Nihalkaran vs Ramchandra

V.R. Newaskar, J.—This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters patent is directed against the decision of Krishnan in Civil Second Appeal No. 246 of 1954. It arises out of a suit for ejectment from an agricultural housing of which the Plaintiff-Appellant was Pakka tenant and which he had leased out to the Defendant Mulchand on annual rent of Rs. 32-8-0. The Plaintiff gave notice to the Defendant Mulchand on 31-12-1951 calling upon him to vacate the land by the 30th of June 1952 which he considered as the end of the current agricultural year. The Defendant in answer to the claim for ejectment set up a permanent lease in his favour and also contended that the notice to quit was illegal as the agricultural year ended not on 30 6 1962 but on Akha Teej i.e. in 5-6-1952. During the pendency of the suit Mulchand died and his 3 sons were brought on record as his legal representatives.

The trial Court found against the Defendant on both these points and decreed the Plaintiff''s claim. On appeal the decision was confirmed on 16-11-1954.

Second appeal was preferred by the Defendant''s legal representatives. While this second appeal was pending Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-Lessee Protection Act No. 29 of 1955 was passed. u/s 4 of this Act suits for eviction of the Ryotwari substanta were stayed subject to certain exceptions which were inapplicable in the present case. This Act was later repealed by the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code which came in to force on 2-10-1959, Subsequent to this on 13-6-1960 an application was submitted on behalf of the Appellants seeking permission to raise a

new ground which had become available to them u/s 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Lord Revenue Code. They were permitted to do so. The contention raised by them in this new ground was that they had become occupancy tenants by reason of Section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code they being the persons who at the coming into force of the Code held the suit land as Ryotwari sub-lessees as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwariful-Lessee Protection Act (Act No. 29 of 1955). Krishnan J., who heard the appeal, overruled the contention raised on behalf of the deceased Defendant regarding permanent character of his sub-tenancy and invalidity of notice to quit. However he upheld the contention based on Section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code and held that the Appellants were not liable to be ejected as they had acquired the status of occupancy tenants and the rights of the Plaintiff in the land had come to an end. According to the learned Judge Section 185 conferred rights of occupancy tenants even upon Ryotwari sub-lessees whose tenancy had come to an end before the coming into force of the Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act if at the date of the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code they were physically in the occupation of the land. On this view he allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit but allowed the costs to the Plaintiff-Respondent i.e., the present Appellant. He however granted leave under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, which gave rise to the present appeal.

In this appeal Mr. Bhalerao for the Appellant contended firstly that apart from whatever could have been said in favour of ex-sub-tenant deceased Mulchand had he been alive on the Interpretation put upon Section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code the Respondents who are the sons of the deceased sub-tenant cannot claim the status of occupancy tenants in any case, secondly that on a correct interpretation of the actual wording of Section 185(i)(ii)(b) even deceased Mulchand could not have claimed himself to be and occupancy ejanant by reason of that provision.

As regards the first point it is contended by Mr. Bhatucha for the Respondent that the said ground does not find place in the judgment of the single Judge in appeal and ought, therefore, to be taken not to have been raised before him. That ground, therefore, cannot be urged for the first time in this appeal under Letters Patent. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel upon the decisions in D.N. Sethi v. Dr. Miss. J.D. Sharma, 1960 JLJ 133; AIR 1955 302 (Nagpur) and Ramrao v. Fattechand, AIR 1956 Nag. 241.

It appears to be a settled view of this Court that a point not urged before the single Judge granting leave cannot be raised in the Letters Patent Appeal against his decision. The reasoning is that Judge cannot be said to have granted leave with reference to a point not urged before him. There are decisions notably Narayanan Nair v. Kunhan Mannadiar. AIR 1949 Mad. 127; Ram Sarup v. Ram Chandar, AIR 1949 EP 29 and The Secretary of State v. Sukhdeo, ILR 21 All. 341 (FB), in which it is held that if a point involves a pure question of law or in one relating to jurisdiction or going to the root of the case it can be raised for the first time in Letters Patent Appeal. There is apparent cogency in this reasoning particularly having regard to the wording of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and I should have considered the desirability of examining this question had the matter been rest Integra. But as I see a long trial of decisions taking the view that even a point involving pure question of law, or of jurisdiction or one joint to the root of the case cannot be urged in a Letters Patent Appeal if the same was not raised or urged before the single Judge, who had granted leave, It becomes unnecessary for me to do so. In the Full

Bench case of this Court in AIR 1955 302 (Nagpur) , it was held by the Full Bench consisting of

Hidayatullah C.J., Kaushalendra Rao and Sen. JJ., that ''once a case is decided by single Judge it is his judgment which is the subject-matter of an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent on leave given by him. If a particular topic was not considered fit tar argument before the learned single Judge, or a point was abandoned before him. It is hot right or proper for the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal to allow it to be urged''. They further say that the appeal being by the leave of the Judge, it would be a little incongruous for the Division Bench to hold that a singe Judge considered the case a fit one for appeal on a point never raised before him'' and that ''if this rule is not followed'' there would be confusion and no end to litigation as new points suggested by the ingenuity of counsel would be urged''. In AIR 1948 327 (Nagpur) , a point regarding the competency of a Suit in a civil Court in view of Rule 26 of the Rules under the Co-operative Societies Act was sought to be raised in the Letters Patel Appeal. The Division Bench held that this could not be done. In both these cases no doubt the learned Judge considered the point raised on merits and held the same to be untenable but the observations made therein were clear and emphatic and leave no room for taking any other view. In Ramrao v. Fattechand, AIR 1956 Nag. 241 and D.N. Sethi v. Dr. Miss J.D. Sharma, 1960 JLJ 133, similar view was taken. It has, therefore, to be held that it is not competent in an appeal under, Clause 10 to deal with a point not urged before the single Judge.

Coming next to the point dealt with in the judgment of the Learned single Judge and found against the Appellant we should first examine the terms of Section 185(1)(ii)(b) on the basis of which the Respondents claim to occupancy right is upheld. That provision, omitting immaterial portions of it, is as follows:

Section 185(i)(ii)(b) -Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds-

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(ii) in the Madhya Bharat region-

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(b) any land as Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Projection Act, 1955 (29 of 1955):

shall be called an occupancy tenant and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon an occupancy tenant by or under this Code.

Section 185(3) -Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall apply to a person who at the coming into force of this Code, holds the land from a Bhumiswami who belongs to any one or more of the classes mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 168 .

The classes mentioned in the above mentioned provision in Section 185(3) include a widow and a minor besides seven others.

Material question to be considered with reference to the above provision is whether the person referred to therein must be one whose sub-lease validly subsists on the date of coming into force of the Code and who holds the land in that capacity or he could be one who had been ushered in as a sub lessee by the former Ryotwari lessee and continues to be in actual possession irrespective of the fact whether his sub-lease then subsisted or had come to an end,

According to the learned single Judge''s expression ''Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined...... etc., should be understood as Sub lessee governed by find benefited by that Act.'' In coming to this conclusion the legislative history leading to the enactment of Section 185(i)(ii)(a) and (b) was held to shed considerable light. It was observed:

It is unthinkable that the Legislature should have taken all the trouble of enacting the Protection Act just that upon the enactment of the Code the matter may revert and the sub-lessee might vacate without having received any benefit except of course, the time element as a result of these enactments.

Dealing with the phrase ''holds'' used in the beginning of Section 185 the learned Judge suggests that it means ''is in actual occupation.'' He illustrates his meaning by referring to a case where a sub-lessee has been ejected In execution of a decree but whose appeal is pending. In such a case such a sub-lessee will according to him not receive the benefit of Section 185 of the Code.

It is not disputed that the Respondents who are the sons of the sub-lessee Mulchand are in actual occupation. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the case of a sub lessee who is out of possession but who is prosecuting his appeal to secure back that possession. The only question which remains to be considered is what exactly is signified by the expression ''who.........holds any land as Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in Act No. 29 of 1955''. Is it necessary for claiming the status of an occupancy tenant that a person must be holding the land at the commencement of the Code as a sub lessee whose sublease is lawfully subsisting or even a person whose sub lease bad terminated but who continued to be in actual occupation and received the temporary benefit under Act No. 29 of 1955 of continuing in possession unmolested either by the direct act of the Ryotwari tenant or by means of a proceeding in a Court of law whether it be original, appellate or for execution, is within the scope of the provisions.

For answering this question we may first refer to the actual wording of the material provision. It is as follows:

Section 185(i)(ii)(b) - Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds any land as Ryotwari sub-lessee (i. e., as a person to whom a Pakka tenant of any

Ryotwari land has sublet on sub-lease any part of his Ryotwari land) shall be called an occupancy tenant.

On strict grammatical construction the use of present perfect tense signifies the continuance of the act of subletting and may indicate subsisting sub-tenancy. But since the term sub-lessee has to bear the meaning as would be signified in its definition in the Act No. 29 of 1955 it ought in my opinion to bear such meaning as it would bear for the purposes of that Act. When it is said ''as defined'' in the Act it, necessarily means as defined and understood in the Act i. e., with all its Implication. When a definition is borrowed from an enactment we have not only to look to the actual words but ought to take it as understood in the parent Act. The definition clause In that sense is liable to be construed some what differently than its strict grammatical construction, would signify. It is here that the legislative history of the provision under consideration as also material provision of Act No. 29 of 1955 ought to enter into consideration.

It has long been contemplated that the benefit resulting from cultivation of land subject to his obligation to pay land revenue as assessed must go to the tiller of the soil and those who act as middlemen between the State and the actual cultivator must not be allowed to continue. After the promulgation of the Constitution due to the introduction of the principle of social and economic justice in the preamble of the Constitution and the directive principles of policy as laid down in Chapter VI legislations came to be passed in different States which sought to abolish the middlemen and to confer better rights upon those who actually tilled the land. These legislations included the Zamindari Abolition Act and the Abolition of Jagirs Act. In spite of the abolition of Jagirs and the system of land tenure known as Zamindari some classes of actual tillers of the soil still remained as before. A comprehensive legislation coveting the cases of all these persons was under consideration of the Government. In the meanwhile owing to the trend of legislation there was likelihood of large scale displacement of actual cultivators by those who may not have any interest in cultivation. This was considered to be detrimental to national economy, and involved undue exploitation and social injustice. With a view to stem the tide of such large-scale displacement of those who bad put in their labour in the soil and who continue to have interest in cultivation legislations in their nature temporary came to be passed in the Madhya Bharat region. The first of them was with reference to an Inam-land tenant, sub-tenant or ordinary tenant known as the Madhya Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub-tenants Protection Act No. 32 of 1954. The second was with reference to a Ryotwari sub-lessee. This was known as the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act No. 29 of 1955. It is the person covered by the protection of this latter Act which we have to consider in the present case, For doing this we must first refer to the provisions contained in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act which are material with reference to sub-lessee.

Section 78 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act prohibited the making of a sub-lease by a Pakka tenant after the coming into force of that Act (i.e., after 15-7-1950) subject to the exception contained In Section 74. The term pakka tenant as used in the Act included Ryotwari Pattedar tenant. Section 74 dealt with the case of a widow of a disabled person who by reason of their position was unable to take part in actual cultivation and provided that in her or his case it was open to make a sub-lease which might last during the lifetime of the widow in the former case and for a period of one year after the disability had ceased, Section 75 provided for sub-leases created prior to the coming into force of the Act i. e. before 15-7-1950. According to it such sub-leases were to terminate either on the expiry of the period of sub-lease under an agreement which brought it into being or on the expiry of four years from the coming into force of the Act whichever be less. Section 76 then provided that a sub-lessee, who fails to handover possession to his lessor or his legal heirs after his sub-lease ceases to be in force under Sections 74 and 75 should be regard as a trespasser and u/s 78 a sub-lessee in possession in contravention of Section 73 or 76 of the Act is liable to be ejected in accordance with the provisions of the Act as contained in Section 58 relating to a trespasser.

It is thus clear from these provisions that when the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sublessee Protection Act came to be passed on 8-10-1955 or when it came into force on 26-1-1956 the position of all Ryotwari sub-lessees had become that of mere trespassers and their occupation had become precarious. However due to shift in the land policy In another direction it was decided by this Protection Act to make a stop-gap provision until on an overall appraisal of the situation it was possible to confer better status upon all or some of them. By Section 3 of this Act a bar was created to the ejectment of these sub-1 sees, whose continuance had become precious under the pre-existing law. This bar was to operate during the continuance of that Act which was for a definite duration notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 76 and 78 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act barring exceptions contained in Section 74 of that Act. Section 4 of the Protection Act provided for stay of all suits as well as of execution proceedings for the ejectment of these sub-lessees covered by these protective precisions. These provisions as contained in Sections 3 and 4 clearly indicated the object of the Act to be to stop ejectment of Ryotwari sub-lessees notwithstanding the fact that their occupation had become precarious under the pre-existing Act. The definition of a Ryotwari sub-lessee as given in Section 2(b) of the Act signified a person to whom a pakka tenant of any Ryotwari laud had sub-let on sub-lease any part of the Ryotwari land. By reason of the object of the Act and actual provisions in Sections 3 and 4 the definition clause was comprehensive enough to include those whose tenancy had come to an end. In fact as discussed above contract or no contract the tenancy in the case of all sub-lessees had come to an end by the legal fiction created u/s 76 of the Madhya Bharat land Revenue and Tenancy Act itself.

When, therefore, the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code by Section 185(1)(ii) provided for conferment of status of an occupancy tenant upon a Ryotwari sub-lessee who was in occupation of the land covered by his pre-existing sub-lease when the Code came into force it could not have meant a sub-leassee whose sub-lease was subsisting or had not ended. The whole course of legislative history and the provisions contained in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, the Ryotwari Sub-lessee Protection Act and Section 185(1)(ii) of the Code clearly indicate that this status was intended to be conferred on all persons who were in occupation by reason of their pre-existing status as Ryotwari sublessees subject of course to the exception contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 185 of the Code. It is imposssible to hold in view of what is said above that only existing sub-lessee was meant. If that meaning were accepted the provision in Section 185(1)(ii) would practically apply to nobody and the provision will almost be rendered a dead letter. Although I have held that the point regarding the effect of death of the original sub lessee and the right of his heirs to claim the same status could not be urged in this appeal under Letters patent although it might go to the root of the case yet I may add that prima facie in view of what is discussed above it may appear that as all sub-lessees except those covered by Section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, had become trespassers by legal fiction by the time the Madhya Bharat Act No. 29 of 1955 came to be passed their position was equally precarious as that of their heirs and having regard to the object of the new provision in Section 185(1)(ii) to keep the land to the tiller the term Ryotwari sub-lessee may have been meant to include their heirs as well as the accidental circumstance of the death of an ex-sub-lessee should not have affected the position but it would have been better if the Legislature had cleared any doubt about what it meant.

It, therefore, follows that by reason of the provisions contained in Section 185(i)(ii) of the Code the Defendant had acquired the stains of an occupancy tenant and the right of the Plaintiff in the land had come to an end on the passing of the Code. This subsequent event has been rightly taken into account and the suit was rightly dismissed.

One more point was raised namely that proviso 1 to Section 261 of the Code makes Section 185(1)(ii)(b) inapplicable to the pending cases.

As regards this contention, apart from the consideration that the point cannot be allowed to be urged in this appeal under Letters Patent as the same had not been raised and pressed before the learned single Judge who granted leave in this case, there are weightier reasons for rejecting the same.

Section 261(b) and (d) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, which are material in this connection are as follows:

The enactments. Specified in Schedule it are hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the 4th column thereof Provided that the repeal shall not affect-

(b) Any rights, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any law so repealed or,

(c) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed.

In order that the repeal of a statute mentioned in Schedule II may not affect pending proceeding by reason of what is contained in the Code one of the conditions to be satisfied is that such a proceeding must be in respect of any right or privilege, which might have accrued or any obligation or penalty which might have been incurred under the statute which is repealed by the Code. It, therefore, follows: that if the right or privilege has not accrued or the obligation or penalty has not been incurred under the repealed statute but it is done under the genera! law apart from any of them or if it relates to a date earlier than the date of coming into force of that statute then the proviso to Section 261 will not attach to it and the provisions of the Code will be attracted. But this only saves certain rights etc., and the possible difficulty, in the way of right, privilege, obligation which is accrued or incurred under the statutes repealed by the Code, is not answered unless we hold that the provisions of Section 185 have overriding effect notwithstanding Section 261.

In our opinion it has got that effect. The provisions contained in Section 261 are general and are intended to incorporate the principle generally followed when a stature is repealed by another statute. And that is that the substantive rights and liabilities are not intended to be affected by the change and that the pending proceedings ought to be completed ignoring the new statute. But this principle is always subject to the rule that if a different intention appears they will be affected. It is plain that proviso to Section 261 which deals with repeal and savings is practically the same as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. It is no doubt true that the words in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act "unless different intention appears" are not there in Section 261 but in the absence of anything in Section 261 to indicate to the contrary they can be assumed to be implied. Because the Legislature has to be credited as far as possible with consistency. We cannot assume that the Legislature conferred the right specifically by one hand and took it away by another. We have already considered the intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 185. The Legislators clearly means to confer new right namely "occupancy right" to persons referred to in that section. The legislative history traced above clearly indicates that in the matter of conferment of these new rights the fact that in the case of some of the persons referred to therein the accidental circumstance that a proceeding has already commenced against them is immaterial. This can clearly be seen from one illustration regarding Ryotwari sub-leases. Under the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act all sub-leases except those exempted by Section 74 of that Act came to an end by 15-7-1954. If we are to hold that the provision is not to apply to any right accrued under that statute it will mean that Section 185(1)(ii) will be rendered a dead letter, Similar argument can be seen to exist in other cases also to more or less extent. Moreover the words "every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds," clearly indicate that his position vis-a-vis the land is to be seen with reference to the coming into force of the Act irrespective of the fact whether any proceeding is commenced against him or not. No doubt it will involve the assumption that the tenant or sub-tenant contemplated there includes an ex-tenant or ex-sub-tenant. We have already held that there is clear justification for such an assumption. Thus on brother consideration also the provisions of Section 261 will not render Section 185 inapplicable to pending proceedings. It is In our view specifically retrospective and consequently general rule regarding saving and repeal as contained in Section 261 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code will be inapplicable.

Contention, that first 1 proviso to section 261 makes Section 185(i)(ii)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code in applicable to pending cases, cannot help the Appellant for another reason. If the provisions of the Code, become inapplicable to the pending proceedings by reason of the saving contained in the first proviso then even the repealing clause will not be applicable since the pending proceeding by Clause (d) is to be continued and the right therein has to be enforced as if the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code has not been passed. This would mean that enactments referred to in Section 185(1)(ii) continue to remain In force including the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-Lessee Protection Act, 1955. Plaintiff in such a case cannot ask for a decree for possession but can only say that the action should stand at a stand-still. However the reasons given above apart from this are, in my opinion, conclusive for the purpose of holding that the right conferred u/s 185(1)(ii)(b) is not effected by Section 261 first proviso of the Code.

This appeal, therefore, does not deserve to succeed. It is dismissed. I would however leave the parties to bear their costs of this appeal. Costs upto the stage of second appeal will be governed by the order of Kishnan J., in the second appeal.

P.K. Tare, J.

Having had the advantage of perusing the draft judgment of my learned brother, 1 find myself in agreement with his exposition of Section 185(1)(ii) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. But I would like to add some more reason in support of the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother.

The question involved in the present appeal, as also the connected appeal, namely, Letters Patent Appeal No. 13 of 1961 (Gangabai deceased through legal representative Bhuwansingh Raghunathsingh), the judgment of which is being delivered by us simultaneously, is not as was posed by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, Shri S.R. Joshi in the connected appeal, but whether the word ''subtenant'' in Section 185(1)(ii) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 includes a sub-tenant holding over or a sub-tenant on sufferance. The question of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 being retrospective in the sense of being applicable to pending cases does not at all arise. Consequently, it is not necessary to consider the repeal and saving sections, namely, Sections 261 and 262 of the Act. The other questions raised by Shri Joshi has been rightly disallowed by my learned brother on the ground that it was not so raised before the learned single Judge.

The learned single Judge, as also my learned brother, Newaskar J. has considered the instant question by taking in to consideration the legislative history in the Madhya Bharat region regarding the protection granted to sub-tenants and ordinary tenants of Jagirdari and Inam lands. The review of the legislative history made by my learned brother Newaskar J. is exhaustive and I need not say anything more in that behalf.

But, I may further observe that after the enactment of the new Constitution it was a general policy throughout all the States to eliminate the vested interests in agricultural land by eliminating the landed aristocracy, as also the middle man who has do interest in the actual tilling of the sol. It was from that point of view that the different State Legislatures started enacting local statutes as a preliminary to the abolition of Malguzari,Zamindari or Jagirdari. We find that so far as our State comprising the different regions is concerned, such steps were taken in the old Mahakoshal region of Madhya Pradesh, as also the other regions. The legislative history in the Madhya Bharat region has been succinctly traced out by my learned brother. I may further say that in the Bhopal region also, the Legislature enacted the Bhopal State Sub-tenants'' Protection Act, 1952 (Act No. VII of 1953) and the Bhopal State Sub-tenants (of occupants) Protection Act, 1954 (Act No. I of 1955) as a preliminary to the abolition of the Zamindari and Jagirdari. In the former Madhya Pradesh, which comprised of the Mahakoshal region of the present Madhya Pradesh and the Vidarbha region of the present Bombay State, similar legislation was undertaken by the Legislature, as we find in the form of Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Raiyats and Tenants Act, 1950 (Act No. XVIII of 1950) as also the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. By the former Act, a better status was sought to be conferred on some types of Raiyats and tenants as a preliminary to the abolition of proprietary rights and to protect them from ejectment. The preamble of the said Act was in the following terms:

Whereas it is expedient to provide for payments by Raiyats and tenants with a view to facilitate the abolition of proprietary rights in estates, Mahals and alienated lands and protection from ejectments and for certain other matters connected therewith.

As the vested interests were Intended to be abolished by the Legislature, It was thought necessary to make a stop-gap arrangements by giving added privileges to the actual tillers of the soil, whether they be tenants, sub-tenants or ordinary tenants and to prevent their eviction in the meantime, although their tenure, in whatever capacity, could have been and might have been ended in accordance with the provisions of the law In force then. I find it unnecessary to discuss the provisions of the said Acts exhaustively. But ft is always open to the Court to take judicial notice of the legislative history, if It becomes necessary for the understanding of an enactment.

We find certain protection given to lessees or sub-lessees in the form of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 (Act No. XXIV of 1951). In the said Act, the dead line was a lease given in the agricultural year 1951-52. If that was found to exist, the lessee was to be called a protected lessee per Section 3, and his tenure inspite contract to the contrary, was deemed to be for a minimum period of 5 years, unless it was already In excess of that period. Then the further provisions of the Act placed restrictions on eviction of protected lessees. Therefore, a legal fiction was created, whereby a statutory relationship was created, although there might not have been a contract in that behalf. This creation of statutory relationship of a lessee or a sub-lessee was thought necessary by the Legislature in order to prevent the eviction of those lessees or sub-lessees by the lessors or Jagirdars or Inamdars till the contemplated Madhya Predesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act No. 1 of 1951 became a statute in force. Therefore, the intent of the Legislature in giving protection to lessees and sub-lessees and in conferring on them the status of a statutory lessee or sub-lessee is very clear. The object of interpretation is to advance the purposes of an once tenant and not to defeat it. If the suggestion of the learned Counsel for the Appellant were to be accepted, it would mean that a sub-lessee holding over or on sufferance or a statutory sub-lessee would be denied the benefit of the protection granted by the local enactments and would thus be deprived of the benefits of the further consolidating Acts, such as, the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954 (No. 2 of 1955) which came into force with effect from 1-10-1955, as also the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, which came into force with effect from 2-10-1959. Therefore, I am of opinion that the view of the learned single Judge, Krishnan J., in this behalf was correct and I agree with may learned brother, Newaskar J. that the said interpretation put by Krishnan J. ought to be upheld.

Section 166 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954 (No. 2 of 1955) conferred a similar status on the protected lessees by making them ordinary tenants. A further improvent in their status was made by the present Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. The Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act No. 24 of 1951 was challenged as unconstitutional before a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Bhaurao v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Chandur-Morsi and another, ILR 1954 Nag. 816. The learned Judges constituting the Full Bench repelled all contentions based on Article 19(1)(f) or (g) of the Constitution of India as also on the ground of discrimination that it legislated regarding only a part of the territory of the State.

A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hidayatullah C. J. (as he then was) and Choudhuri J., in Sonabai v. Board of Revenue, 1958 JLJ 549, had to consider the provisions of Section 40 of the C. P. Tenancy Act, 1920. The learned Judges interpreted the said section by taking into consideration the object of this enactment and further adopted a rule of interpretation of statutes by stating that a change or alteration in the law has to be judicially noticed by the Courts in order to decide whether it Is applicable to pending cases. Therefore, if it is permissible for the Court to take judicial notice of any alteration of the law pendent lite, it would in certain circumstances be permissible to the Court to take notice of the development of the law by going into the previous legislative history in order to be able to interpret the provisions of an enactment in the proper light. From this point of view, there can be no doubt that in the present case It is necessary to go into the be previous legislative history.

The view taken by Krishnan J. in the connected case, which has since been published.

To conclude, I am of opinion that the view taken by my learned brother, Newaskar J. in the lucid and exhaustive judgment proposed by him is the only correct view regarding the interpretation of Section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. To adopt any other interpretation would have the result of defeating the provisions of the said section. Therefore, I entirely agree with my learned brother that this appeal, as also the connected appeal deserves to be dismissed. As regards the direction about costs, the same shall be borne as ordered by my learned brother.