Narpat Ram vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Another

Satyen Vaidya, J

Heard both sides.

By way of instant petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following substantive relief:

“(A) That letter dated 7.6.2014 (Annexure P-4) may kindly be quashed and set-aside and respondent may be directed to release the arrears of Rs.1,16,359/- to

petitioner in single installment along with up-to-date interest.â€​

The petitioner served the Department of Forest, Government of Himachal Pradesh as daily wage Class-IV employee from 1984 till 16.01.1998, on

which date the services of petitioner were regularized. The petitioner continued to work as regular Class-IV employee of the said department till his

superannuation on 31.08.2006.

In 2012, petitioner approached this Court by way of CWP No.9958 of 2012 seeking benefits of the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court

in Mool Raj Upadhyaya vs. State of H.P., 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 316. A Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 17.12.2012 disposed of the

above said writ petition in following terms:

“The petitioner claims the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mool Raj Upadhyaya vs. State of H.P., 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 316 and claim work

charge status on completion of ten years of daily waged service with 240 days per year. In any case, as rightly pointed out by the learned Deputy Advocate

General, there cannot be work charge status prior to 1.1.1994. The claim for regularization will be considered only subject to the availability of vacancies. All

these aspects, the petitioner prays, he may be permitted to bring to the notice of the second respondent. It is open to him to do so. In the event of the petitioner

filing appropriate representation furnishing his service particulars, the matter will be considered and appropriate action will be taken in accordance with law

within four months from the date of production of a copy of this judgment along with the representation by the petitioner before the second respondent.

The writ petition is disposed of, so also the pending applications, if any.â€​

In compliance to above said order, the respondents granted the work charge status to the petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.1995 and consequently arrears in

the sum of Rs.1,16,359/- were calculated as payable to the petitioner. However, nothing was paid to the petitioner on the basis of instructions dated

26.04.2013 issued by the State Government whereby the arrears on account of grant of work charge status were required to be restricted for a period

of three years before approaching the Court of law. Since the petitioner had filed CWP No.9958 of 2012 on 20.10.2012 and he had retired on

31.08.2006, by restricting the arrears to three years prior to filing of the petition, nothing was found due to him.

Aggrieved against the denial of arrears vide letter dated 7.6.2014, Annexure P-4, by the respondents, the petitioner has filed this petition for the

relief as noticed above.

The claim of the petitioner has been contested by the respondents on the ground that nothing was due to the petitioner during three years

immediately preceding the filing of the writ petition by him and for such reasons in compliance to instructions dated 6.4.2013 issued by the Government

of Himachal Pradesh, impugned Annexure P-4 was issued.

In the facts of the case in hand, a huge delay in seeking legal recourse by the petitioner, is evidently visible. The services of the petitioner were

regularized in the year 1998 and at that juncture, he did not raise any dispute with respect to conferment of work charge status from retrospective

date. In fact, there is nothing on record to suggest that before the regularization, the petitioner had ever raised any claim with respect to grant of work

charge status. The petitioner continued to work as regular Class-IV employee from 1998 to 2006. During this entire period also petitioner did not raise

any grievance with respect to non-grant of work charge status on him. Not only this, petitioner kept silent for another six years after retirement and

thereafter he approached this Court by way of CWP No. 9958 of 2012.

Since, this Court has been called upon to examine the case of petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot remain

oblivious to the aspect of huge delay and laches that have taken place in this case.

It is more than settled that the delay defeats equity. In State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and others (2015) 15 SCC 602, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

“27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the

chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim

“Deo gratiasâ€​ â€" ‘thanks to God’.

Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay

on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to

emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for

half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present.â€​

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Similar exposition of law can be found in Union of India and others vs. N. Murugesan and others (2022) 2 SCC 25 wherein it has been held

as under:

“ DELAY, LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE:

The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct

characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a

species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and

perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation

in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the Court than of a strict application of law. The underlying

principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the Court.

LACHES:

The word laches is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slacknessâ€. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing

a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting

a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on

the part of the party approaching the Court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to

confer a remedy to a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular

position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the Court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to

be allowed to avail a remedy.â€​

Recently, in Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others, (2024) SCC Online SC 551, it has been held as under:

“11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ

court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead

cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought

to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the

petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is

true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to

necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal

v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:

“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary

jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and

laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs

under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in

making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to

encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the

meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh

v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide

Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose

v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).

There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the

basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are

and when and how the delay arose.â€​

It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322

whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the

applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder:

 “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of

the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the

applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where

fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports

[(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was

approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808

: AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:

“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.

Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as

equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it

would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every

case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of

limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are,Â

the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the

one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.â€​

It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is

apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970)

1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after

inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution- makers

that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily

assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily

explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of

factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience

and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and

inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-

party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.â€​

Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water

Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:

“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability

of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the

rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the

court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it

noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite

disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant â€" a litigant who has forgotten the

basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time†and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in

hazard and causes injury to the lis.â€​

The petitioner has failed to render any explanation for such a huge delay and inaction on his part. Thus, no fault can be found with rejection of his

claim by the respondents, which otherwise could not have been granted to him on account of huge delay and laches.

Even the order passed in CWP No. 9958 of 2012 cannot rescue the petitioner as the stale claim does not stand revised by securing an order for

consideration of the case of petitioner. There was no adjudication on merits.

In result, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed.

The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.