Niagara Hotels and Builders vs Delhi Development Authority and Others

Rekha Sharma, J.—The Petitioner had purchased plot No. 9 at District Centre, Janakpuri in auction from the Delhi Development Authority (in short, called the "DDA"). The lease deed in respect of the same was executed in its favour on January 29, 1989. The Petitioner constructed on the said plot a multi-storey building known as Vishwa Dadan, 9, District Centre, Janakpuri, New Delhi. On March 10, 2006, the lease in favour of the Petitioner was determined on account of alleged violation of certain terms and conditions of the lease deed and the Petitioner was directed to handover the physical possession of the plot together with the super-structure standing thereon. Consequent to the passing of the order dated March 10, 2006, proceedings under the Public Premises Act were initiated against the Petitioner, which are pending before an Estate Officer. The Petitioner has preferred the present writ-petition challenging the order dated March 10, 2006 and praying for a restraint order against the DDA from taking possession of the multi-storey building which was constructed on the plot in question.

Relying upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court dated February 21, 2006 in the case of D.D.A. v. Ambitious Gold Nib Manufacturing in LPA No. 976/2004, the learned Counsel for the DDA has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ-petition. The facts of the case before the Division Bench and the facts of the present case are no different. In the case before the Division Bench also, the lease was determined and pursuant thereto, the eviction proceedings were initiated under the Public Premises Act.

The question that was raised before the Division Bench was, whether it was open to the Respondent to challenge the order determining the lease by way of a writ-petition when the Estate Officer was seized of the matter under the Public Premises Act. The Division Bench declined to entertain the writ-petition. It held as under:

x x x x x x In the present case, it is alleged by the DDA that on account of violations of the terms of the lease deed, the DDA has determined the lease of the writ Petitioner. We are not going into the correctness or otherwise of these allegations of the DDA as that will be decided by the authority under the Public Premises Act but we are certainly of the opinion that it would be pre-mature to entertain such a writ petition at this stage.

It is open to the writ Petitioner to appear before the authority under the Public Premises Act and contend that it had not committed any breach of the terms of the lease deed; that there was no determination of the lease deed, etc. These are matters to be adjudicated by the concerned authority under the Public Premises Act and we would not like to deal with them. Suffice it to say that this is not a fit case to exercise discretion in writ jurisdiction. The allegation of the DDA was that it had determined the lease deed for breach of the conditions of the lease deed and, in our opinion, this allegation gives sufficient jurisdiction to the authority under the Public Premises Act to proceed with the hearing of the matter before it and adjudicate all these questions.

As already noticed above, the facts of the present case are similar to the facts which were before the Division Bench, hence, following the Division Bench, this writ-petition is dismissed. The interim orders stand vacated. However, the Petitioner shall have the liberty to agitate the issues raised in this Court before the Estate Officer.