High CourtsSingle Bench

Nand Lal vs Joginder Singh and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 21 August 2013 · Citation: (2013) 08 P&H CK 0150

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sabina, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378(4) · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 406, 420
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CRM-A-427-MA of 2013 (O and M)
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

44 paragraphs · 919 words

Sabina, J.—Respondents had faced trial in a complaint case filed by the applicant u/s 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Trial

Court vide order dated 20.03.2013 acquitted the respondents, hence, the present application u/s 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

for grant of leave to file appeal against the order of acquittal dated 20.03.2013 by the complainant. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant

and have gone through the record available on file carefully.

2.

Prosecution story, in brief, is that respondents were owner in possession of the land measuring 89 kanals and 19 marlas. On 27.01.2006,

respondents on their own behalf and on behalf of Narinder Singh, Sukhdeep Singh and Devinder Singh entered into agreement to sell the said land

in favour of the complainant @ Rs. 8,10,000/- per acre. Respondents received Rs. 15,00,00/- by way of advance money. Another sum of Rs.

6,00,000/- was paid to the respondents on 15.02.2006. Sale deed was to be executed on or before 15.05.2006. However, respondents failed to

perform their part of the contract. Complainant later came to know that the respondents had executed sale deed on 30.05.2006 in favour of

Narender Singh, Harvinder Singh, Prem Singh, Lalit Kumar.

3.

During the course of arguments, it has transpired that applicant has filed a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell in question.

5.

In the present case, date for execution of the sale deed was fixed as 15.05.2006 whereas, the sale deed was executed by the respondent in

favour of Narinder Singh and others on 30.05.2006. Thus, the dispute between the parties can be said to be purely civil in nature and applicant has

already resorted to his civil remedy. In the civil proceedings, the validity of the agreement to sell in question will be gone into and further, it will be

seen as to whether the applicant had failed to perform his part of the contract or whether the respondents had failed to perform their part of the

contract.

6.

In these circumstances, the Trial Court had rightly ordered the acquittal of the respondents of the charges framed against them though for

different reasons.

7.

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Allarakha K. Mansuri Vs. State of Gujarat, held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one

which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court.

8.

A Division Bench of this Court in State of Punjab Vs. Hansa Singh , while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has opined as under:

We are of the opinion that the matter would have to be examined in the light of the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar

Vs. State of Rajasthan, which are that interference in an appeal against acquittal would be called for only if the judgment under appeal were

perverse or based on a misreading of the evidence and merely because the appellate Court was inclined to take a different view, could not be a

reason calling for interference.

9.

To the same effect is the ratio of the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Goa Vs. Sanjay Thakran and Another, and in Chandrappa and

Others Vs. State of Karnataka,

10.

Similarly, in Mrinal Das and Others Vs. The State of Tripura, , the Supreme Court, after looking into various judgments, has laid down

parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under:

8) It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its

extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to

re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or

condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for

presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is

presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on

record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the

evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived

at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the

appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An

order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are ""compelling and substantial reasons"", for doing so. If the order is ""clearly

unreasonable"", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has

ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial

Court depending on the materials placed.

No ground is made out to grant leave to file an appeal. Accordingly, this application is dismissed.