Om Prakash Dhadhich @APPELLANT@Hash State of Rajasthan

These writ petitions under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India have been preferred, in sum and substance, with the following prayers and for the sake of convenience, the prayer clauses are

being taken from the leading case being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.14183/2017.

Petitioner has preferred this writ petition with the

following prayer :-

“1. The record of the case may kindly be called for :

The impugned order dated 27.10.2017 may kindlybe quashed and set aside.

The respondents may be directed not to discontinuethe service of the petitioner from the post of Prabodhak.

The writ petition may kindly be allowed and thepetitioner may be held entitled for all consequential benefits.

Any other appropriate writ, order or direction whichthis Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case

may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner.â€​

The broader consideration is regarding the post of Prabodhak in the Udaipur District. The petitioner was given appointment on the post of

Prabodhak. The petitioner underwent the process of selection in accordance with Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008 (hereinafter referred

to ‘Rule 2008’) and after undergoing the same, the appointment were given to the petitioner. At this stage, the appointment of the petitioner is

being terminated by the respondents vide order dated 27.10.2017 which is under challenged. For brevity, the facts of leading case (S.B. Civil Writ

Petition No.14183/2017) are taken into account wherein the petitioner was appointed on 29.09.2008. The petitioner was having the necessary

qualification and was eligible for such appointment in accordance with Rules of 2008. The petitioner thereafter underwent the probation period of two

year and was thereafter regularized and confirmed on the post of Prabodhak. The relevant portion of the Prabodhak Rules is reads as follows :-

“Section 2 Definition :

(a) “Appointing Authority†means the Additional Chief Executive Officer-cum-District Education Officer (Elementary Education) of concerned

District or Authority to whom powers in this behalf may be delegated by the Government by a special or general order and subject to such conditions

as it may deem fit.

(f) “Member of the service†means a person appointed to a post in the service on the basis of regular selection under the provisions of these

rules.

(j) “Substantive Appointment†means an appointment made under the provisions of these rules to a substantive post after due selection by any of

the methods of recruitment prescribed under these rules and includes on appointment on probation or as to probationary period.

Section 20 Constitution of Committee :

Direct recrujitment to the post of Prabodhak shall be made by the Committee at District level Consisting of the following, namely :

Chief Executive : Chairman Officer.

Additional Chief : Member  Secretary

Executive Officer-cum-District Education Officer

(Elementary Education)

Addl. District : Member

  Education Officer / Member

  Addl. District Education   Officer -cum-Senior Deputy   District Education Officer.

Regulations of pay, leaves, allowances, contributory pension etc. â€" Except as provided in these rules, the pay, allowances, contributory pension,

leave and other conditions of service of the member of the Service, shall be regulated by -

(i) The Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951, asamended from time to time.

(ii) The Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification,Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958, as amended from time to time,

(iii) The Rajasthan Travelling Allowance Rules,1971, as amended from time to time.

(iv) The Rajasthan Civil Services (Revise PayScales) Rules, 1998, as amended from time to time

(v) The Rajasthan Civil Services (ContributoryPension) Rules, as amended from time to time.

(vi) The Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,

1971, as amended from time to time. â€​

Schedule

Sr. Name of Method of Post fromQualifications Qualification and Remarks

No. Post Recruitment which a n d experience experience for

with promotion for Promotion direct

percentage is to be Recruitment

made

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

- -

- -

Prabodhak 100% by - - Senior Secondary

(4500-7000) Promotion School Certificate

(1) of Intermediate

or its equivalent,

Samanya

with Diploma or

Shiksha

certificate in

basis teachers

training of a

duration of not

less than two

years or Diploma

or certificate in

elementary

teachers training

of a duration of

not less than two

years.

or

Bachelor of

Elementary

Education (B. El.

Ed.)

or

Graduation with

Bachelor of

Education (B.

Ed.) or its

equivalent

and

Must have at least

5 year

continuous

teaching

experience

without any

break in an

recognized

educational

institution/educa

tional project.

Intermediate or

its equivalent,

with Certificate in Physical

Education (C.P.

Ed) of a duration of not less than two

years or

equivalent. or

Graduation with

Bachelor or

Physical Education (B.P.

Ed.) or its equivalent.

and

Must have at least 5 years continuous

teaching

experience

without any

break in any recognized

educational

Institution/Educa tional project.

The basic advertisement was issued on 31.05.2008 and these were about 20,060 vacant posts all over the State of Rajasthan where the eligibility

and experience were the basic criteria. The initial appointment order of the petitioner in the lead cases is on 06.10.2008 which is Annexure-3 and

confirmation order is Annexure-4 dated 03.06.2011. The respondents sought to terminate the services of the petitioner vide order dated 11.01.2017

without adopting the procedure envisaged under Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 or so much so that without

giving any notice or conducting any inquiry.

The petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.744/2017 (Smt. Meera Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan &

Ors.) decided on 23.02.2017. The relevant portion of said order dated 23.02.2017 reads as follows :-

“Reply has been filed. As per the reply, one Prakash Kalal filed SBCWP No.4357/2013 contending that the respondents have given appointment to

the persons on the post of Prabodhak who are having lesser marks than him and his claim has been ignored for no valid reason. The said writ petition

was disposed of vide order dated 13.1.2014 directing the petitioner to file representation. Shri Prakash Kalal submitted representation in pursuance to

the order dated

13.1.2014. Same was decided vide order dated 24.08.2015 wherein it was held that although Shri Prakash Kalal had obtained 42% marks in the merit

but cannot be given appointment as actually, there is no vacant post in the category in which Shri Prakash Kalal applied. Shri Prakash Kalal filed S.B.

Civil Contempt Petition No.744/2014 which was disposed of vide order dated 20.07.2016 as under:-

“The Secretary Education Department, the Director Elementary Education and the District Education Officer Elementary Education, Udaipur are

present in the Court as directed by this Court on 13.7.2016. Shri K.L. Thakur, AAG appears on their behalf and has placed on record an explanation

supported by certain documents in response to the order dated 13.7.2016. It is not disputed by the respondents that the petitioner, who is an OBC

candidate, secure 42 marks in the questioned recruitment process for the post of Prabodhak and was not given appointment whereas, numerous

candidates from General as well as OBC categories were appointed against OBC category reserved seats even though having less marks as

compared by the petitioner. Shri Thakur prays for some time so that the entire merit list can be reconsidered after holding an inquiry into the matter so

as to arrive at a final conclusion regarding the persons entitled to be appointed inclusion regarding. He further assure that in case after the

inquiry/exercise as above, the petitioner’s name figures in merit, he shall be offered appointment as per law.

He requests that the matter may be posted after three months as the exercise as requested above would be very exhaustive and time consuming.

Time prayed for is allowed.

A comprehensive report regarding the fate of exercise taken in the above terms shall be kept available for Court’s perusal on next date. The

personal appearance of the respondents contemnors is exempted for the next date.â€​Â

In pursuance to the same, the State Government constituted an Enquiry Committee at the level of Directorate, Elementary Education so as to conduct

inquiry in the matter of illegal appointments on the post of Prabodhak in district Udaipur. After enquiry, the Enquiry Committee submitted its report

with the finding that as many as 1125 candidates from district Udaipur were appointed on the post of Prabodhak. The candidature of each and every

candidate was examined in the light of eligibility at the time of their appointment on the basis of documents. So far as the petitioner is concerned, she

has less marks than cut off and accordingly, the initial appointment of the petitioner itself was illegal and void ab initio. Separate reasons have been

given qua separate candidates who too were served the termination order and are before this Court in connected writ petitions. The services of

some of the candidates have been terminated on the ground that they belong to General category and the cut off marks in the General category are

more than the marks received by them. The services of others have been terminated on the ground that they are overage or on the ground that their

experience could not be counted as there were break in service, etc. etc. Learned counsel for the parties were heard and the report has been gone

into.

It is admitted that the petitioner was never given the enquiry report. They were, till the filing of the report, not made aware as to why their services

have been terminated. They came to know for the first time about the termination of their services vide the impugned order dated 11.1.2017. The

argument of the learned counsel of the respondents that they were given time to raise their objection by 25.1.2017 cannot be sustained as the said time

to raise their objection was given in the same order dated 11.1.2017 vide which their services were terminated. The very order in itself is defective,

inasmuch, as the order of termination and opportunity to raise objections is vide the same order. Obviously, the said opportunity is mere eyewash and

that too without giving any enquiry report.

This Court is also made aware of the fact that petitioner has completed almost 09 years of service. She was confirmed on the said post after clearing

the probation period. There is not a word of allegation in the enquiry report or in the reply that any one of the petitioners in any of the above writ

petitions was in any way responsible in getting himself or herself appointed by misleading or concealing any fact. Even as per the enquiry report, a

direction was issued to proceed for disciplinary action against the erring officers and employees who may have been instrumental in preparing the

merit list at the initial stage and nothing has been stated against any petitioner and even qua the erring officer, the finding in the disciplinary enquiry has

yet to be recorded. In fact the enquiry has not even commenced and before any such enquiry could even be concluded, the order of termination has

been passed qua the petitioners against whom there is no allegation of misleading or concealment.

It is a well settled proposition of law that principles of natural justice requires that before making a decision, a prior notice of the proposed decision to

persons affected by it and opportunity to raise objection should be given. Admittedly, no such opportunity was given to the petitioners to represent their

cause or explain their position. The judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Mahipal Singh Tomar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. ::

C.A. No.4584 of 2013 (SLP (C) No.16388 of 2011) decided on 9.5.2013 is fully applicable to the case in hand. In that case, enquiry was initiated

wherein on receipt of complaints alleging large scale irregularities in the placement of selected candidates in different colleges. The District Magistrate

after holding enquiry in pursuance to the direction of the State Government found that in some cases, the candidates were given placement against

non-existent posts in violation of the judgment of the Supreme Court. In view of the finding of the report submitted by the District Magistrate, the State

Government issued directions for cancellation of placement of the appellants and ors. on the post of Principals. The Apex Court after relying on the

various judicial pronouncements allowed the appeals by holding as under:-

“We shall now advert to the impugned orders. As analysis thereof shows that the High Court had mainly relied upon the fact finding report

prepared by the District Magistrate, referred to the provisions of the 1980 Act and held that the appellants' placement in the particular colleges was

contrary to law and they were responsible for such placement. The High Court noted that some of the appellants had been placed in the colleges

which were not even advertised by the Commission and others were placed against the vacancies notified in earlier years. In the opinion of the High

Court, the placement of the appellants was per se illegal and void. However, the record produced before this Court does not show the appellants'

direct involvement in their placement in the particular colleges. That apart, the questions whether the appellants' placement in the particular colleges

was contrary to the statute and whether their placement was subsequently changed for extraneous considerations could not have been decided

without supplying each one of them copy of the inquiry report and without giving him/her an effective opportunity to controvert the findings recorded

by the District Magistrate, who had prepared the report by looking at one side of the coin. He did not give opportunity to any of the appellants to

represent his/her cause or explain his/her position. Not only this, he did not confront any of the appellants with the adverse material produced before

him.

Therefore, the report of the District Magistrate could not have been relied upon by the State Government for directing cancellation of the placement of

the appellants in the particular Colleges and the Director committed grave illegality by mandating the termination of their services.â€​

Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of Inderpreeet Singh Kahlon V. State of Punjab reported in (2006) 11 SCC 356 considered the question whether

the selection and / or appointment to the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) could be cancelled on the allegations of favoritism and corruption

without giving opportunity of hearing to the selected candidates. The appellants in that case had been selected for appointment to the

Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). On receipt of the complaints that there were large scale irregularities in the process of selection, the High

Court recommended to the State Government that the entire selection may be cancelled. The State Government accepted the recommendations of the

High Court and cancelled the selection. The affected candidates, some of whom had already been appointed against the vacant posts, challenged the

decision of the High Court and the State Government. A three Judge Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petitions. The Apex Court reversed

the order of the High Court and held that the selection could not have been cancelled without giving notice and opportunity of hearing to the affected

candidates.

Some of the observations in the said case are relevant for the purpose of the decision in the present case which are as under:-

“Undoubtedly, in the selection process, there have been manipulations and irregularities at the behest of R.S. Sidhu, the then Chairman, Punjab

Public Service Commission. On a careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the case, in my considered opinion, the High Court ought to

have made a serious endeavour to segregate the tainted from the non-tainted candidates. Though the task was certainly difficult, but by no stretch of

imagination, was it an impossible task. The peculiar facts of this case which need to be highlighted are that some of the candidates have worked for

about three years and their services were terminated only on the basis of criminal investigation which was at the initial stage. The termination of their

services as a consequence of cancellation of selection would not only prejudice their interests seriously, but would ruin their entire future career.

The facts of this case reveal that the material supplied to the Committee having regard to the fact that majority of the officers named in the FIR

belonged to 2001 batch, the respondents not only cancelled the entire selection of 2001 batch, but on the basis of the cancellation of selections of 2001

batch the entire process of 1999 and 2002 selections was also cancelled. It is also relevant to mention that the selection process for the year 1998 was

not the subjectmatter nor any recommendation had been made by the Committee, even then the selections of this year were also vitiated. The High

Court Committee without there being sufficient and adequate material on record recommended cancellation of selections of both the executive and

judicial officers and the Full Bench erred in accepting the recommendation and terminating the services of all the officers.

A close scrutiny of the facts of this case clearly reveals that the judicial officers did not get a fair treatment by the High Court. They were not given

copies of the report and other material on which reliance was placed and they virtually had no chance of making effective representation before the

Committee or any other forum where they could ventilate their grievances and present their point of view.

Applying the test in the present case and taking into account the admitted facts that no enquiry report was given to the petitioners and no prior notice

of the proposed decision to be taken by them  was given to the petitioners, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order has been passed in

sheer violation of principles of natural justice and therefore, same cannot be sustained. The object behind a notice of opportunity is that a person

must be given fair hearing which should extend to the right to have notice of the other side’s case, the right to bring evidence and the right to

argue. The petitioner should have been given an opportunity to show that their marks were calculated as per rules, they were fully eligible and could

be adjusted by following a proper procedure inherent in the exercise of the administrative power.

In view of the above, the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned order dated 11.1.2017 is set aside with liberty to the respondents to pass fresh

orders, if so required, after giving due opportunity to each of the petitioners in accordance with law and after complying with the well settled principles

of natural justice.â€​

Learned counsel for the petitioner has harped upon the observations of the Court that even after three months were given by the Hon’ble Court

at the stage of earlier writ petition for conducting a detail inquiry, the respondents were not able to point out a word of allegation in the inquiry report

or in the reply that any one of the petitioner in the above writ petition was in any way responsible in getting himself or herself appointed by misleading

or concealing any fact. The disciplinary action and FIR was initiated against the erring officers but no action whatsoever was pointed out towards the

petitioner in question.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out Rule 40 of the Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008 where there was a power to

relax the rules pertaining to the age available to the respondent and the same is reproduced as under :-

“In exceptional cases where the Appointing Authority is satisfied that operation of the rules relating to age or regarding requirement of experience

for recruitment cases undue hardship in any particular case or where the Appointing Authority is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to

relax any of the provisions of these rules with respect to age or experience of any person, it may with the concurrence of the Government, by order

dispense with or relax the relevant provisions of these rules to such extent and subject to such conditions as it may consider necessary for dealing with

the case in a just and equitable manner, provided that such relaxation shall not be less favourable than the provisions already contained in these rules :

Provided that relaxation in the prescribed period of service or experience under this rule shall only be granted to the extent of 1/3 period of service or

experience prescribed for promotion to any post before holding the meeting of the Department Promotion Committee.â€​

Learned counsel for the petitioner further states that it is a fit case where the rules relating to the age would be relaxed by the respondents looking

into the extreme undue hard-ship upon the petitioners who were regularly recruited and have discharged services of about 10 years.

Leaned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out that judgment passed by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Smt.

Kamla Kumari Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) No.436/2009) decided on 16.04.2010 whereby the proposition of age

has been dealt with as follows :-

“15. The expression 'age limit' as occurring in the said proviso refers, undoubtedly and only, to the age limit as prescribed in the principal provision

of Rule 13, i.e., 35 years; and not to any other age limit. The relaxation has been provided to the persons who have crossed the age limit prescribed by

Rule 13 ibid at the time of direct recruitment if, and only if, they are serving in any of the named projects and they had not crossed the said age limit

prescribed by Rule 13 at the time of initial engagement in the project. The expression ''had they been within age limit'' does not refer to the age limit, if

any, for the purpose of entry into such educational projects but, in view of its very purpose and context, refers to the age limit as provided for the

recruitment in question i.e., recruitment to the post of Prabodhak.

We are not impressed with the suggestion that theRules of 2008 have been promulgated only for the purpose of regularising the services of the

persons working in educational projects. The Rules of 2008 have been framed specifically to regulate the services under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj

Act, 1994 and different provisos to Rule 13 ibid dealing with the age requirement, have only spelt out various aspects of age relaxation. Merely

because the Rules of 2008 provide for some relaxation, it cannot be deduced or presumed that the intention was to regularise all the persons serving in

the projects en bloc.

The suggestion as made before this Court aboutengagement of certain persons in one of the Districts in the State of Rajasthan has only been noted

to be rejected. In the first place, there is no foundation of any such fact in the writ petitions nor any such question was posed before the learned Single

Judge and without specific facts, such contention cannot be gone into. In any case, any suggestion about any illegality in relation to any particular

appointment would not by any stretch of arguments invest the appellants with a right to claim similar illegality. The suggestion about some of the

appellants belonging to Other Backward Classes and entitled for further five years age relaxation is also not found argued before the learned Single

Judge; and as a matter of fact, even if such five years are added to 35 years, the appellants herein, who had definitely crossed 40 years of age at the

time of initial engagement, do not get any benefit yet.

The appellant in SAW No. 436/2009 was about 41 years of age at the time of her initial engagement as Shiksha Sahyogi on 17.07.2001 for her

date of birth being 05.07.1960; and she was more than 48 years of age as on 01.01.2009. The respondents cannot be said to have committed any

illegality in rejecting her candidature. So far the appellant in SAW No. 437/2009 is concerned, his date of birth is 03.03.1959 and he was initially

engaged as Shiksha Sahyogi on 26.06.1999. He too, was more than 40 years of age at the time of initial engagement; and more than 49 years of age

as on 01.01.2009. Similarly, the appellant in SAW No. 438/2009 was born on 05.03.1958 and was initially engaged as Shiksha Sahyogi on 24.05.1999.

He was more than 41 years of age at the time of initial engagement; and more than 50 years of age as on 01.01.2009. In the true operation of the

Rules of 2008, these appellants were not entitled to be appointed as Prabodhak.

In the aforesaid view of the matter, neither therespondents could be said to have committed any illegality in rejecting the candidature of the

appellants nor the learned Single Judge has committed any error in rejecting the writ petitions filed by the appellants. No case is made out for

interference in these intracourt appeals.

As a result of the aforesaid, these appeals fail andare dismissed. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.â€​

Learned counsel for the petitioner therefore, makes a consolidated argument that since they were not responsible for creating any condition by

concealment or fraud or misrepresentation which would have led to their appointment and once the appointment has been granted in accordance with

rules by the respondent then their interest have to be protected.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the matter of State of

Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Sandeep Kumar Bishnoi & Ors. (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.690/2017) decided on 05.09.2017. The relevant portion of this

judgment, reads as follows :-

“15. The expression: 'at this stage' in para 16 of the D.B. decision forms part of a sentence which reads: 'We direct that at this stage they will not

be ousted from service'. The expression: 'at this stage' would mean the time when the Division Bench passed the order. It simply means that those

who had been appointed would not be ousted from service. This is evident by the last sentence of para 16 which reads: 'The State Government will be

at liberty to pass fresh orders, after revising the results and adjusting equities protecting the interest of the appellants- petitioners, to the extent that

they will not be ousted from the select list and will be placed as far as possible at the bottom of the revised select list'. Further, in the preceding part of

the same paragraph, the Division Bench has held: 'In the circumstances, in order to allay any apprehension and to protect the interest of the

appellants-petitioners, who were appointed, and are under constant threat on the revision of lists under directions of the Court, without any fault

attributed to them, we find it appropriate to quash the order dated 30.8.2013 passed by the Secretary and Commissioner, Gramin Vikas and

Panchayati Raj Department (Panchayati Raj Primary Education), Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, to the extent that it directs termination of services

of those persons, who were ousted from selections on the declaration of the first revised results.'

This view appears to be influenced by the decisionof the Supreme Court reported as 2013(4) SCC 690, Rajesh Kumar & Ors. vs. State of Bihar

& Ors. in which candidates as per the (16 of 16) [SAW690/2017] original merit position being offered appointments had joined. Upon re-evaluation of

the marks they became liable to be removed since their merit position was lowered. The Supreme Court directed retention of said persons in service.

Under the circumstances, correcting the viewtaken by the learned Single Judge we dispose of the appeals directing that those who were offered

appointment pursuant to the advertisement in question as Teachers and are continuing to work as Teachers would not be ousted from service.â€​

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Vikas Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs.

State of Chattisgarh & Ors. reported in 2013(14) SCC 494 in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has said that the candidate who have not found to

have committed any fraud or misrepresentation in being appointed and have served for more than three years, if terminated would not only impinge

upon their economic security but their dependents shall also be adversely affected. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also laid down that it would be

highly desirable and highly unfair to the candidates who are innocent appointees, if they are removed at this juncture after prolonged service.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has further taken this Court to Annexure-8 whereby the learned authority has decided to terminate the services

of the petitioner on the ground that he had attained the age of 33 years, 1 month and 29 days whereas his age should have been 33 years on the date

of entry into the service or the project concerned. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further pointed out that Rule 13 of the Rules 2008 has been

invoked for the purpose of terminating the services of the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the respondent Shri PR Singh, Additional Advocate General has vehemently opposed the submissions made by counsel for the

petitioner on count of the fact that any illegality committed cannot be perpetuated by the respondents and the respondents who are not entitled as per

law to be given appointment cannot have the right of claiming such appointment contrary to the Rules of 2008. Learned Additional Advocate General

Shri PR Singh has further contended that in some of the cases, the age gap is quite a lot and therefore, the court need to be strict while considering the

challenge to the termination orders given by the respondents.

After hearing counsel for the parties and perusing the record of the case as well as precedent law, this Court finds that the petitioners are

Prabodhak who were given appointment in accordance with Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008 after a proper advertisement

which was issued by the respondents on 31.05.2008 for 20,060 vacant post of Prabodhak in State of Rajasthan. This Court finds that after adhering to

the selection process, the petitioners were selected and they successfully completed their probation period to the satisfaction of the respondents. This

Court also takes note of the fact that the petitioners for the first time were sought to be terminated by the respondents after completion of about 10

years of service without making any inquiry or even giving them any kind of notice but for the protection given by this Hon’ble Court in the

previous writ petition filed by the petitioner. This Court also finds that the precedent jurisprudence developed by the Honble Apex Court and followed

by this Court regarding the employees who are in long term in appointment is that if those persons have not attained their appointments by committing

any fraud or misrepresentation at the time of initial appointment then they need to be protected on account of the long service rendered by them. The

Hon’ble Apex Court has gone as far as to take note that such terminations would not only impinge upon the economic security of the candidates

but their dependents will also adversely affect their career.

This Court also finds that the question of examination and invocation of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, at

this stage could be limited to the point that the petitioners have already rendered more than 10 years of service after regular recruitment on the post of

Prabodhak by undergoing the regular selection process. The ouster on account of any fact which is age in this matter and which is not attributed to the

petitioners cannot become a good ground for ousting the petitioners at this belated stage of appointment. The respondent in fact were required to have

invoked the extra-ordinary provisions of Rule 40 of the Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008 whereby the State had power to relax the

rules, in cases where undue hard-ship was being caused. This is a perfect case where undue hard-ship shall be caused, if the petitioners are sent

whom from regular recruitment for a cause which is not attributed to them and particularly when the petitioner’s basic qualification and merit is

not under question. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners are qualified, experienced and meritorious candidates and therefore, the respondents were

required to have protected them in light of the fact that they have already rendered 10 years of service. We have noted that respondents have not

come out with any concrete steps against the erring officials who have caused the alleged default.

In light of the aforesaid observations, the present writ petitions are allowed and the termination order passed against the petitioners by the

respondents on account of their being over-age are quashed and set aside while directing the respondents to treat them in continues service which

they are already in. In times when a young man is supposed to create his career in first few years of youth, it is taken note of that most of the

petitioners rendered prolonged service prior to being appointed as Prabodhak with the State Government for almost a decade as para teachers etc.

and thereafter these persons have rendered a decade of regular service with a respondents and the respondents are not in a position to refute the

performance and delivery of the petitioners for the duties assigned to them.