High CourtsSingle Bench

Nirmal Jit Singh and others vs Datinder Singh

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 31 May 1988 · Citation: (1988) 05 P&H CK 0027

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S. Sodhi, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 — Section 15(1)(b)
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Regular Second Appeal No. 2821 of 1985
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Judgment

4 paragraphs · 325 words

S.S. Sodhi, J.—The appeal here arises in a pre-emption matter.

2.

On June 21, 1980, the land in suit was sold by Mohan Singh to Nirmaljit Singh and Paramjit Singh for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-. This sale was sought to be pre-empted by Datinder Singh claiming to be the son of the vendor. The right of pre-emption on the ground of relationship no longer survives in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Atam Parkash v. State of Haryana and others (1986-1) 89 P.L.R. 329.

3.

Faced with this situation, counsel for the respondent adverted to the plea put-forth by the pre-emptor that the land sold was ancestral property and the plaintiff-pre-emptor was thus not bound by the sale. In deciding this issue, the lower appellate Court returned the finding that the land in suit was not ancestral. Counsel for the respondent sought to contend, however, that it stood established from the material on record that the plaintiff pre-emptor was, at any rate, a co-sharer of the vendor. It will be seen that no such plea had been raised before the courts below nor had pre-emption ever been sought on this ground. Further, the latter judgment of the Supreme Court in Jagdish and others v. Nathi Mal Kejriwal and others AIR 1987 S.C. 69, provides a complete answer to this plea, wherein, it was held that "the expression ''other co-sharers'' in clause ''Fourthly'' of Section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre emption Act, 1913 refers to only such co-sharer as do not fall under clause ''First'' or ''Secondly'' or Thirdly "thereof". In other words, the son of the vendor cannot claim a right of pre-emption on the ground of being a co-sharer.

4.

Such thus being the settled position of law, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court cannot be sustained and is accordingly hereby set aside. This appeal is thus accepted. There will however, be no order as to costs.