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Srinivasan, J.—C.M.P. Nos. 5079, 5081 and 5083 of 1988 are for impleading the Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited as a respondent in
the above three appeals while C.M.P. Nos. 5080, 5082 and 5084 of 1988 are for stay of ail further proceedings pursuant to the awards passed
by the Sub Court, Cuddalore against which the above appeals have been filed. The short facts, relevant for these applications are as
follows:�On the request of the petitioner, the Government of Tamil Nadu initiated proceedings in 1977 under the Land Acquisition Act for
acquiring about 5000 acres of land in about six villages adjacent to Neyveli for the purposes of a second mine and a thermal station. The
notification under S.4 (i) of the Act was published on 11-11-1978. The lands of respondents 2 to 5 were included therein. By awards dated 30-
10-1979, 31-7-1979 and 24-10-1979 the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation of Rs. 17,704.82, Rs. 1,789.65 and Rs. 1675.89 for
the lands involved in the three appeals respectively. Respondents 2 to 5 sought for a reference under S.18 of the Act to the Civil Court for fixing
the compensation. Consequently, L.A.O.P. 395 of 1932, L.A.O.P. 98 of 1983 and L.A.O.P. 391 of 1982 on the file of the Additional
Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore were tried and the compensation was enhanced by Rs. 2,42,815.18, Rs. 12,923.45 and Rs. 55,264.11
respectively. At the request of the petitioner, the Government of Tamil Nadu preferred the above three appeals to this Court challenging the
correctness of the decision of the Additional Subordinate Judge.
The Government applied in C.M.P. Nos. 16629 to 16631 of 1986 for slay of all further proceedings is pursuance of the award passed by the
learned Subordinate Judge. By order dated 25-11-1986 Kader, J. ordered notice to the respondents in the appeals and granted interim stay on
condition that the appellant deposited 1/4th of the enhanced compensation in the trial Court within eight weeks therefrom. The ad interim exparte
order was challenged by the Government in L.P.A. Nos. 25 to 27 of 1987 which were ultimately dismissed on 13-1-1988. In the meanwhile
Kader, J. confirmed his interim order on 28-1-1987 after the respondents entered appearance and were heard. By that order, the respondents in
the appeal were permitted to withdraw the amount deposited by the Government.
The petitioner has filed these petitions on 23-3-1988 claiming that the details of the aforesaid proceedings for stay and the orders thereon came
to be known to them only from a letter dated 19-2-1988 from the first respondent herein. The affidavit filed in support of these petitions states that
84 cases were disposed by the Sub Court, Cuddalore in different batches in 1984-85 and the Government had filed appeals in this Court. It is
further stated that in 46 of those 84 cases, this Court directed the Government to deposit the entire enhanced compensation, that the petitioner
preferred petitions for special leave in the Supreme Court of India and that by ad interim exparte order dated 7-5-1986 the Supreme Court
directed as an interim measure, the petitioner to deposit 25% of the enhanced compensation with liberty to the respondents in those cases to
withdraw the same on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court. The Supreme Court granted stay with reference to the
balance amount. The affidavit proceeds to state that the petitioner ''sincerely hoped that the above pattern would be followed in all subsequent
appeals to be filed by the Government in the remaining cases"".
It is alleged in the affidavit that in these three appeals, the petitioner has to pay the 19 fold enhanced compensation to the tune of five lakhs and if
the amount is withdrawn by the claimants, ''restitution of public funds Will be impossible when and if the appeals succeed in due course''. It is stand
in the affidavit that the Supreme Court has held that in land acquisition proceedings, when a matter of compensation is to be decided by the Court
of first instance or the Appellate Court, the requisitioning body is a necessary and proper party to be impleaded It is further averred that unless the
petitioner is impleaded as a party to the appeals it would not be in a position to place its grievances before the Court and the petitioner is a proper
party to be impleaded. It is also stated that in about 40 appeals, the petitioner has been impleaded as a party.
A common counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 2 to 4 to the effect that the petitioner has no locus standi to implead as a
party to the appeals. According to the counter, O.1, R.10 CPC is not applicable to these proceedings. Reference is made to the writ petitions filed
by the petitioner challenging the award and the dismissal of the petitions for stay filed therein. It is stated that the compensation fixed by the Sub
Court is not excessive and it is based on evidence including that of a geologist and sales manager, who are employees of the petitioner. The
counter proceeds to refer to the Letters Patent Appeals filed by the State against ad interim orders and denies the statement of the petitioner that
the Corporation came to know of the proceedings only in February, 1988. It is stated in the counter that even the L.P.As were filed by the
Government only at the instance of the petitioner and that the order of the Supreme Court in the interlocutory applications will not apply to these
proceedings. According to the counter, it is the State Government which pays the compensation and the petitioner can only assist the Government
but cannot implead as a party to the appeal. It is pointed out that the lands were acquired in 1977 and since then the respondents were left without
any occupation and the petitioner did not keep up its promise to provide jobs to the people affected by the acquisition. It is stated further the it the
petitioner has been making huge profits for about 11 years and at the same time delaying the payment of just compensation to the erstwhile owners
of the lands.
On these pleadings, lengthy arguments were advanced on both sides. Several decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court were cited.
At one stage, I suggested that it would be better if the matter is decided by a Division Bench but learned counsel on both sides insisted on my
hearing it and giving my ruling. Hence, I proceeded with the hearing.
After a deep study of all the rulings cited before me, I am of the view that the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sri Kanyaka
Parameswari Devastanam and Charities by its Secretary v. His Holiness Srila Sri Ambalavana Pandara Sannadhi 93 L.W. 623, will govern the
facts of this case and I am bound by the authority of the same. Even on the first principles, I have to express my respectful concurrence with the
ratio of the said decision.
In that case, an extent of land measuring 2 grounds and 183 sq.ft. together with building, structures, etc., were acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act for the purpose of providing additional accommodation to S.K.P.D. Boys High School run by Sri Kanyaka Parameswari
Devasthanam. Compensation was fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer at Rs. 57,656 and at the instance of the owner of the land a reference
under S.18 of the Act was made to the City Civil Court which enhanced the amount. The claimant was not satisfied with that too and filed an
appeal in this Court and ultimately this Court fixed the compensation at Rs. 1,48,015 along with solatium and interest. Then the Devasthanam filed
applications in this Court to implead itself as a party to the appeal and to set aside the decree, etc. It was contained for the Devasthanam that it
was the person affected by the judgment and that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act did envisage participation in the proceedings by such
persons. The only question before the Bench was whether the Devasthanam had locus standi to apply for being impleaded as party to the appeal.
The Bench considered the entire schema of the Land Acquisition Act and concluded as follows:�
The summary of the provisions of the Act would clearly indicate that there are really only two parties to the reference in the civil court and the
further proceeding that may emanate from it, the two parties being the Collector and the owner of the property. The person for whom the land is
being acquired has no locus standi even to demand a reference under S.18, after the award has been passed and can only appear and adduce
evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation�S.50(2) and the proviso. But for the provisions of S.50(2) the entity for
which the land acquisition is made would not be in a position even to appear and adduce evidence for the determination of the compensation.
Thus, some special rights are conferred by the statute on the body for whose benefit the acquisition is made. When once it is specifically provided
that the rights of the entities for which the acquisition is made are only to appear and adduce evidence in relation to the compensation and does not
extend to demanding reference under S.18, it would be clear that they are not really parties to any proceedings even before the Collector. When
they are not the parties even before the Collector, they cannot seek to intervene in the appeal or after the appeal is disposed of to come forward
with any application as has been done in the present case.
The Bench proceeded to refer to an earlier decision of Rajamannar, C.J. in Kottaiyur Nattar''s Estate case C.R.P. 1235 of 1954, and observed
thus:�
....It is necessary to remember, as pointed out in the judgment above, that the jurisdiction conferred on the civil Court in the first instance and the
appellate Court is a special jurisdiction. They relate only to the determination of the compensation. The parties to the proceedings could only be the
owner of the property and the person who acquired, viz., the Government.
The Bench also referred to a ruling of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sree Mullapudi Venkatarayud, Memorial Medial
Trust, Tanuku Vs. Chirapu Varada Raju and Another, which was approved by a Full Bench of the same Court in The Andhra Pradesh Agricultural
University, Rajendranagar Vs. Mahmoodunnisa Begum and Another, . The Bench quoted in extenso from the judgment of the Full Bench and
expressed its agreement with the enunciation of the legal position and held against the Devasthanam. The Bench also agreed with the view of the
Andhra Pradesh Full Bench that the provisions of O.1. R.10 CPC were not applicable and dissented from the judgment of the Allahabad High
Court in The Khurshed Bagh Co-operative Housing Society, Ltd., Lucknow Vs. Smt. Satya Devi and Others, and of the Punjab High Court in
H.S. and Industries v. State AIR 1972 P&H 59.
On the basis of the ruling of the above Division Bench it has to be held that the petitioner is not entitled to get impleaded in these appeals as a
party. But Mr. U.N.R. Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the ruling of the Bench is not good law as the Supreme Court has
taken a contrary view in several cases and categorically laid down that the person for whose benefit the acquisition is made is a necessary party to
the proceedings for fixation of compensation. On the other hand, Mr. V. Krishnan, learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that
there are decisions of the Supreme Court taking the same view as that of the above Division Bench and when there is a conflict between two
decisions of the Supreme Court I should follow that which states the law more elaborately and accurately. In support of that proposition, he relied
on the judgment of a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Amar Singh Yadav and another v. Shanti Devi and others AIR 1987 Pat. 191. As both
sides have relied on Supreme Court judgments it will be convenient and proper to refer to those decisions in the chronological order.
The earliest ruling of the Supreme Court cited before me is in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel
& Ors. (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 183. In that case, certain lands belonging to the first respondent before the Supreme Court were notified under S.4 of
the Land Acquisition Act by the Government of Bombay and late after States reorganisation, the State of Gujarat issued a notification under S.6 of
the Act as the area was allotted to that State. The purpose of the acquisition was mentioned as ""for School and neighbourhood work"". The validity
of the notifications was challenged by the owner of the land in a writ petition filed by him in the High Court of Gujarat on various grounds. When
the petition was allowed, the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, who was the fourth respondent in that petition, appealed to the
Supreme Court. A preliminary objection was raised against the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the Corporation was not aggrieved
by the order. The Supreme Court upheld that objection and observed a as follows:�
The Municipal Corporation was impleaded as the fourth respondent before the High Court but in relief was claimed against the Municipal
Corporation The property, it is true, was notified for acquisition by the State Government, for the use of the Municipal Corporation after it was
acquired by the Government, but that, in our judgment, did not confer an interest in the Municipal Corporation so as to enable it to tile an appeal
against the order of the High Court allowing the petition.
The question before the Supreme Court was not the same as the one which arises here The proceeding in that case did not arise out of any
reference under S.18 of the Act. The only question raised by the owner of the land related to the validity of the notifications under S.4 and S.6 of
the Act. The view of the Supreme Court was that the authority for whose benefit the acquisition was sought to be made did not have any say when
tin validity of the notifications under the Act was challenged.
A similar question arose before the Supreme Court a decade later in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead)
by LR''s., . The appellant before the Supreme Court was a private company carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles
and tiles and other accessories at village Majas Mogra, Jogeshwari, East Bombay. The Company moved for acquiring additional land for purposes
of the company. A notification was issued under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act which was later followed by a notification under S.6 of the Act.
Ultimately, the acquisition proceedings culminated, in an award which was also published in the State Gazette. When the Government sought to
take possession from the owner of the land, he filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the entire acquisition proceedings on
the ground that the purpose of the acquisition was not a public purpose. A single Judge of the High Court accepted the contention and allowed the
writ petition, thereby quashing the acquisition proceedings. The company filed an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which confirmed the view
of the single Judge and dismissed the appeal mainly on the ground that the company had no locus standi to file appeal before the Bench inasmuch
as it was not a person interested, within the meaning of S.18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. On appeal by Special Leave, the Supreme Court of
India had to consider two questions, one relating to the locus standi of the company to file an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court
and the other relating to the merits. Though the Supreme Court agreed with the view taken by the single Judge of the High Court on the merits of
the case that the purpose for which the acquisition was made was not a public purpose and the entire proceedings were void, it went into the
question of locus standi also and differed from the view taken by the High Court. Once again the question before the Supreme Court was whether
the person for whose benefit the acquisition was being made was a person aggrieved by an order holding that the notifications under the Act were
not valid as the purpose of acquisition was not a public purpose. There is no doubt that the same question had been decided by the Supreme
Court in the earlier case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel & Ors. 1970-1-S.C.W.R. 183. The
only distinction on facts between the two cases was that in the earlier case, the proceedings had not gone upto the stage of award while in the later
case, an award had been passed and the Government was about to take possession from the owner of the land. Unfortunately, the decision of the
Supreme Court in the earlier case was not referred to by the Bench which dealt with the later case. Though a case did not arise from any
proceeding under S.18 of the Act, the Supreme Court considered the question whether the company for whose benefit the acquisition was sought
to be made was ''a person interested'' within the meaning of S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The entire discussion on the question of locus standi
was based on the definition of ""a person interested"". The Supreme Court referred to some earlier cases of High Courts and observed that the
preponderance of judicial opinion was in favour of the view that the definition of ""person interested"" must be liberally construed so as to include a
body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. With
great respect to the learned Judges of the Supreme Court who decided that case, it has to be pointed out that it was not brought to their notice that
the words ''person interested'' in S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act, do not stand atone but they as followed immediately by the words ""who has
not accepted the award"". So, for the purpose of S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is not sufficient if the person is ""a person interested"" but it
must also be ''a person who has not accepted the award''. In the case of the person for whose benefit the acquisition is sought to be made, there is
no question of his not accepting the award passed by the Collector as the proviso to S.50(2) of the Act expressly prevents such a person from
demanding a reference under S.18 of the Act. Thus, in my humble view, an approach to the question of locus standi by merely substituting the
definition of ""a person interested"" found in S.3(b) of the Act for the words ""a person interested"" in S.18 is erroneous in law. It has to be kept in
mind that the ""person interested"" in S.18 has to be one ""who has not accepted the award"". Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter was not brought
to the notice of learned Judges who decided the case of Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., .
The question whether the person for whose benefit an acquisition is sought to be made is a necessary or a proper party to a proceeding in
which the validity of the acquisition is under challenge is entirely different from the question whether such a person is a necessary or proper party in
a proceeding for determination of compensation under the Act. The decision of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs.
Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., is only to the effect that a person for whose benefit the acquisition proceedings were initiated was a
necessary party to the proceeding in which the validity of the acquisition was under challenge though the reasoning of the Supreme Court touched
upon the language of S.18 of the Act and the definition of ''a'' person interested, found in S.3 (b) of the Act. The judgment of the Supreme Court
was delivered on 28-3-1980, about 38 days before the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Sri Kanyika Parameswari Devasthanam
case 93 L.W. 623, referred to earlier. Obviously, the decision of the Supreme Court was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench as it
would not have been reported by that time. The authority of the Division Bench of tins Court is not in any way affected by the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., , as the question before the Supreme Court
did not relate to a proceeding arising out of a reference under S.18 of the Act. In view of the fact that both the judgments of the Supreme Court
referred to above do not relate to a proceeding under S.18 of the Act or an appeal therefrom, it is not necessary for me to consider whether there
is a conflict between the two judgments and if so which of them is to be followed by me. I am of the view that neither of them applies to the present
case.
The next judgment of the Supreme Court is rendered in Mrs. Mohini Suraj Bhan Vs. Vinod Kumar Mital, . That was an order passed rejecting
in limine SLP filed by the Union of India upholding the fixation of market value made by the Civil Judge. While the (sic) Court dismissed the appeal
preferred by the Union of India against the award made by the Civil Judge on the ground that it was not entitled to prefer an appeal, the Supreme
Court observed that the Union of India being the party ultimately liable to pay compensation was clearly interested in the determination of the
amount of compensation payable to tin respondents and was, therefore, entitled the appeal against the award. No doubt, the case before the
Supreme Court arose our of a proceeding under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act. But, there is no discussion whatsoever of the provisions of the
Act or the decisions of the High Courts on that question. That case appears to have gone from Karnataka State. In Karnataka State, there is a
local amendment of S.20 of the Act, where by it is mandatory on the part of the Court to issue notice to the person or author in for whom the
acquisition is made. In the absence of any discussion by the Supreme Court in that judgment, it has to be taken that the judgment of the Supreme
Court was rendered in the context of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended in the State of Karnataka.
Even otherwise, the decision in that case was only with reference to the eligibility of the Union of India for whose benefit the acquisition was
made by the State Government to prefer an appeal against the award when the State Government failed to prefer an appeal, the Union of India,
which was necessarily a person aggrieved by the award was held entitled to prefer an appeal by stepping into the shoes of the State Governments.
That is entirely different from saying that a person for whose benefit the acquisition is made is a necessary party in an appeal preferred by the
acquiring Government. Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be taken as an authority in support of the contention urged by learned
counsel for the petitioner in the present case. Nor can it be deemed to have overruled the Bench decision of this Court.
The next decision of the Supreme Court was rendered in Santosh Kumar and others v. Central Warehousing Corporation and another 99
L.W. 416. In that case, a notification under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act was made for the purpose of constructing a godown for the Central
Warehousing Corporation. A declaration was made under S.6 and possession of the land was also taken by the Government. The Collector
passed an award and references were made under S.18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation. When the references were pending, the
Central Warehousing Corporation, claiming to be aggrieved by the compensation determined by the Collector, sought a reference under S. 18 of
the Act for reducing the amount. The Collector rejected the request on the ground that the Central Warehousing Corporation was barred under
S.50 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. Thereupon, the Corporation filed writ petitions in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging the award.
The High Court set aside the award and itself determined the compensation by a reduced rate. Aggrieved thereby, the erstwhile owners of the land
filed appeals before the Supreme Court after obtaining Special Leave. After considering the provisions of Ss.4. 6, 11, 18, 25 and 50 of the Act in
detail, the Supreme Court upheld the contentions of the appellants and allowed the appeal. It will be advantageous to refer to the following
observations made by the Supreme Court in that judgment:�
In our view there cannot be any possible doubt that the scheme of the Act is that, apart from fraud, corruption or collusion, the amount of
compensation awarded by the Collector under S.11 of the Act may not be questioned in any proceeding either by the Government or by the
Company or Local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made. S.50 (2) and S.25 lead to that inevitable conclusion. Surely what may not
be done under the provisions of the Act may not be permitted to be done by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226. Art. 226 is
not meant to avoid or circumvent the processes of the law and the provisions of the statute. When S.50 (2) expressly bars tire company or local
authority at whose instance the acquisition is made from demanding a reference under S.18 of the Act, notwithstanding that such company or Local
authority may be allowed to adduce evidence before the Collector, and when S.25 expressly prohibits the court from reducing the amount of
compensation while dealing with the reference under S.18, it is clearly not permissible for the company or local authority to invoke the jurisdiction
of the High Court under Art.226 to challenge the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector and to have it reduced.
The Supreme Court relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India 32 Indian Appeals 93, and two earlier
judgments of the Supreme Court itself and observed thus:�
If the Collector making an award was in law making an offer on behalf of the Government, it is difficult to appreciate how the Government or
anyone who could but claim through the Government would be entitled to question the award, apart from fraud, corruption or collusion.
(Underlining mine).
The above observation makes it clear that the person for whose benefit the acquisition is sought to be made is one who could claim only through
the Government.
The Bench distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Karim Allarakha Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, , on the ground
that the decision in that case turned on the express provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, which expressly enabled the State
Government department on whose behalf or the company for which acquisition was being made or any person interested who had not accepted
the award, to make a written application to the Collector for reference. While referring to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Town Improvement Trust, Gwalior Vs. Sahajirao Angre and Another, the Court observed that they were not satisfied that the definition in S.3 (b)
of the Act was capable of the wide interpretation given by the Judges of the High Court. It was also pointed out that the question did not really turn
on the meaning of the expression ''person interested'', but turned on the scheme of the Act and scope of Ss.25 and 50 (2) of the Act. Then the
Supreme Court proceeded to refer to the decision of the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel & others
(1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 183 and relied on the proposition laid down therein. Significantly, the decision of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and
Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., was not brought to the notice of the Bench. Thus, the Supreme Court preferred to
rely on the earlier one of the two apparently conflicting judgments. Whatever that may be this decision of the Supreme Court unequivocally points
out that the question has to be decided on the basis of the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act and the scope of the provisions thereof and not on
the definition of ""a person interested"". Though there is no reference to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Sri Kanyaka
Parameswari Devasthanam and Charities Vs. His Holiness Sri La Sri Ambalavana Pandara Sannadhi Avl. Adheena Kartha Thiruvaduthurai
Adheenam and Another, , the propositions of law laid down by the Supreme Court are the same as those laid down by the Division Bench of this
Court. In view of the elaborate and accurate discussion of the law in this decision of the Supreme Court, I prefer to follow the same as against the
decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Mohini Suraj Bhan Vs. Vinod Kumar Mital, even assuming that the earlier decision is one directly on point.
The last of the Supreme Court decisions is that rendered in City and Industrial Development Corpn. Vs. Hasuram G. Gharat and Others, . The
order of the Supreme Court in that Case is as follows:�
In view of the decision of this Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., , it is not possible to
sustain the view taken by the High Court that the appellant herein had no locus standi to maintain the appeal before the High Court. The judgment
and order of the High Court is accordingly set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court for being restored to file and disposal on
merits....
Here again, the question related to the maintainability of the appeal preferred by the party for whose benefit the acquisition was made. Even that
fact has to be inferred from the reference made to the Himalaya Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. case 93 L.W. 623= 1981 1 M.L.J. 42, as the order
does not set out the facts of the case. It is very unfortunate that the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of City of
Ahmedabad case 1970 (1) S.C.W.R. 183, and the decision in Santosh Kumar and others v. Central Warehousing Corporation and another 99
L.W 446, were not referred to by the Supreme Court. It is also not known from the order passed by the Supreme Court whether the proceeding
arose out of a reference under S.18 of the Act or out of a proceeding in which the validity of the acquisition was challenged as in the case of
Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., in Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad case 1970 (1)
S.C.W.R. 183, in the absence of those facts, this decision of the Supreme Court cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that the
person for whose benefit the acquisition is made is a necessary or proper party to the appeal arising out of a reference under S.18 of the Land
Acquisition Act.
Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the order of Shanmukham, J. dated 25-2-1986 made in Neyveli Lignite Corporation
Ltd. Neyveli represented by its Secretary v. The Special Tahsildar, No. 15. Land Acquisition, Neyveli and another C.M.P. Nos. 1381 to 1388 of
1986 in A.S. Nos. 9, 11 to 14 and 16 to 18 of 1986. Those appeals arise out of awards passed in similar acquisition proceedings for the benefit
of the petitioner herein. The learned Judge held that the petitioner is a necessary party in the appeals and granted the prayer of the petitioner to be
impleaded as respondent in the appeals. Though it appears from the order that lengthy arguments were advanced before the learned Judge on the
question whether the petitioner is a necessary party or not, his attention was not drawn to the judgment of the Division Bench in Kanyaka
Parameswari Devastanam case 93 L.W. 623= 1981-1-M.L.J. 42. The learned Judge had discussed whether there was a conflict between the
decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad case 1970 (1) S.C.W.R. 183 and the later decision of the
Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., . The learned Judge came to the conclusion
that there was no conflict between the two decisions on the ground that the earlier decision related to a pre-acquisition right and the later decision
to a post-acquisition right. Unfortunately, the learned Judge failed to note that even in the earlier decision a declaration had been made under S.6 of
the Act and in both the rises the subject matter of challenge was the validity of the acquisition proceedings themselves. With respect, I do not agree
with the learned Judge as regards the distinction made by him between the two cases of the Supreme Court. However, it is not necessary for me to
discuss the matter further as I have already pointed out that neither of the two decisions of the Supreme Court would apply to the present case. In
my view, the order of Shanmukham, J. is not sustainable inasmuch as it runs counter to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kanyaka
Parameswari Devastanam case 93 L.W. 623= 1981-1 M.L.J. 42.
Learned counsel on both sides referred to some judgments of other High Courts in support of their respective contentions. I am not making
any reference to the same in this judgment as it is not necessary and as I am bound by the judgment of this Court rendered by a Division Bench, I
do not want to burden this judgment by a discussion of the judgments of the other High Courts.
In the course of arguments a reference was made to the decision of another Division Bench of this Court in India Rare Earths Limited v. The
Sub Collector, Land Acquisition Officer etc 99 L.W. 221. In that case, the company for whose benefit the acquisition was made, filed writ
petitions challenging the validity of the award on the ground that no notice was issued to the company by the Court when dealing with the reference
under S. 18 of the Act. The Division Bench upheld the contention of the company, taking the view that the Court ought to have issued a notice
before deciding the reference under S.18 of the Act and the failure to issue a notice vitiated the award and, therefore, quashed the award allowing
the writ petition. Admittedly, there is a reference to a larger Bench as the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench was called in question in
a later case. It is not necessary for me to discuss in detail the reasoning of the Division Bench as the question which was actually decided was not
the same as that arises for my consideration here. But, it has to be pointed out that the Division Bench in that case expressly referred to the
decision of the Division Bench in Kanyaka Parameswari Devastanam case 93 L.W. 623= 1981-1 M.L.J. 42, and accepted the correctness of the
proposition laid down in that case. The Division Bench has in fact relied on the decision in Kanyaka Parameswari Devastanam case 93 L.W. 623,
in support of the reasoning adopted by them in that judgment. The following observations made by the Division Bench in paragraph 14 of the
judgment really support the stand taken by the contesting respondents in this case:
.....Though the petitioner has succeeded in making the State Government file appeals to the High Court against the awards passed by the Sub-
Court the petitioner can only be a passive spectator in the appeal proceedings and it cannot take a direct or active part and seek reduction of the
compensation amount. This is because of the fact that in a reference under S.18 there can only be two parties, viz., the Collector and the claimant
who has raised the objection to the award. The person for whom the land is acquired has no locus standi to demand a reference under S. 18 and
he can only appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The proviso to S.50(2) of the Act makes the
position clear. Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek intervention in the appeal and advance independent arguments to assail the correctness of the
award pissed by the civil Court. This position has been sufficiently pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in Kanyaka Parameswari
Devasthanam v. Ambalavana Sannadhi 93 L.W. 623= 1981-1 M.L.J. 42 and also in Indo Swiss Time v. Umrao AIR 3981 P&H 213 (D.B.).
Thus, it can be said that the view of the Division Bench decision in Kanyaka Parameswari Devasthanam case 93 L.W. 623 = 1981 M.L.J. 42, is
once again reiterated by another Division Bench decision of this Court in Indian Rare Earths case 99 L.W. 221.
In Kanyaka Parameswari Devasthanam Case 93 L.W. 623= 1981 1 M.L.J. 42, the Division Bench has taken the view that Order 1, Rule 10
CPC is excluded by the scheme of the Act and cannot he invoked by the person for whose benefit the acquisition is made. In my view even if
Order 1, Rule 10 CPC is applicable to the proceedings here, viz., the appeals, the petitioner cannot invoke the same. The language of Order 1,
Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is the relevant provision, is very clear. Under that rule, a Court may at any stage of the
proceedings either upon or without the application of either party, order that the name of any person who ought to have been joined or whose
presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions
involved in the suit, be added. The essential requisites are, (1) the person concerned ought to have been joined. (2) the person whose presence
may be necessary and (3) the addition of the party is in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the
questions involved. Under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, the only question to be decided in a proceeding under S.18 of the Act or an
appeal arising therefrom, pertains to the quantum of compensation if the Government through whom the petitioner claims has let in the necessary
evidence before the Court for fixing the compensation, it cannot be said that the presence of the petitioner is necessary in order to enable the Court
effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle the question involved. Unless the petitioner conies with a complaint that the Government
had colluded with the erstwhile owner of the land or there has been fraud in the conduct of the case and thus the available evidence was not placed
before the Court, the petitioner cannot invoke the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10(2) Code of Civil Procedure. Under S.50 of the Land Acquisition
Act, the petitioner could have (sic) evidence before the Court for the purpose of determining the compensation. It is not the case of the petitioner
that the petitioner had no knowledge of the proceedings before the Court. A reading of the affidavit filed in support of the petition on behalf of the
petitioner itself shows that the petitioner had been aware of all the proceedings then and there. Not having utilised the opportunity to let in evidence
before the Court, and not having alleged that there had been fraud or collusion in the conduct of the proceedings the petitioner cannot claim to he a
pair whose presence is necessary in these appeals. The petitioner has not even stated in the affidavit that some additional evidence has to be
produced in the appeal for determines the proper compensation. As seen from the counter affidavit, two of the employees of the petitioner had
given evidence before the Court with regard to the value of the property concerned and one of them is a Geologist and the other a sales manager.
It is apparent from the averments in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that the only purpose for which the petitioner seeks to be impleaded
as party to the appeals is to get over an order passed already in the applications for stay filed by the Government. That is not a purpose for which
the petitioner could be impleaded as a party to the appeals as it has nothing to do with an effectual and complete adjudication of the question
involved in the appeal. Hence, I hold that on the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner is not a necessary or proper party to the above
appeals even if Order I, R.10, CPC is applicable to the acquisition proceedings.
In the result, these petitions�C.M.P. Nos. 5079, 5081, and 5083 of 1938 are dismissed.
Though it is not necessary for me to deal with the applications for stay as I have dismissed the applications for impleading the petitioner as a
party to the appeals, I would like to indicate that even if the petitioner is impleaded as a party to the appeals, the applications for stay are not
sustainable. The petitioner is undoubtedly bound by the order passed against the Government on applications for stay filed by the Government. If
the petitioner is impleaded as a party, he could only seek a review of the orders passed earlier if that is permissible under law. As rightly pointed
out by learned counsel for the contesting respondents, the award is against the Government and the execution proceedings are also against the
Government. The petitioner not being a party to the execution proceedings, cannot seek stay of those proceedings particularly when they are lawful
execution proceedings. The only ground on which the petitioner prays for stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the award is that the Supreme
Court had in similar matters passed an order by which the petitioner was directed to deposit 1/4th of the enhanced compensation and the erstwhile
owners of the lands were permitted to withdraw the same on furnishing security. The order of the Supreme Court was passed originally on
7.5.1986 at the time of admission of the petitions for Special Leave. Without admitting the petitions for Special Leave, the Supreme Court issued
notice and indicated expressly that the only question that would be considered by the Supreme Court related to the settlement of the terms on
which withdrawal of the amounts to be deposited was to be permitted. Pending service of notice, the Supreme Court granted stay of further
proceedings and also directed the petitioner to deposit 25% of the enhanced compensation with the Registrar of the High Court within six weeks
therefrom. Thus, the order passed on 7.5.1986 was an ad interim exparte order without hearing the respondents and even before notice was
issued to them. When the matter came up before the Supreme Court after service of notice on 10-8-1986, the Court adjourned the same and
directed them to be listed after eight weeks permitting the respondents to file their counter affidavits in, the meanwhile. As the matter was not heard
on merits, the Supreme Court continued the interim order until further orders and permitted the respondents to withdraw 25% of the enhanced
compensation on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court. That again is not an order passed after hearing both parties.
The order indicates that it is only an interim arrangement until further orders and that the final orders will be passed after the respondents filed their
counter affidavits and after hearing both parties fully. Therefore, the orders passed by the Supreme Court on 7.5.1986 and 10.8.1986 in matters to
which the present contesting respondents are not parties, cannot be treated as precedents or binding decisions in so far as these proceedings are
concerned.
As stated in the counter affidavit, the erstwhile owners of the land were deprived of their property as early as in 1977. The petitioner has not
admittedly provided jobs to the persons affected by acquisition as promised by them. It is wholly unjust to prevent the erstwhile owners of the land
from enjoying at least one portion of the compensation awarded by insisting on their furnishing security when their properties had been taken away
by the Government in the acquisition proceedings. For a very long time, it has been the practice of this Court to allow one half of the enhanced
compensation to be taken by the claimants without security and the other half on furnishing security. In recent times, the proportion is being varied,
according to circumstances of the case. In the present case, the claimants have been permitted to withdraw only 25% of the compensation. It
cannot be said to be unjust or unreasonable in the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, the petitioner, who has admittedly been aware of all the proceedings from the beginning and who has been keeping himself outside
the proceedings all these years, cannot try to step in at this stage and dislodge the order made on the stay application filed by the Government after
hearing both parties fully. In this particular case, the Government has gone to the extent of obliging the petitioner by filing appeals even against ad
interim exparte orders which conduct came in for condemnation by the Letters Patent Bench, to which I was a party. Thus, viewing from all angles,
there is no justification whatever for granting stay of all further proceedings in favour of the petitioner, even if it is held that the petitioner is a
necessary or proper party to the appeals. In the result, C.M.P. Nos. 5080, 5082 and 5084 of 1988 are also dismissed. The petitioner shall pay
the costs of the contesting respondents in C.M.P. Nos. 5079, 5081 and 5083 of 1988. Counsel''s fee Rs. 250 in each case.