Om Parkash vs State of Haryana

A.S. Nehra, J.

Petitioner Om Parkash was convicted under Section 16(I)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (the Act, for short) by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak, on October 20, 1986, and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/ or in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. Appeal against conviction and sentence filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (III), Rohtak on January 24, 1987. Hence this revision petition.

Briefly, the facts of the prosecution case are as under :

On June 27, 1983, at about 3.30 P.M., PW1 Balwan Singh, Food Inspector, accompanied by Dr. (Mrs.) J. Chanda went to the shop of the petitioner situated in Model Town, Rohtak, and found in his possession 10 Kgs. of unindicated milk kept in a tub at his halwai shop for sale to the public. The Food Inspector, after disclosing his identity and serving notice, Ex.PA. upon the petitioner, purchased 660 Mls. of milk from him for analysis against payment of Rs. 2.85 vide receipt Ex.PB. The milk so purchased was then poured equally in the three separate dry and clean bottles and after adding 18 drops of Formalin of 40% strength the sample bottles were corked, labelled, wrapped and sealed according to the prescribed Rules. One of the sealed sample bottles was then sent to the Public Analyst, Haryana, for analysis, who vide his report, Ex.PO, found the sample of milk to be adulterated as its milk fat was deficient by 18 per cent of the minimum prescribed standard. Thereafter, PW1 Balwan Singh, Food Inspector, filed complaint Ex.PE, in the Court for prosecution of the petitioner under Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. A copy of the report of the Public Analyst was sent to the petitioner by Local Health Authority, Rohtak, through registered A.D. post along with forwarding letter, Ex.PF.

To prove its case, the prosecution examined Government Food Inspector Balwan Singh as P.W.1 and Dr. (Mrs) J. Chanda as P.W.2. Both these PWs have substantially deposed to the facts of the complainant''s case, as narrated above. In fact, it is evident from the crossexamination of both these witnesses and the statement of the petitioner recorded under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, that the petitioner did not dispute the taking of the sample in question from his shop. However, he pleaded that it was cow''s milk which fact he had also brought to the notice of the Government Food Inspector, but he had wrongly mentioned this milk in the papers as unindicated.

Mr. S.V. Rathee, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner, did not address any argument before me with regard to the conviction of the petitioner. His solitary contention was that the speedy trial was the essence of justice and inordinate delay in disposing of the case itself was sufficient agony to the petitioner. The trial of the petitioner started on November 26, 1983, whereas the sample of milk was taken from the petitioner''s shop on June 27, 1983. He further contended that as the trial of the petitioner continued for about three years, therefore, it was a fit case where the petitioner should not be sent to Jail at this stage and the sentence of imprisonment awarded to him be reduced to the period during which he remained confined in Jail. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the revision petition of the petitioner was admitted on March 26, 1987 and since then he is on bail and this prolonged litigation itself was a ground for treating the petitioner in a lenient manner. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Braham Dass v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 1988(2) Recent Criminal Reports 184 : 1988(2) Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases 13.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find force in the argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner. For the last more than twelve years, the petitioner has faced protracted litigation and, thus, has undergone sufficient mental harassment. So, keeping in view the circumstances of this case, I find it a fit case where no useful purpose will be served by sending the petitioner to Jail for undergoing the remaining period of sentence of imprisonment.

As a result, I partly allow this revision petition and limit the sentence of imprisonment of the petitioner to the period already undergone. The sentence of fine alongwith its default clause is, however, maintained.