Naresh Prasad Paswan vs M/S. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd And Ors

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Heard the parties.

Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for direction upon the respondents to correct the date of birth of petitioner on the basis of

matriculation certificate which has been obtained by the petitioner before joining the service of respondents and also promotion has been given from

Grade-IV to Grade-III on the basis of said certificate.

The facts of the case in short is that petitioner joined the services of respondent-BCCL in the year 1987 and at the time of verification, submitted

his matriculation certificate to the respondent-authorities, in which the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned as 04.07.1969. Subsequently, the

petitioner was released from Jeenagora Colliery to report to the Dy. Chief Mining Engineer, North Tisra Colliery. It is the further case of the petitioner

that petitioner was regularized in time rated category with immediate effect and asked to perform the existing job as assigned in the year 1991 by the

respondent. The respondent further regularized the petitioner as Monthly Rated Grade-III Clerk with immediate effect vide letter dated 18.06.2009 on

the basis of matriculation certificate of the petitioner. It is the specific case of the petitioner that when he found some serious mistake in his date of

birth recorded in the service book, he applied for correction in his date of birth on the basis of matriculation certificate. The petitioner was roaming

from one office to another for correction of his date of birth but the respondents have not given any attention to his said request and hence, he has

been constrained to knock the door of this Court.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the respondents are duty bound to accept the change of date of birth as per matriculation

certificate which was obtained by the petitioner before joining in the service and the matriculation certificate is the only authentic document for

determination of date of birth. Learned counsel further argues that the action of the respondents is grossly illegal and arbitrary and is violative of

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

On the other hand, though no counter-affidavit has been filed, but learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that this writ petition is

barred by limitation as after 32 years of joining the services, petitioner has prayed for correction of date of birth. Learned counsel further submits that

Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decision has held that no writ can be entertained after a gross delay.

Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warrant in the

instant writ petition. Admittedly, the petitioner joined the services of the respondent in the year 1987 and had worked for 32 long years without any

complain regarding correction of his date of birth. After 32 long years, the petitioner woke-up from deep slumber and started requesting the

respondents for making correction in the date of birth, which is barred by limitation and as such, no interference is required.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1977 SC 197, 9has observed that

“for the first time in September, 1970 the appellant invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for

challenging the legality of an order dated 21.12.1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation and,

therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing it summarily.

Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported

in (2014) 4 SCC 108, has held as under:

“Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and

the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a

constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that

when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal

obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In

certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant

who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant â€" a litigant who has forgotten the

basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of timeâ€​ and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.

Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching

the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be

ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-

employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly

absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does

not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on

others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated

to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or

for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground

alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.â€​

It is the settled principles of law that it is not open for Employer or the Employee to change the date of birth at the fag end of service career. This

issue fell for consideration in several cases before the Hon’ble Apex Court and even before this Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of

State of Maharashtra & Anr. Vs. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble & Ors. [(2010 14 SCC 423], in para-12 has held that

“12. Apart from the notification and the said instruction this Court in a series of cases has categorically laid down that the employees

should not be permitted to change the date of birth at the fag end of their service career. In the instant case, the application of alteration

has been filed at the fag end of his service career after a lapse of twenty eight years.â€​

As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncements, I find no merit in the instant writ application and

accordingly, the same stands dismissed.