Nepolian, Office Assistant (Under suspension) vs The District Registrar (Administration) Additional Charge, Tiruchirappalli

S. Manikumar, J.—By order, dated 22.05.2013 the District Registrar (Admn.) Additional Charge, Trichy has suspended the Petitioner from service, on the ground that a criminal case in crime 421 of 2012 u/s 294(b) and 506(ii) has been registered on the file of the Fort Police Station, Tiruchirappalli and for the reason that disciplinary proceedings have been initiated for suppression of the above said criminal proceedings, Being aggrieved by the same, the Petitioner has preferred this Writ Petition. Assailing the correctness of the impugned order of suspension, Mr. S. Baskar Mathuram, learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that as per Appendix 3 to Rule 14-a of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, the Sub-Registrar alone is the competent authority to impose a penalty of suspension and that therefore the District Registrar (Admn.), Additional Charge, Tiruchirappalli has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned order of suspension.

Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that no show cause notice or opportunity has been given before the order of suspension and hence it is violative of the principles of natural justice.

It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that based on a baseless complaint against the Petitioner, a false case has been registered, implicating the Petitioner in two criminal cases, in crime No. 1454 of 2012 u/s 147, 294(b) and 506(ii) IPC and Crime No. 421 of 2012 u/s 294(b) and 506(ii) IPC and in both cases, the Petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Tiruchirappalli. In the above circumstances, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has prayed to issue a Writ of Certiorarified mandamus to set aside the order of suspension, dated 22.05.2013 and consequently, to reinstate the Petitioner in service as Office Assistant.

Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and perused the materials available on record.

None of the grounds raised above are tenable in law. Suspension can be made (1) by way of penalty (2) as an interim measure keep a Government servant or an employee out of service temporarily, when the appointing/disciplinary authority decides to enquire into the grave charges/contemplation of charges/investigation into a crime/trial.

Earlier, this Court in R. Ravichandran Vs. Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai, reported in 2010 CIJ 553 IPJ, had an occasion to consider the nature and scope of an order of suspension. The Court framed several questions. Some of the questions raised and answered in R. Ravichandran''s case (stated supra) may be relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the second ground of attack in this writ petition, as to whether formulation/pendency of specific charges is a mandatory requirement for placing a Government Servant/employee under suspension. That questions raised are as follows:-

(iv) When the appointing/disciplinary, authority/government can exercise his discretion to place a government servant under suspension and what are all the factors to be taken into consideration?

(v) Whether the order of suspension is administrative or quasi-judicial nature?

(vi) When the power of judicial review is exercised by Courts in adjudicating the legality or correctness of an order of suspension passed by the appointing/disciplinary, authority/government, pending contemplation of the charges/enquiry/investigation/trial, what is the extent of discretion to be exercised by Courts?

The meaning of the word "suspension" extracted from various Dictionaries and the legal meaning, are as follows:-

Suspension, as per Wharton''s Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., is a temporary stop or hanging up as it were of a right for a time, also a censure on ecclesiastical persons, during which they are forbidden to exercise their office or take the profits of their benefices.

''Suspension'' means, action of debarring or state of being debarred, especially, for a time, from a function or privilege; temporary deprivation of one''s office or position, or again, state of being temporarily kept from doing or deprived of something.

Suspension as per Black''s Law Dictionary: 7th Edn. Pg. 1460 means, (1) to interrupt; postpone; defer (2) to temporarily keep a person from performing a function, occupying an office, holding a job or exercising a right or privilege.

As per Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary, ''Suspension'' or ''Suspense'' is a temporal, i.e., temporary, "Stop of Mans'' Right (Cowel). Suspension, as per Bauvier''s Law Dictionary, Vol. II, means a temporary stop of right, of a law, and the like. As per the Ramanatha Iyer''s Dictionary, suspension means temporary intervention or cession of something (as) office, work or labour.

"The act of debarring for a time from a function or privilege". It means a temporary deprivation of once office or position. The suspended officer does not cease to be a public servant, he is only prevented from discharging the duties of his office for the time being. [K.J. Aiyar''s Judicial Dictionary, 14th Edn.]

Suspension, according to Oxford Dictionary, means, The action of suspending or condition of being suspended, the action debarring especially for a time from, a function or privilege, temporary deprivation of one''s office or position or again, state of being temporarily kept from doing or deprived of something.

Suspension is, to defer; to debar from any privilege, office employment, et., for a time being. [Ref. Hemanta Kumar Bhattacharjee Vs. S.N. Mukherjee, ]

ccessation of something as right, work or labour. The basic idea underlying the root word, "suspend" and all its derivatives is that a person while holding an office and performing its functions of holding a position or privilege should be interrupted in doing so and debarred for the time being from further functioning in the office or holding the position and privilege. He is intercepted in the exercise of his functions of his employment of the privilege and put aside, as it were, for a time, excluded during the period from his functions or privileges. Such is the concept of a suspension order. Reference can be made to the decision in Abid Mohammad Khan Vs. The State, .

On the aspect whether an order of suspension is administrative or quasi judicial in S. Pratap Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, , the Supreme Court explained the effect of suspension as follows:

Suspension of a Government servant, during the course of his service, simply means that no work is to be taken from him during the period of suspension. The Government servant does not work on a post during the period of his suspension. If he is actually discharging the duty of a certain office prior to suspension, the order of suspension would mean that he would cease to work on and discharge the duties of that post. If at that time he is not working on any post but is on leave, no question of his actually ceasing to work or giving up the discharge of duty arises, but that does not mean that the order of suspension would be ineffective.

R. Ravichandran''s case (cited supra) relates to a Government Servant. Power of the State Government to place a Government servant under suspension is given under Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, which reads as follows:

(e) (1) A member of a service may be placed under suspension from service, where-

(i) an enquiry into grave charges against him is contemplated, or is pending; or

(ii) a complaint against him of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial and if such suspension is necessary in the public interest.

The power of the Government/appointing authority/disciplinary authority, to place a Government Servant or an employee under suspension, even before the formulation of charges, has been dealt with, at paragraph 37 of the judgment in R. Ravichandran''s case. The necessity or desirability to place a government servant/employee, under suspension, is dealt with, at paragraphs 44 and 46 of the reported judgment, which are reproduced.

In State of Tamil Nadu v. P.M. Balliappa reported in 1985 (2) LLN 362 (Mad.), this Court has held that the necessity or desirability to place the person under suspension is the objective satisfaction of the Government. More so, the Court cannot look into the sufficiency of material, but only the factum of satisfaction if the satisfaction is no satisfaction at all or it was formed on a consideration or there was total lack of application of mind.

In Bhup Narayan Jha Vs. State of Bihar and Others, , a Full Bench of the Patna High Court dealt with rule 49A of the Bihar Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, which rule is pari materia with rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Rule 49A of the Bihar Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 is extracted hereunder:

49(A)(1):--The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the Governor, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension:

(a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or,

(b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial.

The Full Bench dealing with the proviso and the need for suspension, explained its objects as follows:

In this context it become necessary to first consider the very nature of an order of suspension made either during the pendency of a departmental proceeding or in reasonable contemplation thereof. It is well settled that suspension is of two kinds -- one by way of punishment, and the other by way of a procedural aid to the holding of disciplinary proceedings. Admittedly herein we are concerned with the latter category. It seems to be undisputed that the concept of suspension during departmental proceeding has only the large objective of ensuring a free and fair conduct of the enquiry that is either pending or is to follow. In this context, the fact that the suspension order is interlocutory or interim in nature can perhaps be hardly denied. The service rules invariably, if not inflexibly, provide for a subsistence allowance during the period and the delinquent official retains his lien on the post during the continuation of the departmental proceeding. This mellows the rigour of the order of suspension and in the event of the enquiry resulting in favour of the official, he would be invariably entitled to the revoking of the order of suspension and the reinstatement to the post with all the benefits of service and salary, (sometimes even without having worked during the said period), as may be provided in the rules. There is thus no finality or irrevocability attaching to an order of suspension, which, as already noticed, retains its character or being interim or interlocutory, in nature.

The object and purposes of placing a public servant under suspension during or in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding may be manifold and do not call for any exhaustive enumeration. However, its salient features are well known and may call for a passing notice. Where serious allegations of misconduct are imputed against an official, the service interest renders it undesirable to allow him to continue in the post where he was functioning. In case where the authority deems a further and deeper investigation into the same as necessary, it become somewhat imperative to remove the official concerned from the spheres of his activities, as it may be necessary to find out facts from people working under him or to take into possession documents and materials which would be in his custody. Usually, if not invariably, it would become embarrassing and inopportune both for the delinquent official concerned as well as the inquiring authority to do so, while such official was present at the spot and holding his official position as such. It was sought to be contended that such a situation may be avoided by merely transferring the official. However, it would be for the authority concerned to decide whether such an official, against whom prima facie serious imputations have been levelled; should at all be allowed to function anywhere else. If it so decides, then suspension during the pendency or in contemplation of an inquiry might well become inevitable. It seems to be a fallacy to assume that suspension is necessarily and wholly related to the gravity of the charge. Indeed, it may have to be ordered to facilitate free investigation and collection of evidence. Just as criminal procedure is intended to sub-serve the basic cause of a free and fair trial, similarly, suspension as an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceeding, is directed to the larger purpose of a free and fair inquiry. It would thus seem that the power of suspension is not only necessary, but indeed, a salutary power, if reasonably exercised either during the pendency or in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding.

After considering various decisions in State of Orissa Vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, , the Supreme Court held as follows:-

It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent''s continuance in office while facing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge.

On the facts in this case, we are of the considered view that since serious allegations of misconduct have been alleged against the respondent, the Tribunal was quite unjustified in interfering with the orders of suspension of the respondent pending inquiry. The Tribunal appears to have proceeded in haste in passing the impugned orders even before the ink is dried on the orders passed by the appointing authority. The contention of the respondent, therefore, that the discretion exercised by the Tribunal should not be interfered with and this Court would be loath to interfere with the exercise of such discretionary power cannot be given acceptance.

The Supreme Court in The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and Others Vs. Tarak Nath Ghosh, , which has been considered in Biman Kumar Mohanty''s case (cited supra), also raised a question as to whether the suspension of a member of the service can only be ordered after definite charges communicated to him in terms of Rule 5(2) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, or whether the Government is entitled to place him under suspension even before that stage has been reached after a preliminary investigation. The Supreme Court in Tarak Nath Ghosh''s case held as follows:-

Held: (1) The fact that in other rules of service there is specific provision for an order of suspension even when disciplinary proceedings were contemplated, does not mean that a member of the All India Service should be dealt with differently. It would not be proper to interpret the Rules, which form a self-contained Code, by reference to the provisions of other rules even if they were made by or under the authority of the President of India.

In Gyan Singh Parihar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, , a Division Bench of the Allahabad Court tested the correctness of an order of suspension, pending a proposed disciplinary enquiry, against an employee relating to serious charges of fraud, embezzlement, bribe etc., At para. 4 and 5 of the judgment, the Division Bench held as follows:

Whether an employee should or should not continue in his office during the period of disciplinary enquiry is a matter to be assessed by the concerned authority and ordinarily, the Court should not interfere with the order unless it is demonstrated to be mala fide and without there being a prime fade evidence on record connecting the employee with the misconduct in question. See U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad and Others Vs. Sanjiv Rajan, .

It has not been demonstrated before the Court that the order is mala fide and without there being a prime facie evidence on record connecting the petitioner with the alleged misconduct, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

For the purpose of suspension, it is sufficient that the competent authority has arrived at a prima facie conclusion that the Government servant or an employee has committed a serious misconduct, which entails major penalties, like dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, etc., from service. Illustrative cases, where action has to be taken immediately, are persons, involving in serious acts of misdemeanor, such as, (a) offence or conduct involving moral turpitude, (b) corruption, embezzlement or misappropriation of Government money, (c) possession of disproportionate assets, (d) misuse of official powers for personal gain, (e) serious negligence or dereliction of duty, (f) desertion of duty and (g) refusal or deliberate failure to carry out written orders of superior officers; (h) apprehension of tampering with witnesses or documents or likelihood of causing prejudice to an inquiry, investigation or trial; (j) likelihood of subversion of discipline in office; (k) involvement of scandals, and (l) likelihood of holding the employee guilty of departmental proceedings, and in all these illustrative cases, it is the matter of necessity and public interest, involved and therefore, it should be left to the absolute discretion of the competent authority, with whom, the power is vested to suspend and that such discretion exercised in public interest should not be interfered with lightly.

The appointing/disciplinary authority/government, should be allowed to exercise their discretion to place the government servant/employee under suspension, which is a step in aid, to complete the investigation/trial or charges to be framed by the department. Courts have consistently held that even if the materials are not adequate for prosecution or even after acquittal, the appointing/disciplinary authority/government is empowered to place the government servant/employee under suspension, and that the power can be exercised on proper consideration of relevant materials, in public interest.

Once the objective consideration of the allegations and the material on record, warrants suspension, till the completion of enquiry or trial or enquiry by the department, in public interest, it is not for this Court to examine the nature of the allegations, evidence and to record any finding thereon, which would hamper the progress of the departmental enquiry or investigation or trial against the government servant.

No doubt, exercise of discretion, should be rational, should not be arbitrary and that there is also a legal duty cast upon the appointing/disciplinary authority to apply his mind before exercising such discretionary power. However, when the government servant/employee against whom, an enquiry into grave charges is pending/under contemplation or an investigation into an offence or trial is pending and such charge/charges, to be formulated, require, placing a person under suspension, then the competent authority can exercise his discretionary power under the relevant rules to place the government servant/employee under suspension, pending enquiry or under contemplation or investigation/trial.

In this context, it is pertinent to extract the observations of Lord Denning, as found in Wade on Administrative Law,

The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means atleast this: the statutory body must be guided by relevant consideration and not by irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted is good faith, nevertheless the decision will be set aside.

The duty of the Court is restricted only to the limited extent to see that where the appointing/disciplinary authority has taken into consideration the nature of the charge, its complexity, public interest involved in retaining the government servant/employee, against whom, serious imputation are levelled and whether retention of such person, would be scandalous to the department or sub-serve the discipline in the department or affect the morale of other government servants/employees or to facilitate a fair enquiry.

The appointing authority/disciplinary authority/government is entitled to exercise the control and maintain the master and servant relationship. To suspend an employee, as an interim measure for anyone of the reasons stated supra, which are illustrative, is the absolute right of an employer and no employee can insist that he must be allowed to be retained in service and discharge his duties and enjoy the fruits or privileges attached to the post. While testing the correctness of the order of suspension, all that has to be seen by the Court is whether the power of the appointing/disciplinary authority, in controlling the employees, has been exercised reasonably, without any mala-fide and that there should not be any lack of jurisdiction. Any action taken by the appointing/disciplinary authority, in public interest to maintain a clean and honest administration, cannot be interfered with lightly. Even though the government servant/employee is put to mental agony, it is only to the limited extent of restricting him from discharging his duties and enjoy other privileges attached to the post and it is only an interim measure, till he is cleared off of the imputations levelled against him. Suspension cannot be attacked on the ground that the facts stated therein are not correct. It is well settled that High Court cannot delve into factual details, while adjudicating the correctness of an administrative order.

Though Rule 8(A) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal Rules) contemplate suspension as one of the penalties, there is difference between an order of penalty and interim suspension. Under the Rules, the Sub-Registrar may be the competent authority to impose the punishment of suspension, if it is done as a measure of penalty. That does not preclude the District Registrar (Admn.), Additional Charge, Tiruchirappalli, the respondent herein, from ordering suspension, as a temporary measure, if on the facts and circumstances of the case, rules 17(e)(1) of Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules has to be invoked. In the case on hand, two criminal cases have been registered against the Petitioner, on the file of the Fort Police Station, Tiruchirappalli. Besides suppression of the Criminal proceedings to the competent authorities is also alleged. Involvement in criminal cases against the Petitioner for the offences are u/s 147, 294(b) and 506(a) of IPC, cannot be said to be minor act of misconduct. Involvement of the Petitioner in criminal cases and suppression of the same to the higher authorities, would certainly attract public interest.

As regards the contention that the Petitioner ought to have been issued a show-cause notice or provided with reasonable opportunity, before passing an order of suspension, this Court deems it fit to consider the diction in T. Chandralekha vs. The Block Development Officer/Commissioner, Mugaiyur Panchayat Union, Villupuram District and another reported in (2011) 3 MLJ 540, wherein at para. 9 to 12 held as follows:

The issue as to whether any show cause notice has to be given before suspending a Government servant, has been considered by this Court, as early as on 1954 in Y. Venkateswarlu Vs. State of Madras, , where this Court, dissenting with the views expressed by the Nagpur Bench in AIR 1949 118 (Nagpur) , held that,

Therefore under Art. 311, Cl. (2), the penalties contemplated there, for which a statutory safeguard of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him is provided, are dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. On a reading of the decision of the Supreme Court, it seems to me that in that judgment their Lordships did not intend to equate ''suspension'' with ''reduction in rank''. The two ideas are distinct and are intended to apply to different sets of circumstances. I am therefore of opinion that the contention of the learned counsel that suspension is tantamount to reduction in rank is unacceptable. If that is so, there was no necessity for any opportunity being given to the petitioner, before he was suspended, to show cause why he should not be suspended.

Explaining the nature of the order of suspension, as to whether it is administrative or quasi-judicial and whether the government servant should be given an opportunity before suspending him from service, the Supreme Court in S. Pratap Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, , the Supreme Court held that it cannot be said suspension of a Government servant without calling him to explain the charges first, was bad as the proceedings to suspend him were not of a quasi-judicial character and, therefore, necessitated the Government''s obtaining his explanation to the charges of misconduct before passing the order of suspension. The order suspending the Government servant pending enquiry is partly an administrative order. What has been held to be quasi-judicial is the enquiry instituted against the Government servant on the charges of misconduct, an enquiry during which under the rules it is necessary to have an explanation of the Government servant to the charges and to have oral evidence, if any, recorded in his presence and then to come to a finding. None of these steps is necessary before suspending a Government servant pending enquiry. Such orders of suspension can be passed if the authority concerned, on getting a complaint of misconduct, considers that the alleged charge does not appear to be groundless, that it requires enquiry and that it is necessary to suspend the Government servant pending enquiry.

In State of Orissa and Others Vs. Shiva Parashad Das, , the Supreme Court tested the correctness of the order of suspension on the ground that as to whether, it was made in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution of India as well as Rule 12 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the order of suspension, holding that same is in contravention of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. On appeal, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 3, held that,

An order of suspension passed against a Government servant pending disciplinary enquiry is neither one of dismissal nor of removal from service within Article 311 of the Constitution. This position was clearly laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohammad Ghouse Vs. State of Andhra, . It is unfortunate that this decision was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges of the High Court. Clause (1) of Article 311 will get attracted only when a person who is a member of Civil Service of the Union or an All India Service or a Civil Service of a State is ''dismissed'' or ''removed'' from service. The provisions of the said clause have no application whatever to a situation where a Government servant has been merely placed under suspension where a Government servant has been merely placed under suspension pending departmental enquiry since such action does not constitute either dismissal or removal from service. The High Court was, therefore, manifestly in error in quashing the order of suspension passed against the respondent on the ground that it was violative of clause (1) of Article 311 of the Constitution.

The Division of Gujarat High Court in Vagadia Parmabhai Bhurabhai Vs. T.J. Trivedi, Under Secretary to Government and Another, , while dealing with the similar question, at Paragraph 6, held as follows:

The above observation makes it abundantly clear that the application of the rule of natural justice of being heard before any administrative order having civil consequences of is passed, cannot be insisted upon if the same is likely to defeat the very object or purpose of interim suspension. While it cannot be disputed on the principle that the principle of natural justice must be extended to administrative actions involving civil consequences, it must be conceded that insistence on the application of the rule of natural justice, namely, affording a hearing before an order is passed, cannot be permitted if it is likely to result in defeating the administrative action required to be taken with promptitude, having regard to the circumstances of the case on hand. Inflexible and rigid application of the rule of audit alteram partem to R. 5 of the rules would have the effect of setting at naught the very object or purpose of placing a civil servant under suspension. If a civil servant charged of committing an act involving moral turpitude cannot be placed under suspension unless he is given an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed order, he would continue in service till the hearing is contemplated which would not be in public interest. To continue a civil servant who is alleged to have betrayed a tendency to demand and accept illegal gratification would be against public interest and would defeat the very object of prompt action, i.e., suspension in public interest if the procedure of giving a hearing before such an order is passed is required to be undergone. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view taken in Lakshman''s case (supra). We, therefore, do not think that R. 5 is ultra vires the Constitution on the plea that the procedure prescribed thereunder is in violation of the principles of natural justice.

Therefore, the contention that the impugned order suffers from arbitrariness or violation of principles of natural justice is rejected.

The further contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that he had already been enlarged on bail by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Tiruchirappalli and therefore there is no need to place the petitioner under suspension cannot be countenanced. Enlargement on bail does not preclude the appointing/disciplinary authority from invoking rule 17(e)(1)(i) of Tamil Nadu Civil Services(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, to place a Government servant under suspension, pending formulation of charges/enquiry into the charges/investigation/trial, as the case may be, when it is required to be made in public interest. On the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court cannot find any manifest illegality, in placing the Petitioner under suspension, for the reasons stated, in the impugned order. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed. No costs.