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Judgment
15 paragraphs · 1,243 wordsPritpal Singh, J.
The respondent Smt. Padma Rani was married to Ashok Kumar on May 4, 1983. On October 12, 1983, she filed a complaint (Annexure P. 5) under section 4 and 4B of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against her husband, the latter''s parents. a sister and a brother, in the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1 Class, Rajpura, after obtaining the requisite permission from the SubDivisional Magistrate, Rajpura, under Section 8A of the Act (Annexure P.3). The petitioner Nirdosh Kumar, brother of the respondent''s husband Ashok Kumar who has been arrayed as one of the accused in the said complaint has filed this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the complaint (Annexure P. 5) as well as the order of sanction (Annexure P. 3) on the ground that the allegations contained in the complaint do not constitute on offence under section 4 and 4B of the Act.
It is alleged by the respondent in the complaint (Annexure P. 5) that the accused were not satisfied with the expenses incurred by het parents at the time of marriage The accused started compelling her to bring money for purchase of a car. To placate the husband and his relations, the wife''s mother gave one scooter to her husband. However, this did not satisfy the accused who pressed upon Padma Rani to bring Rs. 40,000/ in cash for the purchase of secondhand car. As this demand was not met the accused turned out Padma Rani from her house of June 11, 1983.
It is contended by the learned petitioner''s counsel that it is not even alleged in the complaint (Annexure P. 5) that any dowry was demanded by the accused as consideration'' for marriage at or before the marriage and that the alleged demand is not covered by'' the definition of ''dowry'' as contained in section 2 of of the Act. There is ample merit in this contention. ''Dowry'' has been defined in Section 2 as follows :
2(i) "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the, marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to a marriage or to any other person;
at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the said parties, but does not include dower or mehr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies".
It is apparent from this definition that it is necessary that property or valuable security so as to constitute dowry must he given or demanded as consideration for the marriage. Any demand made by the husband or his family for the first time subsequent to the marriage will not fall within the definition of dowry. It has been so held by this Court in Kuljit Kaur & Ors. v Khem Singh, (1983 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 29) 1983 M.L.J. 118. The Supreme Court while considering the object of the Act and the meaning of the term,dowry as defined in the Act held in L.V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar & Ors. 1983 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 400 (S.C.) 1984 Marriage Law Journal 116 :
"We are of the opinion that having regard to the object of the Act a liberal construction has to be given to the word "dowry" used in Section 4 of the Act to mean that any property or valuable security which if consented to be given on the demand being made would become dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act".
It was further observed :
"We are also of the opinion that the object of S. 4 of the Act is to discourage the very demand for property or valuable security as consideration for a marriage between the parties thereto. Section 4 prohibits the demand for `giving'' property or valuable security which demand, if satisfied, would constitute an offence under S. 3 read with S 2 of the Act".,
It is, therefore. clear from these judgments that any property or valuable security which is either consented to be given on the demand being made or the demand of such property or valuable security itself, as consideration of the marriage, would be considered `dowry'' within the meaning of the Act. In the present case it is not even alleged in the complaint (Annexure P 5) that any demand was made by the accused persons at or before the marriage as consideration for the marriage. The allegation is that after the marriage took place the accused persons felt dissatisfied with the expenses incurred, by the parents of the respondent at the time of the marriage and they started making demands for money to purchase a car. In such circumstances the alleged demand of the accused persons made subsequent to the marriage would not fall within the definition of dowry.
The learned respondent''s counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in L.V. Jadhav''s date (Supra) in support of the contention that even the demand made after the marriage would come within the definition of dowry under the Act. This contention is not correct. In that case it was alleged in the complaint that when the marriage ceremony was in progress the bridegroom and his rather demanded a cash of Rs. 50,000/ from the bride''s father and declared that the latter did not comply with that demand by way of dowry further ceremonies would not be completed. Some respectable persons who were present at that time persuaded the bridgegroom and his father to complete the marriage ceremonies and on their intervention the formalities and the marriage ceremonies were over. After the marriage this demand was reiterated which led to the filing of the complaint by the wife under section 4 of the Act. On these facts the Supreme Court held that the demand having already been made at the time of the marriage its reiteration after the marriage would not make any difference and this demand would still come within the definition of dowry under the Act. It was observed that the demand having been put forward as consideration of marriage, there is no warrant for taking the view that the initial demand would not constitute offence and that an offence would take place only when the demand was made again after the party on whom the demand was made agreed to comply with it. The ratio of the Supreme Court judgment is certainly not that any demand made after the marriage which was not previously made as consideration for marriage, should also be considered dowry within the definition of this term under the Act. As stated earlier, in the instant case no allegation has been made in the complaint (Annexure P. 5) that the demand made by the accused persons after the marriage had been earlier made before or at the time of marriage as consideration for the marriage. Hence the impugned complaint does not make out a prima Facie case against the accused persons under the Act.
For the reasons mentioned above, the present petition is allowed and the complaint (Annexure P. 5) as well as the order of sanction (Annexure P. 3) as also the proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Rajpura, is pursuance of the complaint, are quashed.
