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89 paragraphs · 1,719 wordsNirmal Singh, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 24.10.2002, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
Poonch, in File No: 46/Com-plaint, whereby the respondent has been discharged from the offence u/s 500 RPC on the ground that after the
period of three years, no cognizance can be taken with regard to any offence committed before that. Relevant facts for disposal of the present
appeal be noticed as under:
Appellant/complainant filed a complaint u/s 500 RPC before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Poonch, against the respondent alleging
therein that he is a respectable citizen and engaged in business at Poonch where he is permanently residing. He is enjoying good reputation in his
native village Bhench and Poonch city besides other places in Jammu province. His community members, social, political and business circles
always held him in high esteem due to his honest, fair and principled dealings with his customers, business dealers, associates and all members of
the society. Respondent in order to defame him, filed a complaint before Senior Superintendent of Police, Poonch, on 6.3.1998 for taking action
against the appellant/complainant under the Police Rules and declare him as history sheeter by recording his name in surveillance register No: 10 of
Police Station Poonch and impose all consequential restrictions on his freedom to which he is entitled to under the Constitution of India.
On the basis of the complaint dated 6.03.1998, filed by the respondent before Sr. Superintendent of Police, Police Station Poonch, entered the
name of the appellant in Surveillance Register No: 10 and declared him as history sheeter.
Appellant challenged the action of the concerned Police authority before the learned District Magistrate Poonchby filing an appeal but same was
rejected vide order dated 25.09.2000. Appellant further challenged the order dated 25.09.2000, passed by the learned District Magistrate
Poonch and police proceedings before the High Court of J & K At Jammu by filing Cr. Revision No: 78/2000. Vide judgment and order dated
12.04.2001, the learned Single Judge, set aside the impugned order dated 25.09.2000 passed by the District Magistrate Poonch and entry made
in Surveillance Register No: 10 as same was found to be without jurisdiction.
Thereafter, the appellant filed a complaint u/s 500 RPC before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Poonch, on 9.10.2001. In the said complaint it was
alleged that the reputation of the appellant/complainant has been lowered down whereas the appellant/complainant is honest and enjoying good
reputation. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Poonch, after taking cognizance of the complaint, issued process. In response to the process so
issued, the respondent appeared before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Poonch. He moved an application for his discharge.
Appellant/complainant opposed the prayer of the respondent. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Poonch, after hearing both the parties, dismissed
the complaint aforesaid on the ground of limitation and observed as under:
For the foregoing reasons, the accused herein is discharged as no offence is made out against him u/s 500 RPC because after the period of three
years, no cognizance can be taken with regard to any offence committed before that. Bail bonds executed by the accused shall stand withdrawn
and surety discharged.
Aggrieved of the order dated 24.10.2002, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Poonch, the appellant preferred the present appeal. Mr.
Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that once a cognizance has been taken and the process issued, the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Poonch, has no power to recall or review earlier order as there is bar under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
On the other hand, Mr. Surinder Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent was discharged vide order dated
24.10.2002 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Poonch, on the ground that after the period of three years, no cognizance can be
taken with regard to any offence committed before that. He further submitted that limitation is commenced from the date of the filing of the
complainant and not from the date of discharge. He also pointed out that the complaint before the Sr. Superintendent of Police, Poonch was filed
by the respondent on 6.03.1998, so the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Poonch has discharged the respondent vide order dated 24.10.2002.
In order to appreciate the rival contention, it is appropriate to notice provisions of Sections 538-B, 538-C and 500 RPC which reads as under:
538-B. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-section (2),
after the expiry of the period of Limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be-
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
538-C. Commencement of the period of limitation
(1) The period of limitation, in relation of an offender, shall commence:
(a) on the date of the offence: or
(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such
offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which; the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved
by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier.
(3) In computing the said period, the day from which such person is to be computed shall be excluded.
Discharge from custody
(1) As soon as the bond has been executed, the person for whose appearance it has been executed shall be released; and, when he is in jail, the
Court admitting him to bail shall issue an order of release to the officer-in-charge of the jail, and such officer on receipt of the order shall release
him.
(2) Nothing in this section, Section 496 or Section 497 shall be deemed to require the release of any person liable to be detained for some matter
other than that in respect of which the bond was executed.
Perusal of Section 538-B referred to above, makes it clear that the period of limitation will be six months, if the offence is punishable with fine
only; or one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year: or three years, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. As per Section 538-C of Cr.PC., the period of limitation commences
from the date when the complaint was filed before the Police Officer and not from the date of discharge of the accused. u/s 500B of Cr.PC.,
punishment prescribes for defamatory complaint is simple imprisonment for two years or fine or both and triable by the Judicial Magistrate. Apex
Court while interpreting Section 468 Cr.PC., which is perimateria to Section 500 of Penal Code, in case reported as Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs.
Ascharaj Lal Chopra, has held as under:
A complaint u/s 500 Penal Code for defamation will be barred if filed three years after the commission of the offence. Where in a complaint u/s
500 it is alleged that the defamatory matter was contained in a complaint u/s 406/420 Penal Code against the complainant, the period of limitation
for filing complaint u/s 500, Penal Code would commence from the date of the complaint u/s 406/420 Penal Code and not from the date of the
complainant was finally acquitted of offences under Sections 406/420 Penal Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 469 of Cr.PC. specially provides
that the period of limitation prescribed in Section 468 in relation to an offender, shall commence (inter alia) on the date of the offence and the
question of cause of action would not arise in such case as the controversy relates to the commission of an offence. The exclusion of time for
computing the period of limitation could not also be claimed u/s 470(1) as it could not be said the complainant was prosecuting another
prosecution.
Contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that once process is issued, the Judicial Magistrate has no power to recall or review it. In
support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon a case reported as Dinesh Supari Traders v. Agricultural Produce
Marketing (Regulations) Committee Kadur 2006 CRIL.J 255 Aforesaid case is, however, not applicable to the present one because in the said
case offence was in continuation. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not sustainable.
Respondent has been discharged u/s 253 Cr.PC. which reads as under:
Discharge of accused
(1) If upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 252 and making such examination (if any) of the accused as the Magistrate thinks
necessary he finds that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall
discharge him.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case, if, for reasons
to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless.
Perusal of Sub-section 2 of Section 253 Cr.PC. makes it clear that the Judicial Magistrate has the power to discharge the accused at any stage
but before discharging the accused, the Magistrate has to record the reasons to the effect that the charge is groundless.
The view of the clear bar created u/s 538-B Cr.PC., the Magistrate has been empowered not to take cognizance of the complaint in case the
same is barred by time. The learned Magistrate, after considering this aspect that the complaint is barred by time, has rightly discharged the
respondent For the reasons indicated above, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Magistrate has not committed any illegality or
irregularity in discharging the respondent. This appeal is as such found to be without merit and is dismissed.
