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Judgment
B.J. Divan, J.—The petitioner herein has challenged certain orders passed by the Collector of Mehsana in connection with matters arising
before him under the provisions of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and has also challenged the action of
the second respondent, the President of Kalol Municipality, in connection with certain meetings held on the requisition by some of the members of
that Municipality. The petitioner is appearing in person. He is an elected councillor of this municipality. At the time of the presentation of the
petition, he was the Chairman of the Legal Committee of Kalol Municipality. Respondent No. 2 is the President of the Municipality and respondent
No. 3 is the Acting Chief Officer of the Kalol Municipality, who was appointed to that post under the circumstances set out in the petition.
Respondent No. 1 is the Collector of Mehsana. Respondent No. 4 is the Government of Gujarat. Respondent No. 5 is the former Chief Officer of
the Kalol Municipality and the sixth respondent is the Municipality itself. It is the case of the petitioner, as set out in the petition, that the present
board of the Municipality was Constituted on November 1, 1970. The petitioner contends that there are two groups in this Municipality. One of
the two groups is led by respondent No. 2 and the other group is led by the petitioner. The petitioner contends that, when the new board was
constituted in November 1970, respondent No. 2 had the support of 19 out of 25 councillors of the Municipality and the petitioner contends that
between November 1970 and the date of the filing of this petition, on January 4, 1973, the second respondent had lost the support of the majority
of the councillors and the petitioner contends that at present respondent No. 2 is supported by only 8 councillors whereas the petitioner himself is
supported by 15 councillors. The petitioner states that, on November 1, 1972, a special general meeting of the Municipality was hied under the
chairmanship of the Vice-President ''to discuss a motion of no-confidence'' moved under the provisions of Section 36 of the Act, and the motion
was against respondent No. 2, the President. At that meeting, 18 councillors, including the President and the Vice President, were present and the
petitioner states that the President and the Vice-President voted against the motion and the remaining 16 councillors voted in favour of the motion.
Thus, the petitioner contends that the motion of no-confidence against the President was carried by more than two-third of the councillors present
at the meeting. The proceeding of that meeting of November 1, 1972, was also written to that effect in the proceeding book on the spot and it was
also signed by the Vice President, who was the presiding officer of that meeting. The petitioner says that he himself had read the proceeding but,
subsequently, on November 2, 1972, when a special general meeting of the Municipality, presided over by respondent No. 2, was held, it was
found that the proceeding had been changed. At that meeting of November 2, 1972 a resolution was passed by which it was proposed to
recommend to the Government that respondent No. 2 shall be removed from the presidentship as well as the membership as an ordinary councillor
from the Municipality u/s 37, Sub-section (1) of the Act. This resolution of November 2, 1972 authorised the present petitioner to furnish all
relevant papers to the Government of Gujarat and the resolution directed the Chief Officer to furnish to the petitioner without delay the relevant
papers as well as records as may be required by the petitioner. This resolution was carried by 16 votes to 6 votes. The petitioner says that in the
said special general meeting of November 2, 1972 the minutes of the special general meeting of November 1, 1972 were neither read nor
confirmed and the petitioner contends that at the end of the proceeding certain words were added after the proceeding book was signed by the
presiding officer and after the contents of that proceeding had been actually read by the petitioner. The petitioner contends that these additional
words were written by the then Chief Officer, respondent No. 5, at the instance of respondent No. 2. The petitioner contends that this action on
the part of respondent No. 2 amounted to misconduct and the petitioner and others decided to call a special general meeting of the Municipality to
discuss this alleged misconduct of respondent No. 5 and to take necessary action in the matter. A letter, signed by 10 councillors of the Kalol
Municipality, was addressed and delivered to respondent No. 2, requesting him to call a special general meeting of the Kalol Municipality. The
second respondent presided over the meeting of the Municipality held on November 4, 1972 and the question of correctness of the minutes of the
meeting of November 1, 1972 was raised and there was a lot of discussion at the meeting. The points of order raised by the petitioner are alleged
to have been over-ruled by respondent No. 2. A question was raised that it was not permissible for the president to preside over the meeting even
for the purpose of confirming the minutes of the meeting of November I, 1972 and the petitioner was over-ruled on this point. The petitioner then
sets out a number of matters on which there were differences between the petitioner and respondent No. 2. The petitioner has also mentioned in
the petition that, in the course of the controversy that arose, the Kalol Municipality by a majority purported to pass a resolution on December 4,
1972 reducing the term of office of the second respondent from five years to two years. At that meeting of December 4, 1972 the petitioner had
presided and there was some controversy between the parties as to whether the proceedings of the meeting of December 4, 1972 were legal and
valid or not. In the course of this judgment, we are not concerned to examine the correctness of the rival contentions on this point but the main
question we have to consider, in the course of this judgment, is whether it was competent to the general board of the Kalol Municipality to pass a
resolution reducing the term of office of the President. After that resolution was passed, the third respondent herein, purporting to be the Chief
Officer of the Kalol Municipality; addressed the letter dated December 5, 1972 to the Collector of Mehsana, respondent No. 1 herein, to the
effect that, on reduction of the term of office of the President of the Kalol Municipality, the office of the President had fallen vacant and, u/s 42,
Sub-section (1) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, the Collector was called upon to take appropriate action for filling up the vacancy. The Collector
gave an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, the second respondent and the third respondent, who claimed to be the Chief Officer of the
Kalol Municipality, and, ultimately, by his order dated January 1, 1973, Annexure ''T to the petition, the first respondent held that it was not
competent to the Kalol Municipality to pass a resolution reducing the term of the President. In view of that conclusion, the Collector held that
resolution No. 285, by which the term of the President was purported to be reduced from five years to two years and one month, that is upto
December 5, 1972, was as such illegal and beyond the competence of the municipal board and could not be recognised as valid.
In these proceedings, the petitioner has challenged this order, Annexure ''T'' to the petition, passed by the first respondent on January 1 1973.
We may also mention that the petitioner has challenged the constitutional validity of Section 36 of the Act and has contended that Section 36 is
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution in as much as it makes provision for a special majority for passing a motion of no-confidence without any
reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia. The first respondent and the second respondent appeared at the hearing and after the
stage of admission of this petition and after the matter was discussed before us, the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 and 6 arrived at a certain
arrangement between themselves on January 11, 1973. Under those consent terms, it was agreed that a special general meeting of, the,
Municipality should be called by the second respondent on January 18, 1973 for discussing the propositions set out in those consent terms. Those
consent terms were filed in Court. In view of those consent terms, the only question that we have to decide, in the course of this judgment, is
whether under the provisions of the Act it is open to the general board of the Municipality functioning under the Act to reduce the term of the
president of the Municipality, after it has been initially fixed under the provisions of the Act. We may mention that the petitioner has not given up the
point regarding the constitutional validity of Section 36 of the Act and we have kept that question open, as it is not necessary for us to express any
opinion regarding the validity of that section for the purpose of deciding this petition.
Before we proceed to discuss the provisions of the Act in this connection we may mention that it is common ground that at the first meeting of
the newly elected members of this municipality after the new board was constituted in the month of November 1970, the term of office of the
president of the municipality was determined to be five years and thereafter the second respondent was elected as the president. The petitioner
contends that under the provisions of the Act, it is competent to the general board of the municipality to modify or cancel this resolution passed in
November 1970 in such a manner that the term of the president is not reduced below two years and once the period of two years from the date of
the first determination of the term of office has passed, it is open to the municipality, in view of the provisions of Section 51 to modify or cancel the
resolution and even though a longer period for the term of the president can in the first instance be determined, it can be reduced to a period of not
less than two years.
The relevant provisions of the Act that require consideration may now be noticed. u/s 31 of the. Act, a municipality is required to be presided
over by a president who shall be elected by the councillor from among themselves in the manner prescribed by rules made by the State
Government and there shall be a vice-president similarly elected for each municipality. It is to be noted in this context that the president and the
vice-president must be from amongst the councillors and this has an important bearing when we consider the other provisions of the Act. u/s 32(i),
after a general election to a municipality, the Collector shall call the first general meeting of the municipality for the determination of the term of
office of the president and the vice-president of the municipality and for the election of the president and vice-president. Such meeting shall be
called within twenty five days from the date on which the names of the councillors of the municipality are published in the Official Gazette u/s 6.
This meeting is to be presided over by the Collector or such officer as the Collector may by order in writing appoint in this behalf. The procedure
of the first meeting is to be prescribed by rules made by the State Government and the presiding officer is to have such powers as may be
prescribed by the said rules but he has no right to vote. Sub-section (3) of Section 32, in terms, lays down that, no business other than the
determination of the term of office of the president and vice-president and the election of the president and vice-president shall be transacted at
such meeting. Thus, at the first meeting, only two items can be on the agenda of the meeting, namely, the determination of the term of office of the
president and vice-president and the election of the president and vice-president and no other business can be transacted at that first meeting. Sub-
section (4) of Section 32 is not material for the purpose of this judgment. Section 33, Sub-section (1) is the material section which requires to be
considered and it is in these terms:
Save as otherwise provided in this Act, a president or vice-president shall hold his office for such term as the municipality shall, previous to his
election determine, not being less than two years or the residue of the term of office of the municipality, whichever be less, and not exceeding five
years, and he shall be eligible for re-election:
Provided that the term of office of such president or vice-president shall be deemed to extend to and expire with the date on which his successor is
elected.
Under Sub-section (2) of Section 33, if during his term of office mentioned in Sub-section (1), the president or vice-president ceases to be a
councillor he shall vacate the office held by him. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 33, on the expiry of the term of office of a municipality, the
president and vice-president shall continue to carry on the current administrative duties of their offices until such time as a new president and vice-
president shall have been elected and shall have taken over charge of their duties. Section 35 provides for resignation of the office by the president
or vice-president or by any councillor and the persons to whom such resignations have to be tendered are mentioned in Section 35. Thus, a
president may vacate his office either when he ceases to be a councillor or when he resigns his office u/s 35 and the Collector accepts the
resignation of the post of the president. Equally, a president may resign his office as a councillor d thereby once he ceases to be a councillor, he has
also to vacate the affair of the president held by him. Section 36 provides for a motion of confidence. Any councillor of a municipality who intends
to move a ""movation of no-confidence against its president or vice-president may give notice thereof, in such form as may be prescribed by the
State Government to the municipality. A motion can be moved only if it is supported has to less than one third of the total number of the then
councillors of the municipality. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 36, if the motion is carried majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number
of the then councillors of the municipality, the president or, as the case may be, the vice-president shall cease to hold office after a period of three
days from date on which the motion is carried unless he has earlier resigned, d thereupon the office held by him shall be declared to be vacant.
Thus, the passing of a motion of no-confidence by the requisite two-thirds out of the total number of the then councillors of the city is one more
occasion when the president vacates his before the expiry of the term of his office. u/s 37, the State Government has been empowered to remove
from office any councilor of a municipality or any president or vice-president of a municipality on the ground of misconduct in the discharge of his
duties or of any disgraceful conduct or becoming incapable of performing his duties under the Act. Section 38 provides for certain disabilities in the
case of a councillor from continuing as a councillor and if the requirements of Section 38 are met, he is disabled from continuing to be a councillor
and his office as a councillor shall become vacant. Section 39 provides that if any councillor absents himself for the different periods mentioned
therein from the meetings of the municipality or from the municipal borough without the requisite leave of absence, he shall cease to be a councillor
and his office shall become vacant. Section 40 empowers the State Government to suspend from office a president or a vice-president under the
circumstances mentioned therein and once the order of suspension is passed after following the appropriate procedure, a councillor has to be
elected to perform all the duties and exercise all the powers of a president or, as the case may be, vice-president during the period for which such
suspension continues. Thus, under the provisions of different sections, which we have so far mentioned, the office of a councillor becomes vacant if
the conditions of the relevant sections are satisfied and if the councillor whose office becomes vacant under those provisions happens to be a
president or vice-president, u/s 33, Sub-section (2), the president or vice-president, as the case may be, vacates the office held by him. Over and
above these provisions relating to the vacating of office of a councillor, there are specific provisions, which we have mentioned above, provide for
a vote of no-confidence or resignation or order passed by the State Government on grounds of misconduct or disgraceful conduct or becoming
incapable of performing the duties under the Act, -which indicate that the office of a president may become vacant, even before the expiry of the
term of office determined at the first meeting of the municipality. u/s 42, provision is made for filling up of vacancies. Under Sub-section (1) of that
section, when any vacancy occurs due to failure to elect the full number of councillors at a general election or due to the non-acceptance of office
by a person elected to be a councillor, or due to an election having been set aside, or any vacancy of a president, vice-president or councillor
occurs due to any reason, the Chief Officer of the municipality and in the absence of the Chief Officer, such officer as the Collector may, by
general or special order, designate for the purpose has to give a notice of such vacancy to the Collector within fifteen days from the date on which
the vacancy occurs. Sub-section (2) of that section provides for the procedure to be followed by the Collector on receipt of such a notice of
vacancy. For the purpose of this judgment, Sub-section (5) of Section 42 is material. It is in these terms:
A person elected or deemed to be elected as a councillor or elected as a president or vice-president under Sub-section (2) shall hold office so
long only as the councillor, president or vice-president in whose place he is elected, would have held office had the vacancy not occurred.
Thus, a person elected to fill up a vacancy holds office only so long as the person in whose place he is elected would have held office had the
vacancy not occurred. These Sections 31 to 42 are to be found in Chapter III of the Act and the heading of that Chapter is President, Vice-
president, Councillors and Chief Officer and Sections 31 to 43 both inclusive occur in a group of sections with the heading provisions relating to
Presidents, Vice-Presidents and Councillors of municipalities. We are not concerned with the remaining provisions of this Chapter. Chapter IV of
the Act deals with the conduct of business and under the group of Sections 51 and 52 with the heading Municipal Meetings, provision has been
made with respect to meetings of the municipality. Section 51 provides for meetings of the municipality and procedure. Sub-section 10 of Section
51 provides that, save as otherwise provided by or under this Act all questions shall be decided by a majority of votes of the councillors present
and voting, the presiding authority having a second or casting vote in all cases of equality of votes. Votes are to be taken and the result thereof to
be recorded in such manner as may be prescribed by rules in that behalf for the time being in force under Clause (a) of Section 271. The petitioner,
who has argued his case in person, has relied very strongly on Sub-section (12) of Section 51, which is in following terms:
No resolution of a municipality shall be modified or cancelled within three months after the passing thereof, except by a resolution supported by not
less than one-half of the whole number of councillors and passed at a general meeting, whereof notice shall have been given fulfilling the
requirements of Clause (3) and setting forth fully the resolution which it is proposed to modify or cancel at such meeting and the motion or
proposition for the modification or cancellation of such resolution.
It has been urged before us that ordinarily a resolution passed by the general board of the municipality cannot be modified or cancelled within a
period of three mouths after it has been passed but once the period of three months has expired, any resolution whatsoever can be cancelled or
modified by a simple majority, because under Sub-section (10) of Section 51, save as otherwise provided by or under this Act all questions are to
be decided by a majority of votes of the councillors present and voting. It was contended that, even the original resolution determining the term of
office of the president passed at the first meeting of the municipality contemplated by Sections 32 and 33 -has to be passed by a simple majority
and not by any special majority. u/s 36, Sub-section (2) a special majority is required for passing a motion of no-confidence against the president
or vice-president, namely that the motion of no-confidence must be carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the then
councillors of the municipality. We may also mention that u/s 48, no chief officer or officer appointed under Sub-section (4) or (5) of Section 47
can be removed from office, reduced in rank or suspended except by a resolution passed by a majority of at least two-thirds of the total number of
the then councillors. Thus, wherever the statute so requires provision has been made for a majority of two-thirds of the then councillors instead of
for a simple majority of the councillors present at the meeting and voting. It was contended by the petitioner before us that since no special majority
is provided for the purpose of passing a resolution modifying or cancelling any earlier resolution of the municipality, any earlier resolution can be
modified or cancelled by an ordinary majority of the councillors present and voting at the meeting and hence it is open to the general board of the
municipality to reduce the term of office of the president determined under Sub-section (1) of Section 33, read with Section 32, Sub-section (3),
to any period but not less than two years.
The petitioner has urged before us that the opening words of Section 33, Sub-section (1) ""save as otherwise provided in this Act"" include the
provisions of Section 51, Sub-section (12) of the Act which, according to him, can cover the modification or cancellation of a resolution
determining the term of office of the president. We are unable to agree with this contention of the petitioner. In the first place, Sub-section (1) of
Section 33 deals with the determination of the term of office of president and vice-president of the municipality and this section clearly provides
that such term of office of the president or vice-president has to be determined previous to the election of the president or vice-president.
Secondly, as indicated by Sub-section (3) of Section 32 at the first meeting of the municipality held after the new board is constituted, no business
other than the determination of the term of office of the president and vice-president and the election of the president and the vice-president are to
be transacted. The order in which these two items of business are to be transacted are mentioned in Section 33, namely, firstly the municipality
must decide about the term of office of the president and vice-president and after the term is so determined by the appropriate resolution of the
municipality, the election of the president and vice-president can be held. Sub-section (1) of Section 33 deals only with the term of office of the
president and vice-president and hence the words ""save as otherwise provided in this Act"" occurring at the commencement of Section 33
contemplates only those sections whereby the term of office of the president and vice-president can be affected in any manner. The different
modes in which the term of office of the president can be affected have been mentioned by us earlier. He may cease to be president if a motion of
no-confidence is carried against him; the State Government may remove him from his office if he has incurred a disqualification or if he is disabled
from continuing to be a councillor. For want of leave of absence a councillor may vacate his office and thus because a president vacates his office
for one reason or the other his term of office may come to an end, even before the expiry of the term determined by the municipality at the first
meeting, u/s 33, Sub-section (1), read with Section 32, Sub-section (3). Therefore, there are other provisions in the Act-which clearly indicate that
though the term of office of the president may be fixed at the first meeting for any period between two years and five years, the president will have
to vacate his office and the provisions of Section 42 are to be invoked for filling up the vacancy and it is only one of these-contingencies of vacating
the office of the president which is contemplated by the words ""save as otherwise provided in this Act"". These words, incur opinion, only cover
those other sections and other provisions in the Act which have an impact on the term of office of the president or vice-president. These opening
words cannot, in our opinion, cover the provisions of Section 51, Sub-section (12) which deal with the procedure to be followed at the meetings
of the municipality. The words ""not being less than two years or the residue of the term of office of the municipality, whichever be less, and not
exceeding five years"" occurring in Section 33, Sub-section (1) qualify the word ""term"" occurring in that section and it is clear from these qualifying
words that the term of the office of a president or vice-president which may be determined by the municipality cannot be less than two years and
cannot exceed five years but if the residue of the term of office of the municipality as a whole is less than two years, then, it must extend to the
residue of the term of office of the municipality and not full two years. These words, in our opinion, which are qualifying words for the words ""such
term"" occurring in Section 33, Sub-section (1) cannot empower the general board of the municipality to pass a resolution modifying or cancelling
an earlier resolution without reducing the total term of office of the president to less than two years.
We have pointed out above that u/s 36 a procedure for a motion of no-confidence has been laid down and such a motion of no-confidence has
to be carried by the requisite majority prescribed in Sub-section (2) of Section 36, namely, not less than two-thirds of the total number of the then
councillors of the municipality and not by a majority of the councillors present at the particular meeting where a motion of no-confidence is moved.
If we were to accept the argument of the petitioner, we would be permitting that to be done in an indirect manner which cannot be done directly by
a bare majority of councillors present at a meeting. If the petitioner''s argument regarding the competence of the general board to pass a resolution
reducing the term of office were to be accepted, it would permit a bare majority of the councillors, once the period of two years from the
commencement of the term of office of the president is over, to pass a resolution reducing his term of office from five years to two years, as is
sought to be done in the present case, and in effect remove a president from office, even though two-thirds of the total number of the then
councillors of the municipality have not passed a resolution removing the president from office. It may be pointed out that under the scheme of
different sections which we have noticed, the only power specifically conferred upon the councillors to remove a president from office, once he is
elected, is by passing a motion of no-confidence and that too as required by Section 36 of the Act. There is no other specific power conferred
upon the general board to remove a president or vice-president, save by complying with the provisions of Section 36 of the Act. The other
occasions on which the president or vice-president or a councillor may vacate his office may be because of his own act of omission and
commission or because of an order passed by the State Government but, so far as the general board is concerned, the only power which the
general board has been specifically given to remove a president or vice-president, even before the term of the office, which has been determined at
the first meeting, as contemplated by Section 33, Sub-section (1), is the power conferred upon the general board u/s 36. Therefore, if the power
which has been contended for by the petitioner is to be conceded to the councillors u/s 51, Sub-section (12) of the Act, under the power of
modification or cancellation of an earlier resolution it would amount to holding that, though two-thirds of the total number of the then councillors of
the municipality have not voted for a motion of no-confidence in the president, the president has to go out of office by virtue of the resolution
passed or purported to have been passed by the councillors present at a meeting by a simple majority under the provisions of Section 51, Sub-
section (10) of the Act.
Again the very words of Section 33, Sub-section (1) which use the words ""a president or vice-president shall hold his office for such term as the
municipality shall, previous to his election determine"" clearly indicate that the president or vice-president has a right to continue and hold his office
for the term thus determined by the municipality before his election took place. That right conferred by Section 33, Sub-section (1) can only be
taken away by a specific power given to the municipality as such and not by virtue of the exercise of general power purporting to have been
exercised u/s 51, Sub-section (12) of the Act.
In our opinion, a very useful guidance to the interpretation of Section 33, Sub-section (1) is to be found in Section 42, Sub-section (5) of the
Act. Section 42 lays down the procedure for filling up of vacancies occurring in the office of councillor, president or vice-president and Sub-
section (5) clearly says that a person elected as a councillor or president or vice-president u/s 42 shall hold office so long only as the councillor,
president or vice-president in whose place he is elected would have held office had the vacancy not occurred. Taking an illustration, if the first
meeting of the municipality has fixed the term of office for five years at the first meeting of the municipality and, if before the expiry of that period of
five years, the president vacates his office for one reason or the other, the person elected to fill up the office of the president holds office for the
residue of the period of five years, because it is only for the residue that the president would have held office had the vacancy not occurred. At
such an election of a president to fill up the vacancy, it is not open to the general board to fix the term of office of the president who is to be
elected. The words of Section 42(2)(b) which provide that the provisions of Sections 31 and 32 shall mutatis mutandis apply to such meeting for
filling up the vacancy of the president or vice-president and the election of the president or vice-president thus chosen to fill up the vacancy have to
be read subject to the provisions of Sub-section (5). The term of office of the president elected to fill up the vacancy of an earlier elected president
has not to be determined once again by following the procedure u/s 32, Sub-section (2) but the newly elected president will hold office only for the
residue of the term of the president who has vacated his office for one reason or another on the general power of modification or cancellation of
earlier resolutions which the general board of the municipality always possesses. It is well recognised that if a body or an authority is competent to
transact a business, it is competent to modify or cancel a decision taken by it earlier.
There is another angle from which the argument urged before us by the petitioner can be considered. Section 51, Sub-section (12) is a
restriction on this general power, a restriction is sought to be put by Section 51, Sub-section (12) viz. that once a resolution has been passed by a
municipality, it shall not modify or cancel it within three months after such resolution is passed but if within the period of three months it is to be
modified or cancelled, then, the special procedure laid down in Section 51, Sub-section (12) has to be followed. Section 51, Sub-section (12)
cannot, therefore, be read as a empowering the general board of the municipality to modify or cancel a resolution determining the term of office of
the president once determined u/s 33, Sub-section (1) of the Act. Section 51, Sub-section (12), as mentioned earlier, is not a provision dealing
with the determination of the term of office of the president or vice-president and reading the whole scheme of the Act, in the light of different
provisions, which we have discussed above, it is not possible for us to accept the contention urged before us by the petitioner in person.
The petitioner drew our attention to several passages from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., dealing with the primary rule
of interpretation of statutes, namely, that the language of the Act must be interpreted as it stands and the statute must be read as a whole and the
Act has to be regarded as a whole and not piecemeal. In arriving at our conclusions, we have followed well recognised principles on interpretation
of statutes and it is not necessary for us to deal with different passages from Maxwell relied upon by the petitioner in the course of the arguments.
The ultimate conclusion is that since there is no specific section in the Act empowering the general board to reduce the term of office of the
president once determined u/s 33, Sub-section (1) and since by necessary implication such power could not be found to have been conferred upon
the general board from any other provisions of the Act, it must be held that it is not competent to the general board of the municipality to reduce
the term of the president once determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 32 and Section 33, Sub-section (1) of the Act.
We may mention that all other points which are mentioned in the petition including the question of the validity of the appointment of respondent
No. 3 are left open. The question regarding the vires of Section 36 of the Act and the question of validity of the meeting of January 25, 1973 of
which notice has been given by the second respondent are also left open.
The petitioner has orally applied for a certificate under Article 133(1)(3) of the Constitution but, in our opinion, our judgment does not raise a
question of substantial law of public or private importance to justify the issue of such certificate. We have, therefore, rejected the oral application of
the petitioner.
In these circumstances, the petition stands disposed of. Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs.