Narinder Kumar vs Hardial Singh

Arun Palli, J.—Suit filed by the plaintiffs was decreed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 01.08.2009. The appeal preferred against the said decree by the defendants succeeded and was, accordingly, accepted vide judgment and decree dated 05.05.2012, and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. That is how, the plaintiffs are before this Court in this Regular Second Appeal. Parties to the lis, hereinafter, would be referred to by their original positions in the suit.

Plaintiffs prayed for a decree for injunction that defendants be restrained from interfering in their peaceful possession or causing their forcible dispossession from agricultural land comprised in khewat/khatauni No. 40/185, khasra No. 24//6(8-0), 7(8-0), 14(8-0), 20(9-0) situated at Village Jalalpur, Tehsil Samana, District Patiala.

In short, the case set out by the plaintiffs was that they were in possession of the suit property since 23.10.2000, pursuant to two registered sale deeds No. 3711 and 3712, dated 23.10.2000, being the coshare in khewat. However, the plaintiffs were in exclusive possession of the suit property, which was handed over to them by their vendors at the time of execution of the sale deeds.

Defendants No. 1, 3 and 4 pleaded in defence that the sale deeds being propounded by the plaintiffs were forged and false, and does not contain any khasra number. Rather, the suit land was in cultivating possession of defendants No. 1, 3 and 4. It was maintained that even the suit for injunction between defendants and the Gram Panchayat was decided in their favour vide a decree dated 26.03.2007 in Civil Suit No. 247 dated 10.08.2005. A suit for rendition of accounts, based on the sale deeds being relied upon the plaintiffs, was dismissed by the Collector/SDM, Patran.

On an analysis of the matter in issue and evidence on record, learned trial Court arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiffs had taken the specific share from their vendors to the extent of 320/86786 each and, thus, have stepped into the shoes of the vendors as coshare with Gram Panchayat, who also happened to be one of the cosharers. Jamabandi for the year 2004-05 (Ex. P5) showed that the land was initially owned by Rachpal Singh and Jaspal Singh, who sold their share to the plaintiffs. Thus, the arguments of the defendants that the sale deeds did not mention khasra number and were, therefore, false and fabricated, was misconceived. It was also observed that the defendants had failed to bring on record any evidence to show that the sale deeds executed in favour of the plaintiffs were fabricated. Thus, it was observed that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property. Issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were also decided against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, vide judgment and decree dated 01.08.2009, learned trial Court decreed the suit and injuncted the defendants from interfering in possession of the plaintiffs or causing dispossession.

Being dissatisfied with the said decree, the defendants preferred an appeal. Learned first Appellate Court reviewed the matter in issue, evidence on record in its entirety and on an analysis thereof concluded, that on a consideration of the sale deeds (Exhs. P2 and P3), it was apparent that there was just a sale of a share of the property from khasra No. 40/99-249. The total area of this khatauni was 4339 kanals and 6 marlas and out of the said land only 32 kanals were sold pursuant to the sale deeds in question in favour of the plaintiffs. An analysis of the jamabandies placed on record also revealed that there were large number of khasras in the said khata. The plaintiffs had predicated their case upon the sale deeds (Exhs. P2 and P3) and the said deeds were completely silent as to which khasra number was sold to the plaintiffs by said two documents. Thus, it was observed that the sale deeds being propounded by the plaintiffs were nothing but a sale of share by one of the cosharers. Jamabandi (Ex. P5) produced on record by the plaintiffs also crystallized that predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs were owners of the suit property, but in the column of possession, name of Panchayat was reflected. Of course, name of the plaintiffs do appear as owners but they were not shown to be in exclusive possession of any part of the suit land in any khata. On the contrary, khasra girdawari for the year 2000-2004 (Ex. D2) also substantiated the possession of the defendants. Ex. D6 revealed that the defendants had taken the suit property on lease from Gram Panchayat and Ex. D7 was the receipt of deposit of money. Learned first Appellate Court also referred to a judgment qua the previous litigation between Hardial Singh and Gram Panchayat, which also culminated into a decree in favour of the defendants as they were found to be in possession of the suit property. Thus, it was held that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit property but the defendants were found to be in possession thereof. Accordingly, it was observed that the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property merely on the basis of sale deeds was not sustainable. With reference to the decision of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Ramdas Vs. Sitabai and Others, it was observed that an undivided share of cosharers could be a subject matter of sale, however, possession cannot be delivered to the vendees unless the property partitioned by a recognized mode. Undoubtedly, the vendors of the plaintiffs could always sell their share, but as they themselves were not in exclusive possession of any specific portion, they were hardly in a position to deliver possession of any specific khasra numbers to the plaintiffs. Resultantly, learned first Appellate Court, vide judgment and decree dated 05.05.2012, accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit.

I have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and examined the judgments rendered by both the Courts below.

Learned counsel for the appellants could not show or point out as to how the findings recorded by the learned first Appellate Court were judicially perverse or the conclusions arrived at were contrary to the record.

In the wake of the position as set out above and the conclusions that have been recorded by the learned first Appellate Court, there hardly exist any ground, least plausible in law, to interfere with the decree being assailed in the present appeal. No question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arises for consideration in the present appeal. The same being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.