National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Manoharan Shill and Others

D.N. Choudhury, J.—The reach and extent of the phraseology ''arising out of the use of a motor vehicle'' embodied in Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ''the Act'') is the key question for adjudication in this proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Arjun Shill (since deceased) along with others boarded the bus bearing No. TR-03-1217 as a passenger from Udaipur to Agartala on 21.1.1999 which had to pass through the places called Bagma and Bishramganj, an extremist infested area and high danger prone zone. The passengers of the bus insisted the driver not to proceed towards Bishramganj without an armed escort. The driver put a deaf ear to the entreaties of the passengers and advanced to Bishramganj. When the vehicle reached a place called Pathaliaghat near Don Bosco School, the extremists intercepted the vehicle and started firing on the passengers. As a result Arjun Shill sustained bullet injuries and succumbed to the injuries. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as the legal representatives of the deceased son, presented before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala, a claim petition. An application was also made before the Tribunal, u/s 140 of the Act. The owner of the vehicle as well as the insurance company (petitioner in this case), insurer of the vehicle filed separate written objections resisting the claim. The claimant submitted the copy of the F.I.R. and post-mortem report in respect of the deceased. Post-mortem certificate was issued by the hospital. The owner of the offending vehicle had also submitted the registration certificate, tax token, insurance policy, driving licence of the driver who drove the vehicle in question and fitness certificate of the vehicle, etc. The learned Tribunal considering all the aspects of the matter awarded a sum of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) along with interest at the rate of 11 per cent per annum w.e.f. 30.3.1999, i.e., the date of filing of the claim petition by the award dated 3.3.2000 in Misc. (MAC) No. 36 of 1999 as an interim measure, against the insurance company. The legality and validity of the aforementioned award is under challenge in this proceeding by the insurance company.

Mr. Bhanu Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner insurance company, strenuously urged that the event that took place on 21.1.1999 at Pathaliaghat on the road to Agartala, cannot under any circumstances be said to be an accident ''arising out of the use of a motor vehicle'' and, therefore, the learned Tribunal fell into grave error in entertaining an application u/s 140 of the Act. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel submitted that the deceased was killed at the hands of the extremist elements and not in an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. The learned counsel in his lengthy argument adverted to the volatile situation pertaining to law and order in and around the place of occurrence. The vehicle in question was not insured by the company for such events. The policy did not cover the risk of such eventuality. Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel submitted that assuming the event to be an accident, in the instant case the accident did not ''arise out of the use of the motor vehicle''. There is/was no direct and proximate causal connection between the motor vehicle and the death of Arjun Shill and, therefore, the same was beyond the purview of Section 140 of the Act. Parliament in Section 140(1) of the Act used the expression "where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" and deliberately avoided the expression ''caused by''. There is no statutory requirement for a direct and proximate causal connection between the accident and the use of the vehicle for the purpose of awarding compensation u/s 140 of the Act. No such legislative intendment is discernible. The expression "arising out of the use of motor vehicle" in Sections 140, 165 and 166 broadened and widened the umbrella and cover of the statutory benefit to the victims of an accident enlivening the beneficial object of the statute.

In Shivaji Dayanu Patil and another Vs. Smt. Vatschala Uttam More, the Apex Court in interpreting Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (section 140 of the present Act), held that the causal relationship between user of motor vehicle and accident that resulted in the death or disablement need not be direct and proximate. Referring and relying upon Shivaji Dayanu Patil (supra) the Supreme Court in Samir Chanda Vs. Managing Director, Assam State TPT. Corpn., dealing with a case under similar situation as of this, interpreting Sections 92-A and 110-B of the 1939 Act held that injuries suffered by the victim due to bomb blast inside the passenger bus when it reached the last stoppage and passengers were alighting from it--abnormal situation was prevailing during that period requiring the owner/driver to take extra care of protection. It was held that the accident arose out of the use of motor vehicle. The present case is similarly situated. The owner of the vehicle, therefore, cannot avoid its liability on the pretext of the aberrant situation, so also the undertaker.

In Smt. Rita Devi and Others Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Another, the Supreme Court held that the murder of the deceased autorickshaw driver Dasarath Singh was due to an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. In the above case the deceased Dasarath Singh was a driver of an autorickshaw owned by one Lalit Singh, which was registered as a public carrier vehicle and was insured by the respondent company. On 22.3.1995 some unknown passengers hired the vehicle from the rickshaw stand at Dimapur Railway Station of Kohima District, Nagaland. The autorickshaw was reportedly stolen and the dead body of the driver was recovered by police on the next day. On a claim petition u/s 163 of the Act, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nagaland, awarded compensation which was set aside on appeal by this High Court. The claimants appealed before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court after making a detailed survey of the connected statutory provisions comprising copious reference to the case-laws on the point held:

Applying the principles laid down in the above cases to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the autorickshaw, was duty-bound to have accepted the demand of fare paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the autorickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the autorickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the autorickshaw then it cannot but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the autorickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the autorickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the autorickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the autorickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing the theft of the autorickshaw.

In the above case the Supreme Court after reviewing and scanning the provisions of the Act in question as well as the provisions of the Workmen''s Compensation Act observed that the objects of both the enactments are beneficial enactments operating in the same field, hence judicially accepted interpretation of the word ''death'' in Workmen''s Compensation Act is applicable to the interpretation of the word in the Motor Vehicles Act.

Needless to state that Section 140 of the Act is a beneficial piece of provision to provide a minimum and defined payment promptly by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. The court while dealing with a salubrious piece of legislation is to adhere to the legislative policy with equal concern that accelerate and enliven the purpose and object of the Act avoiding the construction that tends to frustrate the very purpose of the Act.

In this case the award granted by the Tribunal is that of an interim award u/s 140 where such an interim award can be passed for no fault liability. Section 140 is a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer benefit for expeditious payment of awarded amount to the victims of an accident arising out of use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In the circumstances, I am not inclined to interfere in this matter and accordingly the application stands dismissed. No costs.