National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Ravi Kumar and Others

V.K. Gupta, J.—This is an application for condonation of delay in filing CIMA 88 of 1987. When the main appeal was preferred, it was not

accompanied by any application for condonation of delay and it was during its pendency that the appellant realised about the delay in filing-of the

said appeal and, therefore, preferred this application.

The appellant's case, as set out in the application, is that the judgment of the Tribunal was delivered on 28.7.1987, the applied for a certified

copy of the judgment on 29.8.1987, deposited the copying fee on 31.8.1987 and that the copy was prepared and issued to the appellant on

7.9.1987. Whereas the period of limitation for preferring the appeal was to expire on 27.10.1987 the appeal was actually filed on 3.11.1987.

There is thus, a delay of eight days in filing the said appeal. It is through this application that the appellant wants to have that delay condoned.

A perusal of the application reveals beyond any doubt whatsoever that the appellant wants the period spent in obtaining the certified copy of the

award to be excluded from the limitation period and he wants this to be done rather as a matter of right and practice and submits that the period

spent in obtaining the copy should as a matter of course be excluded from the limitation period.

The appellant has not mentioned a word in the application as to what happened between 7.9.1987 to 3.11.1987, the dates between his getting

the copy and the filing of the appeal. Mr. D. S. Thakur, learned Counsel for the appellant, has referred to a Full Bench judgment of this Court in

the case of Managing Director v. Fatima Begum 1989 KLJ 51 and has submitted that even though Section 12 of the Limitation Act is not

applicable to the appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act, the principle underlying this section should be made applicable in the light of the

observations made by the Full Bench of this Court.

I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have also perused the record.

Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act which governs the filing of appeals in the High Court against the awards of the Motor Accidents

Claims Tribunals lays down the period of 90 days for filing an appeal against such an award. It, however, permits a prospective appellant to file the

appeal beyond the period of 90 days if it is in a position to satisfy the court that it was prevented by a sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the

period of 90 days. While the Full Bench was discussing the issue, it referred to Section 12 of the Limitation Act to indicate that even though the

section in terms did not apply to 'appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act, yet its principle and the underlying idea, as emanating from the section,

could be invoked as a sufficient cause for filing the appeal and as a ground by the appellant of satisfying the court that because of such a sufficient

cause it was prevented from filing the appeal within the limitation period. It was in the light of this principle that the Full Bench made the following

observation.

Even though the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act are not specifically applicable to the appeal filed under the provisions of the

Motor Vehicles Act, yet the principle underlying that section can be taken into consideration for determining the existence or otherwise of

'Sufficient Cause' for computing the period of limitation within the meaning of proviso to Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Based on the aforesaid principle of law, therefore, I hold that the principles underlying Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and those emanating

therefrom do not per se apply to the appeals under Motor Vehicles Act and it is not that in every case a prospective appellant is entitled to exclude

the period spent by him in obtaining a copy of the judgment from the limitation period in filing the appeal. If that were the position, the Full Bench

should have said so in so many words. It qualified the application of principles of Section 12 by prefacing that application with the words 'sufficient

cause' and 'prevented'. It is only in those cases where a party approaching the High Court for condoning the delay shows by way of a sufficient

cause that it was prevented from coming to the High Court because of the delay in obtaining the copy of the judgment. Not otherwise. It was not

that in every case a party applies for, obtains the certified copy of the judgment and then sits over for the limitation period to expire and asks for

condonation of delay by excluding the period spent in obtaining the copy.

In the present case the appellant has not mentioned any reason, ground or fact whatsoever as to what prevented it from filing the appeal

between 7.9.1987, the date it obtained the copy of the judgment, and 27.10.1987, the last date of limitation for filing the appeal. It was incumbent

upon the appellant to have established by sound and cogent material that it was in any way prevented from coming to the court during this period

and if it succeeded in doing so, then the court could have considered about excluding the period of limitation for obtaining the copy of judgment.

In the result, no good ground in made out to allow the application. The application is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed.