Nath Singh vs State of Haryana

R.L. Anand, J.

Nathu Singh petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying for the quashment of the impugned order dated 9.9.1996 (Annexure P1) passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Palwal, in case F.I.R. No. 84 dated 23.9.1992 under Sections 435/34 registered at Police Station Sadar, Palwal, vide which the learned Magistrate closed the evidence of the prosecution and posted the case for recording the statement of the accused under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure.

The grouse of the petitioner is that the impugned order is liable to be quashed as the trial Court failed to discharge its duty for the production of the witnesses by issuing the warrants of arrest and by not doing so, great prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, who is the complainant in the main case.

Notice of the petition was given to the respondents, who contested the case of the petitioner.

Before I deal with the arguments which were raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it may be useful for me to incorporate the material portion of the impugned order dated 9.9.1996, a perusal of which would show that before resorting to this order, five opportunities, including the last opportunity, were granted to the prosecution to adduce its entire evidence and when the prosecution failed to bring the witnesses on 9.9.1996, the trial Court was left with no other alternative but to close the evidence of the prosecution by holding that there was no justification in further adjourning the case.

Shri Sumeet Mahajan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that it was the duty of the trial Court to secure the presence of the prosecution witnesses by adopting coercive methods and that the evidence of the prosecution could not be closed by passing the impugned order. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which empower the Court to use coercive methods for the production of the witnesses. The submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any merit. So far as the power of the Court is concerned, it is not disputed. Nor is it disputed that primarily it is the fundamental duty of the Court to secure the presence of the witnesses for the fair decision of the case. Equally is the law that the accused has also the right to speedy trial. In the present case the F.I.R. was registered in the year 1992 and challan was presented in the same year. Five opportunities were granted to the prosecution to adduce the evidence, including the last opportunity on 9.9.1996, and in spite of that no prosecution witness appeared on that date. So much so, the prosecution itself took the responsibility to adduce the entire evidence on the date fixed. At no point of time the prosecution ever made a request to the Court that the witnesses were not likely to appear and that coercive methods may be resorted to so as to ensure the presence of the witnesses. When the prosecution after giving undertaking to the Court is not sticking to its own obligation and commitment, the Criminal Court is not supposed to give such a long rope so that the interest of the accused may suffer and his fundamental right of speedy justice is crippled.

It is well settled that the provisions of Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, are supposed to be exercised sparingly and in rare cases and can be invoked in those cases where this Court formulates an opinion that it has become necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The scales of justice cannot be tilted in favour of the prosecution tr the detriment of the interests of the accused. When the prosecution is not sincere to its own obligations and commitments before the Court, the latter has the power to pass such orders which are necessary for the advancement of the cause of justice. The impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity, which may warrant the interference of the powers of this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C., or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Resultantly, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order.

The petition is hereby dismissed.