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Judgment
Odgers, J.—These were suits brought originally for rent according to a lease agreement as it is called in the plaint in Section A. No. 840 of
1925. This was amended by adding a paragraph for damages for use and occupation of certain land. The question of title in the plaintiff was
expressly excluded and the plaintiffs agent goes to the trouble of recording certain remarks on the plaint whereby the plaintiff reserves his remedy in
ejectment for another occasion. The preliminary objection is taken that all these three suits are of a small cause nature. Their value is admittedly
under Rs. 500. The defendants after the plaints had been filed on the small cause side of the District Munsif''s Court of Palmcottah raised a
question of title by their defence and claimed to be permanent kudivaramadars of the property in question. The issues were first settled on 15th
September, 1922, and the first of them was ''Is the defendant entitled to the permanent right of occupancy claimed''. That was clearly a question
which a Court of Small Causes was incompetent to try and that Court accordingly returned the plaints for representation to the proper Court and
the plaints were accordingly represented on the Original Side of the District Munsif''s Court. On 8th September, 1923, the original issues were
amended and the first issue was deleted leaving the question as to the validity of the lease and the amount of damages for use and occupation, in
other words, rent or damages for use and occupation. It should be added that the first issue as to title, was deleted on the plaintiff''s petition, who it
may be added has all along refused, in this litigation at all events, to embark on any discussion as to his title. The suits appear to have been retained
rightly or wrongly on the Original Side and judgment was given by the Munsif as long ago as 2lst December, 1923, and by the Additional
Subordinate Judge on 5th November, 1924.
On the preliminary objection it has been held in Vira Pillai v. Rangasami Pillai 22 M. 149, that damages for use and occupation may be of a
small cause nature and in Mikkili Ankaya Vs. Alaparti Rattamma, , that a transfer to the Original Side makes no difference. In this case the learned
Small Cause Judge does not say that he transferred it u/s 23 but I take it that that is his meaning. If it is not, then, as I have said, by some oversight
the cases, after the issues were recast, seem to have been retained on the Original Side. The cases are prima facie clearly of a small cause nature.
Mr. Bashyam Iyyengar for the appellant raises the objection that the trials of these suits are ab initio bad and void and they bad no business to be
tried on the Original Side. It seems to me rather curious that an objection like this should be taken by the plaintiff who did not seek to get the order
of the learned Small Cause Judge revised for all these six years, for the order was made in July, 1922, and when the matter did get into the Original
Side succeeded in getting the only issue on which the case was sent to the Original Side deleted, thereby reducing the issues to those of a small
cause nature. He seems to have taken no objection to the jurisdiction at the hearing on the Original Side and it is not raised in his grounds of appeal
here. It is too late to take that objection now which, as I said, comes with singularly bad grace under the circumstances from the plaintiff. The same
question seems to have arisen in a case before Spencer and Ramesam, JJ., reported as Bhuvanapalli Subbayya Vs. Rajah Velugoti Govinda
Krishna Yachendra Varu, Rajah of Venkatagiri, , where the appellant asked that the case should be sent back for re-trial on the Small Cause Side,
i.e., for revision as the Original Side ought not to have tried it and the learned Judge refused to interfere. I am asked to interfere in the same way in
case I am of opinion, as I clearly am, that these appeals are of a small cause nature. The plaintiff in his grounds of appeal claims a decree on the
pleadings and refuses to commit himself, even now as to whether the money alleged to be payable by the defendants is rent or damages for use
and occupation. Both the lower Courts, it may be added, found against the plaintiff. I am clearly of opinion that as these suits are of a small cause
nature no second appeal will lie and further that there is nothing in these cases to induce me to exercise any discretion in favour of the plaintiff who,
as I said has had many years in which to set right any grievance he may have had or any prejudice he may have sustained though, as I said I can
see none by his cases having been tried on the Original Side. The three second appeals are, therefore, dismissed with costs in each.