Narayanan Chettiar vs Rathinasami Padayachi

Rajamannar, C.J.—There is no reason whatever to Interfere with the order passed by the learned District Munsif. The petitioner is the

decree-holder. The respondent who was the first judgment-debtor made an application on 3-6-1949 u/s 19 of Madras Act 4 of 1938 as amended

by Act 23 of 1948 for scaling down the decree which had been passed against him on 24-11-1933. The decree-holder raised a preliminary

objection that the application was not maintainable on the ground that the judgment-debtor had previously filed an application for stay u/s 20 of the

Act and there was an order staying execution passed on 14-3-1946, but he did not file any application within 60 days thereafter and there-fore the

Judgment-debtor was not entitled to once more file an application for stay as he did and then file a substantive application u/s 19. It may be

mentioned that prior to the present application u/s 19 there was another application u/s 20, and there Was an order of stay passed on 17-3-1949

and it is not disputed that the present petition u/s 19 has been filed within the prescribed time from the date of that order.

The only question therefore is whether the judgment-debtor not having filed an application u/s 19 within the prescribed time from the date of the

stay order u/s 20 passed on his prior application, is now precluded from again filing another application u/s 20 followed by an application u/s 19.

Undoubtedly, the judgment-debtor would not have such a right, that is, a right to file successive applications u/s 20 or Section 19 if the reliefs

which he claims as being entitled to are the same in the several applications. But at the same time it is equally clear that if a subsequent application

is based upon a provision of law not in existence at the time of a prior application of his he will not be debarred from filing the later application

simply because he had filed a prior application when the state of law did not entitle him to the relief to which he became entitled by a subsequent

change in the law. The judgment-debtor in this case alleges that he has become entitled to relief under the provisions of the Amending Act 23 of

1948, relief which was not available to him before the amendment. On this footing, the second application was certainly maintainable. The learned

District Munsif was right in holding that the prior application u/s 20 filed in 1946 will not be a bar to a fresh application u/s 20 after the Amending

Act 23 of 1948.

Learned counsel for the petitioner is afraid that the order of the learned District Munsif may be understood as having finally decided the question

of the applicability of the provisions of the Amending Act of 1948. In my opinion, any apprehension on this score is unfounded. The learned

District Munsif has not finally decided as to the applicability of the provisions of the new Act; he has only ''prima facie'' held on the allegations of

the judgment-debtor that there will be no bar on account of the prior application u/s 20 and that the petition was maintainable.

The revision petition is therefore dismissed with costs.