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Judgment
Rakesh Kumar Garg, J.—Respondent-society filed an ejectment petition against the petitioners, u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 (herein to be referred as ''the Act'') for their ejectment from the demised premises. As per the averments, the petitioners had
taken the disputed property on lease vide lease deed dated 6.7.1976 on rent of Rs. 9500/- per month for running spinning and weaving mill under
the name and style of Dayal Bagh Spinning & Weaving Mills and duly paid rent from the time of entering into possession till October, 1998. It was
further case of the respondent that lease money was further enhanced several times with mutual consent. After October, 1998, petitioners stopped
paying the rent for no valid reasons and thus, respondent had to file eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent for different
periods and thus, rent was paid upto 31.8.2002 in those petitions. Another petition was also filed wherein, the petitioners had taken a false and
frivolous defence and the matter was still pending. Respondent filed the instant petition on the following grounds:-
i) That the respondents have neither paid nor tendered the arrears of rent from 1.9.2002 to 31.12.2003 @ Rs. 68100/- per month amounting to
Rs. 10,89,600/- ( Rs. Ten lacs eighty nine thousand and six hundred) plus interest and costs.
ii) That the respondents have ceased to occupy the demised premises for the last more than four months continuously without any reasonable
cause. Respondents have dismantled all the machinery of the factory and sold the same and stopped functioning from the demised premises.
Upon notice petitioners put in appearance and filed written statement raising various preliminary objections. It was averred that Sir Sahabji
Maharaj Mills Ltd. was the owner of Dayal Bagh Spinning & Weaving Mills, Amritsar including the disputed property and transferred the suit
property to respondent-society in 1944 vide agreement dated 9.11.1944 and on the same day, vide another agreement the disputed property was
taken on lease by Sir Sahabji Maharaj Mills Ltd. on monthly rental basis. In 1974, Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalization) Act, 1974 came
into force (herein to be referred as ''Nationalization Act'') under which 103 mills were nationalized including Dayal Bagh Spinning & Weaving Mills,
Amritsar, listed at Sr. No. 30 of the first schedule of the Nationalization Act. It was further submitted that vide Sections 3 and 4 of the
Nationalization Act, lease rights, privileges, assets and all properties movable and immovable including land, building, workshop etc. vested in the
Central Government and the erstwhile owners, lessee and persons having interest were given remedy to obtain mere compensation. Sir Sahabji
Maharaj Mills Ltd. was also given compensation and thus, it was clear that right of both lessor and lessee was extinguished by operation of the
Act. However, petitioners kept on renewing the lease agreements and kept on paying the lease rent to the respondent under misconception and
misinterpretation of the Nationalization Act. However, all these agreements have been done by misconception and misrepresentation of the Act.
The respondent had no right, title or interest in the suit property and the petitioners were not required to pay any rent to the respondent because
under the Nationalization Act, disputed property vested under Sections 3 and 4 in the Central Government and thus, petitioners were paying the
rent continuously by mistake of law. It was further averred that the petitioners have also filed declaratory suit in the Civil Court. It was further
submitted that mere payment of rent by ignorance of law or inadvertence does not create relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties,
as there cannot be any estoppel against law. Thus, respondent had no locus standi to file the present petition for eviction as their exists no
relationship of landlord and tenant between them.
On merits, it was admitted that lease deed was executed between the parties and they had tendered rent upto 31.8.2002 under misconception
and misrepresentation of various provisions of the Act. It was further denied that they have ceased to occupy the demised premises for the last four
months continuously without any reasonable cause. The factum of dismantling the machinery and closing down the Mill was admitted. However, it
was stated that they were in occupation of the entire land as owner thereof as the property vested with the Central Government. Rest of the
allegations made in the application were denied. Lastly, dismissal of the suit was prayed for.
From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:-
Whether the respondent is liable to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent? OPA
Whether applicant is entitled to eviction of respondent on the ground that respondent has ceased to occupy the demised premises? OPA
Whether the application is legally not maintainable? OPR
Whether applicant has got no locus standi to file the present petition? OPR
Relief.
Following additional issue was also framed:-3A Whether there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties?
The Rent Controller, Amritsar, vide impugned order dated 25.10.2011, under Issue Nos. 3, 3A and 4 held that there exists relationship of
landlord and tenant between the parties and thus, the respondent has locus standi to invoke the provisions of the Act and eviction petition was duly
maintainable. While holding so, the Rent Controller noticed the fact that the civil suit filed by the petitioners seeking declaration that petitioners have
become owners of the disputed property under the Nationalization Act, was dismissed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Amritsar, vide its
judgment and decree dated 18.2.2009 and the said judgment was further upheld by the First Appellate Court as well as by this Court in RSA No.
896 of 2010 and even SLP filed by the petitioners against the aforesaid judgment was dismissed. Thus, the stand taken by the petitioners that they
have become the owners of the disputed property stood negated by Hon''ble the Supreme Court. Issue No. 1 was decided against the
respondent-landlord as the rent for the relevant period was tendered. Under issue No. 2, it was held that the petitioners have ceased to occupy the
demised premises without any reasonable cause and thus, eviction of the petitioners was ordered from the demised premises.
Aggrieved from the aforesaid order of eviction dated 18.2.2009, petitioners filed statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority which was
also dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 25.7.2013.
Still not satisfied, the petitioners have challenged the aforesaid orders of the Authorities below.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the respondent is neither the owner of the disputed property nor relationship of
landlord and tenant exists between them and therefore, the Authorities below have committed an error in deciding issues No. 3, 3-A and 4 against
the petitioners. According to the counsel for the petitioners, the premises in dispute stood vested in its favour by operation of law and the
petitioners have become the absolute owner of the suit property on coming into force of the Nationalization Act w.e.f. 1.4.1974. Learned counsel
for the petitioners has further submitted that they have acquired the ownership and property rights in respect of the demised premises and being in
possession of the same as its owner, there was no necessity for it to execute the lease deeds. However, the said lease deeds were executed due to
misconception and misconstruction of the statutory provisions of Nationalization Act, 1974 and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners have
been divested and deprived of the ownership rights as there cannot be any estoppel against the statute.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has further argued that the suit for declaration that they have become owners of the disputed properties
under the Nationalization Act has been decided against them by Hon''ble the Supreme Court. However, in view of the order dated 17.9.2010
which was passed while dismissing the SLP of the petitioners, the petitioners were at liberty to raise the question of their ownership in these
proceedings as the question of law was kept open and thus, the Authorities below have erred at law while relying upon the judgment of the Civil
Court and observing that the plea of ownership of the petitioners has already been negated.
According to the counsel for the petitioners, Authorities below should have given a finding with regard to title of the petitioners qua the suit
property independent of the earlier litigation between the parties and thus, the Authorities below have committed an error of jurisdiction in not
determining the important substantial question of law involved in the petition with regard to title of the petitioners and the order suffers from error of
jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.
Counsel for the petitioners has further argued that the findings of the Authorities below on issue No. 2 are passed on misreading and wrong
appreciation of evidence brought on record as there was no question of the petitioners'' having ceased to occupy the demised premises. According
to the counsel for the petitioners, eviction of the tenant u/s 13(2)(v) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 can be sought if it has
ceased to occupy the disputed property for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause. According to the counsel for the
petitioners, the Courts below have failed to appreciate that the petitioners had continued to occupy and possess the demised premises in dispute
and therefore, the case is not covered under the provisions of 13(2)(v) of the Act.
It has been further argued that the eviction cannot be made on the aforesaid ground unless such cessation, if at all, has been voluntary and
without any reasonable cause because the closure of the petitioners unit was in consonance with the Scheme framed by BIFR for rehabilitation and
it was the BIFR which directed to sell the machinery and therefore, it was neither voluntary nor unreasonable and thus, mere closure of the
demised premises does not amount to cessation of occupation as required by the Act.
Counsel for the petitioners has further argued that the petitioners have already been in ownership, physical possession, control and occupation
of the premises in dispute and having a telephone connection, staff, electricity meter since its closure, the findings of the Authorities below on issue
No. 2 to the effect that it has ceased to occupy the premises in dispute are erroneous and liable to be set aside.
However, on the other hand, learned senior counsel representing the respondent has vehemently supported the impugned orders of the eviction
passed against the petitioners. Learned counsel for respondent-landlord has submitted that once the suit of the petitioners claiming ownership/title
of the suit property dismissed upto Hon''ble the Apex Court, there was no question of giving afresh finding with regard to title of the suit property
on the basis of the provisions of the Nationalization Act. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Authorities below under the Rent Act is limited in nature
and the question of title as raised cannot be decided in rent proceedings.
Learned senior counsel for the respondent has further argued that the respondent has fully proved that on the date of filing eviction application,
the manufacturing and production in the disputed property was lying stopped continuously for a period of more than four months without any
reasonable cause. Counsel for the respondent has referred to various communications of the petitioners placed on record whereby the petitioners
unit has been held to be non-viable and has been ordered to be closed down and machinery sold. Learned senior counsel for the respondent has
further placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Dunlop India Limited Vs. A.A. Rahna and Another, to
contend that if the building is let out for business or commercial purposes, the complete cessation of the business/commercial activity may give rise
to a presumption that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises.
On the basis of the aforesaid argument, it has been submitted that the petition has no merit and liable to be rejected.
Certain facts which are not disputed before this Court be noticed as under:-
i) The petitioners took on lease the disputed property vide lease deed dated 6.7.1976 on rent of Rs. 9500/- per month for running spinning and
weaving mill under the name and style of Dayal Bagh Spinning & Weaving Mills and paid rent from the time of entering into possession till
October, 1998.
ii) It is further not in dispute that the lease amount was enhanced several times with mutual consent.
iii) It is also not in dispute that petitioners paid rent of the demised premises upto 31.8.2002 in various eviction applications filed against him.
iv) The civil suit seeking declaration that petitioners have become the owner of the property under the Nationalization Act was dismissed by the
Court of Sh. K.K. Jain, Civil Judge (Junior Division), Amritsar, vide judgment dated 18.2.2009. Appeal against the aforesaid judgment and decree
preferred by the petitioners was also dismissed by the District Judge, Amritsar vide judgment and decree dated 24.11.2009. Further RSA No.
896 of 2010 preferred on behalf of the petitioners against the aforesaid judgments and decrees of the Courts below was also dismissed vide
judgment dated 23.03.2010 and even Special Leave Appeal preferred against the aforesaid orders was also dismissed by Hon''ble the Supreme
Court vide its order dated 17.9.2010 and all these orders are on the record of the Authorities below.
v) Though the petitioners disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties yet rent for the period w.e.f. 1.9.2002 to 31.12.2003
@ 68100/- per month along with interest and costs in total amounting to Rs. 11,61,062/- was tendered in Court which was accepted by the
respondent.
vi) The petitioners have dismantled the machinery lying in the factory and have sold the entire machinery and stopped functioning from the demised
premises of Dayal Bagh Spinning and Weaving Mills. In fact, the documents placed on record Ex. PW 3/1 and Ex. PW 3/3 would show that the
petitioners'' Mill was declared as a Sick Industrial Company and even workers were given VRS/VSS due to closure of the mill.
It may be further noticed that counsel for the petitioners has argued that while dismissing the SLP No. 20942 of 2010 vide order dated
17.9.2010, the question of law was kept open by Hon''ble the Supreme Court and therefore, the petitioners were at liberty to raise question of title
in the eviction proceedings. The argument raised on behalf of the petitioners is palpably misconceived and liable to be rejected outrightly. The
operative part of the aforesaid order dated 17.9.2010 reads thus:-
In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, the SLP is dismissed. However,
question of law is kept open.
A perusal of the aforesaid order would show that Hon''ble the Supreme Court has very clearly refused to interfere in the judgment of this Court
passed in RSA No. 896 of 2010 whereby the dismissal of the suit filed on behalf of the petitioners was upheld. Once the question of title with
regard to the suit property raised by the petitioners between the parties has been decided against them by Hon''ble the Apex Court, the same has
become final and it cannot be said that since the question of law as raised in the SLP was kept open, the petitioners were given still liberty to raise
such an issue again between the parties.
In view of the findings recorded by this Court in RSA No. 896 of 2010 wherein the Supreme Court has declined to interfere the question of
the title between the parties has attained the finality and no question of law between the parties with regard to title of the petitioners qua the suit
property can be raised against the respondent-landlord.
At this stage, it may further be noticed that except as argued above, no other argument has been raised to support the plea that there exists no
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The petitioners are owners of the demised premises. There is no other material before this
Court on the basis of which petitioners can deny the relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties, as admittedly the petitioners have
executed the lease deed dated 6.7.1976 between the parties taking on lease the disputed premises and thus, no error can be found in the findings
of the Authorities below with regard to question of relationship between the landlord and tenant between the parties. Thus, the findings on issue
No. 3, 3-A and 4 are correct.
At this stage, it may be noticed that demised premises were taken on lease by the petitioners for running a Spinning and Weaving Mill and the
petitioner-Mill is lying closed prior to filing of the instant petition and even the entire machinery from the factory premises stand removed and sold.
Thus, it cannot be disputed that no manufacturing is being done in the demised premises.
As discussed above, tenanted premises are not being used for the purpose for which they have taken on lease for running a Spinning and
Weaving Mill are lying closed. However, the respondent is in possession of the tenanted premises and has also employed certain employees to
look after the premises within the question is to be considered whether in the said circumstances, the respondent has ceased to occupy the
tenanted premises within the meaning of Section 13(a)(2)(V) of the Act which provides as under:-
That where the building is situated in a place other than a bill station, the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four
months without reasonable cause.
An identical provision contained in Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, came for interpretation before Hon''ble the Supreme
Court in the case of Dunlop India Limited v. A.A. Rahna (supra).
Para Nos. 17 and 18 of the aforesaid judgment read thus:-
The word ""occupy"" used in Section 11(4)(v)is not synonymous with legal possession in technical sense. It means actual possession of the
tenanted building or use thereof for the purpose for which it is let out. If the building is let out for residential purpose and the tenant is shown to be
continuously absent from the building for six months, the Court may presume that he has ceased to occupy the building or abandoned it. If the
building is let out for business or commercial purpose, complete cessation of the business/commercial activity may give rise to a presumption that
the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises. In either case, legal possession of the building by the tenant will, by itself, be not sufficient for
refusing an order of eviction unless the tenant proves that there was reasonable cause for his having ceased to occupy the building.
The initial burden to show that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building continuously for 6 months is always on the landlord. He has to
adduce tangible evidence to prove the fact that as on the date of filing the petition, the tenant was not occupying the building continuously for 6
months. Once such evidence is adduced, the burden shifts on the tenant to prove that there was reasonable cause for his having ceased to occupy
the tenanted premises for a continuous period of 6 months. No strait-jacket formula can be evolved for determining as to what is the reasonable
cause and each case is required to be decided keeping in view 22 the nature of the lease, the purpose for which the premises are let out and the
evidence of the parties. If the building, as defined in Section 2(1), is let out for industrial or commercial/business purpose and the same is not used
for the said purpose continuously for a period of six months, the tenant cannot plead financial crunch as a ground to justify non occupation of the
building unless cogent evidence is produced by him to prove that he could not carry on the industrial or commercial/business activity due to fiscal
reasons which were beyond his control. If the tenant does not use the building for the purpose for which it is let out, he cannot be said to be
occupying the building merely because he has put some furniture or articles or machinery under his lock and key.
The aforesaid proposition of law as enunciated by Hon''ble the Supreme Court of India clearly applies on the facts of the present case wherein
manufacturing and production activities in the petitioner-Mill have been stopped since long and the machinery stands sold and all the workers have
been given the VRS/VSS and their all outstanding dues stood paid on the closure of the Mill and the respondent Corporation is merely in vacant
possession of the demised premises. It cannot be disputed that the demised premises were taken on lease by petitioner-Mill for manufacturing
activities. So when manufacturing and production in the Mill has been closed for a period of more than last four months. Then it cannot be said that
respondent is occupying the building within the meaning of above said statutory provision by merely keeping some Watchman or other laborer to
look after the possession of the petitioner over the demised premises.
Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted before this Court that the matter is pending before the BIFR and the
manufacturing activity will be again started in the tenanted premises, as per the rehabilitation scheme, whenever the same is formulated.
However, there is no evidence on record that the impugned Mill is going to be revived by employing the workers or by installing the machinery
therein which stood already sold. Moreover, under the provisions of the Rent Act, the Court has to consider as to whether on the date of filing the
petition, appellate has ceased to occupy the premises continuously for a period of six months without reasonable cause. In the instant case,
respondent has duly proved that on the date of filing of the petition, manufacturing and production was lying stopped continuously for a period of
more than four months without any reasonable cause.
As discussed above, Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Dunlop India Limited v. A.A. Rahna (supra) has held that non use of the
demised premises for the purpose for which it is let out amounts to non occupation of the building within the meaning of above said statutory
provisions. In view thereof, this Court is of the view that the findings of the Authorities below on issue No. 2 are in accordance with law and no
fault can be found with the same.
No other argument has been raised.
Dismissed.