Narayana vs Spl DY.COMMR'' Bangalore. and Others

In this petition under Art. 226(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution, the petitioner who is the owner of the premise bearing No. 159/4, III Floor, situated at Basavanna Temple Street, Avenue Road Cross, Bangalore-2, has challenged the correctness of the order passed by the House Rent and Accommodation Controller, City Area, Bangalore, in Case No. HRC. 160/ACC/B/79, datted 4.4.1979 and also the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner Bangalore District, Bangalore, in Case No. H.R.C.A. 5 of 1979-80, dated 2-7-1979.

After the premises in question became vacant, the vacancy was reported to the Rent Controller by the petitioner. Accordingly, the Rent Controller notified the vacancy. The petitioner landlord also sought for release of the premises in his favour on the ground that he waited to sell away the premises and as such, in order to get proper value, it was necessary to offer vacant possession of the premises to the prospective purchaser. He based his contention on S. 8(1)(b) read with S. 21(1)(e) of the, Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''). This contention did not find favour with the Rent Controller and similarly with the appellate authority. Accordingly, the premises in question, came to be allotted to the 3rd respondent. The very same contention was advanced before me by Sri P. Krishnappa the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, stating that under S. 8(1)(b) of the Act, it was open for the Rent Controller to pass an order directing the landlord not to dispose of or to make any structural alteration in the building without the permission of the Rent Controller within such time or until expiry of such period, not exceeding one month as specified in the order.

The contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner was that the petitioner required the premises in question for the purpose of disposing of the same. He further contended that in order to get a proper price, it was by necessary to give vacant possession of the entire, building to the prospectively purchaser and without obtaining possession of the premises in question which forms part of a, bigger building the petitioner would not be able to get a good price for the building. It is very difficult to accept these can tentions which do not fall under any of the provisions of the Act. S. 8(1)(b) of the Act provides that before issuing any order under S. 5 or S. 6 of the Act, the Rent Controller may, by order direct thatneither the landlord nor any other person shall, without the permission of the Controller, dispose of or structurally alter the building or let it out to a tenant or occupy it or use it until the expiry of such period not exceeding one month, as may be specified in the order. This provision does not give any right to the landlord to seek possession of the premises for himself for the purpose, of disposing of the premises. On the contrary, this provision empowers the Rent Controller to direct the landlord or any other parson to refrain from doing any of the things mentioned therein, including the disposing of the premises during the specified period without the permission of the Rent Controller. This provision is intended to see that the allotment proceedings do not getaffected or stultified or stifled by the unscrupulous acts of the landlord or any other person.

Similarly, the contention based on the provisions contained in S. 21(1)(e) of the Act, is also not tenable. S. 21(1)(e) of the Act provides that the Court may make an order for possession of a premises on the ground that the tenant has given notice in writing to quit and in consequence of that notice, the landlord has contracted to sell or let the premises or has taken any other steps as a result of which he could, in the opinion of the Court, be seriously prejudiced if he could not obtain possession of the premises. The present case does not fall within the ambit of S. 21(1)(e) of the Act. None of the ingredients mentioned therein, is found in the instant case. S. 21(1)(e) of the Act, cannot at all be interpreted so as to give a right to the landlord to seek possession of the premises for the purpose of disposing of the same winch is notified by the Rent Controller for allotment. S. 21(1)(e) of the Act, will apply to the case of the landlord seeking possession of the premises, if he satisfied the following conditions:

(a) that the tenant in occupation of the premises gave to the landlord the notice in writing to quirt the premises;

(b) that the landlord acted upon the said notice and altered his position either by contracting to sell or by letting out the premises or by taking any other steps;

(c) that in the opinion of the Court, the steps taken by the landlord would be detrimental to him if he could not obtain the possession of the premises.

If the aforesaid conditions are satisfied the landlord would be entitled to an order for possession. Thus, it is clear that S. 21(1)(e) of the Act, incorporates the well known rule, of estoppel. Such is not the position in the instant case. There is no provision in the Act, enabling the landlord to seek possession of the premises in question, for the purpose of disposing of the same.

Consequently, the order passed by the Rent Controller and that of the appellate authority cannot at all be said to suffer from any illegality so as to call for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Hence, there is no ground to issue Rule. Accordingly, this writ petition is rejected.