Neeta Mathur vs State of Rajasthan

Vijay Bishnoi, J.—The petitioner, said to be possessing the requisite qualification and eligibility and having offered her candidature for the post of Junior Engineer/Junior Technical Assistant under the Rajasthan Rural Development and Panchayati Raj State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1998 (for short ''the Rules of 1998'') pursuant to the advertisement dated 25.03.2013 (Annexure-5), has filed this writ petition challenging the validity of newly added proviso to Rule 14 of the Rules of 1998 vide notification dated 06.03.2013 while claiming that the action of the State Government of not providing relaxation in the upper age limit to the employees working under the Integrated Watershed Management Programme is discriminatory and, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside.

The petitioner, working as Consultant with the Panchayat Samiti, Luni in the Integrated Watershed Management Programme, is aggrieved of the fact that she would not be given the benefit of relaxation in the upper age limit as provided to the persons working under the MGNREGA or any scheme of the department of the Rural Development and Panchayati Raj or under any project of the Education Department in the State.

It is contended by the petitioner that she is discharging the duties similar to the duties discharged by the persons working under the MGNREGA or any scheme of the Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj or under any project of Department of Education in the State and, therefore, she is also entitled for relaxation in the upper age limit. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the respondents have provided age relaxation to the persons, who are discharging similar type of duties like the petitioner, there is no justification for different treatment to the persons like the petitioner, who is working under the Integrated Watershed Management Programme. According to the learned counsel, there is no intelligible differentia in treating different the candidates, who are engaged in particular Government schemes from other persons, who have actual working experience while working under the Integrated Watershed Management Programme. It is contended that the baseless differentiation has no relation with the object sought to be achieved.

Having gone through the pleadings and after hearing the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we do not find any merit in the challenge of the petitioner to the validity of the impugned newly added proviso to Rule 14 of the Rules of 1998.

It is settled proposition of law that a law made by the legislature can be struck down by the Courts only on two grounds namely (i) that the Legislature, who has enacted the law, does not have competence to enact such law and (ii) that it does not take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights as guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India or any other constitutional provisions.

Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Rakesh Kohli and Another, has held as under.

"16. The statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provision under challenge cannot stand. Sans flagrant violation of the constitutional provisions, the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature is not declared bad."

This Court has repeatedly stated that legislative enactment can be struck down by Court only on two grounds, namely (i) that the appropriate Legislature does not have competence to make the law, and (ii) that it does not take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part - III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provisions. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others, etc. Vs. McDowell and Co. and others, etc., while dealing with the challenge to an enactment based on Article 14, this Court stated in paragraph 43 of the Report as follows:

"43....A law made by Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz. (1) lack of legislative competence, and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground...... if an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19(1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom."

17.... to 25.....

In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Others Vs. The State of Bihar, the Constitution Bench further observed that there was always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. It stated in paragraph 15 of the Report as under:

"15....The courts, it is accepted, must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It must be borne in mind that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest and finally that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation."

The above legal position has been reiterated by a Constitution Bench of this Court Moti Das Vs. S.P. Sahi, The Special Officer In Charge of Hindu Religious Trusts and Others,

In Hamdard Dawakhana and Another, Kalipada Deb and Another, Lakshman Shripati Itpure @ Lakshman Shripati Impore and A.B. Choudhri and Another Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, inter alia, while referring to the earlier two decisions, namely, Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. and Mahant Moti Das, it was observed in para 8 of the Report as follows:

"8. Therefore, when the constitutionality of an enactment is challenged on the ground of violation of any of the articles in Part III of the Constitution, the ascertainment of its true nature and character becomes necessary i.e. its subject-matter, the area in which it is intended to operate, its purport and intent have to be determined. In order to do so it is legitimate to take into consideration all the factors such as history of the legislation, the purpose thereof, the surrounding circumstances and conditions, the mischief which it intended to suppress, the remedy for the disease which the legislature resolved to cure and the true reason for the remedy..."

In Hamdard Dawakhana, the Court also followed the statement of law in Mahant Moti Das and the two earlier decisions, namely, Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India and State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara and reiterated the principle that presumption was always in favour of constitutionality of an enactment."

In the present writ petition, the petitioner has not questioned the competence of the State Government in prescribing relaxation in the upper age limit under the Rules of 1998. However, the petitioner is claiming that while working as Consultant in the Integrated Watershed Management Programme, she is discharging similar set of duties as discharged by the persons employed under the various schemes such as MGNREGA or any other scheme of the Department of the Rural Development and Panchayati Raj and Education, therefore, she is also entitled for the similar relaxation in upper age limit.

From perusal of Annexure-3-Agreement for Consultancy Assignment, it is clear that petitioner has entered into an agreement with the PIA A. En., Panchayat Samiti, Luni as a Member of the WDT for one year. The main function of a Member of the WDT in the Integrated Watershed Management Programme is to perform the assignment as specified in the agreement. There is no material on record to suggest that the petitioner was performing the duties similar to the employees working on the post of Junior Technical Assistant/Senior Technical Assistant, Junior Engineer, Programme Officer, Assistant Programme Officer, Manager SGSY, Programmer, MIS Manager, Lekha Sahayak/Accountant/Assistant Accounts Officer, Coordinator Training, Consultant Training, Coordinate LEC or Coordinator Supervision under MGNREGA or any Scheme of the Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj or Junior Engineer working on contract under any project of the Department of Education.

In the absence of any substantial material available on record, the claim of the petitioner seeking parity with the above named employees, working under the schemes mentioned in the impugned proviso to Rule 14, is not tenable. More over, it is within the domain and jurisdiction of the employer concerned to provide benefit of relaxation in the upper age limit to the persons employed under various schemes and the said benefit cannot be claimed as a matter of right by the persons like the petitioner, who has failed to demonstrate any discriminatory treatment by the respondents.

In view of the above discussions, this writ petition being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. Stay petition also stands dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.