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Judgment
P.R. Shivakumar, J.—The National Insurance company which figured as the third respondent in the MCOP is the appellant.
The respondents 1 and 2 herein claiming to be the dependents of deceased Krishnasamy, had filed the MCOP on the file of the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal (Principal District Judge), Erode making the following averments:
The respondents 1 and 2 herein/petitioners in MCOP are the wife and daughter of deceased Krishnasamy. On 19.11.2000 at about 7.45 p.m
when the deceased Krishnasamy was standing in front of the Tea stall of one Velumani in Aathiyur on the Kunnathur-Perundurai Road, the third
respondent herein/first respondent in the MCOP came there in a TVS-50 moped bearing Registration No. TN-33 U-2602 riding the same in a
rash and negligent manner with an uncontrollable speed and hit it against the deceased Krishnasamy. Due to the said impact, the deceased
Krishnasamy was thrown on the road and he sustained serious head injuries. Immediately he was taken to a private hospital, namely Senthil Neuro
Hospital, at Erode and was kept in the intensive care unit. A surgery was also conducted for the head injury to remove the blood clot. Inspite of
effective treatment, the said Krishnasamy died on the midnight of 21.11.2000 i.e. at about 0.15 AM on 22.11.2000. Postmortem examination was
conducted at Government Hospital, Erode. At the time of death, the deceased was aged about 50 years and was having a monthly income of Rs.
6,000/- as a producer and seller of ""murukku"". Though the respondents 1 and 2 herein/petitioners in the MCOP would assess the loss caused to
them due to the death of the said Krishnasamy to a higher amount, they restrict their claim to Rs. 5,00,000/-.
Based on the said pleadings, the respondents 1 and 2 herein had prayed that an award be passed against the 3rd and 4th respondents
herein/first and second respondents in the MCOP being the rider and owner of the said TVS-50 moped vehicle and also against the appellant
herein/third respondent in the MCOP being the insurer of the said vehicle, directing them jointly and severally to pay the above said amount of Rs.
5,00,000/- together with future interest and cost to the respondents 1 and 2 herein/petitioners in the MCOP as compensation for the death of
Krishnasamy.
The respondents 2 and 3 herein who had been arrayed as the respondents 1 and 2 in the MCOP did not contest the case and remained ex-
parte before the Tribunal.
The appellant herein which figured as the third respondent in the MCOP alone submitted a counter statement and contested the case. The
averments found in the counter statement are as follows:
The appellant herein/3rd respondent in the MCOP suspects collusion between the respondents 1 and 2/claimants and the respondents 3 and 4
herein/respondents 1 and 2 in the MCOP. The respondents 3 and 4 herein/respondents 1 and 2 in the MCOP did not inform the appellant/third
respondent of the alleged accident. The accident did not take place due to the rash and negligent driving of the TVS-50 Moped bearing
Registration No. TN-33 U-2602 by its rider namely, the third respondent herein/first respondent in the MCOP. The alleged motor accident itself is
not admitted. The respondents 1 and 2/claimants 1 and 2 are put to strict proof of the accident. As the accident is said to have occurred after the
amendment providing second schedule had been brought into force, the respondents 1 and 2/claimants in the MCOP could claim only as per the
second schedule. The respondents 1 and 2/claimants are bound to prove that the deceased had permanent employment and was earning Rs.
6,000/- per month. The compensation claimed by the respondents 1 and 2/claimants is highly excessive and exorbitant. Therefore the petition
should be dismissed with cost.
After framing necessary issues, the Tribunal conducted enquiry in which, two witnesses were examined as P.Ws.1 and 2 and 7 documents were
marked as Ex.P1 to P7 on the side of the respondents 1 and 2 herein/claimants. On the side of the appellant/third respondent, no witness was
examined and no document was marked.
At the conclusion of enquiry, the Tribunal considered the evidence brought before it in the light of the arguments advanced by the Counsel
appearing on either side and upon such a consideration, came to the conclusion that the accident in question occurred due to negligent riding of
TVS-50 moped belonging to the 4th respondent herein/2nd respondent in the MCOP by the 3rd respondent herein/first respondent in the MCOP
in a rash and negligent manner. The Tribunal also held that the vehicle stood insured with the appellant herein/third respondent and hence the
respondents 3 and 4 herein and the appellant herein (respondents 1 to 3 in the MCOP) were jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the
respondents 1 and 2 herein/claimants.
The Tribunal took the age of the deceased to be 55 years and the loss of dependency at Rs. 2,000/- per month, applied the multiplier 10 and
assessed compensation for loss of dependency at Rs. 2,40,000/-. A sum of Rs. 20,000/- was awarded towards loss of consortium, love and
affection. As against the amount covered by the medical bills produced by the respondents 1 and 2 herein/claimants and marked as Ex.P6 series, a
sum of Rs. 40,180/- was awarded. A sum of Rs. 1,500/- towards transport expenses has also been awarded. Thus arriving at a total sum of Rs.
3,01,680/-, the Tribunal passed an award directing the respondents 3 and 4 herein and the appellant herein (respondents 1 to 3 in the MCOP) to
pay the above said sum of Rs. 3,01,680/- together with an interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of petition till realisation and with
proportionate cost.
Aggrieved by and challenging the said award, the appellant insurance company (3rd respondent in the MCOP) has brought-forth this civil
miscellaneous appeal on various grounds set out in the memorandum of appeal.
The points that arise for consideration in the civil miscellaneous appeal are
Whether the finding of the tribunal that the TVS-50 moped bearing Regn. No. TN-33 U-2602 belonging to the 4th respondent herein was the
one involved in the accident in question?
Whether the appellant/3rd respondent is not liable to pay compensation?
Whether the award of the tribunal is liable to be set aside or modified by reducing the quantum of compensation?
The appellant in the civil miscellaneous appeal has also filed a miscellaneous petition CMP No. 778/2008 under Order 41 Rule 27 seeking
permission to mark the report of the investigator engaged by the appellant herein dated 04.03.2005 as additional evidence in the appeal. It has
been stated therein that upon receiving several reports of the investigators in the year 2005 revealing the fact that several bogus claims had been
made, a writ petition was filed to have such cases investigated by the CBCID or CBI; that similarly a private investigator was appointed to
investigate the matter concerned in this appeal and that on receipt of the report of the investigator, they came to know that the claim made by the
respondents 1 and 2 herein/claimants was also a bogus one. ""Whether permission sought for under Order 41 Rule 27 can be granted?"" - is the
issue that has arisen for consideration in the civil miscellaneous petition.
This court heard the arguments advanced by Mr. N. Sundaravadanam, learned Counsel for the appellant and that of Mr. A.K. Kumarasamy,
learned Counsel for the respondents. The materials available on record were also perused.
The appellant insurance company which figured as the 3rd respondent in the MCOP is the sole appellant in this civil miscellaneous appeal. The
respondents 1 and 2 herein/claimants 1 and 2 are the wife and daughter of deceased Krishnasamy. According to their case, the deceased met with
an accident on 19.11.2000 at 7.45 p.m when he was standing in front of the Tea stall of one Velumani in Aathiyur on the Kunnathur-Perundurai
Road as he was hit by TVS-50 moped motorcycle, bearing Regn. No. TN-33 U-2602. According to the case of the respondents 1 and 2
herein/claimants in the MCOP, the said moped belonged to the 4th respondent herein/second respondent in the MCOP and the third respondent
herein/first respondent in the MCOP was the rider of the motorcycle who caused the accident. Besides making a clear averment that the said
TVS-50 moped vehicle was driven by the third respondent herein/first respondent in the MCOP in a rash and negligent manner with an
uncontrollable speed as a result of which the said vehicle dashed against the deceased Krishnasamy who was standing in front of a tea shop; that
the same resulted in serious head injuries to the said Krishnasamy, which ultimately proved to be fatal as he succumbed to the injuries despite
medical treatment, the respondents 1 and 2 herein/claimants have also examined P.W.2 - Velumani as an eye witness for the accident. Of course,
the second respondent herein/second claimant in the MCOP, while deposing as P.W.1, made an attempt to describe how the accident took place.
But she has admitted that she did not actually witness the occurrence. At the same time she was categorical in her statement that soon after the
accident, she received the message and went to the place of occurrence.
P.W.2 categorically asserted in his evidence that he actually saw the accident. He has also mentioned the Registration number of the TVS-50
moped motorcycle which caused the accident. It is the clear evidence of P.W.2 that his father was running a Tea stall at Aathiyur on the
Kunnathur-Perundurai road; that on 19.11.2000 at about 7.45 p.m while he was standing in front of his father''s Tea stall, the TVS-50 moped
motorcycle bearing Registration number noted in the petition came there in a haphazard manner and dashed against the deceased who was talking
with another person; that as he was standing in front of his father''s Tea stall at that point of time, he witnessed the occurrence and that after hearing
the hue and cry raised by them, the relatives of the deceased who were residing in the nearby place rushed to the place of accident and took the
deceased to a hospital at Erode where he died on failure of treatment on 22.11.2000. He would also state that the deceased was known to him for
about 20 years. He stoutly denied the suggestion that he was not an eye witness to the accident and that he was giving false evidence as the
deceased was known to him.
In addition to the above said oral evidence, the respondents 1 and 2 herein/claimants have also produced Ex.A1 - certified copy of the FIR,
Ex.A2 - certified copy of the Motor Vehicle Inspector''s Report, Ex.A3 - certified copy of the Postmortem certificate, Ex.A4 - certified copy of
the charge-sheet and Ex.A5 - judgment of the criminal court in S.T.C. No. 101/2000 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Perundurai.
From the said documents, it is obvious that in respect of the said accident in which the deceased Krishnasamy sustained injuries leading to his
death, a case was registered by the police in Crime No. 211 of 2000 on the file of Kunnathur Police Station for an offence punishable u/s 304(A)
against the 3rd respondent herein/1st respondent in the MCOP. From Ex.A4 and A5, it is obvious that after completion of investigation, the police
submitted a charge-sheet for an offence punishable u/s 304(A) IPC; that the first respondent herein pleaded guilty and that based on the plea of
guilty, he was convicted for the offence punishable u/s 304(A) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till raising of the court and to pay a fine of
Rs. 3,500/-. From Ex.A2 it is quite obvious that the moped vehicle belonging to the 4th respondent herein/2nd respondent in the MCOP, bearing
Registration No. TN-33 V-2602 (motorcycle without gear), was the one produced for inspection before the Motor Vehicle Inspector as the
vehicle involved in the accident and on inspection, the Motor Vehicle Inspector found that the accident was not due to any mechanical defect found
in the vehicle. Of course, judgments of the criminal court in criminal cases are not binding on the civil courts or the Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunals and the same shall not be admissible as a relevant piece of evidence, except for a limited purpose of showing that there was a
prosecution which resulted in either acquittal or conviction. There is one exception to the proposition that the judgment of the criminal court is not
relevant in a civil case or MCOP case. If the judgment is pronounced based on the plea of guilty, then the same becomes relevant not as a
judgment of the criminal court, but as a piece of evidence embodying the admission made by the person prosecuted. Admissions are the best
pieces of evidence though not conclusive proof of the facts admitted therein. The party against whom admissions are sought to be used can prove
that the facts admitted therein are not in fact true.
In this case, though the admission made by the 3rd respondent herein/1st respondent in the criminal case was sought to be used by the
respondents 1 and 2 herein/claimants, in support of their case that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the motorcycle
belonging to the 4th respondent herein by the 3rd respondent herein, the only contesting party (the appellant herein/3rd respondent in the MCOP)
did not adduce any evidence to show that no such admission was made or that the fact admitted therein by the 3rd respondent herein was not true
or could not be true. In the absence of any evidence on the part of the appellant herein, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the accident
occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the moped belonging to the 4th respondent herein by its rider namely, the 3rd respondent herein.
In the light of the foregoing discussions, this court feels that there could be no ground for interfering with the above said finding of the Tribunal.
In fact the scope of contest by an insurance company in an MCOP or an appeal arising therefrom shall be confined to the grounds of defence
enumerated u/s 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. However, Section 170 provides for permission being accorded to the insurer on the
ground of collision between the claimant and the insured or on the ground that the insured has failed to contest the claim. Of course the appellant
herein/3rd respondent in the MCOP had raised a plea in the counter statement that the claim itself seemed to have been made on the collusion
between the respondents 1 and 2/claimants 1 and 2 and respondents 3 and 4/respondents 1 and 2. But the very same Section provides that such a
permission can be accorded by an order in writing assigning reasons for the same. There is no material to show that such a permission was
obtained by the appellant herein/3rd respondent in the MCOP before the Tribunal. When that is so, the insurer cannot take a plea on the merits of
the case regarding the question of negligence or the question of quantum.
On the other hand, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that though it is an established principle of law that without
getting the leave u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the insurer cannot raise a defence or file an appeal on the merits of the case, the same
was subject to one exception i.e. the plea of fraud. According to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant, fraud would
vitiate the entire proceedings and the award of the Tribunal can be attacked on the ground of fraud itself. In support of his contention, the learned
Counsel for the appellant cited the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court made in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Chandigarh v. Ltd. Nicolletta
Rohtagi and Ors. reported in 2002 4 CTC 243. In the said case, after going through the relevant provisions regarding the scope of defence that
can be raised by an insurer and the exception to the same, their lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court were categorical in their assertion that the
insurer, in the absence of any permission u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 could not file an appeal or defend the MCOP on any ground
other than those enumerated in Sub-section 2 of Section 149. The relevant paragraphs, namely paragraph 31 and 32 of the judgment are extracted
hereunder.
We have already held that unless the conditions precedent specified in Section 170 of 1988 Act is satisfied an insurance company has no right
of appeal to challenge the award on merits. However, in a situation where there is a collusion between the claimants and the insured or the insured
does not contest the claim and, further, the tribunal does not implead the insurance company to contest the claim in such cases it is open to an
insurer to seek permission of the tribunal to contest the claim on the ground available to the insured or to person against whom a claim has been
made. In permission is granted and the insurer is allowed to contest the claim on merits in that case it is open to the insurer to file an appeal against
an award on merits, if aggrieved. In any case where an application for permission is erroneously rejected the insurer can challenge only that part of
order while filing appeal on grounds specified in Sub-sections (2) of Section 149 of 1988 Act. But such application for permission has to be bona
fide and filed at the stage and filed at the stage when the insured is required to lead his evidence. So far as obtaining compensation by fraud by the
claimant is concerned, it is no longer res integra that fraud vitiates the entire proceeding and in such cases it is open to an insurer to apply to the
Tribunal for rectification of award.
For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the question is that, even if no appeal is preferred u/s 173 of 1988 Act by an insured against the
award of a Tribunal, it is not permissible for an insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation as well as finding as regard
negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle.
Ultimately in the said case, their lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court have held that, if no appeal had been preferred u/s 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act by the insured against the award of the Tribunal, it was not permissible for the insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of
compensation as well as the finding regarding negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle. Relying on the said observation made
by their lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the above said case, the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant was not
questioning the correctness of the finding on the question of negligence or quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, but the very award
obtained for compensation by the respondents 1 and 2/claimants was challenged on the ground that the same was obtained by fraud and that
hence the appellant was entitled to succeed in the appeal.
A thorough reading of the said judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court and a close consideration of the observations made therein would
clearly show that in the absence of any appeal preferred by the insured, the insurer cannot maintain an appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
On the other hand, it is quite clear that their lordships of the Supreme Court were of the view that in case of plea of fraud, the insurer could
approach the Tribunal, which passed the award for rectification of the mistake by recalling such an award obtained fraudulently. When an award is
attacked contending that the award was obtained by fraud, the plea of fraud should be established by adducing proper and sufficient evidence. The
person who raises the plea of fraud shall have the burden of proving it. Such an exercise cannot be undertaken conveniently in an appeal. That is
why their lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court, in the above said case, were of the view that in the absence of an appeal preferred by the
insured and in the absence of permission obtained u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurer could not prefer an appeal and that in case the
insurer would plead ""fraud"" as a ground of attack, the court which passed the award, namely the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal could be
approached for rectifying the defect by recalling the award if the fraud alleged would be proved. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel
for the appellant that an insurer can maintain an appeal on the ground that the award had been obtained by the claimants by fraud cannot be
countenanced.
As clearly indicated by the Hon''ble Apex Court, the insurer, in such cases, has to approach the Tribunal which passed the award for recalling
the award on the ground of fraud. In case of fraud being pleaded as a ground of attack challenging the award, the question of latches also has to be
considered. ""When did the party pleading fraud come to know that the award had been obtained by fraud?"" and ""Why such a plea was not raised
at the earlier stages?"" - are the questions to be considered in such a case. In this case the fraud alleged by the appellant is that the vehicle belonging
to the 4th respondent herein/2nd respondent in the MCOP, namely TVS-50 moped motor cycle bearing Regn. No. TN-33 U-2602, was not the
vehicle which caused the accident; that the 3rd respondent herein was not the person who caused the accident; that another TVS-50 vehicle not
covered by insurance policy was the actual vehicle which caused the accident and that since the vehicle which involved in the accident was not
covered by a valid insurance policy, the respondents 1 and 2/claimants 1 and 2 colluded with the respondents 2 and 3 herein/respondents 1 and 2
in the MCOP and foisted a case as if the TVS-50 belonging to the 4th respondent was the one involved in the accident.
In this regard, the delay in lodging the FIR for about 2 1/2 days has been cited as the ground for suspicion that the vehicle could have been
changed. The appellant has come forward with a miscellaneous petition (CMP No. 778 of 2008) for reception of the report of the private
investigator engaged by the appellant insurance company as additional documentary evidence. According to the appellant''s case, when the
investigator went and approached the persons who knew about the accident, all of them gave statements to the effect that the accident was caused
by a TVS-50 moped in which three persons belonging to Ammapalayam Harijan street came there and dashed against the deceased Krishnasamy
on 19.11.2000 at about 7.45 p.m. that after the death of the deceased Krishnasamy at the midnight on 21.11.2000, a case was foisted by
changing the vehicle as the vehicle involved in the accident was not covered by insurance policy. But at the same time, the investigator''s report
would state that all those persons who ventured and gave such a statement to him orally were not willing to give any statement in writing and that
they informed the investigator that they would give statements in accordance with the police case, if they were asked to give their statement in
writing. It is the further statement of the investigator that all those persons examined by him, informed him that they would not come and give
evidence in favour of the insurance company and that if they were summoned as witnesses they would depose in accordance with the police case
and the case of the claimants. When that is so, even the report of the private investigator engaged by the appellant insurance company would be
nothing but a piece of paper containing hearsay evidence which is inadmissible.
The learned Counsel for the appellant would also admit during his argument that none of the persons who were said to have been examined by
the investigator would be willing to depose in favour of the appellant''s case and that hence the appellant was not prepared to take coercive steps
against them for their appearance as witnesses. The same will be enough to show that the appellant is not in a position to collect admissible
evidence to prove its plea of fraud and the only piece of evidence it wants to adduce as an additional evidence in this appeal is also inadmissible, as
the same is against the rule against admissibility of hearsay evidence. That apart, when the appellant insurer has come forward with a specific plea
that the vehicle actually involved in the accident was changed and a case was foisted introducing another vehicle, it is imperative on the part of the
appellant to give the particulars of the actual vehicle involved in the accident. In this case, though the appellant has come forward with a plea that
the actual vehicle which caused the accident was left as it was not covered by a policy of insurance and another vehicle having insurance was
introduced, the appellant is not in a position to furnish at least the registration number of the vehicle and the name and address of the owner of the
vehicle which actually caused the accident. Only if the particulars of the said vehicle are furnished, it shall be feasible to find out whether such a
vehicle was covered by an insurance policy or not, which shall have an effect in the decision to be arrived at as to whether the vehicle actually
involved in the accident had been changed for the reason that the offending vehicle was not covered by an insurance policy. The appellant is not in
a position to state the name and address of the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident. Nor was the appellant able to give the name of the
person who was riding the vehicle at the time of accident and names of the other persons said to have travelled as pillion riders. It shall also be
pertinent to note that in the report of the investigator which is sought to be introduced as additional evidence, it has been noted that the actual
vehicle involved in the accident had been kept in the Tea shop for two days. But, still the appellant was not able to give the registration number of
the said vehicle. The investigator has also stated in his report that the persons examined by him did not give the names of the persons who came in
the TVS-50 and that they informed him that they did not know the names and addresses of the said persons. It should also be noted that the
award of the Tribunal was passed on 17.10.2001 and the report of the investigator was dated 04.03.2005. Though the said report is said to have
been obtained on 04.03.2005, the appellant had not chosen to file the petition for seeking permission to adduce additional evidence for about three
years thereafter. The CMP was originally filed on 29.01.2008 and represented in March 2008 after rectification of defects.
The right of the victims and the dependents of the victims to get compensation cannot be allowed to be whistled down or postponed
indefinitely by allowing the insurance company to raise frivolous plea of fraud without being supported by materials at least to establish prima facie
case.
All the factors pointed out in the foregoing discussions will clearly show that the appellant insurance company has not been able to make out
even a prima facie case that there was a fraud. Hence the civil miscellaneous petition filed for reception of additional evidence deserves to be
dismissed.
For all the reasons stated above, this court comes to the conclusion that the appeal preferred by the appellant insurance company in the
absence of an appeal preferred by the insured and in the absence of permission u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, on the question of
negligence and on the question of quantum of compensation is not maintainable. The appellant insurance company failed to make out a case of
fraud so that leave can be granted to the appellant to approach the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Principal District Judge), Erode for recalling
the award on the ground of fraud. Therefore, this court comes to the conclusion that the civil miscellaneous appeal as well as the civil miscellaneous
petitions are bound to be dismissed.
In the result, the civil miscellaneous appeal and the connected miscellaneous petitions are dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to
cost.