Narikelapu Ramaiah vs A.P. State

Ramachandra Rao

This is a revision petition filed u/s 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred as the Act) by the declarant in CC. No. 10/PLD/75 on the file of the Land Reforms Tribunal, Narasaraopet. The family unit of the declarant consists of himself, his second wife, and two minor sons through the first wife, who had died 7 year prior to the date of filing of the declaration. The petitioner stated that he had disposed of certain lands subsequent to 24-1-1971. The Land Reforms Tribunal held that the alienations having been effected subsequent to 24-1-1971, they should be ignored as they appeared to have been effected with a view to avoid the Ceiling Law. According the Tribunal included the alienated lands in the holding of the petitioner Ac. 33 82 cents equivalent to 1.2234 standard holdings, and that the family unit consisting of the petitioner, his wife and two minor sons was held entitled to one standard holding, and the excess to be surrendered was determined as 0.2334 standard holdings.

The petitioner carried the matter in appeal to the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Guntur in L.P.A. 82/1976. Before the Appellate Tribunal, he filed an application I.A. No. 345/1976 for receiving registration extracts of a partition deed dated 26-7-3971 as additional evidence. That petition was allowed, and the partition deed was admitted in evidence, and marked as Ex. P.4. Under the said partition deed, the petitioner was allotted Ac. 15-35 cents, his first minor son Ac. 10-45 cents, and second minor son Ac. 10-98 cents. It was contended before the appellate Tribunal that in view of the aforesaid partition, the minor sons cannot be included in the family unit of the petitioner. But this contention was negatived by the appellate Tribunal in view of the definition of "family unit" in section 3 (f) of the Act, which includes in the case of an individual, his wife or wives and minor sons. The gift land made by the petitioner under Ex. P-2 in favour of his first daughter through his first wife, was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal, and the said land excluded from the holding of the petitioner. The sale of Ac. 2-50 cents of land under Ex. P.3 dated 28-6-1971 by the petitioner in favour of his coson-in-law, was not accepted by the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that the petitioner had not shown that the sale was not effected in anticipation of and with a view to avoid the Ceiling Law, Accordingly the appeal was partly allowed, and the order of the Tribunal modified by directing that the land covered by the gift-deed Ex. P-2 should be excluded from the holding of the petitioner.

In this revision petition, though several grounds were raised including the ground that the divided minor sons should not be treated as members of the "family unit" of the petitioner those contentions, have not been pressed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In. C.R.P. No. 972/1976 dated 5-11-76 (Bandi Krishnamurti Vs. The Land Reforms Tribunal, Gudivada), I have held that the divided minor sons included in the "Family unit" as defined in section 3 (f) of the Act. In view of this decision, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not press the contention, that the divided minor sons cannot be treated as members of the "family unit'' of'' their father.

Sri. A. Hanumanth Rao, learned counsel for petitioner rasied a new contention, that under the definition of "family unit" in section 3 (f) of the Act, minor sons can be treated as members of the family unit only in a case where the father and the mother of the minor sons are alive on notified date, and that where the mother had died by the notified date and the father had married a second wife through the predeceased first cannot be, treated as members of the family unit along with their father. This contention was not raised in the Tribunals below. But being a pure question of law, I have allowed the petitioner to raise this point this revision petition. The Learned Advocate-General has appeared on behalf of the respondent on notice being given to him, and contended that the petitioner and his minor sons fall within the definition of ''family unit'' as defined in section 3 (f) (i) of the Act, though the mother of the minor sons was not alive on the notified date.

In order to determine this question, it is necessary to refer to the definition of ''family unit'' in Sec. 3 (f) of the Act:-

(F) ''family unit'' means:--

(i) in the case of an individual who has spouse or spouses, such individual, the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters, if any;

(ii) in the case of an individual who has no spouse, such individual and his or her minor sons and unmarried minor daughters;

(iii) in the case of an individual who is a divorced husband and who has not remarried, such individual and his minor sons and unmarried minor daughters, whether in custody or not: and

(iv) where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons unmarried minor daughters:

Explanation, omitted as not relevant for the purpose of this case.

Under Cl. 3 (f) the Act, four categories of family units have been enumerated;--

(i) in the case of an individual who has a spouse or spouses, such individual, the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters, if any;

(ii) in the case of an individual who has no spouse such individual and his or her minor sons and unmarried minor daughters:

(iii) in the case of an individual who is a divorced husband and who has not remarried, such individual and his minor sons and unmarried minor daughters, whether in his custody or not: and

(iv) where an individual and his or her spouses are both dead, their

minor sons and unmarried minor daughters.

The contentions of Sri Hanumantha Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner is that, in the instant case'' the minor sons were born to the petitioner''s first wife who had died prior to the notified date, that under Cl. (i) of Sec. 3 (f) of the Act, an individual, who has a spouse or spouses and their minor sons" only can form a family unit, that in the instant case the spouse i.e., the mother of the minor sons having died prior to the notified date, it cannot be said that the petitioner is an "individual who has a spouse" and therefore the petitioner and his minor sons do not fall within the definition of ''family unit'' in Cl. (i) of Sec. 3 (f) of the Act:

Under Cl (ii), the individual and his minor sons constitute a family unit, but that applies only to a case Where the individual has no spouse. In the present case, the petitioner''s first wife dived but his second wife is alive. It cannot therefore be said that he is an individual who has no spouse.

Cls. (iii) and (iv) are inapplicable to the facts of the case as they apply only to a case of a divorced husband and to a case where the individual and his spouse are both dead.

No doubt, there is some force in the contention of Sri Hanumantha Rao. But if the said contention is accepted, it will lead to anomalies and result in defeating the scheme and object of the Act. The result of accepting the contention would be that the petitioner and his wife would constitutes a separate unit, and the minor sons along with their father would constitute another family unit. The minor sons cannot be treated as a separate unit under Cl. (iv) because it cannot be said that both the parents of the minor sons are dead. Cl. (ii) cannot be applied because it applies only to a case where an individual has no spouse.

It is well established that a construction which results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity, or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and fiction in the system which the Statute purports to regulate, has to be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which avoids such results. The Court will adopt an interpretation which is just, reasonable and sensible, and avoid a construction which leads to some absurdity and inconsistency or anomalies.

In Tirath Singh Vs. Bachittar Singh and Others, His Lordship Venkatarama Ajyar, J observed at page 833 as follows:-

Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.

If a literal construction is to be placed on the words "their minor sons in section 3 (f) (i) of the Act, it will result in anomalies and will defeat the very purpose and object of the Ceiling Law, In the circumstances, I think the words "their Minor sons" occurring in Sec. 3 (f) (i) of the Act, would also apply to an individual who has minor sons through a spouse who had died by the notified date, and who has another spouse living by the notified date.

In william White vs. Tyndall (1888) 13 L.R. Appeal Case(HL) 263 certain premises were demised to George White and Albert White "their executors, administrators and assings" as tenants in common and not as joint tenants at a single yearly rent; and George white and Albert White covenanted for themselves, their executors, administrators and assigns that they or some or one of them, their executors, administrators or assigns would pay the yearly rent and keep the premises in repair. George White having died during the term, the lessor sued Albert White and the executors of George White for breaches of convenant occurring after George White''s death. The House of Lords held that the covenants were in form joint and not several and that George White''s executors were not liable. In coming to that conclusion, Their Lordships had to construe the word "their" occurring in the expression "George White and Albert White, their executors, administrators and assigns".

Lord Halsbury, observed at page 270 as follows :--

I think it is hardly accurate to say that that the word "their" is an ambiguous word. Its grammatical force is of course like that of other pronouns and its application must be ascertained from the context.

Lord Herschell, observed at page 276 as follows:--

The only ambiguity which has been suggested, as far as I have heard, has been in the use of the ward "their" preceding the words "executors administrators and assigns". An examination of the other parts of the deed indicates, it has been said, that the word "Their" is used distributively as referring "to each of the persons named",

His Lordship further observed,

In truth the word "their" in such a collocation must always be read distributively, because the parties do not anticipate that they will have the same executors, administrators and assigns. Which could only happen in very exceptional cases.

I think that the meaning of the pronoun "their" must be ascertained from the context, and the word "their" occurring in the expression "their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters" in Section 3 (f) (i) of the Act, should be read distributively, and so read'' it will take in the minor children of the individual and also the minor children of his or her spouse.

For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the petitioner and his second wife and his minor sons through the first wife who had died by the notified date, would constitute a family unit within the meaning of sec. 3 (f) (i) of the Act. In the result, the revision petition fails and is dismissed without costs.