Nanjunda Rao vs Queen-Empress

The appellant was convicted of having made to the police a false charge of dacoity against certain persons and was sentenced u/s 211, Indian

Penal Code, to suffer four years'' rigorous imprisonment.

In appeal it is urged that, though the charge to the police may have been false, yet as they referred the charge to the Magistrate as false, and as

the Magistrate ordered the charge to be dismissed as false without taking any action against the accused, there was no ""institution of criminal

proceedings"" within the meaning of Section 211, and the offence was therefore only punishable with a maximum of two years'' imprisonment under

the first part of the section, instead of with seven years'' imprisonment under the second part of the section.

In support of this view, the rulings of the Allahabad High Court reported in Empress of India v. Pitam Rai I.L.R., 5 A., 215 and Empress v.

Parahu ILR 5 A. 598, and Queen-Empress v. Karim Buksh ILR (1887) C. 633 were relied upon. These cases no doubt support the construction

of the section for which the appellant contends, but the construction was considered and dissented from by a Full Bench of five Judges of the

Calcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v. The Queen-Empress ILR (1888) C. 574 where they followed a long series of earlier rulings of

the same Court. We think that the view taken in the latter case is correct. We are unable to find any warrant for holding that the words ""the

institution of criminal proceedings"" should be limited to the bringing of a charge before the Magistrate or to action by the Magistrate or police

against the person charged. It seems to us that, when as in this case a charge of a cognizable offence is made to the police against a specified

person, criminal proceedings within the meaning of the section. have been instituted just as much, as if the charge, had been made before the

Magistrate. It is agreed that when a charge is preferred to the police it merely sets them on inquiry, and they may find the charge to be false and

refuse to proceed with the charge without the accused being even aware that any complaint has been made against him; but precisely the same may

be the case when a complaint is made to a Magistrate. He is not bound to take any action against the person accused. He may refer the charge to

the police for enquiry, and on receipt of their report may refuse to proceed or take any action, against the accused person. In such a case the

accused might be unaware that any complaint had ever been made. Yet it could hardly be contended that the complaint to the Magistrate did not

amount to the institution of criminal proceedings within the meaning of the section.

We are of opinion as already stated that the true construction of the section is that laid down by the Calcutta High Court in the case we have

referred to. Adopting that construction we find that the offence of the appellant in the case before us falls under the latter part of Section 211,

I.P.C., and the sentence is not illegal.

Looking to the gravity, of the offence charged and the malice of the complainant, we certainly do not consider the sentence excessive. We

confirm it and dismiss this appeal.