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Judgment
Pmir,J.
This letters patent appeal is directed against the judgment passed by a learned Single Bench of this court in SWP No.357/1991 on 20.5.1990.
The writ petitioners who are working as Surveyothers is Salal Project sought parity of their pay with their counter parts working in Dhouliganga
Hydre Electric Project (U.P) and Chamera Hydre Electric Project (H.P). The stand of the appellants before the writ court was fourfold:
1 .That the projects were located in different parts of the country and geographically the employees of the appellant corporation working in
different projects had to live in different conditions.
2 Even the conditions of service of the employees belonging to different projects were different.
3 That qualifications for appointment were also different.
4 That the writ petitioners were governed by a settlement which they entered into with the employerappellant and their scales of pay were fixed in
terms of that settlement. That being so, they were estopped from claiming parity with other persons.
The learned Single Bench while passing the judgment impugned has registered two of these objections taken by the appellants. Those are
relating to places of work being different and the privity of settlement between the employer and the writ petitioners. The learned Single Bench
after registering these two objections has referred to judgments laiddown by the Supreme Court in AIR 1990 SC 334, AIR 1985 SC 1124, AIR
1984 SC 1211 and AIR 1994 SC 265. Then the learned Single Bench concludes his judgment by the following sentence:
In view of the above....................................
The petition is accordingly allowed.
The appellantcorporation was not contesting the proposition of law known as ""equal pay for equal work"". There could be no denial to the law
laiddown by the Apex Court of this country in the judgments referred to. The grounds taken in the objections would per necessity require the writ
court to return a finding quo such objections. The learned writ court unfortunately omitted to do so. Dumping the objections on the limb of oblivion,
and deciding the writ petition on the analogy of some judgments, without taking into account the basic distinction of the case in hand (made clear in
the objections) is equivalent to ignoring the basic precautions which law requires a court to take.
The essential features of a judgment under law are statement of facts, adjudication, reasoning and finality. We find the judgment to be lacking
both in adjudication and reasoning. The learned Single Bench has not even touched the grounds taken in the objections, therefore, has omitted to
adjudicate upon points in issue. He has also provided no reasoning for the judgment.
While laying down the procedure for delivering judgment, Rule 57 (3) of J and K High Court Rules, requires the judgment to contain a concise
statement of facts, the points for determination, the decision thereupon and the reasons for such decision. This is the same requirement which Rule
4 of order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down for a judgment. In a case titled M/S Foments Resorts and Hotels Ltd. vs. Gustavo
Ranatodacruz Pinto and others, reported in AIR 1985 SC 736, the court dealt with one ground only while so many issues were raised. The point
was made clear and it was held that the court should deal with all the points raised and once that is not done the judgment leaves room for a
defect. Their Lordships held as under:
In a matter of this nature where several contentions factual and legal are urged and when there is scope of an appeal from the decision of the
court, it is desirable as was observed by the privy council long time ago to avoid delay and protraction of litigation that the court should when
dealing with any matter dispose of all the points and not merely rest its decision on one single point.
The Supreme Court in Swam Lata Vs. Harendra Kumar, reported in AIR 1969 SC 1167 held that a more order deciding the matter in dispute
and not supporting the finding by reasons, is no judgment at all. Their Lordships also held that in absence of affording reasons, the judgment is left
to be decided on the whims and fancis of the court.
The Apex Court in another celebrated judgment titled vasudeo Vishwanath Saraf Vs. New Education Institute and others, reported in AIR
1986 SC 2105, while referring to the attributed of a judgment, held as under:
It is a cordial principle of rule of law which governs our policy that the court including writ court is required to record reasons while disposing of a
writ petition in order to enable the litigants more particularly the aggrieved party to know the reasons which weighed with the mind of the court in
determining the questions of facts and law raised in the writ petition or in the action brought. This is imperative for the fair and equitable
administration of justice. More so when there is a statutory provision for appeal to the higher court in the hierarchy of courts in order to enable the
Superior Court or the appellate court to know or to be apprised of the reasons which impelled the court to pass the order in question. This
recording of reasons in deciding cases or applications affecting rights of parties is also a mandatory requirement to be fulfilled in consonance with
the principles of natural justice. It is no answer at all to this legal position that for the purpose of expeditious disposal of cases a laconic order like
'dismissed' or 'rejected' will be made without passing a reasoned order or a speaking order. It is not, however, necessary that the order disposing
of a writ petition or of a cause must be a lengthy one recording in detail all the reasons that played in the mind of the court in coming to the
decision. What is imperative is that the order must in a nutshell record the relevant reasons which were taken into consideration by the court in
coming to its final conclusions and in disposing of the petition or the cause by making the order, thereby enabling both the party seeking justice as
well as superior court where an appeal lies to know the mind of the court as well as the reasons for its finding on question of law and facts in other
words fair play and justice demands that justice must not only be done but must seem to have been done.
On a birds eye view we find that the learned Single Bench has, after giving the statement of facts, referred to the judgments of the Supreme
court and then given his finding. He has not recorded reasons as to why were the judgments, referred to by his Lordships, applicable to the facts of
the present case. Conclusions are to be adduced after identifying the similarities of die case sought to be decided with those, ratio of which was
applied. Recording of reasons is a sinequanon for a court to come to a certain conclusion.
We have considered the issues arising out of the pleadings. Devoid of reasoning the judgment impugned suffers from legal lacune. The fact that
the employee respondents were working at demographically different places, under different conditions is not denied. This also is not denied that
the respondents through their Union has entered into a settlement and the fixation of grades was ordered under the settlement. The qualifications
prescribed for the other employees also is different.
Once it is admitted that the parties had entered into a settlement, neither of the parties could resile from the terms of that settlement. In fact the
writ petitioners were estopped from taking a plea in consistent with the position already settled. Rule Evidence Art reads as under:
Estoppel: when one person has by his declaration, act or ommission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be
true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceedings between himself and such person or
his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.
In view of the difference in qualifications, duties and functions, the writ petitioners could not be entitled to the scale of pay with others who
were forming a distinct class because of their qualification, functions and duties. In a case titled Sita Devi and others Vs. State of Haryana and
others reported in SCC (1996) 10 page 1, their Lordships while acknowledging equal pay for equal work to be a fact of quality clause enshrined
in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, held that persons claiming parity in pay should establish that their qualifications, duties and functions are
similar to those of the persons with whom they claim such parity. Their lordships laiddown as under:
The doctrine of"" equal work for equal pay"" is recognised by this court as a fact of the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the constitution.
The first of the several decisions on the subject is Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India. The said doctrine has been dealt with by this court in several
later decisions including State of M.P.V. Pramod Bhartiya decided by a threemember Bench of which on of us (B.P. Jeevan ReddyJ) was a
member. This decision dealt mainly with the manner in which the claim of equal work has to be judged. It was held, after referring to the definition
of ""same work or a work of similar nature"" is section 2(h) of the equal Remuneration Act, 1976, that :(SCC P. 547, para 13)
.... the stress is upon the similarity of skill, effort and responsibility performed under similar conditions. Further, as pointed out by MukharjiJ, (as
he then was) in Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenograhers the quality of work may very from post to post. It may vary from
institution to institution. We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter or assumption but one of proof....It must be remembered that
since the plea of equal pay for equal work has to be examined with reference to Article 14, the burden is upon the petitioners pay, or the plea of
discrimination, as the case may be.
Again in state of Haryana and others Vs. Jasmer Singh and others, reported in (1996) 11 SCC, 77, the onus of similarities on seekers of
equality was emphasised. Their Lordships after being satisfied that evaluation of similarities and dissimilarities on basis of qualification, whether
technical or educational should be left to the experts, held:
it is, therefore, clear that the quality of work performed by different sets of persons holding different jobs will have to be evaluated. There may be
differences in educational or technical qualifications which may have a bearing on the skills which the holders bring to their job although the
designation of the job may be the same. There may also be other considerations which have relevance to efficiency in service which may justify
differences in pay scales on the basis of criteria such as experience and seniority or a need to prevent stagnation in the cadre, so that good
performance can be elicited from persons who have reached the top of pay scale. There may be various other similar considerations which may
have a bearing on efficient performance in a job. This court has repeatedly observed that evaluation of such jobs for the purposes of pay scale
must be left to expert bodies and, unless there are any mala fides, its evaluation should be accepted.
There is no disagreement on dissimilarities. The writ petitioners have failed to establish any sort of similarity and yet the learned Single Bench
has allowed the writ petition.
On the analogy given above, we find the judgment impugned not having been supported by any reasoning. The writ court had missed to adjudicate
upon the points of objections raised. We also find no similarity between the writ petitioners and those with whom equality of pay is sought.
Therefore we set aside the judgment impugned and dismiss the writ petition.
No order as to costs.