Naurang Singh vs Union Territory, Chandigarh

J.M. Tandon, J.

The police registered F.I.R. No. 458 dated September 14, 1984, under sections 124A and 153A, I.P.C at P.S. East, Chandigarh and it reads :

"A secret source has informed that there was a congregation at about 69 A.M. in the Gurdwara Singh Sabha, Sector 19, in which about 100/125 men and women gathered there. At the conclusion of Kirtan and Katha at 8.30 A.M. Shri Naurang Singh Propaganda Secretary Gurdwara Singh Sabha addressed the Dewan. He said that there is no freedom for Sikhs as they are being harassed unnecessarily and are not being allowed to live in peace in the country. As per Government declaration only 22 persons were killed at Dukhniwaran Sahib Gurdwara, Patiala whereas people living there said that there were about 4 truck loads of human dead bodies. The Government report says death toll at Amritsar is 799 whereas about 1300 have been said to be killed there. In the village Sikhs are being harassed and about 4 to 5 bar killed daily. In the freedom struggle in India the Sikhs contributed the maximum but promises made to the Sikhs at the time of freedom struggle are not being honoured. It was promised to the Sikhs that Constitution will be so framed which could protect Sikh''s interest. The Sikhs have not been rewarded for their sacrifices. I have listened the Radio Broadcast of the Prime Minister in which she had expressed sympathy with Tamilians in Lanka. Had there been some well wisher of Sikhs similar sympathy would have been expressed for them also. Since all the leaders of the community are not here, the Protest Day is not being held. In the congregation about 9 to 10 men were wearing black turban and six to seven women were having black Dupattas. Shri Gurmukh Nonihal Singh, President was also present there. The people left afterwards. Retired General Narinder Singh was present but he did not address the Dewan. The report is hereby submitted. Sd/ Subha Singh, S.I., C.I.D. U.T. Chandigarh 15.8.1984."

The petitioner having made the speech in the meeting on September 14, 1984, is named in the F.I.R. He has filed the present petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. praying that his name be delected therefrom.

The learned counsel to the petitioner has argued that the speech made by the petitioner on September 4, 1984 is innocent and does not involve commission of any offence. He did not incite violence. He, of course, brought to the notice of the audience some acts which he believed to be true about the incidents that happened in the recent past and further expressed his resentment in relation thereto. The argument proceeds that the speech may involve the commission of offence if it incites or tends to incite violence in a reasonably normal person and in this context the reaction of an extra sensitive individual is irrelevant. There is hardly any justification to infer that the prevailing atmosphere at the time the speech was made was such that the same is capable of being interpreted to incite or tend to incite violence or disturb law and order and create disorder. The petitioner did not suggest any overt act even obliquely. His speech at best reflected his injured feelings. He cannot be taken to have committed and offence, including one under section 124A, I.P.C by publicly airing his resentment against the Army action in the State and the consequence that followed. The petitioner has thus been wrongly named in the F.I.R No. 458 dated September 14, 1984. His name may be deleted therefrom. Reliance has been placed on Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955.

The learned counsel for the Union Territory Administration has argued that the petitioner addressed the congregation in the Gurdwara on September 14, 1984, in connection with the Army Action in the State of Punjab and its repercussions. The speech made by him tend to incite violence and develop contempt for the Government resulting in disturbance of law and order when interpreted particularly in the background of the prevailing atmosphere in the State.

In Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1942(29) Federal Court 22, their Lordships examined the scope of section 124A, I.P.C and made the following observations :

"The first and most fundamental duty of every Government is the preservation of order since order is the condition precedent to all civilization and the advance of human happiness. This duty has, no doubt, been sometimes performed in such a way to make the remedy worse than the disease, but it does not cease to be a matter of obligation because some on whom the duty rests have performed it ill. It is to this aspect of the functions of Government that in our opinion, the offence of sedition stands related. It is the answer of the State to those who, for the purpose of attacking or subverting it, seek (to borrow from the passage cited above) to disturb its tranquility to create public disturbance and to promote disorder, or who incite there to do so. Words, deeds or writings constitute sedition if they have this intention of this tendency, and it is easy to see why they may also constitute sedition, if they seek, as the phrase is, to bring Government into contempt. This is not made an offence in order to minister to the wounded vanity of Governments, but because where Government and the law ceased to be, obseyed because no respect is felt any longer for them only anarchy can follow. Public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation, or likelihood of public disorder, is thus the gist of the offence. The acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder, or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that is their intention or tendency."

In Kedar Nath Singh''s case (supra) the amplitude of sections 124A and 505, I.P.C. again came up for consideration and their Lordships made the following observations :

"The provisions of the sections read as a whole, along with the explanations, make it reasonable clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance or public peace by resort to violence. As already pointed out, the explanation appended to the main body of the section makeit clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government action, however, strongly worded, would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or spoken etc, which have the pernicious tendency or intention or creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order. So construed, the section, in our opinion strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and interest of public order. It is also well settled that in interpreting an enactment the Court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress vide . Viewed in that light, we have no hesitation in so construing the provisions of the sections impugned in these cases as to limit their application to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order, or incitement to violence."

The ratio of the two authorities mentioned above is applicable to the facts of the instant case. The substance of the argument of the learned counsel for the Union Territory Administration is that the State of Punjab and Union Territory, Chandigarh, had been declared Disturbed Area and the extremists activities were going on a large scale in September, 1984. The law and order situation had so deteriorated that the Army had to spread out. In this background, it will be proper to infer from the text and tenor of the speech made by the petitioner that the same was intended and it did tend to bring the Government into contempt with the likelihood of eruption of violence and public disorder in terms of the ratio of the two authorities referred to above.

I have considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner has yet to undergo trial, if challenged. The fact of the matter is that the challan against the petitioner has not been filed so far. It may not be appropriate to dilate on the merits of this case at this stage. Suffice it to say that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference under section 482, Cr. P C.

In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed.