Om Parkash vs State of Haryana and Others

T.H.B. Chalapathi, J.—This second appeal is directed against the decree and judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Jind in Civil Appeal No. 167 of 1992, dated August 29, 1992.

The appellant filed a suit for declaration that the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect imposed upon him by the impugned order dated 15.12.1987 is illegal, null and void. According to the plaintiff, he joined the police department and when he was serving as Assistant Sub Inspector, certain charges have been framed against him and the Deputy Sub-Inspector of Police, Narwana, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to conduct the departmental enquiry and after completion of the enquiry, the Superintendent of Police, Jind imposed a punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect by his order dated 15.12.1987. The plaintiff filed departmental appeal before the third defendant, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala, who has not decided his appeal. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit after serving the defendants with a notice u/s 80 of the C.P.C., to declare that the order dated 15.12.1987 is illegal, null and void.

In the written statement, it has been contended that the Enquiry Officer, on the basis of the evidence recorded by him, found that the charges against the plaintiff were proved and the punishing authority imposed the punishment on a consideration of the material on record including the report of the Enquiry Officer and there is no illegality in the order passed by the second defendant. It is further averred that the appeal filed by the plaintiff before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala, has been rejected on 27.10.1988, and, therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed.

On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Judge framed appropriate issues and on consideration of the evidence on record, decreed the suit on May 16, 1992. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment of the trial Court, the defendants preferred an appeal to the Additional District Judge, Jind, who, by the impugned judgment dated 29.8.1992, allowed the appeal setting aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court. Hence the plaintiff filed this second appeal.

The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the charge sheet was served by the Enquiry Officer, therefore, the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer are invalid. According to him, it is only the disciplinary authority who has to issue the chargesheet. He further contended that no personal hearing has been given to the petitioner before passing the impugned order imposing the punishment on the plaintiff-appellant. Therefore, there is a violation of the principles of natural justice. He further contended that the order, passed by the second respondent, namely, the Superintendent of Police, Jind, is not a speaking order, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed.

The petitioner was proceeded against in the departmental enquiry for his carelessness in the investigation of several cases which have been registered in the Police Station, City Jind, when he was serving as Assistant Sub Inspector of Police. There is also no dispute of the fact that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narwana, was appointed as an Enquiry Officer to conduct enquiry into the charges against the plaintiff. While appointing the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority has already concluded that an enquiry into the charges against the plaintiff should be made and to make such an enquiry the Enquiry Officer has been appointed by the appointing authority. Therefore, the issuance of a charge-sheet to the delinquent is only a ministerial act and the issuance of the charge-sheet by the Enquiry Officer to the delinquent does not vitiate the enquiry proceedings. No rule or authority has been brought to my notice that the charge-sheet must be served on the delinquent only by the punishing authority. The requirement of the law is that no punishment can be imposed by any authority other than the disciplinary authority specified in the rules. It is not the case of the plaintiff that any authority lower than the disciplinary authority has imposed the punishment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the issuance of the charge-sheet by the Enquiry Officer, namely, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narwana, is not illegal and does not vitiate the enquiry proceedings.

The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that no personal hearing has been given, therefore, the punishment is liable to be set aside. But I find from the record that the plaintiff was heard by the Superintendent of Police before imposing the punishment and the Additional District Judge has also recorded the finding that the plaintiff was heard by the Superintendent of Police before passing the final order imposing the punishment. Therefore, this argument does not hold good. Apart from it, in the reply given by the plaintiff to the show cause notice, which is marked as Exhibit P.6, the plaintiff stated that "he may be heard in person also for meeting the ends of justice." Exhibit P.6 is dated 20.05.1987. The petitioner sent another reply on 25.11.1987 to the second show-cause notice dated 13.11.1987 calling upon him to show cause why the stoppage of two increments should not be imposed upon him. It is marked as Exhibit P.8. In that, he has clearly stated that he was also heard at the time when he presented the reply to the first show cause notice. Therefore, the contention that he was not heard personally does not hold good.

The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the order passed by the Superintendent of Police, is not a speaking order. The order is marked as Exhibit P.9. The Superintendent of Police has clearly dealt with the charges levelled against the petitioner and considered the reply given by the plaintiff, and has also considered the evidence himself. Thus, the order of the Superintendent of Police, Jind, is a speaking order, which is marked as Exhibit P.9. This contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant also fails.

In these circumstances, I do not find any grounds warranting interference with the decree and judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Jind. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed.