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Judgment
By a common judgment dated 2801 1999, Civil Revisions 1/99,3/99,4/99,5/99 and 7/99 involving identical questions of fact and law were
disposed of as dismissed. Against the Judgment(s) in all fiverevision petition(s), review petitions seeking recall of the orders of dismissal have been
filled on similar rather same set of facts and circumstances. As in all these review petitions identical questions of fact and law are raised, therefore,
they are taken up together.
Dependents of victims of the vehicular accident, were ordered to be paid interim compensation of Rs.50, 000/ each, under section 140 of
Motor Vehicle Act on 09121995 by the Motor Accident claims Tribunal (District and Sessions Judge) Baramulla The New India Assurance Co,
indemnifier, moved the Tribunal for modification of this interim award to the extent of absolving/sparing the Insurance Coy from payment of the
interim award. However, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Baramulla, on 15091998, rejected the review/modification application and allowed
the original interim award dated 09121995 to stand. Against tins order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Baramulla, the New India Assurance
filed revision petition(s) accompanied by application(s) seeking condo nation of delay. The revision petitions) was/were dismissed by the High
Court on 28011999.
3.This dismissal order of 28011999 of revisions and condo nation applications is sought to be reviewed on the following grounds:
4.That the revision petitions were listed during the course of Winter Vacation and were dismissed on 29011999 in absence of the petitioner. The
petitioner could not present himself before the Court as the clerk of the counsel for the petitioner had inadvertently omitted to collect the regular
supplementary cause list from the Registry. The petitioner was thereby afforded no opportunity of hearing while dismissing the revision petitions.
The Court could not have dismissed the revision petitions on merits in absence of the petitioner, as it had to follow the law on the analogy of
dismissal of appeals in absence of the party. His application for condo nation of delay has been dismissed on wrong construction of the dates
regarding payment of stamps and supply of requisite copy by the MACT Baramulla. There is/an error apparent on the face of record regarding
computation of period of limitation which is a ground for review. That the order does not effectively deal with the points involved in the revision and
the MACT being a Court is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, the revisions could not have been dismissed on
this ground, which too is a ground to warrant review of the order. The review petition is prayed to be accepted, as otherwise, serious miscarriage
of justice flows from the dismissal order.
5.The counsel for the review petitioner has canvassed arguments in line with the above submissions and submits that the orders in question may be
recalled and review petitions allowed.
6.The counsel for the respondents submits that the review petition is not competent. There is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, which
provide for review. The provisions of CPC as contained in Order 47 read with Section 114 CPC, cannot be made applicable to this case. The
revision petition has been rightly dismissed after the petitioner failed to avail the opportunity provided by the Court to appear and argue the case.
The revision petition is time barred, even, if the time consumed in getting the copies as per the construction placed thereto by petitioner is
countenanced. Neither the revision nor review is competent in this case.
7.The counsels for the parties are agreed that the motion is only review in contradistinction to restoration motion. In the review proceedings, the
court is to examine the order of dismissal of the revision itself with a view to consider the legality and propriety or otherwise of varying or setting
aside of the order in question on merits. Being so, it may be in place here to mention that the petitioner has filed two other revision petitions,
challenging the rejection of the application of the petitioner on 15091998 by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Baramulla, regarding
modification/review of interim award of Rs.50, 0007 awarded to the dependents of the deceased victims of the vehicular accident against
petitioner Assurance Company. These two revision petitions which involve similar or identical questions of fact(s) and law, are therefore, taken up
for disposal along with these cases. This is so, on consensual submissions of the counsel for the parties.
8.The revision petitions 01/99,03/99,04/99 05/99 and 07/99 were listed before the Court on 210199. On this date the cases were adjourned as
the petitioner and the counsel engaged by petitioner failed to appear. Then the cases were again listed on 271 1999 (after vacations) only after the
cases were shown in the cause list and the name of the counsel was also given. If the counsel or his clerk has omitted to collect the cause list or did
not take the steps to keep himself informed of listing of the case before the Court, the petitioner or his counsel is to blame only himself. Notification
of the case in the cause list is by itself a sufficient notice. It does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner that he has not been afforded an opportunity to
argue the case. The petitioner had sufficient opportunity to appear and argue the case before the Court but failed to seize the opportunity. To seek
review, in contradiction to rehearing of the revision and the condo nation matter, on this ground is impermissible under law.
9.The contention of the counsel that on the analogy of law incorporated in order 41 Rule 17 CPC, the revision could have been at best dismissed
simplicitor for failure of the petitioner to appear, but could not have been dismissed on examination of the grounds on merits set out in the memo
therefore, is not merited. The procedure provided for appeals as contained in order41 of CPC is not applicable to revisional proceedings sought to
be pressed in service in a memo filed thereto in the Court against an interim award passed under section 140 of M. V. Act. For the reasons to
follow, the revision petition is not competent against such an order. Besides, the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, no where provides for any
revision against an award and much less the procedure for appeals under Civil Procedure Code to be followed in any proceedings laid in revision
against an interim award under section 140 of M. V. A. The review cannot exist unless conferred by law. Even under procedural law, the rule of
review is definitive of its limits within which it is permitted by the court.
Even, if the period between 151298 and 30121998, is excluded on the assumption that this time period was taken and consumed to prepare
and to supply certified copy to the petitioner, yet the main revision filed before this Court is beyond time. The period consumed to furnish the
copying charges and the preparation and collection of the copy when excluded, still no sufficient cause is given in the review memo to warrant
review of the order holding in terms that no sufficient cause is made out for condo nation of delay. Though much stress is laid on the question that
the petitioner had deposited the copying charges on 15121998, the copy was ready and signed by the certifying officer only on 30121998 and
thereby the whole period from 15121998 to 301298 merits to be excluded, yet even so, no ground whatsoever, is made out to warrant review of
the order refusing to condone the delay. Even, if the submissions of the counsel are countenanced then at the most period from 151298 to 301298
is excluded. But, still the revision is barred by three days. The petitioner is under legal duty to explain the reasons and make out a sufficient cause
for condo nation of delay, which is not the case here.
11.In the order dated 2811999, the motion seeking condo nation of delay was disposed of in terms as under:
'The reason for seeking condensation) of delay put forth is that though the petitioner knew the order of the Tribunal on the date when it was
pronounced and even was given a copy of the order it took petitioner time to correspond with their Regional and Head Office. It was only after
hearing from the Regional Office on 141298 that certified copy was applied for on 151298, which was obtained on 301298 and the petition, was
filed on 4199. The intervening days were consumed in preparing and filing the condo nation application with revision. In the motion infact apart
from omnibus and generalised pleas of the Regional and Head Offices of being seized of the matter, no explanation is on record to reveal, why so
much of time was taken in preparing and filing the motion. Under the guise of a generalised statement, the delay cannot be condoned when no
explanation and sufficiency of cause or reason are placed on record.
No ground whatsoever is advanced to warrant review of the order. If fact nothing is given in the review petition for seeking condo nation of the
delay except as already stated of laying overemphasis on exclusion of period from 151298 to 30121998, which period when excluded, still leaves
the main revision time barred.
12.The counsel for the petitioner has laid great stress on the question that the order under review has not effectively dealt with, all important
question of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by High Court in the matter of award of interim compensation under section 140 M. V. A, by the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The orders of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. He has
cited AIR 1997 SC: 2951, AIR 19.72 MP: 125 and SU 1989 J&K 225. The counsel submits that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Civil
Court subordinate to the High Court, therefore, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
13.The counsel for the respondents has canvassed that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court,
there fore, High Court cannot invoke the powers of revision against the orders of Claims Tribunal in matters of interlocutory orders in proceedings
under Motor Vehicles Act. He has cited 1993 ACJ: 413, AIR 1985 J&K 26(DB) in support of his contention that revisional powers cannot be
exercised by the High Court in respect of orders including an interim award under Section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act.
14.In Amar Kaur and Anr. Vs. Kulbir Singh and Anr. (SU 1989 J&K 225), it has been held that for purposes of Section 24 of CPC regarding
transfer of cases from one Tribunal to another, the State Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court and High Court
has powers of superintendence and control over ail the courts including the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. In this case, the pronouncements of
the Supreme Court in Bhagwatidevis case (1983 ACJ 123) and Oarshana Devis case (AIR 1979 SC 855) were relied on. In Bhagwat) Devis
case, (supra), the matter arose in the context of suits and proceedings under section 25 of CPC and the Apex Court held that the Accident Claims
Tribunal is a tivif court for purposes of Section 25 of CPC. In Darshana Devis case, (supra), the Apex Court in the context of extending benefit of
order 33 CPC to the proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, held that order 33 CPC applied to Tribunal which has the trappings
of the civil court. Even so in Amar Kaur's case (Supra), the Hon'ble Dr. A. S. Anand, Chief Justice of this Court, (as His Lordship then was)
observed:
There is divergence of Opinion amongst the courts in the country as to whether a claim tribunal can be considered to be a court subordinate to the
High Court, whereas, some of the courts have held in the affirmative, the others have decided in the negative. But to apply Section 24 CPC to the
claims tribunal, it is not necessary to refer to the differing views of the High Courts on the point in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in Bhagwati Devi and others Vs. M/S I. S. Goel and others, reported as 1983 A. C. J. 123, where the Supreme Court referred to its earlier
pronouncement in the State of Haryana Vs. Smt. Darshana Devi and others, AIR 1979 SC 855, which arose out of decision of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court.
15.In AIR 1972MP: 125, it is held that Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110 of M. V. Act is a Court subordinate to the
High Court and therefore, the orders of the Tribunal are revisable under Section 115 of C. P. C. However, in view of the law laid down by this
Court in AIR 1985 J&K 26(DB) and 1993 ACJ 413, the view expressed in AIR 1972 MP 125 (Supra) is, with respect, dissented from.
16.In AIR 1997 SC: 2951, the Supreme Court in the context of adoption by the Haryana and Punjab Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules,
1964, held that the provisions of order 21 Rule 1 CPC, are applicable to deposits made under the award given by the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, in terms of the interpretation of the above Motor Vehicle Rules. It was held that the amount of compensation ordered to be paid to the
victims of accident or the legal heirs of such victims will earn interest on the decretal amount in case the claimant is not informed of such deposit
either by the judgment debtor or by the Court. The provision of Order 21 Rule 1 CPC were invoked and applied to hold the judgment debtor
liable for the claim of interest on the final award in terms of the directions under the award. This case revolves around its own factual axis. It does
not cover in terms the question whether the order on an application seeking the review/clarification of an interim award passed under 140 of M. V.
Act, by claims Tribunal, is at all revisable by the High Court.
17.In abdul Gaffar Gujri'scase, (AIR 1985 J&K: 26, (DB)> Justice M. L. Bhat, (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the court, observed:
Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind that neither the language of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act nor the Rules framed
there under suggest that the Claims Tribunal was constituted as a civil court. In fact it is constituted as an Adminstrative Authority and has no
trappings or attributes of a civil court. It, therefore, follows that the claims Tribunal is not a civil court subordinate to the High Court or subject to
its revisional jurisdiction.
18.It is to be noted that AIR 1972 M. P: 125 (Supra) though taken note of by the D. B. in Abdul Gaffar Gujri's case (Supra), the Division Bench
observed that the case did not lay the law correctly.
19.In New India Assurance Co. Ltd case (1993, ACJ: 413) Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. P. Sethi, as his Lordship then was after analysing the law on
the subject held that an appeal against an interim award under section 92(A) (corresponding to Section 140 of the new Act) was not competent.
Further after referring and relying on the case of Ghulam Rasool Wani (1990 KLJ173) and Executive Engineer's case (revision 104/88) decided
on 31188, the court also held that the Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act is not a civil court and as such^ not amenable to the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court. Besides, it was observed that New India Assurance Coy Ltd. could not be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (corresponding to Section 103 of the State Constitution) or Article 227 of the Federal
Constitution (corresponding to Section 104 of the State Constitution) for the grant of relief against an interim award as prayed for in that petition.
20.It should be seen that in view of the law laid down in the Abdul Gaffar Gujri's case (AIR 1985 J&K 26) by the Division Bench and New India
Assurance Co. Ltd's case (1993 ACJ 413) and Gh. Rasool Wani's case (1990 KLJ 173) revision against an interlocutory order including interim
award under 140 of Claims Tribunal under Motor Vehicles Act would not lie in so far as the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not amenable to
the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
21.While dismissing the revision, this Court in its order dated 28199 observed:
'The compensation awarded in this case on account of death arising from the vehicular accident U/S 140 of Motor Vehicle Act is on the basis of
No fault liability."" Neither the appeal nor a revision is provided under Motor Vehicles Act against such interim award. The provisions of civil
procedure Code cannot be made applicable to this case, as exercise of powers under Section 140 of the M. V. Act, come within the sweep of
exercise of Special Powers in exercise of special jurisdiction under the Act. Under M. V. Act powers can be exercised in appeal or revision only if
appeal or revision is provided by Motor Vehicles act, which is not the case under Motor Vehicles Act. In fact keeping in view the beneficial
purpose behind the enactment of Section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act and placing construction to the provisions which would advance the purpose
underling the enactment in juxtaposition to the specific provision of M. V. Act, it can be said that the Insurance Company is liable for the interim
award, leaving the question of adjustment and working out of equities between the parties to be determined by the Tribunal on enquiry.
In this case infect what is sought to be challenged in revision, is not interim award itself but the order rejecting an application of the Assurance
Co. to modify the interim award passed under section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act on 1591998. Notwithstanding the form of such application,
infect the application is a review petition wherein award of interim compensation awarded by the Tribunal has been sought to be reviewed. This
application has been dismissed and the order of dismissal of this application is sought to be impugned in the revision. There is no provision in the
Motor Vehicles Act where the order rejecting a review petition of an interim award can be challenged in revision. The challenge in revision thrown
to the rejection of the review application by the Tribunal, is still on a weaker wicket than the challenge in revision thrown to an interim award itself.
Obviously High Court cannot exercise such a jurisdiction, as no power for interfering with such order is found in the Motor Vehicle Act. The High
Court cannot be expected in exercise of special jurisdiction under M. V. Act to interfere with the impugned order in proceedings in revision outside
the Motor Vehicles Act. High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction when a revision is not contemplated or provided for by the M. V. Act. In absence
of any provision for revision in the M. V. Act the operation of statutory provision of 140 of Motor Vehicles Act cannot be circumvented to avoid
or delay the payment of awarded interim compensation. The purpose of such welfare provision cannot be allowed to be frustrated. The revision
petition in such circumstances is not maintainable.
23.Seen through the above extracted passage of the impugned order, it is manifest that the revision petition was dismissed as not maintainable after
noticing the relevant provisions of law and facts of the case, which happen to be in conformance with the law laid down by AIR 1985 J&K
26,1993 ACJ 413 and 1990 KLJ, 173 (Supra).
24.Judged thus, the contention that the High Court has not properly exercised the powers in so far as the Claims Tribunal under Motor Vehicle
Act has been held not amenable to the Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is not and cannot be available, as a ground to seek review of the
impugned order. The order is not merited to be interfered with. The order impugned in review considered as above still holds the field. No
miscarriage of justice is caused and nothing has been brought on record to reveal that any injustice is caused to the other side by coming into
existence of the impugned order. The order is not vitiated by any error apparent on the face of record. The order is not also based on mistaken
view of facts of law. No new and important matter or evidence is stated to be discovered to warrant the review. Review as understood in law can
be creature of a statute and has definitive legal parametrical limits. The review rule when applied to this case, it is seen that the review is neither
merited nor would lie in this case. The varying or setting aside the impugned order on merits is not required in the context of review in the totality of
facts and circumstances of the case.
25.For the aforesaid reasons, no sufficient ground is made out for review.
26.The revision on petitions 2/99 and 6/99 with condo nation applications 3/99 and 11/99 can not succeed for the reasons given here before and
also in Revision Petition No.4/99 with CMP 7/99, which involved identical questions of fact and law and stood dismissed on 2811999.
27.In the result, the review petitions and revision petitions with CMP's are dismissed.