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Judgment
V. Ramaswami, C.J., and Ujagar Singh, J.
This is a petition for the issuance of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the order of the Director, Panchayats, Haryana, respondent No. 1 and to direct the removal of Hawa Singh, Sarpanch, respondent No. 3. The thirdrespondent was elected as a Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Butana Khetlan, District Sonepat some time in June, 1983. On the basis of a complaint made by the petitioner, the thirdrespondent was by an order dated 27101986, placed under suspension by the firstrespondent, Director, pending a regular enquiry against him on the basis of the charges under, section 102(2) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 (shortly the Act). The Director who was the competent authority to remove a Sarpanch, entrusted the enquiry to the Additional General Assistant, Sonepat and required him to submit his report. The Enquiry Officer, after a detailed enquiry into the charges and after giving the complainant and the accusedofficer, an opportunity to make their representation, submitted his report to the Director. The Director then sent a copy of the report to the accused officer and asked him to submit his explanation, if any, on the findings of the Enquiry Officer. On 20.8.1987, the thirdrespondent submitted his explanation on the report of the Enquiry Officer. After consideration of the report and the reply of the thirdrespondent, the Director held that all the charges were not proved. It may be mentioned that the Enquiry Officer held that 8 out of 11 charges were proved. On the basis that the charges had not been, proved, the Director set aside the order of suspension and reinstated the thirdrespondent as Sarpanch.
In this writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner raised various contentions. The first submission was that the order of the Director, reinstating the third respondent was illegal on the ground that before such reinstatement was ordered, no notice had been given to the petitioner who was the complainant. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. It is not in dispute that before the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner was allowed to make his representation and he took part in the enquiry. After the necessary report is submitted, the only person vital who is to be given a copy of the report and competent to accept the same or not is the accused officer and that has been done. After the reply to the report was received from the accused officer, it is open to the Director to consider and decide on the basis of the records available before him whether to accept the report or not. It was not necessary at that stage to call upon the complainant to show as to whether the reinstatement order could not be made or why this suspension could not be revoked. It is not a case where the suspension or removal before enquiry was held or a case of mala fide intention, The decision relied upon by the learned counsel, reported in Suresh Chand v. Director of Panchayats, Haryana, 1979 PLJ 116 : 1985 R.R.R. 518, is of no assistance to him in this respect. What happened in that case was that pending criminal proceedings under sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code before a Criminal Court, an accusedSarpanch was suspended on an information or a complaint made by the the petitioner, that such proceedings before a Criminal Court were pending and to permit him to act as a Sarpanch would not be in the interest of the Gram Panchayat, because it will embarrass him in the discharge of his duties, as offences charged against him involved moral turpitude. Accepting that, the accused officer was suspended, but subsequently that order was rescinded without any further new facts. The criminal proceedings were not over nor was there any other reason for revocation of suspension. In these circumstances, the petitioner filed the writ petition, questioning the rescinding order of suspension on the ground that it was mala fide and that it could not have been made without a detailed enquiry into it. We are unable to agree, therefore, that this judgment, in any way, can help him.
We are not questioning the locus standi of the petitioner to file this writ petition and to bring to our notice if there was any mala fide action on the part of the Governmental authorities. The locus standi as a question is no longer very vital in the case of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. `Public Interest Litigation has come to stay. If the petitioner can make out a case of any mala fide action on the part of the respondents for which Court''s interference is called for, we would not dismiss the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner has no locus standi. However, we are unable to agree that any of the principles of natural justice have been violated by the Director, in not giving a notice before passing the impugned order. Under section 102 of the Act, when Gram Panchayat informs the Director to remove a panch on the grounds mentioned therein, it is not necessary, even if he finds that any one of those grounds is available, the Sarpanch shall necessarily be dismissed. The gravity of the offence and the possibility to rectify any mistake without any detriment can be considered by the Director in deciding whether the removal was necessary or justified.
In this connection, we may also mention that the enquiry officer''s report is in regard, to facts, and on findings of facts, the Director can differ. There is no binding order made by the Enquiry Officer. It is only in the nature of a report which is for consideration of the Director who can, if the facts so warrant, differ from the findings on facts. Therefore, this submission is without any legal basis so as to call for interference by this Court.
The next contention was that at least in respect of one charge, the Director has accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and if once that particular finding is accepted he had no jurisdiction to discharge the Sarpanch. In support of this contention. he relied upon a Single Judge decision of this Court, reported as Risal Singh. v. Director Panchayats, Haryana, 1981 PLJ 48 : 1985 R.R.R. 379. Actually this submission has no factual basis. The charge, the learned counsel says, which the Director has accepted, is charge No. 10. That was a charge about double payment of Rs. 1,004/ for repairs to a tubewell. The case of the accusedofficer seems to have been while accepting the double payment, that it was on account of a mistake made and he had reimbursed that money to the Panchayat and necessary correction also has been made in the registers. This was accepted by the Director and he was held not guilty of the charge. Therefore, it is not factually correct to say that the Director has accepted the finding of guilt given by the Enquiry Officer in respect of this charge. Even otherwise, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that the judgment relied on by him, in any way, can help the petitioner in this case. In that case, the Director had not differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in any respect. The learned Judge was of the view that the only ground on which the Director wanted to discharge or reinstate the accusedofficer was that there was no mala fide intention on his part. The learned Judge was not prepared to accept this case on the ground that the accused officer himself did not plead before the Enquiry Officer at any stage that there was no mala fide intention and bringing in this defence of want of mala fide intention suo motu while passing of the order was uncalled for. Apart from that, the order of the learned Judge shows that he had grave suspicion, whether the order was substituted later on after the records were brought to the Court and this fact persuaded him to hold not to accept the Director''s order ultimately. Thus that case depended upon its own facts and on the impression gathered by the learned Judge and we cannot take that the ratio of that judgment is that the Director could not differ from the findings of the enquiry Officer or that where even if one charge is found true, he had no option but to remove the Sarpanch.
It was then contended by the learned counsel that one of the charges related to the loss of interest on cash in hand and the order did not deal with this charge. It is true, there was no definite finding, but the Director has actually stated that the amount of loss of interest, if any, will have to be determined under S. 105 of the Act and after determination of the loss, if any, action is called for, that can be taken, but this is no ground for removal of the Sarpanch under Section 102 of the Act. Therefore, there is no substance in this contention also.
No other contention has been raised. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any ground for interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed in limine.