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Judgment
V.S. Sirpurkar, J.—Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court, dismissing the writ petition, the petitioner/
appellant comes up before us by way of present appeal. The learned single Judge had confirmed the award, dated September 1, 1986, passed by
the Labour Court. By that award, the Labour Court had confirmed the punishment of dismissal meted out to the appellant after a departmental
enquiry. The award was passed on the basis of a reference u/s 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Government.
The petitioner was employed with the respondent-bank as its Inspector and he was placed under suspension on August 23, 1979. A charge-
sheet was thereafter served on him containing as many as six charges. He submitted his explanation for the said charges and thereafter, the
departmental enquiry ensued. He was thereafter served with a show-cause notice on June 14, 1980 and after consideration of his explanation to
the show-cause notice, he was terminated by an: order, dated September 5, 1980. An appeal was filed before the Registrar of Co-operative
Societies but, the appeal came to be rejected on March 13, 1971. However, it is after about one and a half years that the petitioner moved the
authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act in pursuance of which, the reference came to be made to the Labour Court, as indicated above. The
Labour Court initially enquired into the nature of the enquiry held and passed an order, dated April 27, 1976 holding the enquiry to be fair and
keeping with the principles of natural justice. After that, there was a further enquiry and the Labour Court by its award, dated September 1, 1986,
found that firstly the petitioner was not a ""workman"" and secondly, the charges of misconduct were proved and, therefore, confirmed the dismissal
order. The learned single Judge firstly held that the writ petition was filed belated, i.e., after about two and a half years after the passing of the
award and, therefore, the petitioner is guilty of laches. The learned Judges secondly held that the request of the petitioner to go again into the
appreciation of evidence by the Labour Court could not be countenanced. The learned Judge observes:
The learned counsel took me at length through some of the findings of the enquiry officer and that too in the light of the evidence on record, and
contended that the findings were totally uncalled for. In spite of the best efforts made for the petitioner, the learned counsel appearing for him could
not successfully substantiate that the findings rendered are not based on any evidence on record. The question as to the sufficiency of evidence or
the further question as to whether there could possibly be another conclusion on the findings considered were often held to be not within the scope
of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The said principle squarely supports the case on hand and in spite of some
materials pointed out, the findings rendered as a whole, in my view, could not be said to have been undermined.
In this view, the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition which judgment is in challenge before us.
The learned counsel Sri N.G.R. Prasad, appearing on behalf of the petitioner/appellant, very seriously tried to suggest that here was a case
where there was a complete failure on the part of the Labour Court to appreciate the evidence on record and this was not merely a case of
misappreciation of evidence but, the non-appreciation thereof and the findings by the Labour Court were sketchy, skeleton-like and without any
appreciation of evidence on record. Therefore, the Labour Court was also guilty of non-appreciation of evidence. The learned counsel requested
us to go through the evidence not only recorded before the Labour Court but also during the domestic enquiry and very seriously contended that
there was no effort on the part of the Labour Court to go into and to appreciate the evidence. In order to drive this point, we were extensively
taken through the award and more particularly from Para 8. After pointing out that the Labour Court had quoted the six charges levelled and
thereafter in barely a paragraph the Labour Court had finished the task of appreciation of evidence, Sri Prasad very severely criticised the award
that there was no discussion on the part of the Labour Court to the evidence led during the domestic enquiry. According to him, every charge was
liable to be discussed independently.
The charges framed before the domestic enquiry were as under:
Charge No. 1: The petitioner acted in violation of the bye-laws of the bank. With regard to that, the complaint is that as per Chapter XII-3 of the
Subsidiary Regulations of the bank no employee of the bank or any member of his family shall become a member of any co-operative credit
society or get loans and that in violation of the said rule the petitioner has made his son a member of a co-operative society on July 22, 1978, and
has obtained a loan.
Charge No. 2: The petitioner has obtained benami loans from the co-operative society in violation of the bye-laws of the bank. With regard to that,
the allegations that the petitioner made his son a member of the society and obtained loans of Rs. 1500 and Rs. 1000 on September 30, 1978 and
November 8, 1978 respectively.
Charge No. 3: The petitioner misused his position. With regard to that the allegations are that he obtained benami loans in the name of his father
and his son and also caused the mortgage deed to be executed by his father alone without including him.
Charge No. 4: The petitioner has deceived the bank given false certificate and false information. With regard to that, the allegation is that he has
obtained a loan in the name of his son on the security of same land on which his father had already obtained a loan.
Charge No. 5: The petitioner has been irresponsible in his duties.
Charge No. 6: He has misused the advanced received from the bank. With regard to that the allegation is that he has obtained a loan for purpose
of a motor cycle and that he did not use the motor cycle for the purpose for which it was intended.
As regards the first charge, Sri Prasad had to say that the petitioner could not be presumed to have a knowledge of the regulations of the bank and
it could not be said that he should make his son a member of the co-operative society after all his son was himself a major person and could, in his
own decision, become the member of the co-operative society. As regards the charge Nos. 2, 3 and 4 it was tried to be suggested that there was
no question of petitioner obtaining any benami loans as the loans were factually obtained by his son and the father. He pointed out that the
petitioner could not have control over his son and the father. As regards the fifth charge, the contention raised was that the petitioner at the most
called to be negligent in his duty in not maintaining the registers and for this dereliction, he could not be given an extreme punishment. As regards
their sixth charge, the contention was that it could not be said that the motorcycle, for which he had obtained the loan, was not used by him.
In the first place, it would not be permissible for us to go into the appreciation of evidence at this stage. It is trite law that while exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 226 and more particularly in respect of the awards by the Labour Court pertaining to the punishment meted out in the
domestic enquiry, the High Court does not normally go into the findings of facts. Of course, the jurisdiction of the High Court is plenary and it is not
as if, there is a bar of jurisdiction. However, it is a consistent law that the High Court normally does not go into these aspects. There could,
however, be exceptional circumstances under which, the High Court finds that the Labour Court has not at all considered the evidence or has been
extremely perverse in its approach that the High Court chooses to go into the facts. The question is not of the bar of jurisdiction but of discretion.
We are in entire agreement with the learned Judge that in the present case, there was no such perversity shown by the Labour Court nor could the
Labour Court be held guilty of non-consideration of material piece of evidence. When we read Para 8 of the award, it reveals that the Labour
Court has actually accepted the findings of the enquiry officer on each charge. The Labour Court has also viewed it totally improbable that the
petitioner would not be knowing about the bye-laws and the regulations of the bank where he was working for 22 years. The Labour Court has
also taken into consideration that though it was completely against the rules, the petitioner/appellant went to the extent of recommending the loans
for his son as also the father, which loans were actually granted. The learned counsel wanted to say that the loans were sanctioned by the
President, Directors, and the Secretary of the society and, therefore, it should be they who should be proceeded against and not the appellant,
who had merely recommended the loans. Such a contention cannot be countenanced and, in fact, the Labour Court has recorded that the guilt on
the part of those office-bearers would have nothing to do with the action against the appellant.
A feeble attempt was made to suggest that the brilliant past- record of the appellant was not considered, but there also learned counsel has to
draw blank as the Labour Court had clearly mentioned that his past record was not clean and that he was warned, censured and his increment had
been stopped on several occasions in past. It was pointed by the Labour Court that this appellant was proceeded against on twelve occasions. In
that view, it cannot be said that the Labour Court had in any manner failed to appreciate the evidence on record. It was pointed out to us that an
earlier order has been passed by the Labour Court on July 24, 1980, wherein the Labour Court had held the enquiry to be in order. In fact, even
this order, dated July 24, 1980, was in challenge before the learned single Judge because that order was also a part of the award, dated
September 1, 1986. When this order is glanced at, it suggests a detailed discussion regarding each charge starting from Para 7. The Labour Court
has referred to all the evidence in great details in this order. All the evidence, which was led during the domestic enquiry, has been discussed
thereadbare in this order. Reference to Paras 10 to 12 should be sufficient wherein the Labour Court had discussed each and every charge. The
evidence of one Marappan, who is the Secretary of the bank, is also referred to in great detail. Therefore, this is not a case where there was a
sketchy or skeleton-like finding recorded by the Labour Court. We have pointed out that even in the subsequent final order, dated September 11,
1986, the Labour Court has referred to all these charges. The criticism of the award, therefore, cannot be justified and, in our opinion, the learned
Judge was perfectly justified in ignoring and rejecting the criticism made before him. This is apart from the fact that there is not even one word
uttered regarding the laches because, admittedly, the petition was filed two and a half years after the award was passed.
Sri Prasad, cited few rulings before us. The first amongst them being The Cooper Engineering Limited Vs. Shri P.P. Mundhe, and pointed out
that it is the duty of the enquiry officer to give reasons for his finding. There can be no dispute about this proposition. However, we find that the
enquiry officer has given good reasons which have ultimately been substantiated by the Labour Court. The second case relied upon by the learned
counsel is reported in M. Raghavelu Vs. Govt. of A. P. and Anr., (1997) 10 SCC 779 . The object of citing this ruling appears to substantiate the
plea that where the superior officers are exonerated, the inferior officers should not be made the scapegoats. The contention of the learned counsel
is that it was the duty of the superiors like the President, Directors and Secretary of the Co- operative Society to supervise the grant of loans and,
therefore, it is they who were liable to be proceeded with. We have no quarrel with the proposition but, the factual panorama here is entirely
different. This is apart from the fact that the Labour Court has very correctly observed that the question of the culpability of the petitioner cannot
be linked with the duties of the superiors like the President, Directors and Secretary. On facts, the case is entirely different. The third case relied
upon is reported in The Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. The Management and Others, , This is the ruling
where the Supreme Court deals with Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act on the powers of the Industrial Tribunal to re-appreciate the
evidence. In our view, the case has no bearing to the present controversy.
In short, we are of the opinion that the writ appeal is without any substance and is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed but, without
any orders as to the costs.