High CourtsSingle Bench

Narsingdas Nargis vs Bansi Lal and another

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 5 May 1973 · Citation: (1973) JKLR 386 : (1974) KashLJ 198

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.M.F.Ali, C.J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 — Section 499, 500
CASE NUMBER
No. 3 of 1962
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Judgment

94 paragraphs · 2,095 words

(1) This is an application on behalf of the petitioners for quashing proceedings taken against them for an offence under S. 500 of the Ranbir P. C.

on the basis of a complaint filed by one Bansi Lal in the court of the SubJudge Judicial Magistrate Reasi. The petitioners allege that the complaint

filed by the respondent does not disclose any offence under S. 500 and the prosecution of the accused would amount to unnecessary harassment

and abuse of the process of the court.

(2) The complaint was placed before me, and it' appears that the complaint has taken serious exception to a news item published in the weekly

Chandan Urdu paper whose editors are the petitioners. The complainant is a clerk in the Tehsil Education Office at Reasi and has been working in

that capacity for eight to nine years. The news item published in the said paper disclosed that the complainant had been working as a clerk in the

Tehsil Education office for a large number of years and had oppressed and harassed his subordinate staff. The object of the publication appears to

have been to agitate for the transfer of the complainant from Reasi. The exact words used in the impugned news item are as follows :

muffasil education office ka clerk

reasi main ek clerk Basni Lal muffasil education main 89 saal sae kam kar raha hai aur jis ke tabadili kae koi aasar dekhai nahin dataey, halainkae

awam nain kai war hakam talim ki tabaza dalai. lazam hai ke clerk mazkoota ko tabdil kar ka abam ka matalwa poora kiya jae kionke ise clerk ke

mn manion nain mataika malazmin ka kafia tang kar rakha hai. saaf zahir hai ke itni mudat kisi bi sarkari malazam ek jaga jahan rahna hargiz hargiz

dorust nahin (ek madaras)

(3) The alleged defamatory statement published in the Chand issue of 5771 consists of five parts : (I) that the complainant is a clerk in the Tehsii

Education office at Reasi, (2) that he has been working in this capacity for 8 to nine years, (3) that there has been a serious public agitation for

transfer of the complainant, (4) that the respondent has been exercising strict vigilance which amounts to oppressing and harassing the concerned

staff and (5) that it is not proper in the interest of administration to keep an official at one place for such a long time.

(4) The complainant has himself mentioned in paragraph (1) of the complaint that he is a clerk in the Tehsil Education office and has been working

there for about 89 years. Thus the first part of the allegation made by the accused appears to be true even from the recitals in the complaint itself

As regards the other part which relates to public agitation, that clearly falls within the purview of a fair comment and cannot be said to be

defamatory in any sense of the term. The sheet anchor however of the case of the complainant is that the petitioners used the word 'Kafia Tang'

which amount to an imputation with an intent to harm the reputation of the complainant. The accused has not suggested what was really meant by

using the words 'Kafia Tang' because these words can be interpreted in various ways. These words might indicate that the complainant exercised

such strict vigilance over his subordinate staff that they felt harassed and oppressed. The expression also may mean that the complainant was bent

on teasing the concerned staff of the department. Reading the accusation as a whole, it seems to me that the main object and intention of the

accused appears to have been not to malign the complainant but to seek his transfer by bringing the fact of his long stay at Reasi to the notice of the

higher authorities,

(5) Before an offence under S. 500 of the Ranbir P.C. can be said to be committed, it must be proved affirmatively by the prosecution that an

imputation was made intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such an imputation will harm the reputation of a person.

(6) In the instant case I am unable to find any word in the news item from which an inference can be drawn that the accused had either the requisite

intention or knowledge to harm the reputation of the complainant. On the other hand the case of the petitioners clearly falls within the first and

second Exceptions to S. 499 of the Ranbir P.C. which run thus:

Fist ExceptionIt is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should 'be

made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact.

Second ExceptionIt is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of

his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.

(7) It is manifest that whenever a person accepts Government service or a public office, he must try to imbibe the spirit of toleration and

forbearance so as not to be carried away by emotion and sentiment and get provoked by the slightest criticism of his conduct in the discharge of

his public duties. He should not be too hypersensitive so as to feel hurt by any and every imputation that is made against him, but should try to

stand up to any fair comments that are made in the interest of public good, even though the comments may not be palatable to the Government

official I am fortified in my view by the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1956) SCR

476, 4s2 wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows :

Public men in such positions may as well think it worth their while to ignore such vulgar criticisms and abuses hurled against them rather than given

importance to the same by prosecuting the persons responsible for the same.

(8) In Seymour v. Butterworth, 176 E. R. 166, 168, 169, Cockburn C. J. observed as follows :

Those who fill a public position must not be too thick skinned in reference to comments made upon them. It would often happen that observations

would be made upon public men which they know from the bottom of their hearts were undeserved and unjust ; yet they must bear with them and

submit to be misunderstood for a time.

(9) Similarly in Kelley vs. Sherlock, 1879) 5 QBD 1 Bramwell B. observed as follows :

Whoever fills a public position renders himself open thereto. He must accept an attack as a necessary though unpleasant, appendage to his office.''

(10) Again in the Queen v Sir Robert Cardan, 5 QBD 1, S. Cockburn C J. observed as follows :

It is true that a comment upon given facts, which would otherwise be libellous, may assume a privileged character, because, though unjust and

injurious, yet being founded on facts not in themselves libellous, it is a comment which any one is entitled to make upon a public man.

(11) In Purushottam Vijay v. Stat. AIR 1961 M.P. 205, a Div. Bench of the N.P. High Court laid down various tests to determine what in a

particular case would amount to a fair comment. The first test laid down by their Lordship was that the facts mentioned in the publication should be

substantially true. The second test was that the comments should be fair as being inspired by a genuine desire on the part of the writer to serve the

public interest ; and thirdly that the criticism even if called for by the facts should be in public interest and not actuated by private spite.

(12) I fully agree with the tests laid down by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in the case (Supra) In that case also serious allegations

were made against a Minister. Their Lordships held that the publication did not exceed the limits of fair comment.

(13) To the same effect is a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Vishan Sarup v. Nardeo Shastrs, AIR 1965 All. 439, 441

wherein their Lordships observed as follows :

A newspaper editor, therefore, acts within his legitimate sphere when he offers criticism of what he considers and bonafide believes to be for the

good of the community. In order to pass the test of fair comment the application must be free from malice and made bonafide and in public interest.

Mere exaggeration or inaccuracy in matters of detail does not make a comment unfair so long as what is expressed therein is materially true and for

public benefit/'

(14) In a previous decision of the same High Court in Municipal Board v. Ganesh Prasad, AIR 1952 All. 114 Bind Basni Prasad J held, almost in

similar circumstances, that the impugned publication did not amount to defamation.

(15) Applying the principles of the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the present case, I am convinced that the publication referred to above in the

issue of the Chand dated 5771 cannot be said to be defamatory in any sense of the term so as to attract the provisions of S. 499 of the Ranbir P.

C. The editor does not appear to have transcended his limits of fair comment and fair criticism in order to serve public interest. The complainant

who is serving as a clerk in the Tehsil Education office had undoubtedly been stationed at one place for a period of more than eight years and the

accused thought in good faith that public interest required that he should now be transferred so that he may not develop vested interests at Reasi.

The mere fact that the accused used the expression 'Kafia Tang' does not show that the accused was actuated by any personal vendetta against the

complainant, a fortiori there is absolutely no allegation against the accused that he bore any animus against the complainant.

(16) There is yet one more circumstance which clearly shows that even the complainant did not take the impugned publication as an imputation

calculated to harm his reputation. The impugned matter was published on 5771 and the complaint was filed more than three months thereafter, i. e.,

on 211071 and in between the complainant gave a Lawyer's notice to the petitioners to disclose the name of the person who reported the news to

them. The notice is on record and is a part of the complaint.

(16) In this notice the complainant's Lawyer writes as under :

This news item is purported to have been supplied to you for publication in your aforesaid newspaper by some teacher whose name is not

disclosed below the news item. Since my client intends to lodge a complaint in the competent court of law against the originator of this news, i. e.,

the person who has actually made this imputation concerning my client intending to harm his reputation, you are hereby requested to supply me the

name and full address of that person within a week from the receipt of this notice failing which my client will be constrained to lodge a complaint

against you as you are also answerable for this criminal defamatory act to the same extent as the originator of the aforesaid calumny.

(18) A perusal of this notice clearly shows that the dominant intention in the mind of the complainant was not to prosecute the petitioners, but to

compel them to disclose the name of the reporter at the peril of prosecution. This shows that the complainant himself was not aggrieved by the

conduct of the petitioners in the first instance and wanted to proceed only against the person who reported the facts to the petitioners.

(19) On a careful consideration, therefore, of the complaint and the documents accompanying it, I am clearly of the opinion that no case under S.

500 of the Ranbir PC. has at all been made out against the petitioners. Even if there is any imputation made against the respondent, it is clearly

covered by the first two Exceptions to S. 499 of the Ranbir PC which have been proved even from the recitals in the complaint and the papers

accompanying the same.

(20) The result is that the application is allowed and the proceedings taken against the petitioners are hereby quashed.

(21) The accused are discharged from their bail bonds.