Nirmal Ch. Roy vs Commandant, Manipur Riffles and Others

J.N. Sarma, J.—This Civil Revision arises out of a judgment and order dated 5.2.93 passed by the learned District Judge, Manipur (West) in Execution Case No. 1/93 holding that the Court does not have thejurisdiction to execute the decree. He further ordered that the decree be sent to the Court of District Judge, Manipur (West) for execution of the same. It was ordered by the learned Judge that the decree-holder shall have the right to execute the decree in the said Court in the manner provided by law as well as in the light of the observation made by him in the aforesaid judgment. The execution case though originally filed and proceeded before Addl. District Judge was transferred to District Judge on 3.4.93 and the District Judge passed the impugned order.

Certain facts are necessary to be stated for the disposal of this Revision Petition.

The Petitioner herein as Plaintiff filed originally a suit being O.S. No. 10/86 in the Court of Subordinate Judge at Imphal, Manipur. The case was transferred to the Court of the learned Addl. District Judge No. II at Manipur and there it was registered as Original Suit No. 9/87 and it was subsequently re-numbered as 33/88 and 40/89 and the decree was passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. II at Manipur on 9.3.90. That decree reads as follows:

This suit coming for final disposal on 9th day of March, 1990 before Shri S. Gourachand Singh, Addl. District Judge No. II, Manipur in presence of Sarva Shri L. Nandakumar Singh, M. Manichandra Singh, Advocates for the Plaintiff and Smti. Ch. Bidyamani Devi, Addl. Govt. Advocate for the Defendants and it is ordered and decreed that the Plaintiff is entitled to his arrear of pay and allowances with effect from the month of June 1977 till date of his-re-instatement in his service subject however to the relevant rule operating in this behalf.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court this 9th day of March, 1990.

It may be stated herein that earlier for the whole State of Manipur, there was one District Judge as well as three Addl. District Judges. On 7.2.90 i.e. before this decree was passed, Manipur was divided into two Civil and sessions Divisions and they are as follows:

Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Manipur East. Area of local jurisdiction-Districts of Imphal and Ukhrul. Ordinary place of sitting - Uripok Kangchup Road, Imphal.

Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Manipur West. Areas of local jurisdiction-Districts of Thoubal, Bishnupur Churachandpur, Chandel, Senapati and Tamenglong, Ordinary plane of sitting - Uripok Kangchup Road, Imphal.

On 27-3-90 there was a notification issued by the Registrar (Judicial), Gauhati, High Court at Guwahati whereby certain arrangements were made. By that notification a person was posted as the Addl. District Judge, Manipur West. But it may be born in mind that after manipur was divided into two civil and Sessions Divisions, only thereafter this decree was passed by the Court. This is to be noted as it will have some bearing on the decision to be made in this particular case. Thereafter on 12.11.90, an execution application was filed to execute the decree and that was registered as Execution Case No. 1/90. On 20.2.91, the judgment debtor appeared in the execution case and prayed for time to file an objection. Time was granted. Thereafter on 1.4.91, the judgment-debtor filed objection to the execution petition and in paras 4, 5 and 6 of the objection filed it has been stated as follows:

Regarding the points raised in paragraph Nos. 7 to 10 it is submitted that

i) The impugned Decree cannot be executed as there was no issue on the question of re-enlishment and failure to report for duty after the alleged re-enlishment.

ii) Because of the failure of the D/H to join to his duty, nO cost can be paid by the judgment debtors.

iii) The Chief Secretary and the Commandant 1st Bn, Manipur Rifles cannot be detained to civil imprisonment for an indefinite period and as such the decree is not executable one.

That, as the appeal case is pending in the Gauhati High Court, it is humbly approached to the Hon''ble Court for giving at least 15 days time to J/Ds so that the relevant orders of the Hon''ble Court may be submitted.

That, the detailed calculation about the pay and allowances of the D/H is also not given and such the execution of the decree is not a possible one in the present case.

Though no Section is mentioned in this objection it must be deemed to be objection u/s 47 of Code of Civil Procedure. A bare perusal of the objection filed on 1.4.91, the paras 4, 5 and 6 of which have been quoted above, will show that the present controversy in this Revision Petition was never raised by the judgment-debtor. In that objection the decree-holder filed reply to the written objection on 12.4.91 and on 18.5.91 the Court ordered execution of the decree and direct the judgment-debtor to reinstate the decree-holder to the post of Riflemen and fixed 3rd June, 1991 for submission of compliance report. The judgment-debtor did not file any compliance report and on 3.6.91 and application was filed by the judgment-debtor for examination of the Head clerk of Ist Manipur Rifles for ascertaining the amount for payment in terms of the decree. On 29.6.91 the Court ascertained the amount and directed to pay the same within two months and also directed to submit the compliance report on or before 4.9.92. On 21.9.92 in terms of the order of the Court dated 18.5.91, the judgment-debtor reinstated the decree-holder to the post and 5.11.92 was fixed for payment of arrear as ascertained/calculated by the Court. On 12.1.93 i.e. after almost 2 years of filing the first objection u/s 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment-debtor filed another application praying for return of the execution petition to decree-holder as the learned District Judge, Manipur West is not the Court to pass the decree in question and there was a further prayer for restitution in respect of the part of the decree which has so far been executed as against them. The Decree holder filed objection on 16.1.93 and thereafter, this impugned order was passed. On transfer to his file by the District Judge, Manipur West.

This case again depicts the pitiable state of affairs regarding execution of decree as pointed out by the Privy Council as far back as in 1871. In an appeal form Indian reported in Moore'' Indian Appeal vol. 14 page 605. (The General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga, under the Court of Wards, Appellant v. Maharajah Coomar Pamaput Singh, Respondents) the Privy Council pointed out as follows:

These proceeding certainly illustrate what was said by Mr. Doyne, and what has been often stated before, that the difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a Decree.

It is to be borne in mind that no one hankers after pyrrhic victory. It is the concern of the Court that the decree-holder gets the fruits of the decree. The objection for execution of decree has caused enormous delay/difficulty in executing the decree and the law of execution of decree is made a bad evil. The Court must be careful to execute the decree as early as possible. The Court should not deprive the decree-holder from the fruits of the decree by taking technical approach or should not throwout a decree-holder in the lurch by making tangential approach. This is not justice, but sheer injustice. We should bear in mind that the procedures are the handmade of justice, the procedures caimot be allowed to deprive somebody from getting justice.

I have heard Mr. L. Nandakumar Singh, learned Advocate for Petitioner and Mr. A. Nilamani Singh learned Advocate for Respondents.

Mr. L Nandakumar Singh, learned Advocate for Petitioner contends that this impugned order is absolutely without jurisdiction. He further makes his submission as follows:

(i) that no objection to the execution was taken. The objection was filed on 12-1-93 almost after a lapse of 2 years and this objection cannot be taken up at a subsequent point of time and the judgment-debtor must be deemed to have been waived. He further submits that it is hit by the principle of resjudicata and if not so, at least by the piinciple of estoppel.

(ii) He submits that the decree was passed after Manipur was divided into two civil and sessions Divisions and in view of that matter also, the executing Court where the objection was filed had the jurisdiction to execute the decree.

On the other hand, Mr. A Nilamani Singh, learned Advocate for Respondents submits that the executing Court has no jurisdiction and the question of jurisdiction cannot be decided on the principle of waiver or estoppel. If a Court does not have the jurisdiction the order passed by it shall be deemed to be nullity. That the Court of Addl. District Judge No. II Manipur ceased to exist after 27.3.90 and in view of that matter, the present Distiict Judge Manipur West cannot be deemed to be the successor to Addl. District Judge No. II Manipur. In view of that matter, the Court does not have the jurisdiction to execute the decree.

The learned Advocate for the Petitioner relies on the following decisions in support of his contention-

Merla Ramanna Vs. Nallaparaju and Others, He relies on para 13 of the judgment. In order to appreciated the law laid down by the Supreme Court, let us quote that decision from last part of para 12 and first part of para 13.

12....

And it is settled law that the Court which actually passed the decree does not lose its jurisdiction to execute it, by reason of the subject-matter there of being transferred subsequently to the jurisdiction of another Court. Vide-''Seeni Nandan v. Muthuswamy Pillai AIR 1920 Mad 427 (FR)(P)- Masrab Khan Vs. Debnath Mali alias Abhu Mali and Others, and Jagannath v. Ichaharam AIR 1925 Bom 414 But does it follow from this that the District Court East Godabari has no jurisdiction to entertain the execution application in respect of the decree in O.S. No. 25 of 1927 passed by the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Kakinanda?

There is a long course of decision in the High Court of Calcutta that when jurisdiction over the subject matter of a decree is transferred to another Court, that Court is also competent to entertain an application for execution of the decree vide ''Latchman v. Maddan Mohun'' 6 Cal 513 ''Jahar v. Kamini Devi 28 Cal 238 and Udit Narain v. Mathura Prasad'' 35 Cal 974 But in ''Ramier v. Muthukrishan Ayyar AIR 1932 Mad 418 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has taken a different view, and held hat in the absence of an order of transfer by the Court which passed the decree, that Court alone can entertain and application for execution and not the Court to whose jurisdiction the subject matter has been transferred.

This view is supported by the decision in Masrab Khan Vs. Debnath Mali alias Abhu Mali and Others, It is not necessary in this case to decide which of these two views is correct, because even assuming that the opinion expressed in-''Ramier v. Muthukrishan Ayyar'' AIR 1932 Mad 418 is Correct, the present case is governed by the principle laid down in Venkamamidi Balakrishnayya Vs. Nannapaneni Linga Rao,

It was held therein that the Court to whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the decree is transferred acquires inherent jurisdiction over the same reason of such transfer, and that if it entertains an execution application with reference thereto, it would at the worst be an irregular assumption of jurisdiction and not a total absence of it, and if objection to it is not taken at earliest opportunity, it must be deemed to have been waived, and can not be raised at any later stage of the proceedings.

In that particular case, the Supreme Court has laid down that if an objection regarding assumption of jurisdiction is not taken at the earliest opportunity, it must be deemed to have been waived and cannot be raised at any later stage of the proceedings. That is what has happened in this case in hand. As indicated above, in the instant case also, that objection was never taken at the earliest point of time, but it was taken almost after 2 years.

2 Seth Hiralal Patni Vs. Sri Kali Nath, There the Supreme Court considered Sections 21, 38 and 47 of Code of Civil Procedure. There in that particular case, a case was filed on the original side of Bombay High Court and admittedly the original side of Bombay High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. There also the objection was lot taken regarding lack of jurisdiction at the earliest point of time and that objection was raised only at the later stage of execution on the ground that the decree passed by the original side of Bombay High Court was a nullity. That was turned down by the Supreme Court holding that consent or waiver can cure defeat of jurisdiction but cannot sure inherent lack of jurisdiction. In this particular case, it is a ontended by Mr. L. Nandakumar Singh, earned Advocate for Petitioner that it is not a case of inherent lack of Jurisdiction. The Court had the jurisdiction and the parties participated it and thereafter only after almost 2 years, that objection was taken. The Supreme Court laid down the law as follows:

It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a Court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a Court to try a case. Competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection to the local jurisdiction of a Court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactment like Section 21 of the Code of civil Procedure.

In this particular case also, the objection which has been raised by the judgment-debtor regarding territorial jurisdiction of the Court to execute the decree has no legs to stand upon inasmuch as the decree was passed against the State of Manipur and the question of absence of property within the local jurisdiction of that particular Court does not arise.

Hamir Singh Vs. Bhawani Shankar, That was a case where the Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court considered Sections 37, 38 and 39 of Code of Civil Procedure. There a decree was granted by the learned District Judge, Jaipur. There was a transferred of jurisdiction of the Court. Execution application was filed in Court to which local area was transferred. The Rajasthan High Court held that the executing Court could entertain execution application without an order transferred. The Rajasthan High Court in paras 8 and 9 of judgment held as follows:

It is settled law that the Court which actually passed the decree does not lose its jurisdiction to execute it, by reasons of the subject matter there of being transferred subsequently to the jurisdiction of another Court. However, having regard to the object and purpose of Sections 37 and 39 and construing Section 37 and 38 according to the language used therein, the section empowers the decree-holder to file an execution application either to the Court that actually passed the decree or to the Court than can effectively execute it and in the later case, it is not necessary to comply with the provisions of Section 39 of the Code. The Court to whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the decree is transferred acquires inherent jurisdiction over the same by reason of the transfer and, if it entertains the application with reference thereto, it would be the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. In Mehar Singh and Another Vs. Kasturi Ram and Others, the Full bench of Punjab High Court had an occasion to consider this question. The opinion of the Full Bench as expressed to be found at p 397 of the report, is:

Section 37 and 38 when constructed according to the language used therein empower the decree-holder to file an execution application either to the Court that actually passed the decree or to the Court that can efifectively execute it and in the latter case it is not necessary to comply with the provisions of Section 39 of the Code.

I would here refer to the decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in (1901) 28 Cal 238 , where in the learned Judge had an occasion to consider the provision of Section 649 of the CPC (Act XIV of 1882), which corresponds to Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which governs the present case. The Calcutta decision has taken the view that the provisions of Section 649 of the CPC are permissive and that if, after a Court has passed a decree, the local jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit is transferred by an order of the local Government to some other Court, the application for execution of the decree may be made either to the Court which passed the decree or to the Court to which the local jurisdiction has been transferred. The view taken by the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court is in consonance with the view expressesd in this Calcutta case as well as with the views expressed in (1881) ILR 6 Cal 513, (1908) ILR 35 Cal 974 and Sreenath Chakravarti and Others Vs. Priyanath Bandopadhya and Others, I am in respectful agreement with this Punjab and Calcutta views.

It is settled law that the Court which passed the decree does not lose its jurisdiction to execute it, by reason of the subject matter thereof being transferred subsequently to the jurisdiction of another Court. However, having regard to 39 and construing Section 37 and 38 according to the language used therein my opinion, the sections empowers the decree-holder to file an execution application either to the Court that actually passed the decree or to the Court that an efifectively execute it and in the latter case it is not necessary to comply with the provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The Court to whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the decree is transferred acquires inherent jurisdiction over the same by reason of transfer and, in my opinion, if it entertain the application with reference thereto, it would be the proper exercise of its jurisdiction." Thus the Punjab High Court was of the view that after a decree for possession of properly and sense profits has been passed, the local area, in which the property is situated, is transferred to a different Court, it is open to the decree-holder to apply for execution of the decree in the latter Court, to which the local area has been transferred and the Court can directly entertain an applicadon for execution without an order of transfer by the Court which had in fact passed the decree.

In my view, the above authorities clearly support the case of the decree-holder and the view taken by the lower Court is perfectly justified and in consonance with law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court and the various High Courts. The transfer of a local area from where the decree originated in territoria jurisdiction of any other Court would automatically give jurisdiction to the Court to which that area has been transferred without any necessity of obtaining an order of transfer of the decree.

AIR 1988 Kar 44 (Smti. Laxmi Nagappa Hegde v. The Karnataka Bank Ltd. Sirsi and Ors.) There also a Single Judge of Karataka High Court considered Sections 37, 38 and 39 of CPC as amended. There the Karataka High Court pointed out that the explanation "the Court which passed the decree" in Section 37 includes Court which actually passed the decree and Court newly established having jurisdiction over part of territory also can execute the decree without transfer of decree to it.

Prem Lata Agarwal Vs. Lakshman Prasad Gupta and Others, That is a case regarding applicability of principle of res judicata to execution proceeding. The Supreme Court pointed out that the principle of res judicata applies to execution proceeding. In that particular case, the judgment-debtor earlier did not raise any objection as to limitation in regard to execution of decree but asked for setting aside sale on basis of revival of execution proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the judgment-debtor was barred by principle of res-judicata from questioning order reviving execution proceedings.

Relying on this decision, Mr. L Nandakumar Singh, learned Advocate submits that in the instant case also, the judgment-debtor cannot raise this question at the later stage of proceedings as it will be barred by the principle of res-judicata and if not so, at least by the principle of estoppel and waiver.

On the other hand, Mr. A Nilamani Singh, learned Advocate for Respondents relied on the following decisions:

Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others, where the Supreme Court has pointed out that it is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and whenever his sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.

As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the lack of jurisdiction must be inherent in order to be a nullity. As indicated above, in this case in hand, I do not find that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the execution, Court. So, this case does not help the Respondents.

Raj Rajendra Sardar Maloji Marsingh Rao Shitole Vs. Sri Shankar Saran and Others, That also was a case where a decree was passed by the Court at Gwalior and before April, 1951 the CPC did not apply to the Court at Gwalior, but in spite of it the decree was transferred by the Gwalior Court to Allahabad High Court and the Allahabad High Court wanted to execute the decree. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Court which made an order of transfer on 14-9-51 was not the Court which passed the decree within the meaning of Section 39 of CPC and therefore the Allahabad High Court had no power u/s 38 of CPC to execute the decree as there was no valid transfer of it which passed the decree. That case does not help the Respondents as the facts of that case and facts of the present case are different altogether.

AIR 1947 Mad 347 (Vasireddi Srimanthu v. Devabhaktuni Venkatappayya and Ors.). This is a Division Bench where the Division Bench pointed out as follows:

Section 39 is clear and unambiguous in its meaning and effect a Court passing a decree must have territorial jurisdiction in respect of property against which it can order execution; it has not got that jurisdiction it cannot order execution and must send the decree for that purpose to the Court competent to do so. Section 42 confers like powers in execution upon a transferee Court and it will follow, such Court is subject to the same limitation as the Court which passed the decree.

To this rule there are two exceptions: (a) a Court which has jurisdiction u/s 17 to entertain a suit in respect of immovable property situate within the jurisdiction of different Courts has also jurisdiction to execute the decree against the outlying properties in respect of which it can pass the decree; (b) under Order 21, Rule 3 where immovable property forming one estate is situate within the local limits of the jurisdiction of two or more Courts, any one of such Courts may attach and sell the entire estate.

When a Court has no jurisdiction, no agreement or act of party can confer jurisdiction which it does not possess. Section 21 which refers to objections as to the place of ''suing'' will not apply to an execution petition as the presentation of an execution petition is not ''suing''. Moreover, Section 21 does not cover an objection going to the nullity of an order on the ground of want of jurisdiction.

Where, therefore, a Court to which a decree is transferred for execution ceases to have jurisdiction over the property owing to the change in its territorial jurisdiction and the property is sold by it without any objection by the judgment-debtor, the auction-purchaser geb no title to the property and another execution creditor or the judgment-debtor who seeks to execute his decree against the same property is not precluded from asserting the want of jurisdiction in the transferee Court to sell the property.

In this particular case, the could held that the Court passing the decree must have the territorial jurisdiction in respect of the property against which it can order execution and if it has not got that jurisdiction, it cannot order execution and must send the decree for that purpose to the Court competent to do so.

As indicated above, in the case in hand, the decree was passed against the State of Manipur and within the territory of the State of Manipur, all the Courts will have the jurisdiction to exercise the powers to execution proceedings in respect of the properties belonging to the State of Manipur and it is not the case of the judgment-debtor that within the territorial jurisdiction of the executing Court the property is not in existence and decree cannot be effectively executed. So, the position of the case in that case is different from that of the present case in hand.

There reliance was place in AIR 1932 Mad 418 (F.B) and that case was noted in that judgment reported in Merla Ramanna Vs. Nallaparaju and Others, and the Supreme Court did not approve that decision. In another part of the judgment reliance is placed wherein it has been stated as follows:

When a Court has no jurisdiction to agreement or act of a party can confer no jurisdiction which it does not possess. In 42 Mad 813 it was pointed out by the Judicial Committee at page 820 of the report that Section 21 does not cover an objection going to the nullity of an order on the ground of want of jurisdiction. In 43 Mad 135 after referring to this decision of their lordships of the Privy Council Seshagiri Aiyar, J. Observed at page 140 of the report, in the case, that Section 21 did not bind in terms persons like execution creditors.

So, though it is stated that the Privy Council pointed out that Section 21 of CPC does not cover an objection going to the nullity of an order on the ground of want of jurisdiction. But the decision of the Privy Council was not placed before me, but going through the judgment of the Madras High Court I do not find that it helps in any way the learned Advocate for respondent with regard to the controversy in the present matter.

4 Saryug Barhi Vs. Devendar Mahton and Others, There the single Bench of Patna High Court held that the Court of first instance which passed the decree is abolished after passing the decree, the execution of decree in another Court of equal jurisdiction is competent. This case instead of helping ande learned Advocate for Respondents, rather helps the Petitioner because there is no dispute that the Court of learned District Judge, Manipur West has the equal jurisdiction with the Court which passed the decree save and except the territorial jurisdiction and that objection regarding territorial jurisdiction as indicated above was not taken up at the earliest point of time as required to be done as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Merla Ramanna Vs. Nallaparaju and Others, and that it must be deemed to have been waived, a faint argument has been advanced by the learned Advocate for Respondents that the decree itself is nullity on the ground that the decree amounts to enforcement of a contract of personal service and it is barred by Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. This argument is to be stated only to be rejected in view of the settled position of law that in the case of Govt. Servant as in the present case the civil Court can always pass a decree for enforcement of the contract of service. And that has been decided by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. In case of three categories of person a decree regarding enforcement of contract of service can be passed:

(i) Govt. employees having protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India.

(ii) Employees of Statutory Bodies whose terms of employment governed by statutory rules.

(iii) Employees of Industrial concern but in case of these employees, the enforcement of contract of service must be made by the Industrial Tribunal.

The scope of Section 37 of the CPC a came up for consideration before the different High Courts. The Court of first instance is deemed to pass the decree and is entitled to order execution of the decree, this section explains the terms "Court of first instance" and "Court which passed the decree". On the question whether the Court which passed the decree does not lose it jurisdiction to entertain execution petition not withstanding the fact that its pecuniary jurisdiction is altered there was some divergence of option among the various High Court. Almost all the High Court, namely, the High Courts of Assam Allahabad, Calcutta, O(sic) formly held that such jurisdiction is not lost despite the alteration in pecuniary jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction. The Courts held that the Court of first instance does not cease to exist merely because of change in jurisdiction. A.P. High Court, Mysore High Court, Gujrat High Court and Delhi High Court held when the subject matter of one Court has been transferred to the jurisdiction another Court, the latter Court can execute the decree.

The conflict has been set at rest by the inclusion of an Explanation to Section 37 by the CPC (Am.) Act 1976 (Act 104 of 1976) which has given efifect to the view expressed by the former set of High Courts. This explanation has been brought into force with effect from February 1, 1977 vide notification No. GSR 15(E) dated 14-1-1977) and is retrospective in operation. This explanation confirms the position of law stated by the Supreme Court. Thus when decree is passed by one Court but later the (sic) territorial jurisdiction of the said Court is transferred to some other Court, the latter Court also can entertain an application for execution without an order of transfer of the execution case. In view of the explanation to Section 37 as also in view of Sections 38 and 39, there would be two Courts now which can be said to have passed the decree, that is, one which actually and factually passed the decree and the second one which is newly established for a portion of the territory over which also the Court that actually passed the decree had originally the jurisdiction. The Court that actually passed the decree and the new Court established for a portion of the territory would both be the Courts which would come within the ambit of the phrase "Court which passed the decree."

In the instant case, the decree was passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Manipur after the State of Manipur was bifurcated to two divisions. So even after bifurcation, the learned Addl. District Judge, Manipur West will be deemed to be the Court passing the decree and it cannot be a(sic)ed that the Court of Addl. District Judge, Manipur ceased to exist. There was only change of territorial jurisdiction, but that will not take away the power of the learned Addl. District Judge, Manipur West or District Judge, Manipur West to execute the decree earlier Passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Manipur. So, the contention that the learned Addl. District Judge, Manipur or District Judge, Manipur West cannot execute the decree on the ground of territorial jurisdiction cannot be accepted at all.

That being the position, this Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned judgment passed by the learned District Judge, Manipur West shall stand quashed and the matter shall now go back to the Court of learned District Judge, Manipur West to execute the decree in accordance with law as early as possible.