Nathilal vs R.G. Moghe

A.H. Khan, J.—The Plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of his tenant, alleging that he was an old man of 64 years, that he was having on the fourth storey of his house, that his wife was asthmatic and that for these reasons, he was in genuine need of moving to the second storey of the house in order to have greater convenience. The Defendant resisted the suit on the ground that the requirement of the Plaintiff was not genuine, because the Plaintiff had rented some portions of the house to other persons after his illness. The trial Court held that the accommodation was not genuinely required by the Plaintiff and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Additional District Judge, Shivpuri, held that he believed that the Plaintiff-landlord genuinely required the suit accomodation for himself and that the lower Court was uncharitable in questioning the requirement of the landlord; But dismissed the appeal on the ground that according to Section 4 (g) of the M. P. Accomodation Control Act (Act No. 23 of 1955), a landlord can only "claim back residential accommodation in case he had no other accommodation of his own in the city" and that when the landlord is in occupation of the fourth storey, he cannot ask a tenant, living in the second storey to be evicted. Against this decision the Plaintiff has filed this Second appeal.

The short question for decision in this case is whether a landlord who is living in upper storey can ask his tenant living in the lower storey to vacate it on the ground that he is an old man and that he required the accomodation for his own use.

I am happily relieved of the (sic) to consider this question because my learned brother Dixit J. (as he then was)in Motilal v. Badrilal (1954 MBLJ 274) has considered a similar proposition. In para 10 of the Judgment, he has elaborately discussed the proposition and considered all the implication of Section 4 (g) of the M. B. Accomodation Control Act, I can do no better than quote his actual words-

Having regard to the object of Section 4 (g) and consistent with the earlier (sic) of the Clause. "any other house" (in the present Act the actual words are "no other accommodation" instead of any other house)must in my opinion, be construed as meaning that the alteration accommodation, disentitling the landlord to the relief of possession must be reasonably equivalent as regards (sic) in all respects to the accommodation he is claiming.

The learned Additional District Judge has already held that the landlord owing to his advanced age really needs the accommodation and that his requirement is genuine. And it goes without saying that to a person of 64 years of age, who has a wife affected with asthma, it would afford greater facility to live on the second floor than on the fourth storey, as he is living now. Apart from all this, both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the object of the Accommodation Control Act. To me the real object of the Act seems to be that a landlord may not exploit his tenant in the matter of rent and may not evict him in order to get enhanced rent. But is the instant case, the requirement of the Plaintiff (Who is an old man of 64 years) cannot be said to be for the purpose of exploiting the tenant. There is no doubt that the alternative accommodation which the Plaintiff has "is not reasonably equivalent regards the suitability in all respects to the accommodation" the Plaintiff now claimed Section 4 (g) cannot mean and does not mean that a landlord even when genuine need is established, shall be denied his innate right of priority to use his own accommodation in preference to others. If the law were to deny the owner that facility, then I venture to suggest that such a law would not only be one-ro(sic), but it would be unjust as well. The real split of the Accommodation Control Act however is not that.

Mr. Naoker, learned Counsel for the Respondent, has argued that during the pendency of the suit, a portion in which the Sub-Inspector of Police was living on the second floor was vacated by the Sub-Inspector, yet the landlord did not move into it and gave it on render reply it is stated that the Sub-Inspector (sic)d only a room, a bath room and a kitchen in his possession, and this accommodation was insufficient and therefore the Plaintiff did not move into it. No question has been put to the Plaintiff as to why he did not move in the portion vacated by the Sub-Inspector. From the record it appears that the accommodation which the Plaintiff now claims consist of three rooms, two verandahs and a kitchen. It is obvious that the tenant cannot force a landlord to live in one room only.

For reasons stated above, I would allow the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below, order eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute with costs throughout.