Netra Pal Singh vs State of U.P.& Ors.

Brijesh Kumar, ACJ.

This bunch of writ petitions pertains to the nonrenewal of the term of the Government Counsels of different districts. Some of the petitioners had been working as District Government Counsel or as Additional District Government counsel for a quite long period. The State, on expiry of their term of appointment as Government Counsel refused renewal. In one of the petitions, the grievance of the petitioner is that he is not being given extension nor his case for that purpose has been considered according to the provisions contained in the L.R. Manual. We propose to deal with individual cases on merits in the latter part of the judgment. Since the other questions raised are common to all the petitions, we have heard all these petitions together and propose to dispose them all by this order.

The main grievance of the petitioners is that action of the opposite parties is arbitrary in refusing to renew their term. It is also their case that the opposite parties should have acted in accordance with the provisions contained in the L.R. Manual taking into consideration the opinion and recommendation of the District Judge and the District Magistrate of the district concerned.

On behalf of the State, Learned Counsel Sri A.K. Verma has raised a preliminary objection that the petitions are not maintainable. The stand of the state is that engagement of a Counsel by a client is a matter within the choice and discretion of the client and the same would apply in relation to the State Counsel as well, where their services are requisitioned by the State as a client for its work and for a specified period.

On behalf of the State, it has been submitted that after deletion of subsections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by means of U.P. Amendment Act, 1991 (U.P. Act No. 18 of 1991), with effect from 1621991, the appointment of District Government Counsel (Criminal) is no more statutory in nature. So far the provisions contained in the L.R. Manual are concerned, they do not have statutory force, they are for the purposes of internal guidelines for the State in the matter of engagement of District Government Counsels and Additional District Government Counsels.

Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the public prosecutors. Subsections (4), (5) and (6) read as follows:

"Section 24(4) The District Magistrate shall in consultation with the Session Judge, prepare a panel of names of persons, who are, in his opinion to be appointed as Public Prosecutors or Additional Public Prosecutors for the district.

(5) No person shall be appointed by the State Government as the Public Prosecutors or Additional Public Prosecutor for the district unless his name appears in the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under subsection (4).

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (5), where in a State there exists a regular Cadre of Prosecuting Officers, the State Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor only from among the persons constituting such cadre:

Provided that where, in the opinion of the State Government, no suitable person is available in such cadre for such appointment that Government may appoint a person as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, from the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under subsection (4)."

The above quoted subsections have been deleted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act (No. 18 of 1991) with effect from 1621991. A reference to the statement of objects and reasons of U.P. Amendment Act No. 18 of 1991 has also been made to, which says that with a view to avoid delays in the appointment of Public Prosecutors and enabling the State Government to appoint Public Prosecutors of its choice, it was decided to amend Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in its application to Uttar Pradesh. Subsections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 24 have, thus been deleted. It is submitted that there is no statutory requirement to consider the recommendations of the District Magistrate in the matter of preparation of a panel for appointment of Public Prosecutors. After the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is submitted that Chapter XXI has been added in the L.R. Manual.

A reference to Para 1.06 of the L.R. Manual has been made to indicate that the lawyers engaged by the State are called Law Officers and they work under the supervision of the Legal Remembrance as provided under Para 3.02. A reference has been made to Chapter XXI of the L.R. Manual and it is submitted that in view of Para 21.02 it is a professional engagement terminable at will. Para 7.01 of Chapter VII of the L.R. Manual, the District Government Counsel has been defined providing that the District Government Counsels are legal practitioners appointed by State Government to conduct work in different Courts. Clause (3) of Para 7.06 of the L.R. Manual provides that the appointment of any legal practitioner as District Government Counsel is only a professional engagement terminable at will on either side. It is clarified in the said provision that it is not an appointment to a post under the Government. Hence the Government reserves the power to terminate the appointment at any time without assigning any cause. Para 21.01 of newly added Chapter in the L.R. Manual provides that the provisions contained in Chapter XXI are supplementary to the provisions provided elsewhere in the Manual. In case where there is any inconsistency with other provisions, the provisions of Chapter XXI would prevail. It is provided under Para 21.02 that the change of designation from District Government Counsel to Public Prosecutor, Additional Public Prosecutor GradeI etc. would not affect the basic nature of the professional engagement which is terminable on either side without notice. Para 21.07 has again been referred to emphasise that the appointment made may be terminated at any time without notice or without assigning any reason. The period may be extended from time to time which shall not be treated to be a new appointment.

By making reference to the different provisions of Chapters VII and XXI of the L.R. Manual, the effort of the learned State Counsel is to establish that the appointment of the District Government Counsel/Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutor etc. is not an appointment on any post under the but is purely a professional engagement of a legal practitioner to conduct the work of the Government in different Courts, or the work as may be assigned. The professional engagement as made by the State is terminable at will of the Government without any notice or assigning any reason.

Sri A.K. Verma, learned State Counsel, submits that it is prohibited for the lawyers to solicit work, hence mandamus cannot be prayed for nor can be issued to the State for the purposes of engagement of petitioners as its counsels and the scope of the judicial review is also limited. The State Counsel has referred to a decision reported in (1993) 3 SCC 552, Harpal Singh Chauhan and Ors. v. State of U.P. and placed reliance upon the observations made in Para 19 of the decision to the effect that members of the legal profession have to maintain high standards of legal ethics and they are not supposed to solicit work or seek mandamus from the Courts in the matters of professional engagement. The Court had, however, interfered with the matter since it was found that there was patent infraction of statutory provision of Code of Criminal Procedure as the District Magistrate had not performed his statutory duty as enjoined by law. It is submitted that since the relevant provisions relating to appointment of Public Prosecutor has been deleted from Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there is no statutory provision now which may be applicable in such matters. Therefore, the observations made in the above noted case by Hon''ble the Supreme Court requiring the District Magistrate to act according to the provisions of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Chapter VII of the L.R. Manual would also not be applicable. AIR 1996 SC 864, State of U.P. V. Ramesh Chandra Sharma, has been referred to, more particularly, to Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment to indicate that the engagement of a legal practitioner as Public Prosecutor is a professional engagement but it is to be noticed that the action of the State Government in refusing the renewal of the term of the Public Prosecutor was held to be arbitrary as there existed no material to support the action of refusal to renew the term. Hence, the action was held to be arbitrary, based on a nonexistent ground. The view taken by the High Court was upheld. While referring to a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1988 UPLBEC 1448, Brijraj Tripathi v. State of U.P. and others, the following observations have been relied upon : "Indeed the State has not alleged anything against the petitioner. The office of Government Counsel were all held at pleasure and the Legal Remembrancer''s Manual itself laid down that such appointment were in the nature of contractual engagements and created a relationship of confidence as one between client and counsel and were at the pleasure of the State Government." The Court thereafter observed : "Unfortunately, however, it is not practicable for this Court to scrutinize the appointments of Government Counsel on the basis of competitive merit. It is of course not a happy situation that successor Government look with suspicion an appointment of standing counsel appointed by their predecessors. However, when the Government (which includes the political executive as well as bureaucracy) as litigant chooses to appoint one person instead of another as its counsel it may take into account various factors which on a totality go into the creation of a relationship of confidence between the two. Hence, a judicial scrutiny of comparative merit of various counsel is extremely difficult. In this view of the matter after the suggestions of arbitrariness and political motivation are, for all practical purpose, normally not open to scrutiny in the matter of appointment or removal of Government Counsel, unlike the civil services. While referring to a decision reported in (1993) UPLBEC 965 Vidya Sagar Dwivedi v. State of U.P. and others reliance has been placed upon the observations made that a recommendation of the District Officer is not binding upon the Stale. The State Government was within its rights not to renew the term of the District Government Counsel. The decision reported in (1990) 1 UPLBEC 542, Triloki Nath Pandeyv. State of U.P Band others, has also been relied upon. It has been held that the appointment of District Government Counsel is only a professional engagement terminable at will. The conclusions drawn by the learned Bench are indicated in Para112 of the Judgment, as under:

"112. To sum up, what we have held are as indicated below :

(i) The relationship of employer and employee has not been established between the Government Counsel and the State Government and, therefore, the District Government Counsel does not hold civil post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution.

(ii) Since the District Government Counsel does not hold civil post within the meaning of Article 311, the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution are not attracted when his appointment is sought to be terminated.

(iii) The impugned order terminating the appointment of the petitioners is not violative of Article 311 of the Constitution.

(iv) The officers of District Government Counsel (Civil), District Government Counsel (Revenue), Public Prosecutors, Addl. Public Prosecutors is office under the State but even after appointment to their respective offices, their relationship with the State is that of counsel and client.

(v) The relationship between, District Government Counsel (Civil), District Government Counsel (Revenue), Public Prosecutors, Addl. Public Prosecutors, Panel Lawyers are governed by contract (deed of engagement) which is nonstatutory, purely contractual).

(vi) The right to terminate the appointment of District Government Counsel (Civil), District Government Counsel (Revenue), Public Prosecutors, Addl. Public Prosecutors etc. flows from the contract (deed of engagement) and protection of Article 16 of the Constitution is not available to the petitioners when their appointment was sought to be terminated by the State Government.

(vii) Subpara (3) of Para 7.06 of the Manual is not hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and termination of appointment of the petitioners is not in breach of the provisions of the Manual.

(viii) Office of the Government Counsel is of trust and confidence and even after appointment the relationship of Government Counsel with the Government continues to remain as that of a Counsel and client and any decision of the State Government to terminate the appointment of Government Counsel to be substituted by fresh panel of Government Counsel, does not call for scrutiny by this Court.

(ix) Para 4 of the impugned Government order dated 621990 providing that the appointment of Government Counsel appointed on or after 1st January, 1990, shall not be terminated, does not suffer from the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution.

(x) Fundamental Rules do not apply to the petitioners as they were not appointed under the provisions of rules framed under Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, or held civil posts."

The decision reported in AIR 1991 SC 537 Kwnari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others v. State of U.P and others has also been referred to by the State Counsel. The learned State Counsel has also referred to a case reported in 1994 (2) SCC, 204, State of U.P and others v. U.P. State Law Officers Associations and others. He has more particularly referred to the observations made in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Judgment where it is observed that in the selection of their lawyers the State is duty bound to make earnest efforts to find the best from among those available at the particular time. This is more so, because the claims of and against the Public Bodies are generally monetarily substantial and socially crucial with farreaching consequence. Whatever the method adopted, it must be shown that the search for the meritorious was undertaken and for no other consideration. Thus, according to the learned State Counsel, the Public Prosecutors work under a kind of contractual and professional engagement and do not hold any office under the Government. Hence, their appointment is liable to be terminated any time without notice or assigning any cause. There is a relationship of confidence between the client and the lawyer. Hence, many factors come into play in the matter of selecting, appointing, renewing or refusing to renew the appointment of the District Government Counsel or the Public Prosecutors. Therefore, such matters are beyond the judicial scrutiny.

The question that falls for consideration is as to whether the bar of judicial scrutiny is total and absolute or not in the matter of appointment, renewal or the refusal to .renew the appointment of District Government Counsel/Public Prosecutors, despite the position that it remains a professional engagement and involves relationship of trust and confidence:

Shri Shafiq Mirza appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that it is true that the appointment of Public Prosecutor may be a professional engagement but it is not a matter of absolute discretion vesting in the Government, nor judicial scrutiny is totally barred. The requirement of fair action on the part of the State is applicable in all spheres of its performance of duties and activities. So far relationship between the Government Counsel and the State is concerned, he has also referred to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Kumari Shrilekhq Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1991 SC 537. Particularly referring to Para 12 of the judgment, it is submitted that after considering different provisions contained in Chapter VII of the I.R. Manual, Hon''ble the Supreme Court held that on appointment of legal practitioners as Government Counsel in the Districts, they are treated as Officers of the State and the appointment is ordinarily renewed on an objective assessment of suitability of a person based on the opinion of the District Officer and the District Judge and the character roll maintained in keeping the record of suitability of an appointee to enable an objective assessment for the purpose of his continuance as Law Officer in the District. Provision barring private practice are also there. It is also held that there is an "element of continuity" of the appointment unless the appointee is found to be unsuitable by his work or conduct or age or in comparison to any more suitable candidate available. It is also held that counsels are paid remuneration out of public exchequer and there is a clear public element attaching to the ''office'' or ''post''. In so far the provisions contained in L.R. Manual that the appointment is liable to be cancelled or terminated without notice and assigning any reason has also been interpreted to mean that there has to be some reason which need not be assigned or communicated to the appointee. The existence of some reason is essential otherwise the decision would be arbitrary. The conclusions as drawn in Para 13 of the report may be reproduced:

"............Cl. 3 of Para 7.06 must, therefore, be understood to mean that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is not to be equated with appointment to a post under theGovernment in the strict sense, which does not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character ; and that the appointment may be terminated even during the currency of the term by only communicating the decision the termination without communicating of reasons which led to the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the Government which can be terminated at any time, even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. The construction suggested on behalf of the State of U.P. of this provision, if accepted, would amount to conceding arbitrary power of termination to the Government, which by itself is sufficient to reject the contention and thereby save it from any attack to its validity."

Referring to the observations made in Paragraph 14 of the judgment. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that so far the provisions as contained in Cr P C namely, Section 24, are concerned, Hon''ble the Supreme Court observed that "in the case of Public Prosecutors, this additional public element flowing from statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, undoubtedly, invest the Public Prosecutors with the attribute of holder of a public office which cannot be whittled down by the assertion that their engagement is purely professional between a client and his lawyer with no public element attaching to it." The submission is that the provisions contained in Cr P C which has now been deleted was considered to be only an additional public element flowing from statutory provision. The findings as recorded in Paragraphs 12 and 13 are based on the provisions contained in the L.R. Manual. After amendment by deleting subsections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 24 of the Cr P C, Chapter XXI was added in the L.R. Manual. This Chapter is supplemental to the provisions contained elsewhere in the Manual and only in case of inconsistency, the provisions of Chapter XXI are to prevail. It is submitted that Para 21.04 in Chapter XXI of L.R. Manual requires" the District Magistrate to prepare the panel of names in consultation with the District Judge for the purposes of filling up the vacancies of Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutors for a district. All the information''s Biodata of the person, including report about the Character, integrity and capability of each person included in the panel are to be forwarded to the L.R. The State Government is required to appoint the Public Prosecutor or the Additional Public Prosecutor out of the names appearing in the panel as provided under Para 21.06. Para 21.08 requires the District Magistrate to submit a confidential report after consultation with the Sessions Judge in respect of Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutors giving details about the percentage of success of cases conducted by them and about their general reputation. A special assessment is required to be made in every three years indicating as to whether the person is to be given extension or not. It is, thus, submitted that the provisions contained in the L.R. Manual remain the same even with the addition of Chapter XXI. Therefore, on the basis of the decision of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi''s case (supra), the position cannot be denied that there is an "element of continuity" in the office of the District Government Counsel/Public Prosecutor as well as "Public element" in the office even though he may not be in a strict sense holding a Government post. The power of the State Government pertaining to the appointment and renewal of the District Government Counsel/Public Prosecutor is subject to Article 14 of the Constitution. In this connection Para 20 may usefully be quoted, as below:

"20. Even apart from the premise that the ''office'' or ''post'' of D.G.C.s has a public element which alone is sufficient to attract the power of judicial review for testing validity of the impugned circular on the anvil of Article 14. We are also clearly of the view that this power is available even without the element on the premise that after the initial appointment, the matter is purely contractual. Applicability of Article 14 to all executive actions of the State being settled and for the same reasons its applicability at the threshold to the making of a contract in exercise of the executive power being beyond dispute, can it be said that the State can thereafter cast off its personality and exercise unbridled power unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 in the sphere of contractual matters and claim to be governed therein only by private law principles applicable to private individuals whose rights flow only from the terms of the contract without anything more? We have no hesitation in saying that the personality of the State, requiring regulations of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Article 14, does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirements of Article 14 and contractual obligations are alien concepts, which cannot coexist."

Reliance has also been placed on behalf of the petitioners as well upon the case reported in (1995) 6 SCC 527, State of U.P. v. Ramesh Chandra Sharma and others, to indicate that the provisions of Section 24 of Criminal Procedure Code as existed earlier were relevant only in the matters of appointment of District Government Counsel and Additional District Government Counsel but not in the matters relating to renewal or refusal to renew the term of appointment as observed by the Supreme Court in the above noted decision. Relying upon the observations made in Paragraph4of the judgment it is submitted that the validity of refusal to grant renewal of the terms would be governed by the provisions contained in the L.R. Manual except which were contrary to the provisions then contained in Section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In that sense it is submitted that the case of Harpal Singh Chauhan (supra) stands distinguished in the matters relating to renewal of the appointment. It is submitted that the Court had found that the nonrenewal of term of appointment of the Government Counsel was arbitrary. Hence, that order was held liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that there is a difference between the appointments of the State Counsels in the High Court and the appointment and renewal of the District Government Counsel appointed to look after the work in the subordinate courts. In that of the matter, it is submitted that all the observations in the case of Sri lekha Vidyarthi ''s case (supra) would not be applicable to a case of District Government Counsel. It is submitted that District Government Counsels can be discontinued only for valid reasons. The observations made in Paragraph20 of the judgment reported in State of U.P. and Ors. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association and Ors. (supra) have been particularly pressed into service which may be beneficially quoted below:

"20. As the facts narrated earlier show, out of 26 respondentslaw officers, the period of contract of nine of them had expired and they were continued till further orders. The remaining seventeen had continued after the expiry of their initial term without even formal orders of extension. In other words, none of the 26 officers had any right to hold the office on the date of their removal, even under the initial'' terms of appointment which stipulated the contractual period. This is apart from the fact that the term of the contracts also provided that the appointment could be terminated at any time without assigning reason. The reliance placed by the respondents in this behalf on Shrilekha Vidyarthe v. State of U.P., is misplaced for the obvious reason that the decision relates to the appointment of the District Government Counsel and the Additional/Assistant District Government Counsel who are the law officers appointed by the State Government to conduct civil, criminal and revenue cases in any court other than the High Court. Their appointments are made through open competition from among those who are eligible for appointment and strictly on the basis of merit as evidenced by the particulars of their practice, opinions of the District Magistrate and the District Judge and also after taking into consideration their character and conduct. Their appointment is in the first instance for one year. It is only after their satisfactory performance during that period that a deed of engagement is given to them and even then the engagement is to be for a term not exceeding three years. The renewal of their further term again depends upon the quality of work and conduct, capacity as a lawyer, professional conduct, public reputation in general and character and integrity as certified by the District Magistrate and the District Judge. For the said purpose, the District Magistrate and the District Judge are required to maintain a character roll and a record of the work done by the officer and the capacity displayed by him in discharge of the work. His work is also subject to strict supervision. The shortcomings in the work are required to be brought to the notice of the Legal Remembrancer. It will thus be seen that the appointment of the two sets of officers, viz. the Government Counsel in the High Court with whom were are concerned and the District Government Counsel with whom the said decision was concerned are made by dissimilar procedures. The latter are not appointed as a part of the spoiled system. Having been selected on merit and for no other consideration, they are entitled to continue to their office for the period of the contract of their engagement and they can be removed only for valid reasons. The people are interested in their continuance for the period of their contracts and in their nonsubstitution by those who may come in through the spoils system. It is in these circumstances that this Court held that the wholesale termination of their services was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The ratio of the said decision can hardly be applied to the appointments of the law officers in the High Court whose appointment itself was arbitrary and was made in disregard of Article 14 of the Constitution as pointed out above. What is further, since the appointment of District Government Counsel is made strictly on the basis of comparative merits and after screening at different levels, the termination of their services is not consistent with the public interests. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court committed a patent error of law in setting aside the order dated July 23, 1990 terminating the services of the respondentslaw officers."

A decision of this Court reported in (1997) 2 UPLBEC 1061 : 1997(2) LBESR 105(A11), Bhola Nath Shukla v. State of U.P, has been relied upon to show that an arbitrary action on the part of the State would be vitiated having hit by Article 14 of the Constitution and that the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the cases of Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) and State of U.P. v. Ramesh Chandra Sharma and others (supra), relate to appointment of Government Counsel in the District Courts, hence, in such matters, they would be relevant and not the decision in the case of State of U.P. V. U.P State Law Officers Association (supra), which relates to the appointment of counsels in the High Court since the two are governed by two different sets of rules. Some other decisions of this Court which have been relied upon are decisions reported in 1997 (15) LCD 1046, P.M. Sethi v. State of U.P. and others, unreported decisions rendered in Writ .Petition No. 742 (SB) of 1994, Rajendra Kumar Singh v. State of U.P and others, decided on 981994 at Lucknow, Writ Petition No. (sic) (SB) of 1997, Girja Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P. and others decided on 24997 at Lucknow and Writ Petition No. 37309 of 1995, Amar Singh v. State of U.P. and another decided on May 8, 1996 at Allahabad, for the proposition that arbitrary action on the part of the State in terminating the term of appointment or refusal to renew cannot withstand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4244 (S/B) of 1994, Rajendra Kishore Gupta and others v. State of U.P and others, decided by a Division Bench on February 20, 1995 at Lucknow which places reliance upon the case decided at this Bench, namely, Rajendra Kumar Singh (supra) and Harpal Singh Chauhan (supra) holding that some effective consultation is required to take place between the District Magistrate and the District Judge where their opinions do not tally with each other.

Considering decisions of Hon''ble the Supreme Court and this Court as cited and relied upon by the learned counsels for the parties in support of their respective submissions, it clearly emerges out that the appointment of a District Government Counsel/Additional District Government Counsel in the District Courts is not an appointment to a post under the State Government. The Contention of the learned State Counsel that it is a professional engagement is also correct. The State has right and discretion in the matter of appointment of District Government Counsel/Additional District Government Counsels so as to be able to choose the best available for the professional work in the interest of the State but it would be fallacious to equate the professional engagement of lawyer by the State with the professional engagement of a private person or a party. If the State has any such view that it has absolute power or discretion to engage and disengage a counsel at will without any reason in an arbitrary manner, the State is certainly mistaken about its obligation in the matter relating to contest the matters in District Courts in the causes against the State. A private party or an individual is a master of his own affairs. If he takes a step injurious to himself or abandons a litigation or gives a walk over it would obviously be his own choice. So also in the matter of choosing and retaining a counsel. But the State is not so free as an individual or private person. It is answerable and accountable to the public. The professional fee and payments are made out of the State exchequer. Quite often, high stakes are involved having far reaching consequences, ultimately, affecting the people and the citizens at large. The basic and essential function of the State is to protect the interest of the common men, the citizens and the people. Arbitrary action on the part of the State or an action which is not bonafide or in the interest of the State would hardly be permissible in dealing with public affairs.

In the judgments of the Hon''ble the Supreme Court referred to above it is clearly observed that the professional engagement of counsels the State Government has a "public element" and the appointments of the Counsels has an "element of continuity". The Manual of the Legal Remembrancer is there to provide safeguard for the State action in the matter of engagement, appointment and continuity of the Government Counsel. The provisions of the Manual also indicate that objectivity is to be ensured in the State actions. Hence, it provides for the opinion of the District Magistrate and the District Judge and maintenance of record about the performance, reputation etc. of the Government Counsel. The ''element of continuity'' and ''public element'' in the matter of appointment and continuance of the Government Counsels have been found by Hon''ble the Supreme Court on consideration of the provisions of the L.R. Manual. So far provisions contained in Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are concerned it was observed that it only provided the additional ground to hold so. Therefore, in our view, merely by deleting subclauses (4), (5) and (6) of Section 24 of Cr P C, there would not be much change in the position. Strictly, (of course), it cannot be said that the appointments are statutory in nature, nonetheless ''public element" in the matter of appointment and its continuity would certainly be there. The appointments not being statutory would not necessarily lead to the corollary that it is entirely a private engagement of a lawyer by an individual or a private party. The responsibility of the State to act reasonably and not arbitrarily cannot be passed by adding or deleting some provisions under the law. The provisions of law may provide a form but, in substance, the Government discharges the responsibility of the State and acts in the interest of the State and by deleting some provisions, it cannot be said that it can act or behave like a private party or an individual client. The fallacy that the appointments not being statutory after deletion of subsections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 24 of Cr P C therefore, the engagement of a counsel must be at par with engagement by a private individual lend vehemence to the argument advanced on behalf of the State which, in our view, has no substance. In our view, there exists a real and substantial distinction between the engagement of a counsel for professional services by a private party on an individual to prosecute or defend his interest and the engagement of a lawyer by the Government for prosecuting or defending the interest of the State which in turn is nothing but the interest of the people of the State at large to whom the Government is accountable. So far, District Government Counsel or Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal) are concerned they prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the State. A cognizable of fence is a crime against the society. Thus, a counsel appointed by the State, the District Government Counsel/Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal) discharges the function, though professional, which affects the society and concerns the people. Considering these aspects of the matter, we are constrained to observe that the argument advanced on behalf of the State has no force that professional engagement of Counsel by the Government not being a statutory appointment would be like any other engagement of a counsel by a private or an individual. The restriction to act reasonably and not arbitrarily, applies with full force on the State action in regard to appointment or retention of Government Counsel. To act reasonably and not arbitrarily and with objectivity in the actions of the State has to be there, Keeping which in view, the Government has the Manual of Legal Remembrancer. Freedom sought by the Government is also misplaced. Therefore, the State action not matters relating to appointment and continuance of Government counsels must be tested at the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. No doubt the scope of judicial scrutiny in matters like one in hand would be limited. The Court would not be justified in reassessing the merit of a petitioner. It is for the State to consider the overall performance and make its own assessment on the question as to whether the term of an incumbent is to be renewed or not. It is, however, also essential that the parameters ''which'' are set by the State to judge the suitability of a person for the purposes of his retention should be reasonable and not arbitrary. The State, as observed earlier, would certainly be free to judge the ability, performance and general suitability of a Government Counsel in a reasonable manner adhering to the professed norms as they exist in its own Manual so as to provide guidance in its action relating to appointment and retention of Government Counsels.

There may be cases where even though the District Magistrate and the District Judge both have recommended a candidate for renewal of his term, yet t here may be reasonable cause for the State to take a different view, ultimately. But as observed earlier, there must be some reasonable ground to take a different view of the matter.

As one of the grounds to assess the merit, the State may set a resultoriented parameter but that alone may not always be a safe ground. The acquittal of trials may depend on many factors. Adhering strictly to a given percentage to success may only lead to arbitrary results. In cases where the performance, ability and integrity of the incumbent has not been doubted, mere lower percentage of success in trials which may not be very low would violate the criterion of reasonableness.

In the light of what has been held above, we now proceed to scrutinize the individual cases of the petitioners in different writ petitions.

The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1925 (MB) of 1998. Gajraj Singh Shakya has been recommended for renewal by both the district authorities, Le. the District Judge, Etah as well as the District Magistrate, Etah. The District Judge, Etah has reported that Gajraj Singh Shakya possesses very good knowledge of law and has conducted State cases diligently and sincerely and he is a lawyer with uptodate knowledge of law and takes keen interest in the conduct of cases. The District Judge has further reported that Sri Gajraj Singh Shakya is a cool tempered person and there is nothing against his integrity which is certified. The District Judge Etah has also mentioned in his report that he has no objection if the term of Sri Gajraj Singh Shakya renewed for further years. The District Magistrate Etah vide his letter dated 29th April, 1998 addressed to the Joint Secretary/Joint L.R. recommended the case of the petitioner, Sri Gajraj Singh Shakya, for renewal, The conviction of Sessions trials conducted by the petitioner was 39%. In revisions and appeals his success was 62%. He has been denied renewal of the term as his work was not found satisfactory by the State Government.

While considering the percentage of success in the trials, it is to be noticed that it is 39%. Around 60% acquittal may not be solely attributable on unsatisfactory work of the petitioner when the District Judge as well as the District Magistrate has spoken high of him in the matter of professional competence and integrity both. The success around 40% cannot be considered as very low. No other material has been placed by the State to substantiate its assessment that his work was not found satisfactory. Refusal to renew of the petitioner is found to be arbitrary and is set aside.

Similarly in other Writ Petitions of district Etah (Le. Writ Petition No. 1926 (MB) of 1998, 1927 (MB) of 1998, 1928 (MB) of 1998, 1929 (MB) of 1998, 1930 (MB) of 1998, 1931 (MB) of 1998, 1932 (MB) of 1998,1933 (MB) of 1998 and 1950 (MB) of 1998) the petitioners Sarvashri Mahendra Pal Sharma, Sahdeo Singh Pundir, Anil Kumar Jain, Farooq Ali Khan, Ratnesh Parihar, Munna Lal Yadav, Raj Narain Sharma, Mohd. Shamsuddin and Azad Bux Israili respectively have been recommended by the District Judge Etah as well as District Magistrate Etah for renewal of their terms as Assistant District Government Counsel Etah. It has also been indicated in the reports while recommending for renewal of the terms of the petitioner that they have good knowledge of law, work and conduct is also good and their integrity is certified. The percentage of conviction of the cases conducted by Sri Mahendra Pal Sharma, according to the petitioner is 62 while according to the State it is 20. According to the petitioner he got 100% success in criminal appeals and 90% success in criminal revisions. The percentage of conviction of the cases con ducted by Sri Sahdeo Singh Pundir (the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1927 (MB) of 1998) according to him 62 while according to the State it is 24%. According to the petitioner in criminal appeals his success was 100% while in criminal revisions he got 90% success. According to the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1928 (MB) of 1998, Sri Anil Kumar Jain, he has to his credit 43% success in criminal cases, 100% success in criminal appeals and 71% success in criminal revision while according to the State the percentage of conviction of the cases conducted by him was 22. The percentage of conviction of criminal cases conducted by the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1929 (MB) of 1998. Sri Farooq Ali Khan, Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal) Etah, according to him, was 80 while according to the State it was 34. In criminal appeals and revisions he got 77% success. According to the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1930 (MB) of 1998, Sri Ratnesh Parihar, he got 46% success in sessions trials and 60% success in criminal appeals while according to the State the percentage of conviction in the cases conducted by him was 28. The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1931 (MB) of 1998. Sri Munna Lal Yadav, Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal), according to him got 60% success in sessions trials, 100% success in criminal appeals and 75% success in criminal revision while according to the State he got 22.3% success. The Petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1932 (MB) of 1998, Sri Raj Narain Sharma, Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Etah, according to him, got 50% success in sessions trials and 80% success in criminal appeals/revisions. According to the State he got only 8% success in sessions trials. According to the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1933 (MB) of 1998, Sri Mohammad Shamsuddin, Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal) Etah he got 51% success in sessions trials and 80% success in criminal appeals/revisions. According to the State he got 26% success in sessions trials. The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1950 (MB) of 1998, Sri Azad Bux Israili, Asstt. District Government Counsel (Criminal) Etah, according to him got 71% success in sessions trials excluding hostiled cases, while including the hostiled cases his success in the Session Trials was 25.51%. According to the State also he success in the Sessions trials was 25.51%. In criminal appeals he got 66% success. All the above petitioners have been denied renewal of their term as their work was not found satisfactory by the State Government.

We are accepting the percentage of success in regard to the Session trial as given on behalf of the State. We find that in the above noted cases, except the performance of Farooq Ali Khan petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1929 (MB) of 1998 which is 34%; the success of all other counsels is ranging between 8% to 28%. The performance of Farooq Ali Khan at 34% cannot be said to be too low so as to fall in the category of those whose work would be unsatisfactory when the District Judge and the District Magistrate have made recommendations in his favour. In the result Writ Petition No. 1929 (MB) of 1998 filed by Farooq Ali Khan deserves to be allowed and nonrenewal is set aside, all other Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed.

Now we proceed to examine the case of district Agra. There are three writ petitions of this district, namely Writ Petition No. 1915 (MB) of 1998,1916 (MB) of 1998 and 1934 (MB) of 1998 filed by the petitioners Netra Pal Singh, Dharm Veer Singh and Liladhar Singh respectively. The District Judge, Agra has recommended renewal of the term of all the three petitioners as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Agra after obtaining reports from the Presiding Officers of the courts concerned where the petitioners had worked, regarding their ability, conduct and general reputation. The percentage of success of Sri Netra Pal Singh, the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 55 in sessions trials. Dharm Veer Singh, the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1916 (MB) of 1998 go 58%; success in sessions trials while Sri Liladhar Singh, the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1934 (MB) of 1998 got 60% success in sessions trials. But the District Magistrate did not recommend their renewal on the ground that effective was not done by the petitioners which adversely affected prosecution and, therefore, the work of the petitioners was not satisfactory. The petitioners have brought on record a letter dated 141998 sent by one Sri Chandan Singh, Adhyaksha, Zila Panchayat, Agra to the District Magistrate, Agra, requesting to send his report to the State Government against Sri Dharm Veer Singh, Netra pal Singh, Liladhar Singh and Brahmchandra Pushkar, regarding their renewal of term as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Agra because they are the relatives of the senior local leaders of Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party. According to the State there was not such letter on the record at the time of consideration of renewal of the term of the petitioners by the State Government. The petitioners have been denied renewal of their term as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) as their work was not found satisfactory by the State Government.

We find that performance of the petitioners on the above noted three writ petitions is good and the District Judge has also recommended their case. The District Magistrate, however, reported that effective pairvi as expected was not done. The report of District Magistrate is not substantiated by material on record since their performance, as indicated earlier, is quite good. We also find that it would not be a reasonable ground to refuse renewal, if the self assessment submitted by the petitioners did not contain a certificate of their selfassessment or some signatures were missing in the prescribed form as performance would be a matter which is conveniently verifiable from the records. One is not supposed to pick one or the other pretext to reject the renewal. It should be based on consideration of substantial matters, the performance being one of them, We, therefore, find that nonrenewal of the term of the petitioner is arbitrary and based on no material. Thus, the above noted three writ petitions deserve to be allowed. The order of their nonrenewal is quashed.

There are two writ petitions from District Pilibhit i.e. Writ Petition No. 1498 (MB) of 1998 filed by Kanhaiya Lal and Writ Petition No. 1499 (MB) of 1998 filed by Surendra Mohan Jatav. The percentage of conviction in the session trials conducted by Sri Kanhaiya Lal is 25 and that of acquittal is 75. The reason of low percentage of conviction is stated to be the witnesses having been hostiled. His work, conduct and general reputation has been reported by the District Judge to be very good and. his integrity has also been certified. The District Magistrate, Pilibhit vide his letter dated July 15, 1997 recommended the name of the petitioner for renewal. In Para 34 of the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the State it has been submitted that later on the District Officer made an adverse report against the petitioner, Sri Kanhaiya Lal, in January, 1998 complaining about the integrity of the petitioner. Likewise, the case of the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1499 (MB) of 1998, Sri Surendra Mohan Jatav, was also recommended for renewal as District Government Counsel (Criminal), Pilibhit by the District Judge as well as District Magistrate in January, 1997 mentioning his work and conduct to be satisfactory and certifying his integrity. The petitioner has got 76% success in the cases conducted by him. Thereafter on 891997 the District Officer Pilibhit submitted an adverse report against the petitioner to the effect that the Principal, Government Girl''s Inter College, Pooranpur, made a complaint against the petitioner for not giving legal opinion about a High Court''s order. The Tehsildar, S.D.M. and other senior officers of the district also made a complaint against the petitioner for avoiding work and slackness in doing pairvi in the State cases. His success in SC/ST and Narcotics cases is also reported to be zero.

So far the petitioner Kanhaiya Lal is concerned his performance seems to be low but the performance of Surendra Mohan Jatav is undoubtedly good. The District Judge recommended for renewal of his term. His performance and the recommendation of the District Judge seem to be ignored on the report that once he has not given his opinion to the Principal of the Government Girl''s Inter College and the Tehsildar, S.D.M. and other senior officers complained that he was avoiding work and slackness in doing pairvi. The allegation of slackness in doing pairvi is contrary to the rate of success of the petitioner which is indicated to be 76%. Merely because case under particular Act did not result in conviction would be no reasonable ground to hold that the work was unsatisfactory. The decision of the State Government refusing of his term of appointment is arbitrary, being contrary to the record. Writ Petition No. 1499 (MB) of 1998 filed by Surendra Mohan Jatav deserve to be allowed and the order refusing to renew the term is set aside.

Two writ petition relate to district Rae Bareli i.e. Writ Petition No. 1951 (MB) of 1998 filed by Sri Shitla Prasad Dubey and Writ Petition No. 2029 (MB) of 1998 filed by Sri Punjab Singh Monga. The District Judge, Rae Bareli vide his report dated 2211998 recommended renewal of the term of both the petitioners. The District Magistrate also vide his letter dated February 27, 1998 recommended renewal of the term of both the petitioners as Asstt. District Government Counsel (Criminal) Rae Bareli. The percentage of conviction in the cases conducted by Sri Shitla Prasad Dubey is 40 while that of the cases conducted by Sri Punjab Singh Monga is 35. Their work and conduct has been reported to be satisfactory and their integrity has also been certified by the District Judge as well as the District Magistrate. They have been refused renewal of their term on the ground that the State Government did not find their work to be satisfactory.

In view of the discussions we have held while dealing with other writ petitions, the decision of the State Government in refusing to renew the term of their appointment is arbitrary. The performance cannot be said to be so low to lead to the inference of their work being unsatisfactory. Writ Petition No. 1951 (MB) of 1998 filed by Shitla Prasad Dubey and Writ Petition No. 2029 (MB) of 1998 filed by Punjab Singh Monga deserve to be allowed. The orders of refusal to renew their term of appointments are set aside.

Three petitions have been filed from district Farrukhabad i.e. Writ Petition No. 1541 (MB) of 1998 filed by Sri Shiv Ram Singh Chauhan, Writ Petition No. 1542 (MB) of 1998 filed by Virendra Singh Kashyap and Writ Petition No. 1544 (MB) of 1998 filed by Sri Abdul Ahad Qureshi. The District Judge and the District Magistrate Farrukhabad both have recommended for renewal of the term of the petitioners as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Panel Lawyer. The success in the sessions trials conducted by Sri Shiv Ram Singh Chauhan was 31.6%, that of the cases conducted by Sri Virendra Singh Kashyap was only 2% and that of the cases conducted by Sri Abdul Ahad Qureshi was 40%. These petitioners have been denied renewal of their term on the ground that their work was not found satisfactory by the State Government.

Out of the above noted three petitioners, performance of Virendra Singh Kashyap is only 2% and that of Shiv Ram Singh Chauhan is 31.6%. The performance of the petitioner Abdul Ahad Qureshi is only good. He has, however, completed 60 years of age and Shiv Ram Singh Chauhan too has attained the age of 60 years which is the normal age up to which the District Government Counsel can continue except where it is extended. In the light of the above, the aforesaid three writ petitions are dismissed.

Three writ petitions have been filed from district Sultanpur. The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1555 (MB) of 1998, Sri Hari Shanker, who was working as District Government Counsel (Civil) Sultanpur, has already completed 62 years of age on 881998 and therefore, this petition has become in fructuous. Sri Sukhdeo Prasad Pandey, Panel Lawyer (Civil), the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1593 (MB) of 1998, is going to complete the age of 62 years on 321998 and therefore, his Writ Petition No. 1593 (MB) of 1998 having become in fructuous is not being considered on merit. The case of the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1496 (MB) of 1998, Syed Mahmood Ali, was recommended by the District Judge and the District Magistrate both for renewal of his term for two years as District Government Counsel (Criminal) Farrukhabad. His success in criminal cases was 50%. On behalf of the State it has been submitted that there were several complaint against the work and conduct of the petitioner, Syed Mahmood Ali and an F.I.R. has also been lodged under Sections 120B, 419, 420, 467, 471 and 218 I.P.C. at Police Station Kotwali, district Sultanpur. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has brought on record the said F.I.R. by filing a supplementary affidavit and submitted that this F.I.R. has been lodged with a mala fide intention. Although the matter relates to the saledeeds executed by the petitioner regarding his own land in 1998, the F.I.R. has been lodged in 1998 i.e. after about ten years. It has further been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that except the above mentioned civil litigation there has been no complaint against the petitioner with regard to his work and conduct as District Government Counsel (Criminal) and the District Judge as well as the District Magistrate both have recommended for renewal of the term of the petitioner.

Writ Petition No. 1555 (MB) of 1998 filed by Sri Hari Shanker and Writ Petition No. 1593 (MB) of 1998, filed by Sri Sukhdeo Prasad Pandey both are rendered infructuous, hence, deserves to be dismissed. So far Writ Petition No. 1496 (MB) of 1998 Syed Mahmood Ali is concerned we find that on the basis of some material the State Government has considered him to be not suitable. We do not find it would be a fit case for interference. Hence, the said writ petition is also liable to be dismissed.

Writ Petition No. 1956 (MB) of 1998 has been filed by Sri Daya Ram Singh Ravi, Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Bijnore. His term was not renewed on the ground of his integrity being doubtful and his conduct being against professional ethics. His work was also not found satisfactory. According to self "assessment the success of the petitioner in criminal cases was only 25%.

In view of the discussions held in connection, with other writ petitions, no interference is called for and the petition deserves to be dismissed.

Writ Petition No. 1430 (MB) of 1998 1431 (MB) of 1998 and 1410 (MB) of 1998 have been filed by Sri Kulbhushan Gupta, Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Saharanpu,, Sri Prakash Chandra Gupta, Panel Lawyer (Criminal) Saharanpur and Sri Rajendra Singh Panwar, Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Saharanpur, respectively. The District Judge, Saharanpur recommended the petitioners for renewal of their term and the District Magistrate, Saharanpur, on the basis of the recommendations of the District Judge also recommended the petitioners for renewal of their term. The success of Sri Kulbhushan Gupta in the criminal cases conducted by him was 13.75% while that of the cases conducted by Sri Prakash Chandra Gupta was 18% and that of the cases conducted by Sri Rajendra Singh Panwar was 18%. These petitioners have been denied renewal of their term on the ground that their work was not found satisfactory by the State Government. These writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in view of what we have held in the preceding paragraphs.

The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 2005 (MB) of 1998, Sri Jayendra Singh Mathura, was working as District Government Counsel (Criminal) Uttar Kashi. The District Judge, Uttar Kashi reported his work and conduct to be good, knowledge of law sufficient and preparation of cases good. His integrity was also certified by the District Judge. On the basis of the report of the District Judge the District Magistrate, Uttar Kashi recommended the name of the petitioner for renewal of his term. The State Government did not grant renewal to the petitioner on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. His success in criminal cases was 27.7.%. Looking to the performance, we do not think that the decision of the State Government deserve to be interfered with. The petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

In district Maharajganj the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 3277 (MB) of 1998, Mohd. Zamir Khan, was appointed as District Government Counsel (Civil) on 1681990 for a period of one year. The petitioner was allowed to continue as D.G.C. (Civil) even after expiry of the period of one year in view of the Government Order dated 28th December, 1991 by which it was provided that all the Government Counsel in Uttar Pradesh would continue till further orders. On 5th December, 19% the District Magistrate sent his recommendations to the State Government for renewal of the term of the petitioner. The success of the State in the cases conducted by the petitioner was 71%. The petitioner was refused renewal vide order dated 29th July, 1997. The petitioner has already attained the age of 60 years. He would not be entitled to continue unless his term is extended. No interference is called for. The petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. It will, however, be open to the State to consider the extension of his term as may be permissible under law.

The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 2170 (MB) of 1998, Sri Mahendra Kumar Pandey, was Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal) Faizabad. His success in sessions trials was 50%. The District Judge, Faizabad as well as the District Magistrate Faizabad both recommended the petitioner for renewal of his term in March/April 1996. But thereafter on a complaint made by Sri Rakesh Kumar Mishra Advocate and one Nizamuddin son of Vakil Shah resident of Rasoolpur Dargah, Police Station Baskhari, district Ambedkar Nagar, the District Magistrate wrote to the State Government for not renewing the term of the petitioner. The Bar Association has also passed a resolution against the petitioner.

In view of the facts indicated above, we do not find this a fit case for interference in writ proceedings. The petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1554 (MB) of 1998, Sri Devendra Pratap Singh, was Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Gorakhpur since 921983 and his term was renewed from time to time. By order dated 1551998 renewal of his term was refused. The District Judge, Gorakhpur has reported that he had no objection to the renewal of the term of the petitioner but the District Magistrate did not recommend him for renewal. The self assessment submitted by the petitioner was also found incorrect after enquiry by the Additional District Magistrate. The District Magistrate has not recommended for his renewal and the District Judge has only said that there would be no objection to the renewal. His selfassessment statement is also not found to be correct after due enquiry by the Additional District Magistrate. We do not think that the decision of the State Government in not renewing his term of appointment can be interfered with. The petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.

In Writ Petition No. 2659 (MB) of 1998 the petitioner, Sri Ghasiram Prajapati, who was working as District Government Counsel (Revenue) Hamirpur, has been denied renewal of his term by the State Government on the ground that there were some complaints against the petitioner. A perusal of the record shows that the Bar Association, Hamirpur made a complaint against the petitioner on 4th March, 1998. a complaint was also made by the Nagar Panchayat Sarila, district Hamirpur on 1031998 against the petitioner. The success of the petitioner in the cases conducted by him was 90%. Both the above complaints were enquired into by the Distt. Magistrate through the Deputy District Magistrate Hamirpur, Sri Arun Kumar Dwivedi. On enquiry the complaints were found false and baseless. The enquiry report was submitted to the District Magistrate, Hamirpur on 861998 and on the basis of the enquiry report the District Magistrate, Hamirpur vide letter dated 1061998 informed the State Government that the complaints made against the petitioner were false and baseless. Since the performance of the petitioner seems to be excellent being 90% and the reports having been found to be false and baseless after enquiry by the State Agency, were hardly find any justification for nonrenewal of his term of appointment. The decision taken suffers from arbitrariness once there is nothing found against the petitioner. The petition, thus, deserves to be allowed. The order of nonrenewal is set aside.

The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 2962 (MB) of 1998, Sri Mukesh Kumar Jain was working as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) Rampur since 3171990 and his term was renewed from time to time. By order dated 1781998 renewal of his term was denied by the State Government. Although he was recommended by the District Judge as well as the District Magistrate for renewal of the term but renewal of the term has been refused on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory by the State Government. According to the petitioner the success in the cases conducted by him was 73% in criminal appeals, 87% in criminal revisions and 16% in sessions trials including hostiled cases. The rate of success of the petitioner in so far sessions trials are concerned on his own showing is 16%. Undoubtedly it is very low. The decision of the State Government does not call for any interference. The petition is liable to be dismissed.

The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 2963 (MB) of 1998, Sri Prithvi Brian Singh, was working as Additional District Government Counsel (Civil) Rampur. He was recommended for renewal of his term by the District Judge as well as by the District Magistrate. His success in State cases was 75%. His term was not renewed on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory by the State Government. The petitioner has made allegations of mala fide against one Sri Bahadur Saxena, an M.L.A. from SwarTanda constituency of Rampur district, opposite Party No. 4, that in a case (Suit No. 664 of 1994) filed by the wife of the opposite Party No. 4 the petitioner was the counsel for respondent, Sugar Corporation and ultimately the petitioner got success in the case as the Misc. Appeal No. 103 of 1994 filed by him was allowed and the Writ Petition No. 40904 of 1994 filed by the wife of opposite Party No. 4 was dismissed by the High Court at Allahabad on 15 121994. According to him due to the above malice the opposite Party No. 4 became instrumental in getting him removed from the post of Additional District Government Counsel (Civil). The performance of the petitioners seems to be very good as rate of success is 75%. Nonrenewal could not be resorted to merely by saying that the work was not satisfactory. The reason assigned is belied by the performance of the petitioner. This alone would be sufficient to set aside the decision of the State Government being arbitrary in not renewing the term of his appointment. Hence, the said writ petition deserves to be allowed and the order of refusal to renew the term is set aside.

A decision has been rendered at Allahabad by a Division Bench in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4064 of 1''998, John Mai v. State of U.P. [since reported in 1999(1) LBESR 603(A11)] It is dated 11121998. Some suggestions have been made in the said judgment for constituting some collegiums to consider the question of appointment and renewal of District Government Counsel. We do not think that it is necessary to consider that judgment in the present case since in the writ petitions in hand, we are concerned with the decisions which had already been taken by the State Government.

In the result Writ Petition No.

1915 MB of 1998, 1499 (MB) of 1998,

1916 MB of 1998, 1925 (MB) of 1998,

1929 MB of 1998, 1934 (MB) of 1998,

1951 MB of 1998, 2029 (MB of 1998

2659 (MB) of 1998 and 2963 (MB) of 1998 are allowed and writ petitions Nos. 1498

MB of 1998, 1926 (MB of 1998, 1927

MB of 1998, 1928 (MB of 1998, 1930

MB of 1998, 1931 (MB of 1998, 1932

MB of 1998, 1933 (MB of 1998, 1950

MB of 1998, 1430 (MB of 1998, 1421

MB of 1998, 1555 (MB of 1998, 1593

MB of 1998, 1956 (MB of 1998, 2170

MB of 1998, 1541 (MB of 1998, 1542

MB of 1998, 1554 (MB of 1998, 2005

MB of 1998, 3277 (MB of 1998, 1544

MB of 1998, 1410 (MB of 1998, 1496

MB of 1998 and 2962 (MB) of 1998 are

Is missed. No order as to costs.

Ordered accordingly.