Om Parkash vs State of Haryana

S.S. Dewan, J.

Om Parkash petitioner has been convicted under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short the, Act) and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/ by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak. In default of payment of fine, he has been awarded three months rigorous imprisonment further. In appeal, his conviction and sentence have been maintained by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak. Hence this revision.

According to the prosecution case, a sample of separate milk which the petitioner was having in the premises inside the General Bus Stand, Rohtak, was purchased by the Food Inspector in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. One of the samples was sent for analysis to the Public Analyst. His report disclosed that it contained 5% milk fat and 9.4% solids not fat. The milk fat was thus found 4.5% in excess of the maximum prescribed standard of 0.5%. On the complaint filed by the Government Food Inspector, the petitioner has been prosecuted and convicted as above.

The case against the petitioner rests primarily on the unimpeached testimony of Food Inspector Sant Lal PW. 1, Daya Nand PW. 2, Dr. (Mrs.) J. Chanda PW. 3 and Dr. K.C. Aggarwal PW. 4. The accused petitioner denied the prosecution allegations and pleaded false implication in the case. Krishan Lal, Jai Ram Phal Bhardwaj were examined by him in defence.

Mr. H.N. Mehtani, appearing for the petitioner, has raised the identical arguments which were earlier urged before the appellate Court and which have been elaborately dealt with. To my mind, it would be totally wasteful to tread the same ground over again. It suffices to mention that I would endorse in toto the reasoning and the findings of the appellate Court.

Be that as it may, an argument laboured with little persistence on behalf of the petitioner is that the charge under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act framed against the petitioner is misleading and it is not in accordance with the prosecution case and therefore, the petitioner has been materially prejudiced in his defence. The learned counsel has referred me to the report Ex. PD of the Public Analyst wherein it has been stated as under :

"The sample contains milk fat 5% against the maximum prescribed standard of 0.5%.

But according to the learned counsel, the trial Magistrate while framing charge against the petitioner used the following words :

"It was found to be adulterated as it contained milk fat 5% against the maximum prescribed standard of 0.5% and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act."

I do not understand how the petitioner has been prejudiced by the charge framed by the trial Magistrate. I do not think the criticism of the learned counsel has any substance. The sample of milk sent to the Public Analyst for analysis was found to be against the prescribed standard and thus it was adulterated. We have to look to the substance of things and not to mere technicalities. It is well known that even if a charge is wrongly framed, the conviction is not liable to be quashed unless and until prejudice has accrued to the accused as was held by the Supreme Court in the well known case in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 116, that a charge in a Criminal trial is not to be regarded as a ritualistic formula. In order to be able to decide whether a charge was bad, we have to take into account the evidence and the circumstances of the case; and unless we are satisfied that the accused was in fact prejudiced there can be no question of the trial being held bad on the ground of defect in the charge. It cannot be denied that the constituents of the milk sold by the petitioner to the Food Inspector were above the standard of cow''s milk though not exactly of the standard of buffalo''s milk or separate milk and therefore, it was found to be adulterated by the Public Analyst. The petitioner who was represented by a counsel in the trial Court well knew of the charge he was going to meet. This, in my view, has not created any prejudice to the petitioner as he was supplied copies of all the documents and the evidence was recorded in his presence. The contention of the learned counsel must, therefore, necessarily fail.

The sentence imposed is already pegged at the statutory minimum. The revision petition is without merit and is hereby dismissed.