Nizam Khan vs Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation and Another

Narasinga Rao, J.—This revision petition u/s 115, CPC is directed against the order of the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, whereby he refused to set aside an exparte order dated 6-12-1977.

The revision petition was admitted subject to maintainability. The Respondent has raised an initial objection that the revision petition is not maintainable u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act is not a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court. It was, on the other hand, contended that the Commissioner appointed under the Act has the powers of sic. a civil court and a Petitioner has a right of appeal against the orders of the Commissioner to the High Court and therefore the Commissioner acts as Civil Court subordinate to the High Court and thus the revision petition is maintainable.

It is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the CPC as well as the Workmen''s Compensation Act in order to appreciate these contentions.

Section 115 of the CPC reads as follows:

Revision:? (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

Section 20 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act gives power to the State Government to appoint Commissioners by notification for any area as may be specified in the said notification. Section 23 of the said Act reads as follows:

The Commissioner shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and material objects and the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and of Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

Section 30 of the Act provides for appeals in the following cases from the orders of the Commissioner and it reads as follows.

Appeals (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:

(a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for lumpsum

(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty u/s 4-A;

(b) an order refusing to all redemption of a half-monthly payment;

(c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant;

(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 12; or

(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions:

xx xx .

The order of the Commissioner which is now sought to be revised does not fall under any of the above categories which provide an appeal to the High Court. All that the above provision lays down is that certain orders of the Commissioner are appealable to the High Court.

The point for consideration is whether in view of Sections 23 and 30 of the Act, the Commissioner can be said to be a Civil Court and a Court subordinate to the High Court. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that in view of Section 23 the Commissioner has all the powers of a Civil Court and that he adjudicates civil rights of parties and that the orders passed by the Commissioner are not mere administrative orders. Therefore, the proceedings before the Commissioner are quasi-judicial in nature and in as much as appeals are provided to the High Court against the orders of the said authority the Commissioner functions as a Civil Court and as a subordinate court to the High Court. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied upon the following rulings: In AIR 1938 855 (Lahore) it is held that a Commissioner appointed under the Workmen''s Compensation Act and adjudicating a claim under the Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, CPC or Section 44 of the Punjab Courts Act and a petition for revision lies under it, provided all the necessary conditions are present.

In Mt. Dirji Vs. Smt. Goalin, , it is held that a court over which the High Court has appellate jurisdiction is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and that the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, being subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court is a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure.

The Bombay High Court in a ruling reported in Mohanlal Prabhuram Vs. Fine Knitting Mills Co. Ltd., also held that the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court and a revision lies to the High Court from his order. This ruling also proceeded on the ground that because appeals to the High Court are provided against certain orders of the Commissioner and is thus subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court the Commissioner is a subordinate Court and therefore a revision from his order lies to the High Court.

In addition to the above rulings, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that since the Commissioner adjudicates civil claims and not merely passes administrative orders, he can be considered to be a Civil Court. On the analogy of certain other laws or enactments, this contention is sought to be pressed. In Rajah of Venkatagiri Vs. Shaik Mahaboob Saheb and Others, , a case arising under the Madras Agriculturists'' Relief Act, as against the order of a District Collector setting aside the order of the Sub-Collector passed u/s 15(4), it was held that a revision lies to the High Court u/s 115 Code of Civil Procedure. It was also held that the proceedings before the collector and Sub Collector were civil proceedings and therefore their courts are Civil Courts for purposes of Section 3 of the CPC and thus subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 115 CPC and that all Courts including Revenue Courts are in the hierarchy of Civil Courts of which the High Court forms the apex.

In T.V. Subba Rao Vs. T. Koteswara Rao, a single Judge of this Court held that a Collector acting u/s 13 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act is charged with the duty of deciding disputes of civil nature and therefore he is a Civil Court within the meaning of Section 3 of the CPC and therefore subordinate to the High Court and consequently Section 115, CPC applies.

In P. Venkata Somaraju and Others Vs. Principal Munsif-Magistrate, Bhimavaram, West Godavari Dist. and Others, another single Judge of this High Court held that the District Munsif exercising the powers under the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act, is not a persona designata but a subordinate court within the meaning of Section 115 CPC and thus his orders are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction.

It was, on the other hand, contended by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that merely because a Tribunal or Authority is conferred with the powers of a Civil Court in some respects either of recording a evidence or for compelling the production of documents or for certain other limited purposes, the said authority cannot be a Civil Court. It is only a Tribunal which adjudicate civil rights of parties and is thus charged with quasi-judicial fuctions and it cannot, therefore, be said to be a Civil Court and much less a subordinate Court.

Section 3 of the CPC defines subordination of Courts and it reads as follows:

For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court, and every court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court.

Therefore, in order to be a subordinate court, it must be a Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of District Court. The point that arises for consideration is, whether the Commissioner is a court at all ? It is true that certain appeals are provided against the orders of the Commissioner to the High Court. Needless to say that the Commissioner adjudicates civil disputes between the parties. It may be a civil proceeding and the orders passed by him are not merely administrative orders, but quasi-judicial orders. The question, therefore, is whether having regard to the nature of the proceedings and the orders passed by him in Civil disputes, can he be characterised as a Civil Court ? Tribunals like Accidents Claims Tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act, which also decide civil rights between subjects and subjects and which perform quasi-judicial functions are held to be not courts, much less subordinate Courts to the High Court. In Branch Manager, B.I.G. Ins. v. Chanbi 1968 A.C.J. 322, it is held that a Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act is not a Civil Court and that the orders passed by the Tribunal are not revisable u/s 115, Code of Civil Procedure.

In K.C. Sundaram v. Labour Court 1969 Lab. l.C. 225 Krishna Iyer, J. (as he then was) the Kerala High Court held that the Authority under the Minimum Wages Act is a Tribunal and not a Civil Court, that though the Tiibunals may share common features with Courts, they are not full-fledged Courts and that every adjudicating authority is not a Court and consequently the orders of such authority are not revisable u/s 115 Code of Civil Procedure. It can, however, be noted that under Payment of Wages Act, no appeal is provided to the High Court. But even though under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, certain appeals are provided to the High Court against the orders of the Commissioner, it cannot be said that the Commissioner is a Civil Court or a Court Subordinate to the High Court. In the said ruling, the difference between a Tribunal and a Civil Court is brought out. A Tribunal which adjudicates civil rights of parties may have the trapping of a Civil Court. It may also be clothed with certain powers of a Civil Court for purposes of enquiry. Yet it is held that such a Tribunal is not in the hierarchy of subordinate Courts constituted under the Constitution and in that view it was held that a Tribunal cannot be subordinate to the High Court, though under Article 227 of Constitution, a High Court may exercise superintendence over such Tribunals. The learned Judge following the decision in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. P.N. Sharma and Another, held that the expression ''Court'' denotes a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the status of inherent judicial powers, that the Constitution recognised a hirerachy of Courts and to their adjudication are normally entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between citizens and States and that these courts can be described as Courts of ordinary civil jurisdiction. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 36(2) of the Constitution occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of Constitution. Though the Tribunals as well the Courts are both adjudicating bodies, their features are distinct and separate. It is thus held that though the Tribunals may share common features with Courts, they are not full-fledged Courts and every adjudicating authority is not a Court. In that view, it was held that the Authority under the Minimum Wages Act is only a Tribunal and not a Court and consequently its orders are not revisable u/s 115, Code of Civil Procedure. It may, however, be noted that no appeals are provided to the High Court under the Minimum Wages Act; yet it does not make any single Judge of the Madras High Court was in a difference.

The question that fell for consideration before a converse situation which is the subject matter of a decision reported in Govind Singh v. Addl. Commr. for Workmen''s Compensation (1972) 1 I.L.C. 431. Aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, writ was preferred to the High Court. The contention was that a writ does not lie and a revision alone lies against the order of the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act. That was a case where the Commissioner set aside an earlier exparte order and this was challenged by way of a writ. It was held therein that as against the impugned order, no appeal is provided by Section 30 of the Act and that though for certain limited purposes specified in Section 23 of the Act and with regard to matters specified in Section 30, an appeal is provided to the High Court, the Commissioner exercises his jurisdiction only as a statutory functionary and that no revision would lie u/s 115 of the CPC and that the said order is only amenable for correction in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is, however necessary to note that some of the aforesaid rulings reported in Mt. Dirji Vs. Smt. Goalin, were considered in the course of the judgment.

To sum up, the subordination in Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, arises out of statutory provisions only and not the subordination arising out of the subjection to the appeal or the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court and hence the words ''Subordinate Courts'' occurring in the section can take within its ambit only a Court belonging to the hierarchy of courts mentioned in Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the Commissioner may have the trapping of a Civil Court, he is not a court nor a Civil Court, subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

A single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in State of Mysore v. Shankaranarayana consturing Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that subordination means not judicial subordination within the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution, but subordination under the hierarchy of Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure. Having regard to the distinction laid down between a Tribunal and a Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. P.N. Sharma and Another, , I hold that the Commissioner is a Tribunal and not a Court or a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court. Though as noticed earlier that u/s 30 certain orders of the Commissioner are held appealable to the High Court, he is only a Tribunal and therefore a revision as against his order does not lie u/s 115, CPC to the High Court.

Mr. Kodandaramaiah, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, alternatively urges that he must be given permission to convert the Civil Revision Petition into a Writ Petition. He is accordingly permitted to convert the revision petition into a Writ Petition. One week''s time is granted for the said purpose. In view of the conclusions reached above, I do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the merits of the order now sought to be challenged. Thus, the objection of the Respondents, as to the non-maintainability of the revision is upheld, subject to the observation granting permission to the Petitioner to convert the revision petition into a Writ Petition within a period of seven days.