Narinder Paul Singh vs State of Punjab and Others

Sabina, J.—This petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order passed by the Board of Governors, whereby extension was granted to respondent No. 6 to continue as Vice Chancellor of the Punjab Technical University.

The important question involved in the present case is as to whether extension granted to respondent No. 6 as Vice Chancellor of the University is as per Section 10 of the Punjab Technical University Act, 1996 (the Act for short).

Case of the petitioner, in brief, is that the petitioner joined on deputation with the respondent-University on the post of Dean after being selected by the selection committee on 22.9.2006. The Board of Governors constituted a search committee in the year 2008 to fill up the post of Vice Chancellor. Respondent No. 6 was chosen to occupy the office of Vice Chancellor. On 9.12.2009, selection committee was constituted for filling up various posts in the University including the post of Dean. 14 candidates were interviewed by the selection committee and the petitioner was placed at Sr. No. 1. The recommendation of the selection committee was approved by the Board of Governors in its meeting held on 11.2.2010. On 30.6.2010, the University Grants Commission (UGC for short) issued guidelines for appointment of Vice Chancellor. Petitioner was fully eligible to be considered for the said post. As per the Act, chairman of the Board of Governors was to be appointed by the Chancellor. The Chancellor in utter disregard to the provisions of the Act nominated the Chief Secretary of the State to be the chairman of the Board of Governors. The term of respondent No. 6 was extended for another three years in a meeting held on 2.11.2011 without considering his eligibility. Respondent No. 6 was not having requisite qualifications as prescribed by the UGC vide regulations notified on 30.6.2010. Petitioner filed CWP No. 577 of 2013 before this Court on 11.1.2013. The said petition was disposed of on 8.7.2013 by passing following order:-

we have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.

It is agreed that the petition may be disposed of with following directions :-

(i) The question of extension of respondent no. 5/Vice Chancellor by the Board of Governors on 05.10.2011 would be re-examined by the new Board of Governors.

(ii) The examination of the aforesaid issue would be as per the norms applicable to the post of Vice Chancellor on the date when the extension was granted.

(iii) The decision will be taken within a maximum period of six weeks from today.

Thereafter, petitioner represented to the Chairman of the Board of Governors on 17.7.2013. On 19.8.2013, it was announced by the University that extension granted to respondent No. 6 had been upheld. Hence, the present petition.

Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that no extension could be granted to respondent No. 6 under the Act without complying with the requisite conditions. In the present case, at the time of granting extension to respondent No. 6, no advice had been sought from the State Government nor any search committee had been nominated in terms of Section 10 of the Act. Initially there were no qualifications provided for the post of Vice Chancellor. However, the UGC vide notification dated 30.6.2010 (Annexure P-13) had provided qualifications for the post of Vice Chancellor. Respondent No. 6 was not having the requisite qualifications for the post of Vice Chancellor, therefore, the extension granted to him was liable to be set aside. Learned counsel has further submitted that appointment and conditions of service were different. Recruitment must be governed by the UGC regulations. The UGC guidelines were binding on the University. In support of his arguments, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in University Grants Commission and Another Vs. Neha Anil Bobde (Gadekar), , wherein it was held as under:-

Section 26(1) of the UGC Act confers powers on it to make regulations consistent with the Act and the Rules. Clauses (e), (f) and (g) of Section 26 are of some relevance and are given below:

Power to make regulations: (1) The Commission may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make regulations consistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder-

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(e) defining the qualifications that should ordinarily be required of any person to be appointed to the teaching staff of the University, having regard to the branch of education in which he is expected to give instruction;

(f) defining the minimum standards of instruction for the grant of any degree by any University;

(g) regulating the maintenance of standards and the co-ordination of work or facilities in Universities.

UGC, in exercise of its powers conferred under Clauses (e) and (g) of Section 26(1) of the UGC Act and in supersession of the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications required for the Appointment and Career Advancement of Teachers in Universities and Institutions affiliated to it) Regulations, 2000, issued the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2010. Regulation 2 states that the minimum qualifications for appointment and other service conditions of University and College teachers, Librarians and Directors of Physical Education and Sports as a measure for the maintenance of standards in higher education, shall be as provided in the Annexure to the above Regulations. Clause 3.3.1 of the Annexure reads as follows:

3.3.1. NET/SLET/SET shall remain the minimum eligibility condition for recruitment and appointment of Assistant Professors in Universities/Colleges/Institutions. Provided however, that candidates, who are or have been awarded a Ph.D Degree in accordance with the University Grants Commission (Minimum Standards and Procedure for Award of Ph.D Degree) Regulations, 2009, shall be exempted from the requirement of the minimum eligibility condition of NET/SLET/SET for recruitment and appointment of Assistant Profession or equivalent positions in Universities/Colleges/Institutions.

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We have elaborately referred to various statutory provisions which would clearly indicate that the UGC as an expert body has been entrusted by UGC Act the general duty to take such steps as it may think fit for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in Universities. It is also duty bound to perform such functions as may be prescribed or as may be deemed necessary by the Commission for advancing the cause of higher education in India. The UGC has also got the power to define the qualification that should ordinarily be required for any person to be appointed to the teaching staff of the University and to regulate the maintenance of standards and coordination of work and faculties in the Universities.

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We are of the view that, in academic matters, unless there is a clear violation of statutory provisions, the Regulations or the Notification issued, the Courts shall keep their hands off since those issues fall within the domain of the experts. This Court in University of Mysore vs. C.D. Govinda Rao, Tariq Islam vs. Aligarh Muslim University and Rajbir Singh Dalal vs. Chaudhary Devi Lal University has taken the view that the Court shall not generally sit in appeal over the opinion expressed by expert academic bodies and normally it is wise and safe for the Courts to leave the decision of academic experts who are more familiar with the problem they face, than the Courts generally are. UGC as an expert body has been entrusted with the duty to take steps as it may think fit for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in the University. For attaining the said standards, it is open to the UGC to lay down any qualifying criteria, which has a rational nexus to the object to be achieved, that is for maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research. Candidates declared eligible for lectureship may be considered for appointment as Assistant Professors in Universities and colleges and the standard of such a teaching faculty has a direct nexus with the maintenance of standards of education to be imparted to the students of the universities and colleges. UGC has only implemented the opinion of the Experts by laying down the qualifying criteria, which cannot be considered as arbitrary, illegal or discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Annamalai University rep. by Registrar Vs. Secy. to Govt. Infn. and Toursm Dept. and Others, , wherein it was held as under:-

The UGC Act was enacted by the Parliament in exercise of its power under Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India whereas Open University Act was enacted by the Parliament in exercise of its power under Entry 25 of List III thereof. The question of repugnancy of the provisions of the said two Acts, therefore, does not arise. It is true that the statement of objects and reasons of Open University Act shows that the formal system of education had not been able to provide an effective means to equalize educational opportunities. The system is rigid inter alia in respect of attendance in classrooms. Combinations of subjects are also inflexible.

Was the alternative system envisaged under the Open University Act was in substitution of the formal system is the question. In our opinion, in the matter of ensuring the standard of education, it is not. The distinction between a formal system and informal system is in the mode and manner in which education is imparted. The UGC Act was enacted for effectuating coordination and determination of standards in Universities The purport and object for which it was enacted must be given full effect.

The provisions of the UGC Act are binding on all Universities whether conventional or open. Its powers are very broad. Regulations framed by it in terms of clauses (e), (f), (g) and (h) of sub-Section (1) of Section 26 are of wide amplitude They apply equally to Open Universities as also to formal conventional universities. In the matter of higher education, it is necessary to maintain minimum standards of instructions. Such minimum standards of instructions are required to be defined by UGC The standards and the Co-ordination of work or facilities in universities must be maintained and for that purpose required to be regulated. The powers of UGC under Sections 26(1)(f) and 26(1)(g) are very broad in nature. Subordinate legislation as is well known when validly made becomes part of the Act. We have noticed hereinbefore that the functions of the UGC are all pervasive in respect of the matters specified in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 12A and clauses (a) and (c) of Sub-section (2) thereof.

Indisputably, as has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant as also the learned Solicitor General that Open University Act was enacted to achieve a specific object. It opens new vistas for imparting education in a novel manner. Students do not have to attend classes regularly. They have wide options with regard to the choice of subjects but the same, in our opinion, would not mean that despite a Parliamentary Act having been enacted to give effect to the constitutional mandate contained in Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, activities and functions of the private universities and open universities would be wholly unregulated.

It has not been denied or disputed before us that in the matter of laying down qualification of the teachers, running of the University and the matters provided for under the UGC Act are applicable and binding on all concerned. Regulations framed, as noticed hereinbefore, clearly aimed at the Open Universities. When the Regulations are part of the statute, it is difficult to comprehend as to how the same which operate in a different field would be ultra vires the Parliamentary Act. IGNOU has not made any regulation; it has not made any ordinance. It is guided by the Regulations framed by the UGC. The validity of the provisions of the Regulations has not been questioned either by IGNOU or by the appellant-University. From a letter dated 5.5.2004 issued by Mr. H.P. Dikshit, who was not only the Vice-Chancellor but also the Chairman of the DEC of IGNOU it is evident that the appellant-University has violated the mandatory provisions of the Regulations.

The amplitude of the provisions of the UGC Act vis-a-vis the Universities constituted under the State Universities Act which would include within its purview a University made by the Parliament also is now no longer a res integra.

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In University of Delhi vs. Raj Singh, this Court held (SCC pp. 526-27, para 13):

13....By reason of entry 66, Parliament was invested with the power to legislate on "coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or reach and scientific and technical institutions." Item 25 of List III conferred power upon Parliament and the State legislatures to enact legislation with respect to "vocational and technical training on labour". A six-Judge bench of this Court observed that the validity of State legislation on the subjects of University education and education in technical and scientific institutions falling outside Entry 64 of List I as it then read (that is to say, institutions for scientific or technical education other than those financed by the Government of India wholly or in part and declared by Parliament by law to be institutions of national importance) had to be judged having regard to whether it impinged on the field reserved for the Union under Entry 66. In other words, the validity of the State legislation depended upon whether it prejudicially affected the coordination and determination of standards. It did not depend upon the actual existence of union legislation in respect of coordination and determination of standards which had, in any event, paramount importance by virtue of the first part of Article 254(1).

In State of T.N. vs. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute, this Court laid down the law in the following terms:

What emerges from the above discussion is as follows:

(i) The expression "coordination" used in Entry 66 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to he Constitution does not merely mean evaluation. It means harmonization with a view to forge a uniform pattern for a concerted action according to a certain design, scheme or plan of development. It, therefore, includes action not only for removal of disparities in standards but also for preventing the occurrence of such disparities. It would, therefore, also include power to do all things which are necessary to prevent what would make "coordination" either impossible or difficult. This power is absolute and unconditional and in the absence of any valid compelling reasons, it must be given its full effect according to its plain and express intention.

(ii) To the extent that the State legislation is in conflict with the Central legislation though the former is purported to have been made under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List but in effect encroaches upon legislation including subordinate legislation made by the center under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List or to give effect to Entry 66 of the Union List, it would be void and inoperative.

(iii) If there is a conflict between the two legislations, unless the State legislation is saved by the provisions of the main part of Clause (2) of Article 254, the State legislation being repugnant to the Central legislation, the same would be inoperative.

(iv) Whether the State law encroaches upon Entry 66 of the Union List or is repugnant to the law made by the center under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List, will have to be determined by the examination of the two laws and will depend upon the facts of each case.

(v) When there are more applicants than the available situations/seats, the State authority is not prevented from laying down higher standards or qualifications than those laid down by the center or the Central authority to short-list the applicants. When the State authority does so, it does not encroach upon Entry 66 of the Union List or make a law which is repugnant to the Central law.

(vi) However, when the situations/seats are available and the State authorities deny an applicant the same on the ground that the applicant is not qualified according to its standards or qualifications, as the case may be, although the applicant satisfies the standards or qualifications laid down by the Central law, they act unconstitutionally. So also when the State authorities derecognise or disaffiliate an institution for not satisfying the standards or requirement laid down by them, although it satisfied the norms and requirements laid down by the central authority, the State authorities act illegally.

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in State through Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Parmeshwaran Subramani and Another, , wherein, it was held as under:

It is settled law that where there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to undertake any exercise to read something into the provisions which the legislature in its wisdom consciously omitted. Such an exercise if undertaken by the courts may amount to amending or altering the statutory provisions.

In a plethora of cases, it has been stated that where, the language is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of legislation or the intention of the legislature, when the language of the provision is plain. The court cannot rewrite the legislation for the reason that it had no power to legislate. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. The court cannot, on an assumption that there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, correct or make up assumed deficiency, when the words are clear and unambiguous. Courts have to decide what the law is and not what it should be. The courts adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but cannot set at naught legislative judgment because such course would be subversive of constitutional harmony [See: Union of India & Anr. Vs. Deokinandan Aggarwa].

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Rajesh Awasthi Vs. Nand Lal Jaiswal and Others, , wherein it was held under:-

We express no opinion with regard to the contentions raised by the first respondent that the appellant had links with J.P. Power Ventures Ltd. According to the first respondent, the appellant had approved the higher tariff right to favour M/s. J.P. Power Ventures Ltd., vide his order dated 27.8.2010. We have already found that the question as to whether, being Vice President of the J.P. Power, the appellant had any financial or other interest which would prejudicially affect his function as chairperson was an issue which the Selection Committee ought to have considered. We may point out that when the Selection Committee was constituted, 1999 Rules were in force and the present 2008 Rules came into force only on 1.1.2009. By virtue of Section 85 of the Act, the then existing 1999 Rules were also safeguarded. Rule 3 of the 1999 Rules deals with the selection process for the post of Chairperson, which is almost pari materia with the 2008 Rules. Sub-section (3) of Rule 3 is of some relevance, hence we extract the same:

3 (3) The convener shall sand requisition for the selection of any member for the aforesaid posts to different departments of State Governments and Central Govt., Public and Private Undertakings, Industrial Enterprises and to Organisation engaged in generation, distribution and supply of electricity, financial institutions, educational institutions and to the High Court and shall also invite applications directly from eligible persons by notifying the vacancy in the Government Gazette. The eligible persons may send their applications directly or through an officer or authority under whom he is for the time being working.

The above-mentioned statutory requirements were also not followed in the instant case, over and above, the non-compliance of sub-section (5) of Section 85 of the Act.

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We are of the view that non-compliance of subsection (5) of Section 85 of the Act is not a procedural violation, as it affects the very substratum of the appointment, being a mandatory requirement to be complied with, by the Selection Committee before recommending a person for the post of Chairperson. We are of the view that non-compliance of sub-section (5) of Section 85 of the Act will vitiate the entire selection process since it is intended to be followed before making the recommendation to the State Government. Non-compliance of mandatory requirements results in nullification of the process of selection unless it is shown that performance of that requirement was impossible or it could be statutorily waived. The expression "before recommending any person" clearly indicates that it is a mandatory requirement to be followed by the Selection Committee before recommending the name of any person for the post of Chairperson. The expression "before" clearly indicates the intention of the Legislature. The meaning of the expression "before" came for consideration before this Court in State Bank of Travancore v. Mohd. Mohammad Khan where the words "any debt due at and before the commencement of this Act to any banking company" as occurring in section 4(1) of the Kerala Agriculturist Debt Relief Act, 1970, were construed by the Supreme Court to mean "any debt due at and before the commencement of this Act". We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of learned senior counsel that this, being a procedural provision and non-compliance of sub-section (5) of Section 85 of the Act, is a defect curable by sending the recommendation back to the Selection Committee for compliance of sub-section (5) of Section 85 of the Act.

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From the aforesaid pronouncements it is graphically clear that a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto and he stands in the position of a relater. He need not have any special interest or personal interest. The real test is to see whether the person holding the office is authorised to hold the same as per law. Delay and laches do not constitute any impediment to deal with the lis on merits and it has been so stated in Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi v. Speaker.

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In Centre for PIL v. Union of India a three-Judge Bench, after referring to the decision in R.K. Jain v. Union of India, has opined thus: (Centre for PIL case, SCC p. 29, para 64)

Even in R.K. Jain case, this Court observed vide para 73 that judicial review is concerned with whether the incumbent possessed qualifications for the appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to be made or whether the procedure adopted was fair, just and reasonable. We reiterate that the Government is not accountable to the courts for the choice made but the Government is accountable to the courts in respect of the lawfulness/legality of its decisions when impugned under the judicial review jurisdiction.

It is also worth noting that in the said case a view has been expressed that the judicial determination can be confined to the integrity of the decision making process in terms of the statutory provisions.

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On a perusal of the report of the Selection Committee it is manifest that the Committee has not recorded its satisfaction with regard to ingredients contained in Section 85(5) of the Act and left it to the total discretion of the State Government.

On a scanning of the anatomy of Section 85(5) it is limpid that the Selection Committee before recommending any person for appointment as a Chairperson or a Member of the State Commission shall satisfy itself that the person does not have any financial or other interest which is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as such Chairperson or Member, as the case may be. As the proceedings of the Selection Committee would reveal, it had not recorded its satisfaction prior to recommending the names of the two candidates. It is vivid that the Selection Committee abandoned its function and simply sent the file to the State Government. It has been argued with vehemence by Mr. Nageswara Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellant that when two names were chosen from amongst certain persons it has to be inferred that there was recommendation after due satisfaction as per statutory requirement.

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I have referred to the aforesaid pronouncements only to highlight that Section 85(5) of the Act has inherent inviolability and every word used therein has to be understood in the context regard being had to the legislative intendment. There has to be concentrated focus on the purpose of legislation and the text of the language, for any deviation is likely to bring in hazardous results.

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I have referred to the aforesaid authorities singularly for the purpose that regulatory commission is an expert body and in such a situation the selection has to be absolutely in accord with the mandatory procedure as enshrined u/s 85 of the Act.

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Nagar Mahapalika (Now Municipal Corpn.) Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , wherein, it was held as under:-

This Court in a large number of decisions has expressed its concern on how and in what manner appointments on daily basis or by way of ad hoc arrangement are made in flagrant violations of constitutional provisions enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and/or the statutory recruitment rules. This Court has also been noticing that the State or the public sector undertakings or the local self governments themselves are making all endeavours to regularise the services of such employees who have entered the services through the backdoor. The Industrial Tribunals, in some cases the High Courts also, had been generous enough to direct regularisation for the services of such workmen without proper application of mind.

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Branch Manager, M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. and Another Vs. Shri S.C. Pandey, , wherein, it was held as under:-

The question raised in this appeal is now covered by a decision of this Court in M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Srivastava wherein this Court clearly opined that: (1) when the conditions of service are governed by two statutes; one relating to selection and appointment and the other relating to the terms and conditions of service, an endeavour should be made to give effect to both of the statutes; (2) A daily wager does not hold a post as he is not appointed in terms of the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder and in that view of the matter he does not derive any legal right; (3) Only because an employee had been working for more than 240 days that by itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularized in service; (4) If an appointment has been made contrary to the provisions of the statute the same would be void and the effect thereof would be that no legal right was derived by the employee by reason thereof.

Learned senior counsel for respondents No. 4 to 6, on the other hand, has opposed the petition and has submitted that at the time of initial appointment of respondent No. 6 as Vice Chancellor, advice from the State was liable to be taken with regard to the panel of persons recommended by the Board of Governors through a search committee. At the time of extension of term of the Vice Chancellor, the advice from the State Government was not mandatory. Respondent No. 6 was not to be re-appointed on the post of Vice Chancellor but his term was merely to be extended for another term as provided u/s 10 (2) of the Act. The UGC recommendations were not binding on the University as University was not taking any grant from the UGC. Assuming that UGC regulations were binding on the University then as per Section 14 of the UGC Act (3 of 1956), grant to the said university could be withheld, whereas, the respondent-university was not taking any grant from the UGC. Moreover, the UGC regulation in question had not been adopted by the university by amending the Act. Therefore, the same were not binding on the University. In support of his arguments, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma Vs. State of Bihar and Others, , wherein, it was held as under:-

To some extent there is an air of redundancy in the prayers made on behalf of the Respondents in the submissions made regarding the applicability of the scheme to the State and its universities, colleges and other educational institutions. The elaborate arguments advanced in regard to the powers of the UGC to frame such Regulations and/or to direct the increase in the age of teachers from 62 to 65 years as a condition precedent for receiving aid from the UGC, appears to have little relevance to the actual issue involved in these cases. That the Commission is empowered to frame Regulations u/s 26 of the UGC Act, 1956, for the promotion and coordination of university education and for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research, cannot be denied. The question that assumes importance is whether in the process of framing such Regulations, the Commission could alter the service conditions of the employees which were entirely under the control of the States in regard to State institutions. The authority of the Commission to frame Regulations with regard to the service conditions of teachers in the centrally-funded educational institutions is equally well established. As has been very rightly done in the instant case, the acceptance of the scheme in its composite form has been left to the discretion of the State Governments. The concern of the State Governments and their authorities that the UGC has no authority to impose any conditions with regard to its educational institutions is clearly unfounded. There is no doubt that the Regulations framed by the UGC relate to Entry 66 List I of the Constitution in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but it does not empower the Commission to alter any of the terms and conditions of the enactments by the States under Article 309 of the Constitution. Under Entry 25 of List III, the State is entitled to enact its own laws with regard to the service conditions of the teachers and other staff of the universities and colleges within the State and the same will have effect unless they are repugnant to any central legislation.

However, in the instant case, the said questions do not arise, inasmuch as, as mentioned hereinabove, the acceptance of the scheme in its composite form was made discretionary and, therefore, there was no compulsion on the State and its authorities to adopt the scheme. The problem lies in the desire of the State and its Authorities to obtain the benefit of 80% of the salaries of the teachers and other staff under the scheme, without increasing the age of retirement from 62 to 65 years, or the subsequent condition regarding the taking over of the scheme with its financial implications from 1st April, 2010.

As far as the States of Kerala and U.P. are concerned, they have their own problems which are localised and stand on a different footing from the other States, none of whom who appear to have the same problem. Education now being a List III subject, the State Government is at liberty to frame its own laws relating to education in the State and is not, therefore, bound to accept or follow the Regulations framed by the UGC. It is only natural that if they wish to adopt the Regulations framed by the Commission u/s 26 of the UGC Act, 1956, the States will have to abide by the conditions as laid down by the Commission.

That leaves us with the question which is special to the State of Bihar, i.e., the effect of Section 67(a) introduced into the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976, by the Bihar State Universities (Amendment) Act, 2006, and the corresponding amendments made in the Patna University Act, 1976. Section 67(a) has been extracted hereinbefore in Paragraph 13. While, on the one hand, it has been mentioned that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any Act, Rules, Statutes, Regulation or Ordinance, the date of retirement of a teaching employee of the university or of a college shall be the date on which he attains the age of 62 years, the confusion is created by the next sentence which further provides that the date of retirement of a teaching employee would be the same which would be decided by the UGC. It has been urged that the said provision clearly contemplates that in the event of an alteration resulting in an upward revision of the age of superannuation, the same would automatically apply to all such teachers and staff, without any further decision of the State and its authorities in that regard. In other words, what has been sought to be urged is that when in regard to Centrally-funded universities, colleges and educational institutions, the age of superannuation has been increased to 65 years by the University Grants Commission, the same has to uniformly apply to all universities and colleges throughout the country, without any discrimination. The same did not necessitate any separate decision to be taken by the State and its authorities regarding the applicability of the decision taken by the University Grants Commission.

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Dr. A.C. Julka and Others Vs. Punjab University and Others, , wherein it was held as under:-

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The next question which arises before this court is whether the Government of India letter dated 27th July, 1998, Annexure P-1A, letter dated 6th November, 1998, Annexure P-2 and the UGC Circular dated 24th December, 1998, Annexure P-3, need to be implemented being binding in nature. While dealing with the question of implementation of these letters/circular, we feel the necessity of examining whether any such recommendation would have effect without the same being incorporated in the statutes governing the University. In respect of Punjab University, there is a particular regulation which prescribes the age of superannuation of the teaching staff as 60 years. Regulation 17.3 of Chapter VI (A) of the Conditions of Service of University Employees reads thus:

17.3. All whole-time members of the teaching staff, as defined in Regulation 1.1 of Chapter V (A), shall retire on attaining the age of 60 years and no extension in service shall be granted.

The above regulation has been framed in exercise of power u/s 31(2)(e) of the Punjab University Act, 1947. It is evident that unless Regulation 17.3 is amended and age of superannuation therein is prescribed as 62 years, the UGC recommendations would have no effect and the teaching staff will continue to retire at the age of 60 years. It appears that at various stages, the matter was considered by the Syndicate and the Senate of the University. Certain resolutions were also passed for enhancing the age of retirement from 60 to 62 years and for amending Regulation 17.3 accordingly. The said resolutions have been reproduced in the foregoing paras while noticing the submissions of counsel for the petitioners. However, it is obvious that these resolutions passed by the Senate and Syndicate of the University, did not get the approval of the Government of India and thus never came into effect. There is no doubt in our mind that for a resolution to take effect and to become a part of the regulation, it is necessary that sanction of the Government is obtained. In this respect Section 31(1) of the Punjab University Act is relevant which reads thus:

Regulations:

(1) The Senate, with the sanction of the Government may, from time to time, make regulations consistent with this Act to provide for all matters relating to the University.

This Section makes it clear that sanction of the Government is required to make regulations in respect of matters pertaining to the University. The Government as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act means the Central Government. However, in the instant case, the Central Government refused to accept the resolutions passed by the Senate of the University as is evident from a reading of the impugned letter dated 23rd July, 2002, Annexure P-13. Therefore, the question of any amendment being carried out in Regulation 17.3 did not arise. The regulation as it stands on date on the statute-book of the University provides the age to be 60 years and the same would continue to be so unless the regulation is amended. An incidental question which arises is whether a mandamus can be issued by this court directing the Government and the University to amend the relevant statute for increasing the age of superannuation of the University teaching and non-teaching staff. In our view, carrying out an amendment to a statute is a legislative function and falls purely within the domain of the legislature.

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in University of Delhi Vs. Raj Singh and others, , wherein, it was held as under:-

We now turn to analyse the said Regulations. They are made applicable to a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act, every institution, including a constituent or an affiliated college recognised by the U.G.C. in consultation with the University concerned, and every institution deemed to be a University. The said Regulation are thus intended to have the widest possible application, as indeed they must have if they are to serve the purpose intended, namely, to ensure that all applicants for the post of lecturer, from whichever University they may have procured the minimum qualificatory degree, must establish that they possess the proficiency required for lecturers in all Universities in the country. This is what clause 2 of the said Regulations mandates, thus :" No person shall be appointed to a teaching post in university............ in a subject if he does not fulfill the requirements as to the qualifications for the appropriate subject as provided in the Schedule 1". The first proviso to clause 2 permits relaxation in the prescribed qualifications by a University provided it is made with the prior approval of the U.G.C. This is because the said Regulations, made under the provisions of Section 26(1)(e), define the qualifications that are ordinarily and not invariably required of a lecturer. The second proviso to clause 2 makes the application of the said Regulations prospective. Clause 3 of the said Regulations provides for the consequence of the failure of a University to comply with the recommendation made in clause 2 in the same terms as are set out in section 14 of the U.G.C. Act. The provisions of clause 2 of the said Regulations are, therefore, recommendatory in character. It would be open to a University to comply with the provisions of clause 2 by employing as lecturers only such persons as fulfill the requirements as to qualifications for the appropriate subject provided in the schedule to the said Regulations. It would also be open, in specific cases, for the University to seek prior approval of the U.G.C. to relax these requirements. Yet again, it would be open to the University not to comply with the provisions of clause 2, in which case, in the event that it failed to satisfy the U.G.C. that it had done so for good cause, it would lose its grant from the U.G.C. The said Regulations do not impinge upon the power of the University to select its teachers.

The University may still select its lecturers by written test and interview or either. Successful candidates at the basic eligibility test prescribed by the said Regulations are awarded no marks or ranks and, therefore, all who have cleared it stand at the same level. There is, therefore, no element of selection in the process. The University''s autonomy is not entrenched upon by the said Regulations.

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision of this Court in KRM DAV College Nakodar vs. State of Punjab and another in CWP No. 20646 of 2011 decided on 6.8.2013:-

The grant-in-aid is granted for the purpose of encouraging and extending enterprise in education and such grant is to be given on satisfaction of the conditions of the grant-in-aid instructions framed by the State. The entitlement of grant-in-aid and its disbursement is in terms of the policy of the State Government. Thus, the petitioners cannot seek a mandamus to seek financial assistance to comply with the condition of pay scales fixed by the University Grants Commission. The Colleges are entitled to grant in aid in terms of the scheme framed only. In Jagdish Prasad Sharma''s case (supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held, in para 65 of the order reproduced above, that there cannot be automatic application of the recommendations made by the Commission, without any conscious decision being taken by the State in this regard, on account of the financial implications and other consequences attached to such a decision. Since, the claim of the petitioner has financial implication on the State, therefore, there cannot be any direction to the State Government to provide financial assistance to the unaided colleges or to unaided staff of the aided colleges.

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision in Suresh Patilkhede of Thane vs. The Chancellor and others Public Interest Litigation (Lodging) No. 80 of 2011:-

As already held by us, Regulations 7.2.0 and 7.3.0 of UGC Regulations, 2010 are traceable to section 12(d) of UGC Act, 1956. The same are not without any authority of law but at the same time, they are merely recommendatory in nature and, therefore, neither the State Legislature nor the State Government is bound to accept the same. Accordingly, when the State Government issued order dated 15 February 2011 at Exhibit ''F'' enumerated those regulations which are adopted by the State Government out of UGC Regulations 2010, the State Government decided not to adopt Regulations 7.2.0 and 7.3.0. We, therefore, find considerable substance in the argument of learned Advocate General that non-adoption of directory Regulation 7.3.0 would not render the State legislation or the Government order dated 15 February 2011 invalid or unconstitutional.

To sum up-

(i) Regulation 7.3.0 of UGC Regulations, 2010 is not traceable to clause (e) or clause (g) of Section 26(1) of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956.

(ii) The source of making Regulation 7.3.0 of UGC Regulations, 2010 is Section 12(d) and (j) of UGC Act, 1956. However, since section 12(d) and (j) of UGC Act merely enables UGC to make recommendations to Universities, Regulation 7.3.0 has to be treated as recommendatory in nature.

(iii) Regulation 7.3.0 of UGC Regulations, 2010 being a subordinate legislation under an Act of Parliament cannot override plenary legislation enacted by the State Legislature and, therefore, also Regulation 7.3.0 does not override section 12 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994.

Learned senior counsel has further placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Dr. Rohtas Kanwar Yadav Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , wherein, it was held as under: -

It is clear from Section 11(1A) of the PGI Act that appointment can be maximum for a period of five years or upto the age of 65 whichever is earlier. Though respondent No. 4 will be completing the age of 65 on 30.4.2011, objection is to extension of tenure beyond the statutory period of five years. In our view, the said provision applies only to first appointment. There is no bar to second appointment or extension if otherwise permissible. Normally, for giving a second appointment, same procedure as is adopted for the first appointment ought to be followed but this requirement cannot be held to be rigid. Object of wide publicity is to get the best available candidate for the Institute and also to provide opportunity to all eligible candidates. Procedure for due publicity has been adopted by the PGI under its regulations and was followed at the time of initial appointment. The same was not followed for further continuation/extension. Every public appointment has to be normally made after due publicity and selection process. However, extension does not contemplate the same procedure as it is merely stop gap arrangement. Temporary tenure appointment also may not always require any rigid procedure. Reference may be made to judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in B. Srinivasa Reddy Vs. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees'' Association and Others, . If having regard to nature of post, utility of the incumbent and the age of retirement, period for which appointment is to be made, there may be no illegality involved in such appointment being given. We are not concerned with a case where action may be malafide. Rule 7(4) of the rules itself permits an extension even beyond period of six months with the approval of Central Government. In the present case, Central Government itself made the appointment which has been ratified by the Institute. Even if Institute was continuing appointment by Central Government and ratification by PGI did not render the appointment void nor caused any prejudice to anyone. The view taken by the Tribunal does not, thus, call for any interference.

Before dealing with the issue involved in the present case, it is necessary to read Sections 7, 8 and 10 of the Act and the same are reproduced herein below:-

Office of the University:- The following shall be the officers of the University namely:-

(i) the Chancellor

(ii) the Vice Chancellor

(iii) the Pro Vice Chancellor

(iv) the Registrar, and

(v) such other persons in the service of the University as may be declared by the Regulations to be the officers of the University.

Appointment, powers and duties of officers, their terms and office etc.-

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the powers and duties of the officers of the University other than the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, Pro-Vice-Chancellor, and the Registrar the terms for which they shall hold office and the filing of the casual vacancies in such offices shall be provided for by the Regulations.

(2) The mode of appointments, terms and conditions of service and the functions of the officers of the University, other than the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor. Pro-Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar, shall be prescribed by Regulations in so far as they are not provided herein

Appointment, Powers, Duties and Conditions of service of Vice-Chancellor.- (1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor from amongst distinguished persons in the field of technical education on the advice of the State Government from the panel of persons recommended by the Board of Governors through a Search Committee to be nominated by the Board of Governors:

Provided that the first Vice-Chancellor of the University shall be appointed for a period of three years by the State Government to manage the day to day affairs of the University.

(2) The Vice-Chancellor shall hold office for a term of three years which may be extended by the Chancellor on similar advice and Recommendation of the Board of Governors for further period of three years.

(3) The Chancellor shall determine the amount of remuneration and other conditions of service of the Vice-Chancellor:

Provided such terms and conditions shall not be altered to the disadvantage of the Vice-Chancellor during the term of office.

(4) In case of illness or absence or leave of the Vice-Chancellor or in any other contingency, Pro-Vice-Chancellor shall act as Vice-Chancellor.

(5) The Vice-Chancellor shall be Principal Executive and academic officer of the University and shall exercise general control over its affairs in accordance with the Regulations and give effect to the decisions of the authorities of the University.

(6) The Vice-Chancellor shall have the power of convening meetings of the Academic Council.

(7) It shall be the duty of the Vice-Chancellor to ensure that the provisions of this Act and the Regulations are faithfully observed and he shall have all powers necessary for this purpose.

(8) If, in the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor, an emergency has arisen which requires immediate action to be taken, the Vice-Chancellor shall take such action as he deems necessary and shall report the same for confirmation at the next meeting to the authority, which, in the ordinary course, would have dealt with the matter: Provided that if the action taken by the Vice Chancellor is not approved by the authority concerned he may refer that matter to the Chancellor whose decision thereon shall be final:

Provided further that where any such action taken by the Vice-Chancellor affects any person in the service of the University, such person shall be. entitled to prefer, within thirty days from the date on which he receives notice of such action an appeal to the Board of Governors.

(9) The Vice-Chancellor shall exercise such other powers as may be prescribed by the Regulations.

Item 7.3.0, whereby qualifications for the post of Vice Chancellor were provided vide Annexure P-13 reads under:-

Vice Chancellor:

Persons of the highest level of competence, integrity, morals and institutional commitment are to be appointed Vice-Chancellors. The Vice Chancellor to be appointed should be a distinguished academician with a minimum of ten years of experience as Professor in a University system or ten years of experience in an equivalent position in a reputed research and/or academic administrative organisation.

In the present case, the controversy revolves around interpretation of Section 10 of the Act. Respondent No. 6 was appointed as Vice Chancellor in the year 2008. There is no dispute qua the initial appointment of the petitioner as Vice Chancellor. Thus, it is evident that the appointment of respondent No. 6 as Vice Chancellor was made in terms of Section 10(1) of the Act. The dispute has arisen only with regard to extension granted to respondent No. 6 for three years in the year 2011 by the Board of Governors in its meeting held on 5.10.2011. The resolution/order dated 5.10.2011, whereby, respondent No. 6 was granted extension of another term, was challenged by the petitioner by filing CWP No. 8345 of 2013. The said petition was disposed of vide an agreed order on 8.7.2013 and the Board of Governors was directed to re-examine the issue as per the norms applicable to the post of Vice Chancellor on the date when the extension was granted. Thereafter, the Board of Governors in its meeting held on 19.8.2013 (Annexure R-1) held as under:-

Item "01: Re-examination of the extension of the term of Vice-Chancellor by the Board of Governors as per the directions of the Hon''ble Punjab and Haryana High Court.

Members deliberated and discussed the agenda item. The Board also considered the written opinion of the members not present.

Although various opinions were expressed but members present were of the view that extension granted to Dr. Rajneesh Arora, Vice-Chancellor, PTU in the 44th meeting of BOG on Oct. 05, 2011 was as per the provisions of PTU Act, 1996.

Members further observed that though the UGC (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2010 ("UGC Regulations 2010") stipulate provisions for appointment of Vice-Chancellor, they do not appear to have any express provision in relation to extension of the term of the Vice-Chancellor.

Members further observed that the State. Govt. has not made any amendment to PTU Act, 1996 pursuant to the UGC, Regulations 2010 so far.

In conclusion, the Board felt that recommendation for extension of another term granted in 44th BOG meeting on October 5, 2011 to Dr. Rajneesh Arora, Vice Chancellor, PTU, was as per PTU Act, 1996.

The meeting ended with a vote of thanks to the Chair.

The question that requires consideration is as to whether the extension granted to respondent No. 6 was as per the Act or was against the provisions of the Act.

A careful reading of Section 10 of the Act reveals that at the time of initial appointment of the Vice Chancellor by the Chancellor, advice of the State is to be taken with regard to panel of persons recommended by the Board of Governors through a search committee nominated by the Board of Governors. So far as the initial appointment of respondent No. 6 as vice chancellor is concerned, there is no dispute qua the same and thus, the same can be held to have been made as per the Act i.e. 10 (1).

So far as Section 10(2) of the Act is concerned, it provides that the vice chancellor shall hold the office for a term of three years which may be extended by the Chancellor on similar advice and recommendation of the Board of Governors for a further period of three years. In case the argument raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is to be accepted, it would mean that virtually the vice chancellor was to be re-appointed to the said post instead of extension of term. Thus, the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. In the present case, the term of respondent No. 6 was being considered for extension of three years and not for re-appointment. Considerations at the time of appointment and extension of term cannot be said to be the same. Thus, the words appearing in clause 2 of Section 10 of the Act i.e. on similar advice and recommendation of the Board of Governors would not mean that the same were to be followed with the same strictness as at the time of initial appointment of the vice chancellor. Further a perusal of Annexure R-1 reveals that the meeting was also attended by Principal Secretary to Govt. of Punjab, Department of Technical Education and Industrial Training and Principal Secretary to Govt. of Punjab, Department of Finance. The members after debate concluded that the recommendation for extension of another term granted to respondent No. 6 was as per the Act. At the time of appointment of respondent No. 6, there were no qualifications prescribed for the post of Vice Chancellor. Since under the Act the term of Vice Chancellor could be extended, the extension of term could not be denied to respondent No. 6 merely on the ground that the UGC had amended the regulations and had provided qualifications for the post of Vice Chancellor. As per Section 7 of the Act, Vice Chancellor is the officer of the University. As per Section 8 of the Act, the mode of appointment, terms and conditions of service and the functions of the officers of the university other than the Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, Pro Vice Chancellor and the Registrar shall be prescribed by regulations in so far as they are not provided in the Act. So far as the Vice Chancellor is concerned, the mode of appointment, terms and conditions of service etc. cannot be prescribed by regulations.

Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the qualifications provided by the UGC for the post of Vice Chancellor were not liable to be taken in consideration at the time of extension of term granted to respondent No. 6.

On 2.11.2011 (Annexure P-12), following order was passed:-

Punjab Raj Bhawan

No. PRB-2G-2008 (PTU)/Dated 2.11.2011

In exercise of the powers conferred u/s 10(1) and (2) of the Punjab Technical University, Act 1996 as amended from time to time, the Chancellor, Punjab Technical University, Jalandhar is pleased to extend the term of appointment of Dr. Rajneesh Arora, as Vice Chancellor, Punjab Technical University, Jalandhar for another term of three years with effect form 22nd December, 2011.

The terms and conditions of services will remain the same as contained in Punjab Raj Bhavan order dated 02.03.2009 issued vide endst. No. PTU/2009-2G-PRB/1735-1738 dated 10.03.2009.

Dated Chandigarh, the 2nd November, 2011

M.P. Singh Principal Secretary to Governor, Punjab For Chancellor, Punjab Technical university

Thus, the Governor of Punjab had approved the extension of term granted to respondent No. 6 for three years w.e.f. 22.12.2011. Governor is the executive head of the State. Even otherwise, the meeting of the Board of Governors held on 19.8.2013 (Annexure R-1) was also attended by Principal Secretary to Govt. of Punjab, Department of Technical Education and Industrial Training and Principal Secretary to Govt. of Punjab, Department of Finance. Hence, it can be said that there is substantial compliance of Section 10(2) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no violation of Section 10 of the Act at the time of grant of extension of term to respondent No. 6. The judgments relied upon by learned senior counsel for the petitioner fail to advance the case of the petitioner as the same are based on different facts.

Accordingly, this petition is dismissed.