Nihal Kaur and Another vs Hari Chand and Another

Chopra, J.—The only question involved in this second appeal is whether ancestral property in the hands of a son''s widow of a deceased judgment-debtor was liable to attachment and sale in execution of money decree.

Sobha Ram and others got a money decree against the estate of Nidhan Singh in the hands of his sons, Pritam Singh and Sunder Singh. During execution proceedings taken out by the representatives of the decree-holders, Sunder Singh and Mst. Nihal Kaur widow of Pritam Singh took objection to the attachment of the agricultural land in their possession on the ground that it was ancestral in the hands of Nidhan Singh qua his sons. The trial court dismissed the objections and the judgment-debtors went in appeal to the District Judge against that order. The learned District Judge, Sangrur, accepted Sunder Singh''s appeal and released his half share of the land from attachment. The appeal of Mst. Nihal Kaur, however, was dismissed and she has now come in second appeal.

The contention of S. Baldev Singh, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, is that while the widow of the original debtor could have no right to object to the'' attachment on the ground that the land was ancestral the case of his son''s widow depended upon different set of facts, and that she was not debarred from taking up the said objection. More precisely the argument is that since Pritam Singh could take objection to the attachment on the ground that the land was ancestral his widow Mst. Nihal Kaur as his representative acquired the same right and could take objection on similar grounds.

The contention, however, is without any substance. The tenure of a widow is very different from that of a reversioner both in its nature and its origin. The widow''s life tenure originated in her right to maintenance and her right to enjoyment of the-estate is mainly in lieu of the maintenance to which she is entitled. The case of a reversioner, however, stands on a different footing. Nidhan Singh in the present case had no absolute right of alienation in the property which was ancestral in his hands qua his cons. If during his life time he had alienated any part of it his sons had a right to impugn the alienation on the ground that it was not for legal necessity; a right which they derived from the common ancestor. That is the basis on which under the Customary Law of the Punjab it has been maintained that ancestral property which has passed on the reversioners is no longer liable for debts of the original judgment-debtor. Mst. Nihal Kaur had no right to challenge an alienation of the property by Nidhan Singh on similar grounds. The principle of representation cannot be carried as far as to vest in her all the rights that her husband possessed, and cannot give her the right to challenge an alienation made by her father-in-law, It necessarily follows that she cannot take objection to the attachment of the property on the ground that it was ancestral. No other point has been pressed in the appeal. It is, consequently, dismissed with costs.