Nandkishor and Others vs State of M.P. and Others

M.C. Garg, J—This petition has been filed by all the family members of Shri Virendra, who was married to the complainant in the year 2005. There was also a child born from the wedlock in the year 2006, however, right from June, 2011, the complainant started living separately as she left her matrimonial home and started living with her parents in village Bhiladia, Tehsil Seoni, District Hoshangabad(M.P.).

After receiving notice asking the complainant to join the company of the applicant in June, 2012, the complainant filed a complaint against the petitioners, who are the husband, the father-in-law, mother-in-law and the brother-in-law of the petitioner after about 1 year of separation from the petitioner-husband. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, Police registered F.I.R. against the petitioners vide Complaint No. 217/2012 under Section 498-A, 506/34 of the IPC as also under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. A challan has also been filed.

The petitioner, on the receipt of summons of the case has filed the petition for quashing of the proceedings. It is stated, that the allegations made in the complaint are omnibus and the complaint has just been filed to stay away from the matrimonial home and without any truth, which are anyways vague and without any particulars.

The case was directed to be listed for final disposal in terms of the order passed by this Court on 23.09.2015.

Arguments have been heard and written submissions have also been filed by the complainant.

According to the complainant, if the allegations are sufficient for consideration of charges, at that stage, this Court should not intervene by way of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing of the complaint. Having referred to two judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court, which are as follows:

(i) State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992) CriLJ 527 : (1990) 4 JT 650 : (1990) 2 SCALE 1066 : (1992) 1 SCC 335 Supp : (1990) 3 SCR 259 Supp

(ii) Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj and another Vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another, AIR 1996 SC 309 : (1996) CriLJ 381 : (1995) 4 Crimes 171 : (1995) 7 JT 299 : (1995) 5 SCALE 670 : (1995) 6 SCC 194 : (1995) 4 SCR 237 Supp

On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the present case, considering the allegations made and the manner it has been done by impleading each and every family members of the petitioner that also after 6 years of the marriage and after receiving a notice under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act only goes to show that the allegations are mala fide and without any basis.

He has also relied upon various judgments of the Apex Court to support their contentions, such as:

(i) Nawal Kishore Jagannath Prasad Vs. State of M.P., (1978) ILR (MP) 1464 : (1999) 1 MPLJ 167

(ii) Ramesh Kumar Radheshyam Agrawal and Others Vs. State of M.P., (1999) 1 MPLJ 423

(iii) Annapurnabai @ Bhoori Vs. State of M.P., (2000) 1 DMC 699 : (1999) 2 MPLJ 85

(iv) Smt. Sarla Prabhakar Waghmare Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (1990) CriLJ 407 : (1991) 1 DMC 310

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the complaint as well the notice issued by the petitioner to the complainant to join his company.

In her complaint, the complainant has stated as under:

The complaint is dated 12.05.2012, whereas the parties are married to each other in the year 2005. A perusal of the complaint show that no details as to when exactly the demands were made and by whom.

There is no dispute that she is living separately from the year 2011 and a notice has been given to her by the complainant through lawyer on 07.06.2012 which reads as under:

It is, therefore, apparent that except for the allegations made in the complaint, which does not contains any particulars and the allegations made by the petitioner and who made the demand and where, also taking into consideration the fact that the complaint was filed only after receipt of the notice calling her to join the company of the petitioner, the allegation apparently appears to be mala fide. Even in the written arguments, except the complaint, nothing has been mentioned.

A judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Preeti Gupta & Another Vs. State of Jharkhand & Another decided on 13.08.2010 in Criminal Appeal No. 1512/2010, which is relevant and reproduced hereunder:

"15. This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts'' powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphrys [1977] AC 1 stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court''s power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved.

The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution but court''s failing to use the power for advancement of justice can also lead to grave injustice. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.

This court had occasion to examine the legal position in a large number of cases. In R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960) CriLJ 1239 : (1960) 3 SCR 388 , this court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

This court in State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, AIR 1977 SC 1489 : (1977) CriLJ 1125 : (1977) 2 SCC 699 : (1977) 3 SCR 113 observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.

In Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1978) CriLJ 165 : (1977) 4 SCC 551 : (1978) SCC(Cri) 10 : (1978) 1 SCR 749 : (1977) 9 UJ 733 , a three-Judge Bench of this court held as under:

" ..... In case the impugned order clearly brings out a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court, or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. Such cases would necessarily be few and far between. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. The present case would undoubtedly fall for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, that the invoking of the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible."

This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Others Vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Others, AIR 1988 SC 709 : (1988) CriLJ 853 : (1988) 1 Crimes 780 : (1988) 1 JT 279 : (1988) 1 SCALE 261 : (1988) 1 SCC 692 : (1988) 2 SCR 930 observed in para 7 as under:

"7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the un-controverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."

In State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992) CriLJ 527 : (1990) 4 JT 650 : (1990) 2 SCALE 1066 : (1992) 1 SCC 335 Supp : (1990) 3 SCR 259 Supp , this court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, Cr.P.C.) under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:

"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

In G. Sagar Suri and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 2000 SC 754 : (2000) 100 CompCas 613 : (2000) CriLJ 824 : (2000) 2 CTC 107 : (2000) 1 JT 360 : (2000) 1 SCALE 271 : (2000) 2 SCC 636 : (2000) 1 SCR 417 : (2000) AIRSCW 296 : (2000) 1 Supreme 322 , this court observed that it is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing the process particularly when matters are essentially of civil nature.

This court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Others Vs. Md. Sharaful Haque and Others, AIR 2005 SC 9 : (2005) CriLJ 92 : (2004) 9 SCALE 177 : (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus:-

"It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

A three-Judge Bench (of which one of us, Bhandari, J. was the author of the judgment) of this Court in Inder Mohan Goswami and Another Vs. State of Uttaranchal and Others, AIR 2008 SC 251 : (2007) 5 CTC 614 : (2007) 11 JT 499 : (2007) 12 SCALE 15 : (2007) 10 SCR 847 : (2007) AIRSCW 6659 comprehensively examined the legal position. The court came to a definite conclusion and the relevant observations of the court are reproduced in para 24 of the said judgment as under:-

"Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute."

We have very carefully considered the averments of the complaint and the statements of all the witnesses recorded at the time of the filing of the complaint. There are no specific allegations against the appellants in the complaint and none of the witnesses have alleged any role of both the appellants.

Admittedly, appellant No. 1 is a permanent resident of Navasari, Surat, Gujarat and has been living with her husband for more than seven years. Similarly, appellant No. 2 is a permanent resident of Goregaon, Maharashtra. They have never visited the place where the alleged incident had taken place. They had never lived with respondent No. 2 and her husband. Their implication in the complaint is meant to harass and humiliate the husband''s relatives. This seems to be the only basis to file this complaint against the appellants. Permitting the complainant to pursue this complaint would be an abuse of the process of law.

It is a matter of common knowledge that unfortunately matrimonial litigation is rapidly increasing in our country. All the courts in our country including this court are flooded with matrimonial cases. This clearly demonstrates discontent and unrest in the family life of a large number of people of the society.

The courts are receiving a large number of cases emanating from section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which reads as under:-

"498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.--Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, `cruelty'' means:-

(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."

It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under section 498-A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment are also a matter of serious concern.

The learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and obligation to ensure that the social fiber of family life is not ruined or demolished. They must ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are filed either on their advice or with their concurrence. The learned members of the Bar who belong to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions and should treat every complaint under section 498-A as a basic human problem and must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best of their abilities to ensure that social fiber, peace and tranquility of the society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also ensure that one complaint should not lead to multiple cases.

Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and consequences are not properly visualized by the complainant that such complaint can lead to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant, accused and his close relations.

The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband''s close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband''s relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.

Before parting with this case, we would like to observe that a serious relook of the entire provision is warranted by the legislation. It is also a matter of common knowledge that exaggerated versions of the incident are reflected in a large number of complaints. The tendency of over implication is also reflected in a very large number of cases.

The criminal trials lead to immense sufferings for all concerned. Even ultimate acquittal in the trial may also not be able to wipe out the deep scars of suffering of ignominy. Unfortunately a large number of these complaints have not only flooded the courts but also have led to enormous social unrest affecting peace, harmony and happiness of the society. It is high time that the legislature must take into consideration the pragmatic realities and make suitable changes in the existing law. It is imperative for the legislature to take into consideration the informed public opinion and the pragmatic realities in consideration and make necessary changes in the relevant provisions of law. We direct the Registry to send a copy of this judgment to the Law Commission and to the Union Law Secretary, Government of India who may place it before the Hon''ble Minister for Law & Justice to take appropriate steps in the larger interest of the society.

When the facts and circumstances of the case are considered in the background of legal principles set out in preceding paragraphs, then it would be unfair to compel the appellants to undergo the rigmarole of a criminal trial. In the interest of justice, we deem it appropriate to quash the complaint against the appellants. As a result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Consequently, this appeal is allowed.

We may also make a reference to the following judgments which lays down that: "where large number of family members had been included by casually mentioning their names and contents did not disclose their active involvement, cognizance of matter against them would not be justified":

(i) (2005) 5 SCC 207

(ii) Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 2005 SC 3100 : (2005) CriLJ 3439 : (2005) 2 DMC 325 : (2005) 6 JT 266 : (2005) 6 SCC 281 : (2005) 2 SCR 730 Supp : (2005) 2 UJ 1057 : (2005) AIRSCW 3569 : (2005) 5 Supreme 137

(iii) Ramesh and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2005 SC 1989 : (2005) CriLJ 1732 : (2005) 1 DMC 554 : (2005) 3 JT 90 : (2005) 3 SCC 507 : (2005) 2 SCR 493 : (2005) 2 UJ 885 : (2005) AIRSCW 1319 : (2005) 2 Supreme 381

(iv) Manoj Mahavir Prasad Khaitan Vs. Ram Gopal Poddar and Another, (2011) 111 CLT 277 : (2010) 2 DMC 802 : (2010) 12 JT 473 : (2010) 11 SCALE 59 : (2010) 10 SCC 673 : (2011) 1 SCC(Cri) 94

(v) Geeta Mehrotra and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Another, AIR 2013 SC 181 : (2012) 10 SCALE 299 : (2012) 10 SCC 741 : (2012) AIRSCW 5692

(vi) Chandralekha and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, (2013) 2 AD 565 : (2013) 1 DMC 1 : (2012) 12 JT 390 : (2013) 1 RCR(Criminal) 959 : (2012) 12 SCALE 692

(vii) (2014) 13 SCC 567

Applying the Principles as laid down, in the facts of this case, when it is apparent that the filing of the complaint that also with vague allegations and without particulars after receipt of a notice of a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act having separated from the matrimonial home for a period of more than one year prior to that and, having not raised any dispute against the petitioner or his family members right from the year 2005 when the marriage took place only goes to show that the respondent/complainant does not wish to live with the petitioner.

It is apparent on a bare perusal of the complaint that the allegations made by the complainant are mala fide and only with a view to harass the petitioner and his family members for some reasons which are not coming forth and may be for fetching some good amount of compensation which the petitioner may not be in a position to pay.

Hence, allowing such kind of prosecution would only amount to permitting abuse of process of law, therefore, the present petition is allowed. Consequently, the FIR in crime No. 217/2012 dated 12.06.2012 registered against the petitioners for offences under Section 498-A, 506/34 of the IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and the proceedings pending in the court of JMFC, Seoni - Malwa, District Hoshangabad, vide Criminal Case No. 357/2012 are quashed at this stage itself and their bail bonds are discharged.