National College vs The Syndicate of The Punjab University and Others

Tek Chand, J.—This is a petition u/s 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, praying that as the Respondents have committed contempt of this Court in so far as they had defied the order of this Court made on 20th of October, 1967, in Civil Writ No. 135 of 1967, they may be proceeded with for having committed contempt of Court. The Respondents are the Syndicate, Registrar and the Deputy Registrar (Administration) respectively of the Punjab University. On 25th of January, 1968, I had admitted the petition and directed that notice should issue to Respondents 2 and 3 and to the Chairman of the meeting of the Syndicate held on 28th October, 1967. It was further directed that the implementation of the Resolution of the Syndicate be stayed ad interim.

The petition is on behalf of National College, Sathiala through the General Secretary, Brig. G.S. Bal (retired). The facts of this case are that a writ petition was filed (Civil Writ 135 of 1967), in this Court challenging the legality of the order of the Syndicate, dated 8th of December, 1966, by which the University had declined to give its concurrence to the suspension/dismissal of S. Kartar Singh, Principal of National College, Sathiala, and had further directed the college authorities to reinstate him. The prayer in the writ petition was that the Registrar and other officials of the University be restrained through a writ of Prohibition, direction or order from illegally coercing the Petitioner to take back a legally dismissed employee by forcing his services upon an unwilling employer, the Petitioner. This petition was allowed by my order, dated 20th of October, 1967, wherein I had observed:

...In the instant case, the impugned decision of the Syndicate was violative of the powers which vest in the Senate and the Government under the Statute and statutory Regulations.

The petition deserves to succeed and is, therefore, allowed. I will, therefore, quash the decision of the University declining to give its concurrence to the suspension or dismissal of Shri Kartar Singh, Principal and further requiring the Petitioner to reinstate him. The University is restrained from requiring the Petitioner to take back the Principal in its service, who has been dismissed seemingly in accordance with the procedure laid down in Regulations 11 and 12....

This order was issued to the University from the High Court office on 13th of November, 1967 and must have been received within a day or two. In this petition it is urged that the above order was passed in the presence of and after hearing the counsel for the University. Even otherwise, the University authorities concerned were fully conversant with the above order, and further, it was their duty to acquaint themselves with the order passed by this Court. Eight days after the passing of the order, a meeting of the Syndicate was held on 28th October, 1967, at which decision were taken in respect of the affairs of the National College, Sathiala, which were communicated to the college authorities by Respondent No. 2, the Registrar of the University by a Registered A.D. letter,--vide copy Annexure I, dated 8th of November, 1967. The relevant portion is reproduced below:

Subject.--Affairs of National College, Sathiala.

I am to inform you that the Syndicate at its meeting held on 28th October, 1967, considered report of the Inspection Committee (copy enclosed) on the above cited subject and decided as under:

(i)....

(ii)....

(iii)....

(iv) The permanent Principal, Shri Kartar Singh, be reinstated immediately (i.e., by 30th November, 1967, at the very latest), in pursuance of the Syndicate decision, dated 8th December, 1966.

This communication was signed by Respondent No. 3 as a Deputy Registrar. The above direction was in opposition to the order of this Court in the writ petition and the direction specifically restraining the Syndicate from requiring the college authorities to reinstate Principal Kartar Singh in its service after his dismissal had been violated. The order passed by this Court was mandatory and by the action of the Respondents the prestige and dignity of this Court has been lowered.

In reply, affidavit has been filed by Respondent No. 2, who is the Registrar of the University. No return has been filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 3. In this affidavit, the Registrar has stated--

It was learnt some time later that the writ petition had been allowed but the copy of the judgment was not immediately then available.

It has not been indicated in this affidavit when the Registrar or the other University authorities concerned actually came to know of the writ petition having been allowed, and when was the copy of the judgment obtained. The details are lacking as to the date when knowledge was acquired of the decision of this Court. It has not been indicated, if the counsel engaged on behalf of the University had communicated to the University authorities the decision of this Court and when. It is stated in the affidavit by the Registrar that the letter, in pursuance of the decision of the Syndicate, dated 28th of October, 1967, to which objection had been taken, was issued in the ordinary routine and in accordance with the normal practice of conveying the decision of the Syndicate to the authorities concerned. This decision was taken in accordance with the recommendations of the Inspection Committee which had been appointed to examine the working of the college. The report of the Committee was put up before the Syndicate on 28th of October, 1967, by which date the judgment of this Court was not available. In these circumstances, the recommendations of the Committee were accepted in their entirety, without there being any intention on the part of the Respondents to flout the authorities of this Court. In defence, it has been stated that all this happened due to an inadvertent mistake on account of the non-availability of the copy of the judgment at that time. It was also said that the true meaning and the import of the judgment were not known to the answering Respondents or to any member of the Syndicate when the decision on 28th October, 1967, was taken by the Syndicate and the letter written. It was further stated that when the copy of the judgment was available, it was circulated to the members of the Syndicate with the agenda issued on 21st January, 1968, for a meeting, which was held on 28th January, 1968. On coming to known of the judgment, the members of the Syndicate passed a Resolution, which rescinded their previous Resolution of the 28th October, 1967. in complaince with the directions of that judgment. It was also stated that no disrespect to the Court was intended by a decision of 28th of October, 1967 and the error was due to want of knowledge of this Court''s decision.

Objection was also taken to the improper language used in the petition for contempt of Court. In this connection, I may state at the outset that the language used in the petition is immoderate, unrestrained and borders on the libellous. The use of such language in a petition scandalising the opposite party deserves to be reprobated. It is a reprehensible practice to use an invective or undignified language with a view to vent one''s spleen against the opposite party out of anger or abuse. Pleadings are to be used for stating the facts on the basis of which inferences may be drawn. It is not the purpose of the pleadings to let a party indulge in rancorous language with the object of slandering the opposite party. The language in the petitions has per force to be restrained and refined. The use of opprobrious word must be eschewed as the use of such a language is contempt of Court by itself. The use of scandalous language where it is not relevant to the merits of the case, but where the object is to sting, cannot be countenanced; and the Registrar in his affidavit has justly taken exemption to the impropriety of the words. Where the object is either to strain the reputation, or to wound the feelings of the parties, the Courts have gone to the length of striking out the objectionable words, or the offensive matter. The Petitioner has used improper language both in the petition and in the rejoinder. Without slightest excuse, the Petitioner has referred to the Respondents as "appearing to indulge in their foolish and illegal action with impunity", and that they are stated to have acted "most irresponsibly and out of sheer callousness." When exception was taken in the affidavit of the Registrar to the use of such a language, worse language was employed in the Petitioner''s rejoinder stating that the second Respondent was guilty of verifying the affidavit falsely adding insult to injury and indicating an obstinacy hardly to be equated with expression of genuine repentence. The most offensive words which were used by the Petitioner were when, in reply to the affidavit of Respondent 2 objecting to the use of improper language, the Petitioner in the reply said: "The language used by the deponent in para 6 of the petition can hardly be termed improper or unparliamentary. To call a knave a knave is no sin and is perfectly legal." To my mind this is a scurrilous language, which cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed without censure.

The petition for proceeding for contempt of Court cannot, however, be dismissed simply because the Petitioner has indulged in the use of indecorous and slanderous language. The question of commission of contempt is vis-a-vis the Court, which is the party offended and whose dignity has been said to have been lowered. The question which calls for determination is whether the order of this Court has been defied deliberately and recklessly, or unintendingly. It will also be relevant to find out if the Respondents had knowledge of the decision given by this Court before the resolution of the Syndicate was passed. It may be mentioned that on behalf of the Respondents nothing has been said as to the date when they became aware of the decision of this Court. In a contested case where parties are represented by counsel, it is not unreasonable to presume that the decision of this Court, which was announced on 20th of October, 1967, must have been communicated on the same date or soon after to Respondent No. 2, the Registrar of the University, or to Respondent No. 3, the Registrar (Administration). After the communication of the resolution passed by the Syndicate, which is impugned in these proceedings, a letter, dated 28th November, 1967, was addressed by the Deputy Registrar to Shri Bahadur Singh, President, Managing Committee, National College, Sathiala, drawing his attention to the earlier letter from the University, dated 8th of November, 1967, asking him to comply with the decision of the Syndicate within the stipulated period and that intimation be sent to the office of the University immediately. Thus, even on that day the decision of this Court was being ignored and Managing Committee was being required to comply with the Syndicate''s decision which had been struck down. The Petitioner sent a reply to the Registrar of the University on 29th of December, 1967,--vide Annexure VII, wherein inter alia, it was pointed out that in view of the judgment of this Court delivered on 20th of October, 1967, the University was restrained from requiring the Petitioner to reinstate the Principal and, therefore, the University''s directive was illegal and if the University persisted in demanding his reinstatement, the college authorities would be forced to go to a Court of law. There has also been produced a copy of the letter, dated 11th of January, 1968, from the Registrar of the Punjab University, Chandigarh addressed to "Principal Kartar Singh, National College, Sathiala". Shri Kartar Singh was no longer the Principal, having been dismissed by the college committee. It was stated, that the Registrar while still addressing Shri Kartar Singh as the Principal, was doing so in disregard of the order of this Court. In this case, Respondents 1 and 3 have not chosen to give any reply to the petition, and on this it is contended that it should be assumed that these two Respondents are not in a postion to deny the allegations made in the petition. Mr. H.R. Sodhi, counsel for the Respondents says, that he represents all the three Respondents and opposes the petition and that it was not incumbent upon Respondents 1 and 3 to file their written statements. When serious allegations are made against the Syndicate, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar, that they have defied the order of this Court in passing a Resolution, which runs counter to the order of this Court, it is proper to file the returns in the form of an affidavit and to place their version indicating how no contempt had been committed. If the fact of commission of contempt is being admitted, then apology should have been placed on the record on behalf of Respondents 1 and 3. There is no indication in the affidavit filed by Respondent No. 2 that it is also deemed to be on behalf of Respondents 1 and 3. The main argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondents was that the resolution was passed in accordance with the recommendations contained in the report of the inspection Committee, dated 23rd of October, 1967 (Annexure ''A''). The order of this Court was made on 20th of, October, 1967. It is not the Petitioner''s case before me that the members of the Inspection Committee had also defied the order of this Court, dated 20th October, 1967. The main case of the Respondents is, that they were not aware of the order passed by this Court through inadvertence, and the meaning and import of the judgment were not known to the Respondents or to any member of the Syndicate when the decision was taken on 28th of October, 1967. It was further stated that when the judgment was made available to the members of the Syndicate and read by them in their meeting on 28th of January, 1968, the earlier Resolution passed by the Syndicate on 28th of October, 1967 in so far as it related to reinstatement of Shri Kartar Singh was rescinded in view of the judgment of this Court. No indication has been given in the affidavit of the Registrar when he became aware of the judgment of this Court, and all that is stated is that a copy of the judgment of this Court was circulated with the agenda issued on 21st January, 1968. It does appear that prompt steps were not taken to give effect to the judgment of this Court, which it was incumbent upon the University to take. On the record, however, I feel satisfied, that no affront was intended and no Respondent was deliberately attemping to set at naught the order of this Court. It does not appear, that the disobedience was wilful or intentional and with the awareness that an order had been passed by this Court, Disobedience to an order of the Court, In order to be punishable as contempt, must be wilful and not just casual, accidental or unintentional. There is no clear evidence, that the order of this Court said to have been disobeyed was within thx knowledge of the Respondents on the date when the impugned resolution was passed. The Courts do not act in contempt unless they are satisfied that the disobedience was wilful,--vide Dodington v. Hudson 130 E.R. 165, Stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban District Council 1910 2 Ch. 190 . Oswald, however, made it clear that a person could be guilty of contempt of Court even if it did not receive a copy of the order, but is otherwise aware of its contents, and despite that knowledge, proceeds to disobey the order. "In order to justify committal for breach of such an order, it is not necessary that the order should have been served upon the party against whom it has been granted, if it be proved that he had notice of the order aliunde, as by telegram, or newspaper report, or otherwise, and knew that it was intended to be enforced, or if he consented to the order, or if he was present in Court when the order was pronounced, or when the motion was made, although he left before the order was pronounced",--vide Oswald on Contempt of Court, page 203, Hasbury'' Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 8, para 64, pages 36-37 Hoshiar Singh Vs. Gurbachan Singh, , Dipendra Nath Sarkar Vs. State of Bihar and Others, .

In the absence of circumstances showing knowledge of the order of this Court on the part of the Respondents, it will not be correct to visit on the Respondents the consequences of committal for contempt of Court for not complying with the order of the Court. In the absence of any indication that in the circumstances of this case the conduct of the Respondents was calculated to lessen the authority or the dignity of this Court, a case does not seem to be made out for holding that contempt of Court has been committed-The Respondents had specifically denied any contumacious intent on their part and have not hesitated to offer unconditional apology. It does appear to me, that if the University authorities concerned were a little more diligent, and a little less negligent, they would have come to know, that an order had been passed by this Court, and the resolution passed by the Syndicate ran counter to the injunctions of this Court. On the allegations of the Petitioner, it is more a case of civil contempt than of criminal contempt. Where the offence complained of is found to be of a slight or trifling nature, this Court exercises its power reluctantly and with scrupulous care, and only when the case is clear and beyond any reasonable doubt,--vide Monoharlal v. Sri Prem Shankar Tandon and Ors. AIR 1960 All. 231, Emperor v. Murli Manohar Prasad and Ors. AIR 1929 Pat 72. In the mater of Muslim outlook, Lahore AIR 1927 Lah 610.

In the circumstances of this case, no action for proceeding in contempt against the Respondents is called for. This Court, however, expects the Respondents to be more attentive and prompt in acquainting themselves with the decision of the Court in which the University is a party.

The petition made u/s 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.