Narinder Kumar Raseen vs Usha Awasthy

Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.—The landlady filed an eviction petition u/s 14D read with section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act (for short, the DRC Act") qua property bearing No. B-6/96, IInd Floor, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi where the petitioner is living as a tenant, which was allowed by the learned Additional Rent Controller (ARC) vide order dated 14th February 2008 dismissing the application of the petitioner for leave to defend. The petitioner is aggrieved by this order and has preferred this petition u/s 25B (8) of the DRC Act. The landlady along with her husband was living at Sector 15, Faridabad, Haryana, the house owned by her husband. Her husband filed an eviction petition u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act Against the tenant (the petitioner herein) on the ground that he was not keeping well and wanted to shift to Delhi with his wife for his treatment in AIIMS Hospital, which was nearer to the suit premises. However, the husband of the landlady died during the pendency of the eviction itself on 11th March 2007 and thereafter his Lrs withdrew the said petition and the landlady filed the present eviction petition u/s 14(D) of the DRC Act. She pleaded that after death of her husband, in a family arrangement, she got the property in occupation of tenant to her share while her two sons got the house No. 461, Sector 50 and her sons relinquished their rights in her favour in respect of property in question. She submitted that she was born and brought up in Delhi till 1997, when she shifted to Faridabad at the instance of her sons and husband. She had differences with her daughter-in-laws, even during the lifetime of her deceased husband. After the death of her husband, the attitude of her daughters-in-law has become more unbearable. She did not wish to involve herself in family disputes and wanted to live separately peacefully in her own house in Delhi. She also stated that medical facilities in Delhi were far more superior as compared to medical facilities in Faridabad and the AIIMS hospital was nearer to her property. She had no other alternative accommodation of her own in Delhi except the property in question. She needed the property for her own bonafide requirement of living there.

The leave to defend application, the petitioner pleaded that the landlady had no intention to shift to the property and just wanted to sell out the same. Her husband during his lifetime sold the ground floor and first floor of the property in question. He alleged that the family arrangement arrived at between the landlady and hers sons was also was with a motive to get the eviction order. The physical condition of the landlady was not such so as to live alone. The sole motive was only to evict the petitioner. In the previous petition filed by her husband, it was nowhere mentioned that there were differences between her and her daughters-in-law. The landlady was not suffering from any diseases and she was leading a hail and hearty life in sound state of health. She was having a big bungalow in Faridabad and her sons were well settled and it was not difficult for the landlady to commute to Delhi from Faridabad which was 30 kms. away from AIIMS. There were no restrictions on her travel. The needs of the landlady were no bonafide and, therefore, the leave to defends should be granted.

The learned ARC observed that there was no disputes that the sons of the landlady were settled in Faridabad and no malafide can be smelled in respect of family arrangement between the landlady and her sons. The interse arrangement between the co-owner in respect of the property of the deceased was not open to challenge by the tenant. It was also found by learned ARC that the plea of the landlady that she was brought up in Delhi and lived here along with her husband up till 1997 was not denied. The differences between her and her daughters-in-law could not be gone into by the Court. If her husband had not mentioned in the previous petition about the differences, that would make no difference since the earlier petition was on the basis of bonafide requirement of her husband due to his ailments as the couple wanted to shift to Delhi where better medical facilities were available. It was not for the Court or the tenant to see how she would stay alone in the property and how she would manage to live alone in the property. A landlady who claims to have differences with her daughters-in-law has a right to live peacefully in her own premises and this requirement cannot be said to be unjustified. The learned ARC also dismissed the plea of the tenant that the landlady was hale and hearty and or took false ground of her illness. The learned ARC observed that this submission of the tenant was self-contradictory since tenant himself has stated that she was unable to stay alone because of her ill-health. The landlady, in fact, had not stated that she was seriously ill but she had simply stated that better medical facilities were available near her Delhi house because one of the prime hospital of the country AIIMS was situated near her house and her house was in a less polluted area since it was surrounded by a green belt. He plea of the tenant that the landlady''s husband had sold the ground floor and first floor of the same property did not find favour with the learned ARC since the ground floor and the first floor were sold in the year 1992 and in 2000 and the landlady had clarified that the same were sold by her husband as he ran into business losses and to cover up the losses, he sold a part of the property. The learned ARC observed that the Court has to consider the necessity of the landlady on the date of filing of the petition and earlier sale by her husband would have no bearing on it.

Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the learned ARC was bound to grant leave to defend when the petitioner filed affidavit pleading therein that the grounds taken by the landlady were false and frivolous and the intention of the landlady was to sell the property. It is submitted that the learned ARC could not have gone into the details of each and every ground and could not have analyzed the material as if the evidence was recorded and it was sufficient for the tenant to state on affidavit the ground on which the tenant wanted to contest the petition and the leave to defend ought to have been allowed. He relied upon Precision Steel and Engineering Works and Another Vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, wherein the Supreme Court observed as under:-

The language of sub-section (5) of section 25B casts a statutory duty on the Controller to give to the tenant leave to contest the application, the only pre condition for exercise of Jurisdiction beings that the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground mentioned in section 14(1) (e). Section 14(1) starts with a non obstante clause which would necessarily imply that the Controller is precluded from passing an order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises in favour of the landlord against the tenant unless the case is covered by any of clauses of the proviso. The proviso sets out various enabling provisions on proof of one or the other, the landlord would be entitled to recover possession from the tenant. One such enabling provision is the one enacted in section 14(1) proviso (e). Upon a true construction of proviso (e) to sections 14(1) it would unmistakably appear that the burden is on the landlord to satisfy the Controller that the premises of which possession is sought is; (i) let for residential purpose; and (ii) possession of the premises is required bona Fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family etc. and (iii) that the landlord or the person for whose benefit possession is sought has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. This burden landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. This necessarily transpires from the language of section 14(1) which precludes the Controller from making any order or decree for recovery of possession unless the landlord proves to his satisfaction the conditions in the enabling provision enacted as proviso under which possession is sought. Initial burden is thus on the landlord.

The question is whether this burden is in any way diluted or stands discharged or wholly shifted to the tenant because of a different procedure prescribed in Chapter IIIA of the Act. Section 25(4) provides that in default of the appearance of the tenant in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order eviction on the ground set out in section 14(1)(e). On a combined reading of section 14(1) proviso (e) with section 25B(1) and (4) the legal position that emerges is that on a proper application being made in the prescribed manner which is required to be supported by an affidavit, unless the tenant obtains leave to defend as contemplated by sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 25B, the tenant is deemed to have admitted all the averments made in the petition filed by the landlord. The effect of these provisions is that the Controller would act on the admission of the tenant and there is no better proof of fact as admission, ordinarily because facts which are admitted need not be proved. But what happens if the tenant appears pursuant to the summons issued under sub-sec. 2 of section 25B, files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application.

As a corollary it would transpire that the facts pleaded by the landlord are disputed and controverted. How is the Controller thereafter to proceed in the matter. It would be open to the landlord to contest the application of the tenant seeking leave to contest and for that purpose he can file an affidavit in reply but production and admission and evaluation of documents at that stage has no place. The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section 4 and the reply, if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any field by landlord the Controller has to pose to himself the only question: Does the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1). The controller is not to record a finding on disputed question of facts or his preference of one set of affidavits against other set of affidavits. That is not the jurisdiction conferred on the controller by sub-sec. (5) because the Controller while examining the question whether there is a proper case for granting leave to contest the application has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosing such facts as would prima facie and not on contest disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession.

At the stage when affidavit is filed under sub-section (4) by the tenant and the same is being examined for the purposes of sub-section (5) the Controller has to confine himself only to the averments in the affidavit and the reply if any and that sub-section (5) that the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant disclose such facts as would disentitle the landlord from recovering possession etc. The jurisdiction to grant leave to contest or refuse the same is to be exercised on the basis of the affidavit filed by the tenant. That alone at stage is the relevant documents and one must confine to the averments in the affidavit.

If the averments in the affidavit disclose such facts which, if ultimately proved to the satisfaction of the Court, would disentitle the landlord from recovery possession, that by itself makes it obligatory upon the Controller to grant leave. It is immaterial that facts alleged and disclosed are controverted by the landlord because the stage of proof is yet come. It is distinctly possible that a tenant may fail to make good the defence raised by him. Plausibility of the defence raised and proof of the same are materially different from each other and one cannot bring in the concept of proof at the stage when plausibility has to be shown. This view taken in B. Kanjibhai & Ors. v. Mohanraj Rajendra Kumar, 7 Kishan Singh v. Mohd. Shariq & Ors.(2) appears to have been approved in Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh (3) where at p. 1217 this, Court while commenting upon an order granting conditional leave under order XXXVIL, r. 3, passed by the trial judge which was to this effect: ''In'' the absence of these documents, the defence of the defendants seems to be vague consisting of indefinite assertions....observed as under:

This is a surprising conclusion. The facts given in the affidavit are clear and precise, the defence could hardly 517 have been clearer. We find it difficult to see how a defence that on the face is clear becomes vague simply because the evidence by which it is to be proved is not brought on file at the time the defence is put in.

The learned judge has failed to see that the stage of proof can only come after the defendant has been allowed to enter an appearance and defend the suit, and that the nature of the defence has to be determined at the time when the affidavit is put in. At that stage all that the Court has to determine is whether, ''if the facts alleged by the defendant are duly proved'' they will afford a good or even a plausible answer to the plaintiffs claim. Once the Court is satisfied about that, leave cannot be withheld and no question about imposing conditions can arise, and once leave is granted, the normal procedure of a suit, so far as evidence and proof go, obtains.

The manifest error committed in the procedure followed at present by the Controller under s. 25B may be pointed out. The tenant has to file an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application. The Controller may accept an affidavit in reply if landlord chooses to file one. So far there is no difficulty. There then follow affidavit in rejoinder and sur-rejoinder and the documents are produced and when this procession ends the Controller proceeds to examine the rival contentions as if evidence produced in the form of the affidavits untested by cross-examination and unproved documents are before him on the appreciation and evaluation of which he records an affirmative finding that the facts disclosed in the affidavit of tenant are not proved and therefore leave to contest should be refused. In our opinion, this is wholly impermissible. The regular trial required to be held by a Court of small Causes as contemplated by sub-sec. 6 read with sub-sec. 7 of section 25B is not to be substituted by affidavits and counter-affidavits at the stage of considering tenant''s affidavit filed for obtaining leave to contest the petition under sub-sec. 4. Sub-section 6 enjoins a duty on the Controller where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application to commence the hearing of the petition as early as practicable and sub-section 6 prescribes procedure to be followed as if the Controller is a Court of small Causes. The Court of small Causes follows the summary procedure in the adversary system where witnesses are examined and cross examined and truth of averment is decided on the touchstones of cross examination. A speedy trial not conforming to the well-recognised principle of arriving at truth by testing evidence on the touchstone of cross-examination, should not be easily read into the provision at a stage not contemplated by the provision unless the statute positively by a specific provision introduces the same. The scheme of section 25B does not introduce a trial for arriving at the truth at the stage of proceeding contemplated by subsection (4) of section 25B.

Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand, (1983) 1 SCC 301 wherein the Supreme Court observed as under:

What should be the approach when leave to defend is sought? There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave to defend is sought, the tenant must make out such a prima facie case raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not the final success in the action Santosh Kumar Vs. Bhai Mool Singh, At the sage of granting the leave parties rely in support of their rival contentions on affidavits and assertions and counter-assertions on affidavits may not afford such incontrovertible evidence to lead to an affirmative conclusion one way or the other. Conceding that when possession is sought on the ground of personal requirements, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. If as it appear in this case, the landlord is staying at Pathankot, that a house is purchase, may be in the name of his sons and daughters, but there may not be an apparent need to return to Delhi in his old age, a triable issue would come into existence and that was sufficient in our opinion to grant leave to defend in this case.

Counsel for the petitioner argued that the pleas taken by the tenant ought to have been accepted on the face of it and leave to defend should have been granted.

On the other hand, counsel for the respondent relied upon S.N. Kapoor (Dead) by his LRs. Vs. Basant Lal Khatri and ors, whereby the Supreme Court observed as under:-

That the landlord has no other building in New Delhi is not in controversy and it is also a fact specifically noticed also by the Rent Controller. The question that does really arise for consideration is as to whether the claim of the landlady or the need to occupy the premises at New Delhi, in the circumstances, pleaded or demonstrated could be said to be not bona fide or reasonable merely because the landlady is residing, for the time being, at Bhopal - altogether a different city in a different State also, along with her son and his family notwithstanding her decision to live separately at New Delhi. The need felt by the landlady to do so does appear to be sincere and honest and not a mere pretence only to evict the tenant. No material has been brought on record and no proof has been made by the tenant by any positive material that it is neither genuine nor bona fide reasonable but a mere excuse to get rid of the tenant. Though the choice or proclaimed need cannot be whimsical or merely fanciful yet certain amount of direction has to be allowed in favour of the landlady too and Courts should not also impose its own wisdom forcibly upon the landlady to arrange her own affairs, according to their won perception carried away only by the interest or hardship of the tenant and inconvenience that may result to him in passing an order of eviction. In adjudging the claim u/s 14-D what is required to be substantiated is the landlady is a window and that she wants the premises for the own residence and that the claim by her is bona fide and not a feigned one. So far as claim u/s 14(1)(e) is concerned, the very requirements has to he shown not only to be bona fide but the move of the landlord/landlady to seek the eviction of the tenant must be genuine. As far as the claim u/s 14-D is concerned, the widow-landlady''s need for her own residence is recognized statutorily to be a valid one, but the move or request made to avail of the special benefit must be shown to be a bona fide and not a pretext only to get rid of the tenant. Viewed in the context of the indisputable facts on record that the widow has no other premises of her own at New Delhi and that she want to reside away from Bhopal and aloof from her daughter-in -law are by themselves sufficient to sustain her claim. The rejection of the claim seems to be on hyper-technical appreciation of the material on record and does not constitute a real, proper and effective consideration at all. Therefore, viewed from any angle, we find the need and requirement of the appellant-landlady to be bonafide and consequently an order of eviction shall follow. We allow the claim of the landlady for eviction and the appeal against order dated 3.7.2000 shall stand allowed.

Learned Counsel for he respondent also relied upon J. Chatterjee Vs. Mohinder Kaur Uppal and Another, wherein the Supreme Court observed as under:-

From the provisions quoted above, it is clear that in a case where a petition for eviction is field u/s 14-D, such petition shall be dealt with in accordance with the special procedure prescribed u/s 25-B. From the provisions in Sub-sections (4) and (5) it is manifest that the Controller can grant the tenant leave to contest the application for eviction only if the affidavit field by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground of personal requirement as provided in Section 14(1) proviso (e) or u/s 14-A. Sub-section (8) of Section 25-B bars an appeal or second appeal against an order for recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller under the section. The proviso to Sub-section (8) vests a supervisory jurisdiction in the High Court for satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under that section is according to law.

From the aforementioned statutory provisions, the legislative intent is clear that if an application for eviction of a tenant is field by a window to recover the premises in question for her self-occupation, the Controller shall pass an order for eviction of the tenant from the premise with utmost expedition. The provisions intended to serve the social need to help a widow in getting possession of the premises required for her personal occupation. To sub serve that purpose she has been included in the special class of landlords who are entitled to recover possession of the premises let out by them when they require the same for self-occupation and special provision has been made in Section 25-B providing for an inquiry by the Controller following a summary procedure to satisfy himself that the plea of self occupation taken by the widow-landlady as a general and bona fide one and not a mere pretence to get the tenant evicted from the premises. For that reason, heavy burden is placed on the tenant to satisfy the Controller by filing an affidavit stating such facts which, if believed, will sufficiently prove that the plea of need of personal occupation by the petitioner-widow is nothing but pretence. Whether leave to defend will be granted to the tenant in a case depends on the facts and circumstances of the case as emanating from the averments in the eviction petition filed by the landlord and the affidavit filed by the tenant seeking leave to defend the eviction petition. No hared and fast rule or strait-jacket formula can be laid down for judging the question. It is to be kept in mind by the Controller and the Courts that the petition for eviction filed by a window u/s 14-D should not be frustrated by granting leave to the tenant to raise any plea denying/refuting the case pleaded in the eviction petition. Unless a real and substantial case is made out on the averments made in the affidavit filed by the tenant in support of the petition filed u/s 25-B of the Act, the proceeding should not be dragged on unnecessarily and should be disposed not be dragged on unnecessarily and should be disposed of with due expedition. A balance has to be maintained between the general object of the Statute which is to provide protection to the tenants against arbitrary action of the landlord for their eviction and the assistance to be referred to the special class of landlords including a widow to recover possession of premises let out by her for self-occupation. We are aware that in some decided case this Court has learned in favour of granting leave to the tenant to defend the eviction petition but on a closer look at the decisions it will be clear that the cases were decided considering the facts and circumstance involved therein. At the cost of repetition we may state that the decision on the questions of grant of leave to defend depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon EMC Steel Limited, Calcutta Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, wherein the Supreme Court observed as under:-

The object of the Act, as stated in its preamble, is to provide for the control of rents and eviction, and of rates of hotels and lodging houses, and for the lease of vacant premises to government, in certain areas in the Union territory of Delhi. The original Act came into force on February 9, 1959 having received the assent of the President on December 31, 1958. The working of the Act disclosed certain deficiencies, inconveniences and hardships both to the landlords and the tenants. Their associations, therefore, made representations various committees and commission also recommended amendment of certain provision of the Act. Considering the grievances of the landlords and the tenants as well as the recommendations of the committees/ commission, the act was amended in 1988 with the object of (a) rationalizing the law by bringing out the balance the interests of landlords and tenants, (b) giving a boost to house building activity and maintaining the existing housing stock in a reasonable state of repairs, (c) reducing litigation between landlords and tenants and of ensuring expeditious disposal of disputes between them. By this amendment Sections 14-B to 14-D were added. The object of section 14-D is obvious. It is to assist a vulnerable and needy section of the society to recover possession of the premises as expeditiously as possible and without the usual trials and tribulations.

We have already held in the accompanying judgment that classified landlords such as the widow landlady u/s 14-D can supply for possession of the premises under the respective provisions even if the premises are not let for residence. It is not necessary to repeat the said discussion in this judgment. Section 14-D makes no distinction between the landlady who become widow before and after letting out of the premises. It merely says that where the landlady is a widow and the premises are let out by her or by her-husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. The language of the section in that respects very clear. The premises might have been let out by her as a window or they might have been let out by her husband or even by herself before she had become widow. The legislature wanted to given a special privilege to the landlord who is window notwithstanding whether the premises were let out before or after she become window. Such conferment of special benefit on a 384 window-landlady is permissible even under the provisions of Article 15(3) of the constitution which is an express exception to the provisions of sub-clauses (1) and (2) of that Article.

It states that nothing in the sad Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. A widow is undoubtedly a vulnerable person in our society and requires special protection. We further see no merit in the contention that if the benefit given by Section 14-D is allowed to be availed of by window, they may make a business of it. There is no warrant for such apprehension. For, in the first instance, the right to recover possession u/s 14-D can be availed of by the widow only once. That is a sufficient guarantee against the abuse of the privilege granted by the section. Secondly, she has to prove her bona fide need for the occupation of the premises in question for her own residence like any other landlord. Thirdly, the provisions of Section 19 of the Act come into play in her case also, when the order for possession on the ground of bona fide requirement for occupation as residence is made in her favour.

A perusal of the above judgments of the Supreme court would show that a petition u/s 14(D) stands on a different footing than a petition u/s 14(1)(e). The above petition was filed by the landlord u/s 14(D), after death of her husband, who wanted to shift to Delhi due to his illness but he died inter se during the pendency of his petition. The contention of the tenant that the ARC is not supposed to consider the averments made in the affidavit in detail and is not supposed to analyze the averments but has just to give leave to defend once the averments controverting the claim of the landlord is made, is baseless. In most of the petitions filed in the Courts truth is the first of the tenant casualty. Even false affidavits are filed with impunity. In most of the applications for leave to defend presented before the ARC, the ownership of the very premises taken on rent from the landlord the letting purpose and the relationship of the landlord and tenant, are all disputed apart from disputing the bonafide requirement of the landlord. Under these circumstances, if the landlord places on record the rent agreement, rent receipts and other material to show that disputes raised about ownership, relationship of tenant and landlord and letting purposes were being raised falsely just for the sake of raising disputes, the Rent Controller is bound to consider all the material and arrive at a logical conclusion whether the tenant has raised genuine pleas for leave to defends or has just, for the sake for denying everything written in the eviction petition, denied those things. There is no escape from analyzing the material placed before Rent Controller along with the affidavit field by the tenant with the leave to defend application and the counter affidavit tiled by the landlord and the documents filed by both the sides. No affidavit can be considered only at the face value because there is no prosecution in this country for filing false and frivolous affidavits. The Courts are already so heavily burdened that the prosecution of perjury is almost NIL, despite the fact the perjury is committed day in day out in the Courts with impunity. It is, therefore, more advisable for the Rent Controllers to scrutinize the facts in light of the documents filed by the parties and to come to a conclusion whether the triable issue has been raised or not.

A triable issue is the one for the decision of which trial and recording of evidence is necessary. Where a tenant denies the tense relationship between the landlady and her daughters-in-law, what evidence he can produce since the tenant is not a family members and is living far away form the family of the landlady. Her relations with the daughters-in-law are in the special knowledge of the landlady and only she can testify about these relations. Still the tenant had, by way of affidavit, denied the tense relationship between the landlady and her daughters-in-law. Moreover, it not necessary that a woman keeps harping about her sore relations on every occasion. Many persons like to suffer in silence, instead of washing dirty linen in public and quietly separate from such circumstances. The ARC also had no alternative but to look into the medical records filed by the landlady along with the counter affidavit. The ARC had to come to a conclusion whether the landlady was suffering from ailments or not, Even those matters which were in the special knowledge of the landlady, were denied by the tenant.

No triable issue can be raised when the tenant has no privity to the facts. The triable issues can be raised by the tenant only in respect of those facts about which he has knowledge or which can be proved in the Court by his testimony or testimony of his witnesses. If the landlord or the landlady, as the case may be, had let out other premises available with him or her, despite bonafide requirements, such a fact can be considered as a triable issue because it can be proved by the testimony of the person to whom it has been let out in that case, the fact of ownership of that premises by the landlord must be an admitted fact. If the tenant alleges any other premises to be owned by the landlady, without disclosing even an iota of evidence that the premises belonged to the landlord or landlady, no leave to defend can be granted to the tenant. If leave of defend is granted just by alleging something, then the tenant would name any premises and say that it belonged to the landlord without disclosing as to on what basis he was saying so. I, therefore, consider that a triable issue is raised by the tenant only when tenant prima facie discloses evidence in his possession about the allegations made by him and the evidence admissible under law so that the alleged fact can be proved in the Court, and if proved, it would disentitle the landlord to have eviction decree. Those issues which are raised only for the sake of depriving landlord of his rights like denying of relationship of tenant and landlord and the ownership of the landlord, denial of letting purposes, extent of the family of the landlord, extent of the premises available with the landlord such issues need no trial unless these issues cannot be decided on the basis of affidavits and material placed along with affidavits. The court on the basis of affidavit and material can come to a conclusion whether the affidavit filed along with the leave to defend application, has some substance in it or it was just an affidavit to raise unnecessary issues to gain leave to defend. In this case, learned ARC rightly held that no triable issue was raised, I find no reason to interfere with the order passed by learned ARC. The petition is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.