Navdeep Singh vs Gulab Preet Kaur

S.S. Grewal, J.—This petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) relates to quashment of first complaint, Annexure P/1, dated 26th November, 1983 and the second complaint, Annexure P/2, dated 23rd August, 1985, filed by the complainant-respondent, as well as the charge framed. against the petitioners on 18-12-1987 in the two complaints.

Brief facts relevant for the disposal of this petition, are, that the marriage between the complainant and Navdeep Singh accused No. 1 was performed on 14th November, 1982 and after their marriage they lived together as husband and wife at Delhi. At the time of Thaka ceremony which was performed at the residence of the accused at New Delhi, the accused demanded Rs. 50.000/- from the father of the complainant before the marriage, and, promised that they will not take furniture, trunks and utensils. The aforesaid amount was paid by the father of the complainant to the accused at the time of Shagun ceremony which was performed at the village of the complainant''s father. At that time the accused are stated to have promised that they would not put any demand of dowry and would not put unnecessary burden on her father. The marriage of the complainant and Navdeep Singh accused were duly performed at Amritsar and the marriage party was provided proper accommodation. It was further alleged that at the time of the marriage the father of the complainant gave huge dowry to accused Nos. 1 to 3 for the use of the complainant as detailed in Annexure ''B''. The articles of dowry were displayed in the presence of the respectables, relatives of the complainant and co-villager of the complainant''s father. After sometime husband of the complainant started maltreating her on the ground that she had not brought sufficient dowry at the time of marriage according to their status, and, all the accused started insulting the complainant in the presence of visitors and relatives, who, used to come to see the newly wedded wife. All the three accused demanded a sum of Rs. 1,00,000,00 for investment in their Dolphin Enterprises which they were running and also for purchase of plot for the complainant''s husband. The complainant wrote about all these incidents to her father. Thereafter, she went to village Shanker to appear in her M.A. final examination. Later on, her husband flatly refused to take the complainant to her matrimonial home. The complainant and her parents went to Delhi, but, at that time the parents-in-law of the complainant demanded rupees one lakh and also payment for the purchase of plot as a pre-condition for any talk of rehabilitation. At that time the husband of the complainant had already left India. The complainant and her parents requested the parents of the husband for return of the articles of dowry, but, they refused to hand over those articles. While the first complaint was still pending, second complaint was filed by the complainant on identical facts. In the first complaint, the accused were summoned under Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, whereas, in the second complaint they were summoned u/s 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Both the complaints were later on clubbed together, vide, order of the trial Magistrate dated August 21,1987. After recording pre-charse evidence, the learned trial Magistrate vide his impugned order dated 18th December, 1987, discharged the mother-in-law of the complainant Smt. Santosh Kaur, whereas, complainant''s husband and her father-in-law were charged u/s 406 of the Indian Penal Code.

The learned counsel for the parties were heard at length.

Firstly, it was argued on behalf of the petitioners that since the first complaint filed by the petitioners, copy whereof is Annexure P/1, was still pending, the second complaint filed by the complainant on identical facts could not be legally entertained and the same is liable to be quashed. On behalf of the respondent, it was submitted on the basis of the authority of their lordship of the Supreme Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar Vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, , wherein relying upon Vadilal Panchal Vs. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker and Another, as per majority view it was held that an order of dismissal u/s 203, Criminal Procedure Code, is no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint, on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, e.g., where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record, or, on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or, it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish, or, where new facts which could not with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced.

From perusal of the facts in Pramatha Nath''s case (supra), it is quite apparent that in the said case, the second complaint was filed when first complaint had already been dismissed, whereas, in the case in hand the second complaint was filed when the first complaint was still pending. As the facts and circumstances of the case in hand are entirely different, the aforecited authoritv in Pramatha Nath''s case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case in hand, and, is clearly distinguishable. Even otherwise mere fact that in the first complaint all the three accused including the present petitioners had been summoned under Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and not in respect of other offences mentioned in the complaint, it cannot be held by any stretch of imagination that the summoning order passed in the first complaint had been passed on incomplete record, or, on misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint, or, it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish. Nor it is the case of the complainant that true facts which could not with reasonable diligence have been brought on the record in the first complaint have been addued, or, came to light while filing the second complaint.

Faced with this situation, reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on Single Bench authority of Delhi High Court in O.P. Trehan v. Shri Parvinder Singh Monga and Anr. 1983 (2) RCR 142, wherein it was held as under :

"The learned Magistrate did not incorporate any reason, whatsover, for dismissing the complaint with regard to offences other than that u/s 406/34 I.P.C. complained of by Parvinder Singh Monga. As a necessary corollary it would follow that there was no application of judicial mind and there was no compliance with the mandatory provisions of law. The said order was thus vitiated manifestly resulting in miscarriage of justice. No doubt, it was open to the complainant to call the said order in question by way of a revision petition to a higher court, but he failed to do so. That would, however, not disentitle him to avail of the alternative remedy of filing a fresh complaint and seek redress on the ground that the previous decision betrayed non application of judicial mind and was bad in law."

No authority has been cited before me to the effect that once the accused have been summoned only with regard to a particular offence, no other charge could be framed against them at a later stage by way of addition, amendment or alteration, as may be deemed necessary from the material brought on the record by production of pre-charge evidence. This aspect of the case was not considered at all in the aforesaid Division Bench authority in O.P. Trehan''s case (supra), cited on behalf of the respondent. On that ground too the said authority would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and is clearly distinguishable.

In the instant case mere fact that in the first complaint, Annexure P/1, the three accused had merely been summoned under Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, would not in any manner indicate that they have been acquitted in respect of the other charges mentioned in the complaint. After the accused had appeared in the Court it was open for the complainant to adduce evidence in support of her complaint. As already observed earlier, there is no legal bar for the trial Court on the basis of the pre-charge evidence led in the first complaint to frame additional charges against the accused petitioners. In this view of the matter, it cannot be held that the mere fact that the trial Court had ordered summoning of the accused only with respect to offences under Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, no other charge against the accused-petitioners could be subsequently framed by the trial Court. Thus, it cannot be held that the impugned order was unjust, or, that the said order would constitute a good ground for entertaining the second complaint on identical facts. Nor on flimsy grounds the complainant party could be legally permitted to file second complaint during the pendency of the first complaint, particularly, when the complainant party could produce pre-charge evidence according to its own choice and then pray for framing of the necessary charges which could be suitably amended, modified or altered at any stage during the trial on the basis of the first complaint. As such there is no justification for filing or entertaining the second complaint as far as facts and circumstances of the present case are concerned. Filing of the second complaint dated 23-8-1985, in my view, amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court and the same is directed to be quashed.

As far as first complaint is concerned, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that there are no specific allegations of entrustment in respect of the amount of Rs. 50.000/- which even according to the allegations in para No. 3 in the first complaint was allegedly paid to the accused at the time of Shagun ceremony which was held in the village of the father of the complainant, whereas the marriage was subsequently performed at Amritsar. Perusal of the allegations too indicate that this amount was allegedly paid to the accused before marriage, after the accused allegedly promised that they would not take furniture, trunks and utensils. It is significant to note that there is no mention in the complaint that this amount had been entrusted to the accused-petitioners for purchase of articles of dowry or that the said articles were meant for exclusive use of the complainant-wife or was meant subsequently to be handed over to the complainant after her marriage, on her demand. Thus payment of amount of Rs. 50,000/- would not in the circumstances of the present case constitute Istridhan property of the complainant.

As far as the remaining articles of dowry said to have been given by the father of the complainant to the accused, are concerned, the lower Court in its impugned order Annexure P/3 observed that the complainant has failed to prove that the articles of dowry given to the accused were meant for her exclusive use and benefit. The trial of first complaint has lingered on for the last more than seven years. It is significant to note that during the pendency of the first complaint, the complainant filed second complaint on identical facts, after about two years of the filing of the firsn complaint. This inordinately prolonged delay is mainly due to the fault of the complainant and cannot be attributed to the accused petitioners alone. This callous and inordinately prolonged delay of more than seven years referred to above has certainly violated an inalienable fundamental right of the accused petitioners to a speed trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

I find support on this point from the observation of the Full Bench of Patna High Court in Madheshwardhari Singh and Another Vs. State of Bihar, , wherein it was observed as follows :--

"In all criminal prosecutions the right to a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of the citizens under Article 21 of the Constitution."

It was further observed as under :--

"Laying down of an outer time limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. A callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused, or, is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21. Unless the fundamental right to speedy trial is to be whittled down into a mere pious wish, its enforceability in Court must at least be indicated by an outer limit to which an investigation and the trial in a criminal prosecution may ordinarily extend. Holding otherwise would be merely paying lip service to a precious right whilst denuding it of the benefits of its actual enforceability."

To the similar effect is the Division Bench authority of this Court in State of Punjab v. Babu Lal 1990 (2) RCR 232.

For the foregoing reasons, both the aforesaid complaints, Annexures P/1 and P/2 dated 26th November, 1983 and 23rd August, 1985 respectively and consequent proceedings taken thereunder are directed to be quashed. This petition is accordingly allowed.