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Judgment
34 paragraphs · 664 wordsAs identical questions of law and facts are involved, therefore, I propose to decide above indicated petitions, arising out of the same
incident/cross-case/FIR, by means of this common judgment, in order to avoid the repetition.
Initially, in the wake of complaint of complainant Amrik Singh son of Gurdev Singh-respondent No.2 (for brevity ""the complainant in 1st case""),
a criminal case was registered against the petitioners-accused (in 1st case), vide FIR No.81 dated 27.05.2015, under Sections 324, 447, 427,
148 and 149 IPC, registered at Police Station Kartarpur, District Jalandhar.
Likewise, in pursuance of separate statement of complainant Narinder Pal Singh son of Gurmej Singh-respondent No.2 (for short ''the
complainant in 2nd case''), a criminal cross-case was also registered against petitioners-accused (in 2nd case), under Sections 324, 447, 427, 148
and 149 IPC recorded in above-said FIR No.81 dated 27.05.2015.
Heard.
Both the parties were directed by this Court, vide orders dated 17.01.2017 to appear before the learned trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate and get
their statements recorded and in pursuance thereof, learned learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jalandhar, recorded the statements of both the
parties and submitted a report dated 24.04.2017. A perusal of the report reveals that the compromise entered into between the parties is with their
own sweet will, without any inducement and coercion.
Having regard to the contentions of learned counsel for the parties and the fact that the occurrence relating to cross fight on both sides, who
have ultimately settled their disputes with the intervention and the compromise shall give an opportunity to them to live peacefully in future as well.
Hence, it would be in the interest and justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter as continuance of the prosecution would be an
exercise in futility. It is agreed by both the parties that injuries were not on the vital part of the body. Even before this Court also, none of the
parties has raised any objection against the quashing of the FIR/cross-case in question.
Hon''ble Supreme Court in case titled as Yogendra Yadav and others vs. State of Jharkhand and another, 2014(9) SCC 653 has held as
under:-
Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the IPC which are non-
compoundable. Needless to say that offences which are noncompoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of
compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab). However, in a
given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that
the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases
the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve
moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the
society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to
the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace
or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of
justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would
be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace.
In view of above, the impugned FIR and its cross-version and all consequent proceedings resulting therefrom are hereby quashed.
Petitions are allowed.
