was to prepare a list of validly nominated candidates. Sub-section (1) of section 36 provided that on the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations each candidate and one other person duly authorised may attend at such time and place as the Returning Officer may appoint, and the Returning Officer was required to give them all reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers of all candidates which had been duly delivered. Sub-section (2) then dealt with scrutiny of the nomination papers and provided that the Returning Officer shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may either on such objection, or on his own motion, after such summary, enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any nomination on any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a), (b), and (c) of the said sub-section. Sub section 2(b) dealt with cases where there bad been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of sections 33 or 34. In that case, Jai Bhagwan, one of the candidates failed to produce the certified copy of the electoral roll and the relevant entry of such roll as is required by sections 36(7) and 33(5). There was no doubt in that case about the failure on the part of Jai Bhagwan to comply with section 33 (5) and prima facie section 36 (2) (b) seemed to justify the rejection of his nomination papers on that ground. It was argued before the Supreme Court that the requirement of section 33(5) was not mandatory but only directory. Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court observed: "Whenever the statue requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence it would be difficult to accept the argument that the failure to comply with the said requirement should lead to any other consequence". It was also urged before the Supreme Court that the statute itself makes a distinction between the defects which are of a substantial character and those which are not of a substantial character. Reference was made to section 36(4) of the Act, which provided that the Returning Officer shall not reject any nomination papers on the ground of any detect, which is not of a substantial character. This argument was rejected in these words:

There is no doubt that the essential object of the scrutiny of nomination papers is that the returning officer should be satisfied that the candidate who is not an elector in the constituency in question is in fact an elector of a different constituency. The satisfaction of the returning officer is thus the matter of substance in these proceedings; and if the statute provides the mode in which the returning officer has to be satisfied by the candidate it is that mode which the candidate must adopt. In the present case, Jai Bhagwan failed to produce any of the copies prescribed and the returning officer was naturally not satisfied that Jai Bhagwan was an elector of a different constituency. If that in substance was the result of Jai Bhagwan''s failure to produce the relevant copy the consequence prescribed by section 36(2)(b) must inevitably follow....

It is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law have to be strictly observed.

The observations of the Supreme Court in Baru Ram''s case apply with greater force to the case before me. It may be noted that there is no provision in the Punjab Municipal Election Rules corresponding to section 36(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The failure on the part of Bihari Lal Respondent, therefore, to comply strictly with the provisions of Rule 11(2) could not be overlooked merely on the ground that the Returning Officer could, from the certificate appended to the nomination papers, satisfy himself that the candidate was a member of one of the Scheduled Castes, for which a seat had been reserved from this Double-member Ward.

Mr. Rekhi has also referred to Rattan Amol Singh and another v Ch. Atma Ram AIR 1954 S.C. 519 and Brijendralal Gupta and another v. Jawala Prasad18. In the former case, it was held that the provisions of section 33(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 195l, are not directory but mandatory in nature. In the later case, it was held that the omission to specify the age of a candidate was a defect of a substantial character, and could not be condoned. On the same principle and also in view of the language of Rules 11 and 16(1) of the Punjab Municipal Rules, it can be said that the provisions of these rules are mandatory and not merely directory. Once it is found that in the nomination papers a candidate has not complied with any of the mandatory requirements of this rule, the penal consequences detailed in clauses (a) and (c) of Rule 16(1) inevitably follow. If despite the failure of a candidate to comply with these imperative provisions of Rule 11, the Returning Officer or the revising authority accepts the defect in the nomination papers of the candidate, it will be deemed that there is an error of law apparent on the face of his order, which would warrant an interference by this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

In view of the above discussion, it must be held that the impugned order of the revising authority accepting Bihari Lal''s nomination papers, and the consequent order made under Rule 20, declaring Bihari Lal Respondent as having been elected unopposed from the reserved seat of this Ward, were manifestly illegal. I would, therefore, allow this writ petition to the extent, indicated above, and set aside the impugned order, dated 8th September, 1967, of the revising authority. A writ of quo warranto shall also issue, removing Bihari Lal Respondent from the membership of the Municipal Committte, Amritsar. The Deputy Commissioner shall prepare, fix, and notify a fresh programme in accordance with the rules, for election to the Reserved seat of this constituency at an early date.

In view of the vague and general allegations of mala fide in the petition which have not been pressed at the trial, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs.