Narang Industries Ltd. and another vs Ashok Leyland Finance Ltd.

Both these Crl.O.P.Nos.5067 and 5068 of 1996, filled against C.C.Nos.2685 and 3661 of 1994, on the file of the disposed of by a common

order, as the parties as well as the issue involved are one and the same in both these proceedings.

The petitioners 1 and 2, the Company, as well as its Managing Director, having office at Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, approached the respondent,

the complainant company, having its main office at Chamiers Road, Madras -18, and entered into an agreement on a hire purchase scheme,

agreeing to pay the hire dues regularly as per the schedule for the purchase of redistillation plants.

Towards the part settlement of hire dues, the petitioners issued two cheques on two different dates. One cheque dated 12.11.1993 for

Rs.50,000 drawn on Canara Bank, Diplomatic Enclave, New Delhi and another dated 17.3.1994 for Rs.2,81,000 drawn on State Bank of

Hyderabad Pragati Vihar New Delhi. On due dates the complainant, presented the above cheques for encashment through their bankers, viz.,

State Bank of India, New Delhi, but the same were returned unpaid with the endorsement ""funds insufficient"". Therefore, in respect of these two

cheques, separate statutory notices were sent on different dates, from the office at Madras, demanding for repayment of the cheques amount,

within fifteen days from the date of the said notices. Though notices were received by the petitioners they did not chose to reply, nor make any

payment. Therefore, within the stipulated time, the complainant, the respondent herein, filed the above complaints before the learned Magistrate,

which were taken on file in C.C.Nos. 2685 and 3661 of 1994, by the learned XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Madras 15.

The learned Magistrate after having taken on file, on recording the sworn statement of the complainant, issued summons to the petitioners. Since

they did not appear, learned Metropolitan Magistrate issued non-bailable warrant against the petitioners. On receipt of information about the

issuance of non-bailable warrant, the petitioners have, now directly moved this Court by filing these above applications, requesting this Court to

invoke the inherent powers u/s 482 Cr. P.C., and quash the above proceedings.

Mr. Ranka, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, elaborately argued, mainly on the point of jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel, the

agreement was entered into between the parties at New Delhi, and the same were presented and dishonoured at New Delhi, and that therefore the

court at New Delhi alone will have the jurisdiction to take the complaint on file and as such, taking cognizance for these offences by the Court at

Madras, is without jurisdiction and so the proceedings are liable to be quashed. Learned counsel also cited several authorities to support his

submission with reference to the power u/s 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings which is illegal and without jurisdiction. The authorities are:

Jan Parkash v. Dinesh Dayal and another. 1991 Crl. L.J. 418; Ravindra Somising Paul and another v. Rajendra Pandit Paul and others1991 Crl.

L.J. 963

Wherein the following two decisions of the Apex Court had been cited:

(i) Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Others Vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Others, ; (ii) State of Bihar Vs. Murad Ali Khan and

Others, ; Ms. Ess Bee Food Specialities and others v. M.S. Kapoor Brothers 1992 Crl. L.J. 739; Dynamatic Forgings India Ltd., and another v.

Nagarajuna Investment Trusts Ltd., and another1993 Crl. L.J. 739

Per contra, Mr. V. Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the respondent, by citing several authorities, strenuously submitted that the proceedings

initiated by the complainant u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, on which cognizance has been validily taken by the Court below cannot be

quashed at this stage, u/s 482, Cr.P.C. The authorities are : J. Veeraraghavan v. Lalitha Kumar etc.1994 L.W. (Crl.) 663 State of Maharashtra v.

Ishwar Pirajai Kalpatri and others1996 SCC (Crl.) 150 State of Orissa v. Bansidhar Singh1996 SCC (Crl.) 259; Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mohad

Hobibur Rehman Faizi and others1996 SCC Cri 443; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma1996 SCC (Crl.) 497

The crux of the authorities cited by both, as reiterated in State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, is that

where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is

instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, the power conferred u/s 482, Cr.P.C., to this Court should be exercised in order

to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

On applying the above analogy, it is quite evident that when the Court has no jurisdiction to take the case on file and to proceed with the trial,

the inherent power of this Court can be validly exercised to prevent the continuance of the proceedings, which was taken on file, without

jurisdiction, as it amounts to bar of jurisdiction. Therefore, I am not able to persuade myself to accept the objection raised by Mr. V.

Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the respondent, with regard to the maintainability of this petition filed u/s 482, Cr.P.C. As far as this point is

concerned, I hold in favour of the submissions made by Mr. Ranga, as in my view, the petition is maintainable.

8 (a) Let me now endeavor in the process of appreciating the next question passed in this case, with reference to the jurisdiction:-

(i) A perusal of the records filed before the Court would reveal that the agreement entered into between the parties was at New Delhi. The

issuance of cheques, the presentation and the dishonour of the same were also at New Delhi.

(ii) u/s 177, Cr.P.C. ""every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was commit-ted.

(iii) Under these circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioners would with vehemence submit that each and every transaction culminated into an

offence had taken place only in New Delhi, and as such, the proceedings initiated before the Court at Madras, is without jurisdiction and the same

is liable to be quashed.

(iv) On the contra Mr. V. Padmanabhan learned counsel for the respondent would submit that u/s 178, Cr.P.C. if an offence consists of several

acts done in different local areas, it may be enquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction very any of such local areas, and an offence u/s

138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, consists of various acts and mere dishonour itself is not an offence, and the cause of action arises only after the

expiry of 15 days, after service of notice on the accused calling upon him to pay the amount due under the dishonoured cheque and as such every

transaction prior to the cause of action arises put together constitutes an offence, and as such since the issue of statutory notice was admittedly

done from Madras office the Court at Madras also has got jurisdiction to try the case. Both the Counsel cited authorities in support of their

respective submissions

Let me now consider the decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioners with reference to the question of jurisdiction :-

(a) In P.K. Muraleedharan v. C.K. Pareed and another, 1993 (1) Crimies 46 the High Court of Kerala, has held as follows:-

-- ""The place where the creditor resides or the place where the debtor resides cannot be said to be the place of payment unless there is any

indication to that effect either expressly or impliedly. The cause of action as contemplated in Section 142 of the Act arises at the place where the

drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of the money. That can be the place where the bank to which the cheque was issued is located. It can

also be the place where the cheque was issued or delivered, the Court within whose jurisdiction any of the above mentioned places falls has,

therefore, got jurisdiction to try the offence u/s 138 of the Act.

(b) the next decision, which the learned counsel for petitioner referred, is reported in Jai Prakash v. Dinesh Dayal and another1991 Crl. L.J. 418

wherein the Delhi High Court has held as follows:-

In the present case also, it will be seen that the agreement between the parties i.e., the Company of the petitioner and the branch office of

respondent No.2 at Bhadohi was entered into at Bhadohi. simply because the head office of respondent No.2 is closeted at New Delhi, it will not

furnish any cause for filing any criminal complaint against the petitioners to respondent No.2 at New Delhi because there were actually no dealings

between the company of the petitioners at bhadohi and the head office of respondent No.2 at New Delhi.

(c) The next decision relied on by learned counsel is reported in Dynamatic Forgings India Ltd, and another v. Nagarajuna Investment Trusts Ltd

and another1993 Crl. L.J. 739 in which the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, has held as follows:

It is to be seen that the office of the first respondent is located at Nagarjuna Hills Hyderabad over which the 5th Metropolitan Magistrate

Hyderabad has jurisdiction. The cheque was issued in favour of the first respondent company with head office at Nagrajuna Hills Hyderabad. The

said cheque was presented at Hyderabad for collection and consequently part of the cause of action arose at Hyderabad by virtue of Section 178

and 179 of the Code and consequently the court at Hyderabad have got jurisdiction to try the offence.

(d) In Ravindra Sonusing Patil and another v. Smt. Rajendra Pandit Patil and others1991 Crl. L.J. 963 the Bombay High Court, observed thus:-

In the present petition filed by the accused there is no dispute raised with regard to the execution of the two documents in question at Bombay,

and therefore, it will have to be held that since the documents were executed at the residence of the complainant, that regardless of the fact of the

partnership property and business being located at Jalgaon that as far as the present complaint is concerned that the Bombay Court before which it

has been filed did have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure very clearly specifies that an offence

is triable at the place where the act is done or the consequence ensures. In the present case, the allegation is to the effect that the complainant was

induced to sign the consent letter at her residence at Bombay and consequently, since the act of signing has taken place at Bombay, the local court

at Bombay would have jurisdiction to entertain and try this complaint.

(e) Learned counsel also cited a decision in the case of M/s. Ess Bee Food Specialities and others v. M/s. Kapoor Brothers 1992 Crl. L.J. 739

wherein the Punjab & Haryana High Court, held as hereunder:-

Coming to the question of jurisdiction, it is to be considered that the issuance of the cheques and their dishonouring are only a part of cause of

action, the offence was complete only when the petitioners failed to discharge their liability to the respondent/firm. For discharging a debt, it is the

debtor who has to find out his creditor and since in the present case, the respondent, who is the creditor, has its office at Panchkula the Court at

Ambale had the territorial jurisdiction to try the offence complained of

(f) The next decision cited by learned counsel is reported in Om Prakash Ummot, Proprietor, M/s. Techni Science Industries v. The Honourable

VII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras-1.1990 MLJ (Crl.) 76 in which this court had held as follows:

Insofar as the jurisdiction of the criminal court in inquiry and trials Section 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without any doubt,

indicate that in a contingency of this type the Court situate in a place where the consequence had occurred has jurisdiction to try and dispose of the

case. If that be so, the complaint filed by the petitioner will have to be entertained by the VII Metropolitan Magistrate within whose jurisdiction

Karur Vysya Bank is situate and which bank is the banker of the petitioner.

On the strength of these decisions it is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioners that the transactions such as issuance of cheques,

presentation, dishonour, and the agreement entered into were taken place only at New Delhi, and as such the Court at Madras has no jurisdiction

to entertain the complaint and issue process against the petitioners.

Mr, V. Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the respondent, in support of his plea, referred earlier cited very many authorities to point out the

scope and object of the Act the procedure to be adopted the manner of conducting the trial relating to the offences under this Act, and with

reference to the jurisdiction. Since the question of jurisdiction is mainly argued in this petition by learned counsel for the petitioner it would suffice to

refer about the Judgment relating to the jurisdiction point alone.

(a) Learned Counsel for the respondent cited a decision in M/s. Hamosons Apparels Pvt. Ltd., and another v. M/s. Sivan Textiles1994 (1) Cri

427 wherein this Court observed as follows: -

As per section 138(b) the payee making a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the

cheque is one requisite. In Page 3 of the typed set filed by the petitioner copy of notice sent by the respondent herein is filed from it, I find that it

was issued at Erode on 13.4.1991. As such, the notice contemplated u/s 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act and which is a requisite for

making out the offence, was issued at Erode. u/s 178(d), Criminal Procedure Code the Court at Erode also has got jurisdiction to try the case.

Furthermore as per section 138(c) Negotiable Instruments Act. if there is failure to make the payment of the said amount within 15 days of the

receipt of notice the complaint is to be filed. The respondent is at Erode. The payment which is to be made within 15 days of receipt of notice can

be made only at Erode. In this view of the matter also a part which constitute offence would be only at Erode.

(b) The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Tarsem Lal Hans v. Prem Nath Palta1995 Crl. L.J. 2408 has held that

in the present case the cheques were issued at Moga and these were presented by the respondent for collection of payment of State Bank of

Patiala at Moga. The cheques were dishonoured by the State Bank of India, Jalandhar, but intimation of dishonour was received at Moga. Notices

were sent by the respondent to make payment at Moga. Moga court had therefore, jurisdiction to try the case.

(c) The next decision referred by learned counsel for the respondent is reported in Pobathi Agencies v. State of Karnataka1992 (Supple) M.W.N.

53, wherein the High Court of Karnataka, has held as follows:-

The offence falling u/s 138 of the Act will not be the only solitary act of dishonour by the Bank on which the cheque is drawn. Even giving of the

cheque by the accused when he has not made arrangements for honouring of the cheque itself will be a part of the facts constituting the offence.

Section 178(b), Cr.P.C. lays down that when an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another area, it may be enquired into

and tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. u/s 179, Cr.P.C. when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has

been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing

has been done or such consequences has ensued. Giving the cheque by the accused to the complainant and giving the cheque for collection by the

complainant to its banker at Bangalore will also be the facts constituting the offence. Therefore, in view of the provision of Section 178(b) and 179,

Cr.P.C. the complaint can be filed in a Court within the jurisdiction of which the cheque had been issued or the place where the cheque is

presented for collection or the place where the cheque is not honoured.

(d) In a recent decision reported in M/s. Deepee Shoe Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. rep. by their Director Meenakshi Natarqjan v. M/s. Pallava Leathers &

Products, rep. by their Partners P. Srinivasan1997 (1) LW (Crl.) 205 while considering this point on similar situation, by quoting Section 178,

Cr.P.C. and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, held that the place at which notice was issued also would have jurisdiction to try the

complaint. The relevant observations are as follows:-

It therefore follows that the above provision of law (Sec. 178, Cr.P.C.) provides the jurisdiction for inquiry or trial to be conducted by the Courts

when it is uncertain in which or several local areas an offence was committed and the offence was committed partly in one area and partly in

another and when such offence is a continuing one in more local areas than one or otherwise by the Court having jurisdiction over any of such local

areas...

It would clearly mean from the wordings of the above Section of law ( 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act), that in the place where the legal

notice is given to the drawer of the negotiable instrument making the demand to pay and in the event of which has not been complied with, would

also give rise to a cause of action for the purpose of the existence of the debt or other liability as provided in the explanation added to the above

Section.

From a careful reading of the citations referred above, it could be seen that only two authorities would refer about the situation, in which the

similar question has been raised. They are (1) M/s. Hamosons Apparels Pvt. Ltd., and another v. M/s. Sivan Textiles1994 (1) Cri 427 the

decision rendered by Justice Pratap Singh as he then was: and (2) M/s, Deepee Shoe Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. rep. by their Director Meenakshi

Natarajan v. M/s. Pollava Leathers & Products, rep. by their Partners P. Srinivasan, 1997 (1) L.W. (Crl.) 205 - the decision rendered by Justice

N. Arumugham, by referring Sections 178(b) and 178(c) Cr.P.C., would relate to the several acts constituting offences, partly in one local area

and partly in another area.

It is quite relevant at this stage, to refer about Section 179 Cr.P.C. Which has not been considered in the above decisions. In view, Section

179, Cr.P.C., is more relevant to solve the situation arose with reference to the facts of this case. Section 179, Cr.P.C., runs as follows:

Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues:- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a

consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or

such consequence has ensued.

In order to understand the applicability of the concept enshrined in Section 179, Cr.P.C., let me first endeavour to collect the relevant

provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act and Code of Criminal Procedure Act, in the process of determining the issue of jurisdiction.

(a) Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable u/s 138 except upon a

complaint in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be the holder in due course of the cheque, made within one month of the date on

which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, before the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the

First class.

(b) A reading of Section 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would make it crystal clear that the cause of action arises only when the

drawer of the cheque fails to pay the amount to the payee or holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be within fifteen days of the

receipt of notice of demand, provided in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the said Act.

(c) As envisaged u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act the omission to pay the amount on demand by issue of a notice after return of a cheque,

is an offence. An""offence"" as define in S. 2(n) of the Code includes not only the doing of a positive act but by omitting to do something as well. In

the instant case, it is an omission to pay the amount on demand by issue of notice, after cheque was returned, that is made an offence.

(d) Drawing the cheque is not the act by which the offence is deemed to have been committed. When the drawer fails to make the payment within

the period specified in Clause (c) of the proviso, the offence is complete. This aspect is made further clear in S. 142(b) of the Act. Under the said

clause no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable u/s 138 of the Act. unless ""such complaint is made within one month of the date on

which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to S. 138"". Normally cause of action does not arise until the commission of the

offence. When Section 142(c) says that the clause (c) of the proviso, such cause of action is the omission to make payment within fifteen days of

the receipt of the notice.

(e) However, this cause of action is a a product of several parts of an offence, such as dishonour of a cheque, notice for payment of cheque issued

in conformity with the clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act. and expiry of the period for payment as envisaged in clause (1) of the

proviso to 138 of the Act. Again the basic cause. viz the dishonour of a cheque also includes several stages such as (i) issuance of a cheque by the

drawer; (ii) presentation of the cheque by the payee to his banker for collection and (iii) intimation to the payee from his banker, that the cheque

has been dishonoured by the banker of the drawer.

(f) While dealing with this the Punjab & Haryana High Court. In the case of M/s. Ess Bee Food Specialities and others, 1992 Crl.L.J. 739,

observed thus:-

The legislature has by means of the Banking Public Financial Institution and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) act 1988 inserted Section

138 and 142 to make out the dishonouring of a cheque to be an offence if the same is dishonoured for want of funds and after service of notice the

amount is not paid within the period prescribed. The offence that is deemed to have been committed under the provisions of Section 138, shall be

a complete offence only if the three conditions, specified in the provisos to the section also exist.

(g) Therefore, where punitive action is sought against the drawer of a cheque, who had failed to honour the same on presentment, the following

conditions should be satisfied:-

(1) There should be some existing debt, or liability between the drawer and the payee;

(2) The amount of money standing to the credit of the particular account in which the cheque is drawn is insufficient or it exceeds the arrangement;

(3) The cheque must have been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its

validity whichever is earlier;

(4) The person who is entitled to get money under the cheque should have made a demand for payment of the amount covered by the cheque

through a written notice addressed to the drawer within fifteen days from the date of receipt of intimation of the return of the cheque; and

(5) The drawer of the cheque should have failed to make payment of the amount within fifteen days of receipt of the notice.

Therefore, the service of notice of dishonour, and demand for payment is a condition precedent before the cause of action, since the cause of

action does not arise until the drawer fails to make payment, after receipt of such notice within fifteen days.

(h) The observations culled out from the decision reported in M.M Malik v. Preme Jumar Goyal1992 MWN (Crl.) 14 would be quite relevant to

be quoted here in this case :-

Section 138 comes into play only when the three provisos to the section are also complied with...... Section 142(b) provides a clincher. The cause

of action will be completed when the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of notice contemplated by

proviso (b).

The offence shall be deemed to have been committed only from the date when the notice period expired............

Dishonouring of the cheque was only a part of cause of action and the offence was completed only when the petitioner company failed to discharge

its liability to the creditors (the complainant herein). For discharging the debt, the petitioner had to find out their creditors and since the creditor has

its office at Pehowa, the offence was completed at that place and in this situation, the Court at Kurukshetra had the territorial jurisdiction to try the

matter.

(i) u/s 179 Cr. P.C., when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence

may be enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequences has ensued. What Section

179 Cr. P.C., provides is that when a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of two things, by reason first, of anything

which has been done, and secondly, of any consequence which has ensued, then the jurisdiction is conferred on the Court where the act has been

done or the consequence has ensued. The offence, therefore, must be charged by reason of the two things, the act done and the consequence

which ensued and the consequence, therefore, forms the, necessary part of the offence.

(j) Thus a reading of the Section 179 Cr.P.C. would make it clear, that this Section confers jurisdiction on:

(i) the Court within whose jurisdiction anything was done by reason of which a person is accused of the commission of the offence and

(ii) the Court within whose jurisdiction limits any consequence ensued by reason of which the person is accused of the commission of an offence.

The expression ""by reason of which"" governs both [he clauses. i.e., anything which has been done, and any consequence which has been done,

and any consequence which has ensued.

(k) It is settled law that Section 179, Cr. P.C. could apply, where the act and its consequence combined together constitute an offence, which is

subject matter of the trial. In other words, Section 179, Cr.P.C, applies to those offences, which are not completed until a specified consequence

as an offence. This consequence must be a necessary part and ingredient of the offence.

(i) Various rulings while interpreting Section 179, Cr.P.C., would hold that where the offence is complete irrespective of any consequence, this

section has no application and the place where the Act was done would determine the jurisdiction of the Courts. Section 179, Cr.P.C., applies to

those offence, only when the act and its consequence taken together constitute the offence which is charged. If the accused is to be prosecuted for

the act alone then the jurisdiction of the Court where the consequence occurred will not arise, but if the accused is prosecuted for that offence

which was completed by the act followed by its consequence, then the Courts where the act was committed and where the consequence ensued

will both have jurisdiction to try the offence.

(m) In the light of the principles discussed above as laid down in the above decisions, the place from which the notice has been issued, intimating

the dishonour of the cheque and demanding the cheque amount to be paid to the creditor and the failure to make payment would also have the

jurisdiction, since the consequence as contemplated u/s 179, Cr.P.C. for the act done by the accused, by issuing cheque which was dishonoured

due to which the demand of the amount and failure to make the payment had ensued.

(n) It is also to be pointed out at this stage, that there is also an averment in the complaints filed in both the cases, in the following words :-

The offence has taken place within the jurisdiction of this Hon''ble Court.

Even in the decision cited by learned counsel for the petitioners reported in Muraleedharan''s case, 1993 (I) Crimes 46 it has been clearly held that

in order to ascertain the place where such failure to make payment has taken place the averments in the complaint have to be looked into. In the

said decision, the High Court of Kerala, following the judgment of the Apex Court in State of M.P. v. K.P. Ghjara AIR 1957 S.C. 196 held that

the venue of enquiry or trial of case has primarily to be determined by the averments contained in the complaint and that on the basis of such

averments, if the Court finds the jurisdiction, it can proceed with the complaint.

(o) Therefore, as pointed but earlier, there is also an averment, in the complaint stating that the Court at Madras would have got jurisdiction, since

the offence had been completed at Madras. No doubt it is true that the hire purchase agreement entered into between the parties bears the seal of

the office at Delhi. But a reading of the pre-amble of the hire purchase agreement would show that the agreement was entered into between M/s.

Ashok Leyland Finance Ltd. (Complainant) carrying on business at its registered office, Chamiers Road at Madras and M/s. Narang Industries

Limited (the Petitioners), New Delhi of course mere mentioning of the office situate at Madras in the agreement will not be sufficient to decide

about the jurisdiction, as contemplated under sec-tions 177 to 179 Cr.P.C. But, a reading of the complaints in the light of Section 138 and 142 of

the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 170 Cr.P.C. would make it clear that since the demand for cheque amounts was made by the

complainant from the Registered Office at Madras, by issuing a written notice as per the second proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, with whom, the hire purchase agreement was entered into, cheque amount is payable at Madras.

In view of the above circumstances, I am of the opinion that the non-payment of cheque amount at Madras, despite the written demand from

the Registered office at Madras, would make the offence complete. This is made clear even from the observation made by the High Court of

Kerala in Muraleedharan''s Case, 1993 (1) Crimes 46 that the cause of action arises at the place, where the cheque was issued or delivered or the

place where the money was expressly or impliedly payable. In the instant case, the complainant, the Registered office at Madras demands money

from Madras, asking the drawer to pay the money to Madras office. Therefore, the place where the money is payable also will have the

jurisdiction.

In the light of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that the Court at Chennai (Madras) would also have the jurisdiction to try the

case. Therefore, I do not see any ground to quash the proceedings initiated against the petitioners, through the complaints filed by the respondent,

and as such these petitions have to be dismissed as devoid of merits.

Accordingly, these two petitions are dismissed. As indicated earlier, the petitioners even without moving an application to recall the non-

bailable warrant issued against them by the trial Court, have moved this Court by way of these quashing applications.

Therefore, the petitioners are directed to surrender before the trial Court and file applications to recall the warrant, which will be considered by

the trial Court in accordance with law. The trial Court is also directed to dispose of the cases as expeditiously as possible as they have been

pending from the year 1994.

Judgement Pronounced by M. Karpagavinayagam, J.

Mr. Denny, learned counsel representing Mr. Ranka, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave of this Court to file SLP in the Apex Court.

When I asked what is the constitutional question of law that has been raised to enable me to grant leave. Mr. Denny, learned counsel fairly submits

that there is no constitutional question of law, but jurisdictional questions raised. Since learned counsel himself fairly submitted that there is not

constitutional question of law raised. I do not think it fit to grant leave raised. I do not think it fit to grant leave. Oral request is rejected.