Om Prakash Jatav vs State of M.P

Sujoy Paul Judge

By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 15.3.2012 whereby he is placed under suspension by Chief Conservator of Forest (respondent No.2). Shri Tomar submits that the respondent No.2 is neither the appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority of the petitioner. He submits that there is no general or special order authorizing respondent No.2 by the Governor to suspend the petitioner. In absence there of, petitioner submits that order is without jurisdiction. Per contra, the State relied on a Gazette notification dated 4-11/5/2011 (Annexure R-1) whereby powers were delegated to Conservator of Forest to inflict minor punishment under Rule 10 (1) of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. It is further stated by relying circulars dated 7.6.2011 and 29.7.2011 (Annexure R-2) that respondent No.2 is competent to inflict minor punishment on the petitioner and, therefore, automatically becomes the disciplinary authority for the petitioner.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

As per Rule 9 (1) of M.P.C.S (CCA) Rules, the following authorities are competent to place the employer under suspension.

(i). Appointing authority.

(ii). An authority to whom appointing authority is subordinate

(iii). Disciplinary authority.

(iv). An authority who is authorized by the general or special order by the Governor to place an employee under suspension.

Thus, the question is whether respondent No.2 is one of aforesaid authority or nor?

By notification dated 4-11/5/2011, the Conservator of Forest was delegated with the power to impose minor punishment. Thus, he became disciplinary authority for the petitioner. Admittedly, respondent No.2 is higher in rank/superior than the Conservator of Forest. By a conjoint reading of circular dated 7.6.2011 and 29.7.2011 (Annexure R-2), it is clear that pursuant to the said notification and circulars, the respondent No.2 also became the disciplinary authority for the petitioner. In paras 2,3,4 and 5 of circular dated 29.7.2011, it was made clear that even respondent No.2 is a disciplinary authority for the purpose of imposing punishment under the CCA Rules. The word "disciplinary authority" is defined in the CCA Rules as under:

2(d). "disciplinary authority" means the authority competent under these Rules to impose on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in Rule 10;

A bare perusal of this definition shows that if the respondent No.2 is a disciplinary authority for imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 10, he is automatically competent to place the petitioner under suspension under Rule 9 of the said rules.

In the considered opinion of this Court, a conjoint reading of the aforesaid notification and circulars make it clear that respondent No.2 can act as a disciplinary authority as per rules against respondent No.2. Thus, he is one of the competent authority, who can place the petitioner under suspension. Thus, it cannot be held that respondent No.2 had no jurisdiction to place the petitioner under suspension.

So far the contention of the respondents that the suspension order should not have been passed, in the considered opinion of this Court, in view of State of M.P. and Others Vs. Ashok Sharma, the petitioner has a statutory appellate remedy under the CCA Rules. The correctness of the allegations cannot be gone into at this stage by this Court. The same view is taken by the Supreme Court in the case reported in S.A. Khan Vs. State of Haryana and others, (para 29) reads as under:-

Above all, we are inclined to dismiss this writ petition since it is only a suspension order and there is a statutory remedy available to the petitioner.

In the light of aforesaid, no interference is warranted by this Court in the present writ proceedings. The petitioner is at liberty to avail the alternative remedy under the CCA Rules. With the aforesaid observations, the petition stands disposed of. No costs.