Nidhi Kesharwani (Ku.) vs State of Chhattisgarh and Others

Satish K. Agnihotri, J.—Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was duly appointed on the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade -II by the appointment order dated 17.06.2005 (Annexure P-3). On the basis of certain complaint, by order dated 06.12.2005 (Annexure P-2) the Director, Panchayat & Scocial Welfare, Raipur, while exercising his power u/s 85(1) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (for short ''the Adhiniyam, 1993"), suspended the execution of the order of appointment, issued by the chief Executive Officer, Zile Panchayat, Janjgir-Champa, on the basis of said order dated 06.12.2005, the chief Executive Officer, passed the impugned order of termination on 12.12.2005 (Annexure P-1) without affording any opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the Chief Executive Officer, is without competence, as he has exceeded his jurisdiction in terminating the services of the petitioner without following due process of law, as prescribed under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997 (for short ''the Rules, 1997").

The Director, exercising his power u/s 85(2) of the Adhiniyam, 1993, suspended the order of appointment issued, may be with the purpose to hold enquiry. The Chief Executive Officer, has no authority or competence to terminate the services on the basis of suspension order passed by the Director.

Learned counsel appearing for the State respondents submits that there is no dispute that the Director exercised his power to suspend the execution order with the purpose to examine the order issued and there after, the order of termination from service can be passed.

Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended there to, it is evident that the Chief Executive Officer has passed the order of termination on the basis of suspension order passed u/s 85(1) by the Director.

Section 85(1) of the Adhiniyam, 1993 reads as under :

Power to suspend execution of orders, etc,- (1) the State Government or the prescribed authority may by an order in writing and for reasons to be stated there in suspend the execution of any resolution passed, order issued, licence or permission granted or prohibit the performance of any act by a Panchayat, if in his opinion,-

(a) such resolution, order licence, permission or act has not been legally passed, issued, granted or authorized.

(b) such resolution, order licence, permission or act is in excess of the powers conferred by this Act or is contrary to any law; or

(c) the execution of such resolution or order, or the continuance in force of such licence or permission or the doing of such act is likely-

(i) to cause loss, waste or misapplication of any money or damage to any property vested in the Panchayat;

(ii) to be prejudicial to the public health, safety or convenience;

(iii) to cause injury or annoyance to the public or any class or body of persons or

(iv) to lead to a breach of peace.

The service condition of Shiksha Karmis are governed by the Rules. 1997 it is well settled principles of law that principle of natural justice must be read into the provisions of law, which provides for termination at any time by one month notice, as prescribed under Rule 10 of the Rules, 1997, in the case on hand, nothing has been done, even one month notice has also not been given.

The removal of a regular employee without affording an opportunity of hearing is unconstitutional, as under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, it is provided that no such person shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. In such cases, where the employee has power to remove the employee from service, in that event also the basic opportunity of hearing must be afforded to the employee. Thus, the impugned order is illegal and cannot be sustained under the provisions of law.

This Court in Roshan Prasad Sidar v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2010 (3) MPHT 8 (CG), observed as under :

It is well settled principle of law that if any order visits with civil consequences, the same, is vitiated. If passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the employee (s). (See S.K. Siddique Vs. Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another, D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., Basudeo Tiwary Vs. Sido Kanhu University and Others, Canara Bank and Others Vs. Shri Debasis Das and Others, Viveka Nand Sethi Vs. Chairman, J and K Bank Ltd. and Others, , Mohd. Sartaj and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, , Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, State of Manipur and Others Vs. Y. Token Singh and Others, , Jaswant Singh Pratap Singh Jadeja v. Rajkot Municipal Corporation & another, (2007)10 SCC 71, Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan Vs. Mehbub Alam Laskar, , and State of Punjab and Others Vs. Constable Avtar Singh (dead) through LRs.,

This Court in Ku. Punam & Others v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, (2008) 2 CGLJ 366, where an identical issue came up for consideration, observed as under :

It is well settled that the purpose of rules of natural justice is not to administer Justice alone but to prevent miscarriage of justice and the principles of natural justice are applicable to the administrative order, if such order affects right of a citizen.

Applying will settled principle of law to the facts of the cases, there is a common thread that the principle of natural justice is not unruly horse. The principles of natural justice are required to be complied with, having regard to the facts situation obtained therein. Thus, the principles of natural justice may not be required to be followed in the cases, where the facts are admitted. Secondly, that it is practically impossible or highly improbable to afford an opportunity of hearing, in the event, of quashing of selection on account of irregularity committed on mass scale, or en masse cancellation. Thirdly, not useful purpose would be served by affording an opportunity of hearing.

Accordingly, the impugned order dated 13.12.2005 (Annexure P-1) is quashed and the writ petition is allowed with all consequential benefits. No order asto costs.